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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a development of the programme of 
discourse analysis in the social study of science. The 
need for an analysis of scientific discourse is demon- 
strated by taking representative studies from quantit- 
ativeg ethnographicq interest and relativist programmes 
and showing how each fails to deal adequately with the 
texts and utterances which are their ultimate data base. 
The analytic chapters of the thesis are based upon 
verbatim transcripts of the discussion periods of psych- 
ology conferencesq along with psychologists' published 
and unpublished writings. The topics of theory 
applicationg values in theory choiceg categorisations 
of scientists and scientistd interpretation of discussion 
are addressed. In each case a distinctive approach is 
developed which is sensitive to the wide variation in 
scientists' versions of their own and others' actions 
and beliefsv and attempts to explicate the interpretative 
practices through which accounts are produced. These 
analyses cast further doubt on the adequacy of more 
traditional approaches. 
The analysis also documents scientists' use of two 
broad explanatory repertoires, corroborating findings 
from other studies of scientific discourse, and des- 
cribes some of the detailed interpretative procedures 
through which versions are produced and modified. Fin- 
ally certain criticisms of the programme of discourse 
analysis are discussed. 
- 
INTRODUCTION 
The work discussed in this thesis is a development 
of the programme of discourse analysis which is at pres- 
ent under way in the area of social studies of science. 
This is fundamentally different from most of the major 
approaches to science taken by other researchers. 
Iaf wlý-2 
Although the L" ffer from one another in many of their 
theoretical presuppositions and have adopted widely div- 
ergent methodologies, their basic aim is to produce an 
empirically based account of events, actions and beliefs 
during particular scientific episodes. In the long run 
traditional researchers hope to draw together studies of 
different episodes and specialties to formulate a social 4v 
theory of scientific knowledge production orýtest and 
improve upon existing conjectures about the way science 
develops. Quantitative researchers rely heavily on 
counts of citations to do this, while ethnographers and 
relativists tend to take part in scientific culture in 
some way, and interest theorists concentrate on the qual- 
itative analysis of historical documents. Nevertheless 
their fundamental goal is shared. 
Discourse analysts have adopted a rather different 
basic goal. Instead of trying to produce definitive ver- 
sionS of scientists' actions and beliefs, and thereby to 
develop a theory of scientific changep they are concerned 
with the procedures through which scientists themselves 
construct their accounts of actions and beliefs and the 
way these accounts are organised in different social con- 
texts. Although this is a considerably more limited goal 
than that common to traditional approaches it is necessit- 
ated by certain unexplicated methodological problems which 
beset these alternatives whether their data is generated 
through citation counts9 interviews, or documentary 
analysis. As I show in chapter oneg each of these alter- 
native perspectives embodies shortcomings which arise 
Out of th e ir failure to deal adequately with scientists' 
- vi - 
discoursein its different forms. In particular, these 
studies fail to accomodate successfully the variabil- 
ity in scientists' discourse and the specific interp- 
retative tasks for which participants' fashion their 
discourse. 
The analytic materials used in the specific studies 
are verbatim transcripts of scientific conferences. 
These are particularly appropriate for study because 
at conferences scientists meet one another for direct 
communication and are able to gain immediate responses 
to each others' knowledge claims. Cc)n-cxunCPS 
a situation in which discursive data can be collected 
naturalistically, with little or no direct interference 
from the researcher. Conferences are a novel situation 
for analysis -I have identified only one other study 
which uses conference material in the area of social stud- 
ies of science; and this was brief and flawed (see chapter 
two). In additiong no other studies have looked at rec- 
ords of face to face interaction of an adversorial char- 
acter. 
The specific analytic chapters of this work address 
the topics of theory applicationg values in theory choiceg 
scientists' categorisations of their fields9 and scient- 
ists' interpretations of their own discourse in transcribed 
form. In each case the approach adopted is the same. 
Participants' discourse is closely examinedg paying part- 
icular attention to the variability in accounts and the 
particular situations in which certain kinds of accounts 
are used. The findings question the conclusions of trad- 
itional research on these topics while providing further 
evidence for the necessity of a systematic study of sci- 
entists' discourse. In particular, the studies corrobor- 
ate work on other areas of science which has documented 
the operation of two broad interpretative repertoires or 
accounting systems. These repertoires are used when 
participants account for the applicability of theoriesq 
when they depict the role of values in constraining theory 
choiceg and when the events in a section of transcript are 
characterised. These studies also identify a number of 
detailed interpretative procedures through which discourse 
- vii - 
is fashioned to suit the specific context of use. 
Finally, it is worth commenting on the issue of 
anonymity. It must be strongly emphasised that the 
intention of this work is not to offer any criticism 
of the participants whose utterances and writings are 
examined here. Indeed, it is their very ordinariness 
as instances of scientific language which makes them 
analytically interesting. Nevertheless, it is not usual 
for participants' off-the-cuff statements and early 
drafts to be exposed to quite the same degree of detailed 
attention as they are here. Consequently to prevent any 
undue attention being paid to the contributions of spec- 
ific individuals I have used pseudonyms throughout. 
- viii - 
CHAPTER ONE 
SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE AND DISCOURSE 
In this initial chapter I intend to discuss some of the 
main approaches that are current in the social study of sci- 
entific knowledge. It would be folly indeedv in the light 
of the claims which are to come, to suggest that this is an 
entirely dispassionate review of the literature. And it is 
certainly not meant to be an exhaustive survey whicýh rakes 
1 
over every last varied inch of this fast growing field 
Instead it is intended to fulfill a number of considerably 
more circumspect goals. 
This chapter is firstly meant briefly to summarise some 
of the main theoretical perspectives which are focussed spe- 
cifically on the production and reception of scientific 
knowledgeg rather than on purely organisational or psychol- 
ogical issues. Thus I will ignore insitutionally orientated 
questions concerning# for instanceg scientists as a social 
class, the relation between research in universities and 
industry, or the growth of scientific specialties; and also 
issues with a predominantly psychological orientation, such 
as the personalities of scientists, the age at which they 
produce their best work and questions of scientific genius. 
Topics of this kind may occasionally be referred to in this 
and subsequent chapters, but only insofar as they are of 
direct significance to scientific knowledge itself or are 
drawn upon by scientists in their own writings or talk. 
A second goal of this chapter is to explicate the way 
theoretical perspectives on scientific knowledge are based on 
certain analytic practices and to illustrate the sorts of 
studies which are taken to confirm or disconfirm such per- 
sPectives. Throughout this thesis I will be concerned prim- 
arily with approaches to scientific knowledge which are emp- 
irically based. Where philosophically orientated theories 
are discussed, for example in chapters 5 and 6, my interest 
is in their empirical implications rather than in their 
adequacy as philosophical schemes. 
The third goal of this chapter is to document certain 
-1- 
shortcomings in each of these perspectives on scientific 
knowledge which arise out of their failure to deal adequately 
with scientists' discourse in its different forms, and in 
particular with their inability to accomodate to the role of 
discourse in both constructingand making sense of scientists' 
social worlds. This will lead into a discussion of those 
approaches to scientific knowledge which attempt to face up 
to, the difficulties of analysing scientists' writings and 
utterances. It is here that I will outline the theoretical 
and analytic perspective which will be adopted throughout the 
rest of this thesis and at the same time raise some of the 
questions which will be addressed empirically in later chap- 
ters. 
Let me beging theng by discussing four central perspect- 
ives on scientific knowledge and its production: quantitative 
approaches, exemplified in the work of Hewell Whitet Dan 
Sullivan and Edward Barboni; 'constructivism', exemplified 
in the work of Bruno Latour and Karin Knorr-Cetina; tinter- 
est theory'9 exemplified by the work of Barry Barnes, David 
Bloor and Brian Wynne; and trelativism', examplified in the 
work of Harry Collins. These examples were chosen to be as 
representative as possible of the broad spectrum of contem- 
porary social studies of science. 
In addition to covering a variety of different tharet- 
ical perspectives, a strong contrast in methodological 
approaches is also exhibited. While White, Sullivan and 
Barboni argue for large scale quantitative analyses of feat- 
ures of formal scientific publications such as citationsv 
Barnesq Bloor and Wynne attempt to reconstruct historical 
episodes through qualitative interpretation of scientists, 
formal and informal writings. On the other hand, although 
both Collins and Latour and Knorr-Cetina use a combination 
of participant observation and interviewingg Collins has 
tended to emphasise the different perspectives found in a 
widely separated network of scientists while Latour and 
Knorr-Cetina have concentrated on the activities of scient- 
ists within a single laboratory. 
Overall I then, these studies exemplify the breadth of 
both theoretical and methodological positions adopted when 
conducting studies of science. In each casel after giving 
some general introductory remarks to the theoretical aims 
- 
of the programme I will concentrate on the analytic practice 
as seen in a representative study. By taking this approach 
I hope to address critically at least one example from each 
of the most important traditions in this broad and hetero- 
geneous field. 
Quantitative Studies 
Unlike the other approaches which I will discuss there 
is no single coherent theoretical programme underlying quan- 
titative analyses of science. Howeverg quantitative studiesp 
whether of communicationt quality or the reconstruction of 
historical episodes in scienceg tend to presuppose a very 
similar set of assumptions about the way scientific activity 
may be operationalised in terms of categories which may be 
counted in some way. For instanceg citation is often used 
as an indicator of communication (in the sense that the 
cited paper is taken to be used in some way by the citing 
author), influence (assuming that the citing author's work 
has been affected by the cited article) or quality (with 
the number of citations used to measure the degree of impact). 
In each caseq although different theories may be testedg the 
units and form of analysis are standardised: a numerical 
feature of an area of scientific literature is treated as 
revealing some feature of scientistst activity or some 
2 
attribute of their work 
The study I will examine in detail is White, Sullivan 
and Barboni (henceforth WSB): The interdependence of theory 
and experiment in revolutionary science: The case of parity 
violation3. It is concerned with the sociological investig- 
ation of philosophical schemes. It will thus be used not 
only to illustrate problems with quantitative research on 
science but also with the application of broad philosophical 
models to actual scientific episodes. 
WSB use citation analysis to examine the changing rel- 
ationship between theory and experiment in a specialty of 
particle physics called 'weak interactions'. Their analysis 
is 'guided' by Lakatos's philosophical schema for character- 
ising scientific Progress and they focus on the idea that 
progress can be defined as the theoretical anticipation of 
experimental results: 'Therefore, according to Lakatosq in 
- 
progressive research programmes*** theory will anticipate 
experiment, and experiment will be directed by theory. ' 
4 
WSB maintain that weak interactions has undergone a scient- 
ifically progressive phase following the Idiscoveryt that 
one of its previous basic assumptions - the conservation of 
parity - was untenable. They suggest that the tV-A theorylt 
which in due course provided a general solution to the anom- 
oly of parity nonconservation, is a remarkably successful 
theory. The point of their analysis is to show how the int- 
erdependence between theory and experiment changed after 
the'discovery of parity nonconservation' and at the same 
time to compare Lakatosts speculations about progressive 
science with an actual instance. The assumption that weak 
interactions is progressive is thus essential to the logic 
of their paper; it is this assumption which allows them to 
judge the adequacy of Lakatosts analysis by examining its 
ability to cope with the case of weak interactions. 
WSB proceed by categorising articles and citations in 
the field of weak interactions between 1950 and 1972 accord- 
ing to whether they were experimental, theoretical or phen- 
omenological. Their citation data are presented in the form 
of graphs which show the deviation of each year's citations 
from the frequencies which would be expected if citation 
were random. WSB suggest that by examining the changes in 
citations across categories it is possible to measure the 
dependence of each category upon the othersq and thusq the 
dependence of each kind of scientific activity upon the 
other two kinds of activity. By plotting these citation 
ratios over timel WSB attempt to identify the changing Pat- 
terns of interdependence between theory and experiment and 
thereby furnish a dynamic measure of Lakatos's concept of 
scientific progress. 
WSB find that it is only for one short period, immed- 
iately after the publication of the theory which led to the 
abandonment of parity conservation, that their data are con- 
sistent with Lakatosts scheme. During this period there 
was a large increase in the citation of theoretical articles 
by experimental articles. WSB interpret this to mean that 
theory was anticipating experiment; as it should in a 
Lakatosian progressive research programme. However, soon 
after thist experimentalists seem to have become less con- 
- 
cerned with theory, or as WSB put it: 
these data suggest that the number of 'instances ver- 
ifying excess [empirical] content? were decreasing in 
frequency. Thus, if we take a very strong position 
on the relevance of these data, and if we take Lakatos 
seriouslyp we must conciude that weak interactions 
subsequent to 1959 was experiencing a period of 'dec- 
lining progress'. (5) 
WSB describe the specialty of weak interactions as 
being revolutionary and progressive. Yetq according to 
their operational measures of Lakatosts criteriap progress 
declined after 1959. As a result of this apparent inconsis- 
tency between their results and Lakatosts interpretation of 
scientific development, WSB suggest that their findings9 in 
conjunction with other recent work, weaken our confidence 
in the adequacy of the Lakatosian scheme. They point to a 
parallel between weak interactions and radio astronomy. 
For the latter discipline also experiences an undeniably 
progressive period of growth in which 'experiment almost 
6 
always led theory' Thus neither of these two fields 
seems to conform to Lakatosts model of progressive science. 
One reSpDnseq they acceptq could be to retain Lakatosts con- 
ception of progress and to classify radio astronomy and 
weak interactions as non-progressive 'by definition'. But 
this, they suggest, 'hardly seems sensible', because it 
would go against participants' strong conviction thatthese 
fields are in fact progressive 
7. It appears to them, there- 
fore, in view of the accumulating empirical evidencel that 
Lakatos's model of progressive science is in need of revis- 
ion. 
In their concluding remarks, WSB seem to distinguish 
between the correctness and the usefulness of Lakatos's 
speculations. Lakatos may not be right and more approp, - 
riate emprical classifications will have to be devised, but 
his schema did provide a helpful point of departure. WSB 
emphasise the contribution made by Lakatos's writings in 
stimulating them to create useful ways of measuring the 
relationship between important kinds of social action in 
science. They maintain that these measures have led, ind- 
ependently of Lakatos's philosophical speculations, to a 
much richer understanding of the dynamics of intellectual 
change in this specialty8. 
I will now examine in more detail how WSB apply 
- 
Lakatosts philosophical categories to their specialty. 
WSB treat this exercise as if it were quite straightforward; 
various terms in Lakatos's philosophy are taken to refer 
to certain observable features of weak interactions. Cru- 
cial to their argument is the claim 
, 
that the conservation 
of parity is part of the 'hard core' - in Lakatos's sense - 
of weak interactions. For they claim that the overthrow of 
parity conservation led to the formation of the 'first 
truly "progressive" research programme in weak interact- 
9 ions' Yet WSB relegate the justification of this claim 
to a footnote, where they state that there is 'much evid- 
ence' that parity conservation, was part of the hard core. 
As an example of such evidence, they quote thý. ree lines from 
a speech given at a Nobel Prize ceremonyq in which a part- 
icipant refers to the assumption about the symmetry of elem- 
entary particle reactions which was held 'almost tacitly"O. 
Lakatos himself writes only in very general terms 
about the hard core being made up of essential or funda- 
mental assumptions. It is not clear, thereforeq what 
either WSB or Lakatos mean by Ifundamentaltg although there 
is no*thing to suggest that Lakatos simply means 'tacitly 
held'. Moreover, WSB's procedure of referring to one brief 
phrase in a Nobel speech in order to identify a fundamental 
component of the hard core seems strikingly asociological. 
We cannot take a Nobel presentation speech as a colourless 
factual record of the development of weak interactions. It 
is surely the case that such speeches are designed for the 
occasiong in such a way that the nature of the 'achievement' 
being celebrated is fully recognised. Thus it is equally 
possible to treat the passage quoted by WSB as an example 
of scientists reconstructing events in a way which makes 
their award of the prize appear entirely appropriate and 
11 natural 
Despite their claim to be checking Lakatos's ideas by 
means of rigorous quantitative methods, WSB's identification 
of the hard core in the text of their paper depends on a 
highly selective and rather simplistic use of a participants' 
account of the 'central assumptions of the field'. This leads 
me on to a more basic question about the equivalence of part- 
icipants' and analysts' categoriesy namely: in what sense is 
weak interactions a research programme or a series of res- 
earch programmes? Lakatos's seemingly commonplace termin- 
- 
ology makes it tempting to equate a research programme with 
the social units recognised by participants. However, the 
Lakatosian concept has an explicit philosophical meaning, 
part of which suggests9 for instance, that it refers to a 
12 
series of theoriesp each adding clauses to the last 
WSB do not acknowledge thisin their paper and they do not 
check whether the entity tweak interactions', as defined by 
participantsl corresponds systematically with the Lakatosian 
concept of 'research programme'. 
WSB avoid facing this problem of conceptual correspond- 
ence directly by simply re-interpreting Lakatosts concepts 
in participantst terms. Thus, the research programme under 
investigation is treated as identical to the specialty of 
weak interactions; the hard core is treated as equivalent 
to the assumptions of parity conservation/nonconservation; 
theory and experiment are defined in terms of participants' 
distinctions between theorists, experimentalists and phenom- 
enologists; and so on. Throughout their textq WSB move 
frequently and unreflexively between analysts' and partic- 
ipants' categories, usually treating the two kinds of con- 
cept as equivalent, whilst consistently adopting particiP- 
antsf terminologyp definitions and interpretations as their 
own. 
WSB not only give participants' categorisations prec- 
edence by allowing them to subsume Lakatosts philosophical 
concepts, but they also prefer whalt. they take to be part- 
icipantst interpretative claims to those of Lakatos where- 
ever there appears to be a discrepancy. This can be seen 
most clearly in WSBIs decision to accept the 'accumulated 
wisdom'13 of participants as providing the most convincing 
index of scientific progress. WSB appear to work on the 
assumption that if enough scientists say that a field is 
progressive, then it offends commonsense to maintain that 
it could be otherwise. The point which I want to emphasise 
is that central parts of WSB's analysis consist of restate- 
ments of what they take to be the general view of the field 
as expressed by participants. 
There are several problems with this use of scientists' 
accounts. First of allq the analysts tend to ignore the 
diversity of these accounts. Did the participants all say 
exactly the same thing on all occasions aboutj for examplet 
- 
the progressive character of the field/programme? If not, 
how have the analysts obtained their simple summary of par- 
ticipants' views? We cannot answer these questions for 
weak interactionsg but the variability of participants' 
characterisations of radio astronomyg and their lack of 
14 
uniformity or of clear consistencyv are well documented 
This leads us to a second problemg that of temporal 
reference. To which precise period does the 'accumulated 
wisdom' of participants refer? WSB find that weak inter- 
actions was strongly progressive in the Lakatosian sense 
only during the period 1957-9 and they conclude that in 
Lakatosian terms tweak interactions subsequent to 1959 was 
15 
experiencing a period of "declining progress"' This, 
they suggest, seems inconsistent wi'th participants' char- 
acterisation. of the field as 'progressive'. But WSB offer 
no careful examination of members' accounts in order to 
show that these accounts are clearly incompatible with the 
results of their citation analysis. It may well be thatg 
although participants refer loosely to 'the progressiveness 
of weak interactions'l they would be quite willing to accept 
that the field was more progressive in the late 50's than 
at any other time. 
Thirdly there is the question of what participants 
mean when they refer to 'progress' or when they use some 
equivalent term. Thus a participant might say: 'Radio 
astronomy was certainly progressive during its first two 
and a half decades in the sense that new kinds of data and 
new realms of study were being rapidly identified. But no 
major advances in scientific understandinq occurred then. 
Thus real progress, which of course depended on these earl- 
ier observationsl occurred only after the mid-1960's when 
the task of theoretical interpretation began in earnest'. 
In this hypotheticall but plausible, statement the notion 
of progress is used in a subtle way to encompass the whole 
development of the field, yet at the same time to allow for 
different degrees, phases and facets of progress. By vary- 
ing the meaning of the term 'progresstp the speaker can 
claim both that radio astronomy has undergone one contin- 
uous progressive sequence and that it has been progressive 
only since the mid-19601s. Theseq and many other easily 
conceived and easily documentedg accounts are quite possible. 
-6- 
The same kind of possibilities presumably apply equally in 
the case of weak interactions. Thus participantst interp- 
retative accounts cannot be used in the simple manner exemp- 
lified in, but by no means restricted to, WSB's study. 
So far I have examined the way that WSB either rely on 
selective examples of participants' actual accounts or sum- 
mary versions of participants' supposed accounts as they 
try to conceptualise such basic Lakatosian notions as 'hard 
corelp tresearch programme' and 'progress'. A similar 
failure to deal carefully enough with participants' interp- 
retative work is evident in their quantitative methods. 
once again, the way in which they deal with members' 
accounts undermines their analysis. 
WSB do not propose that quantitative methods should 
replace qualitative methods9 but they do see them as pro- 
viding a tcheck' on claims derived from qualitative evid- 
ence as well as a 'finely calibratedt assessment of research 
16 
areas Their study, they claiml contains quantitative 
findings that prove to be particularly revealing 
17 
. Central 
to their method is a three-fold classification of articles 
on weak interactions based upon participants' own categories. 
It is easy to allocate articles to these categories, they 
suggest, because it is 'well known' that elementary part- 
icle physics papers are 'quite easily distinguishable'18 
into those which concern general theory, phenomenology and 
experiment. WSB appear to mean by this that there seems to 
be considerable agreement among participants about the use- 
fulness of such a classification of articles. Because they 
are presupposed in the interpretation of citation datag it 
is crucial for WSB's paper that these categories are valid 
and reliable. More specifically, each category of papers 
is taken as representing a discrete class of social action 
and the citations between categories of papers are taken 
to represent interdependence between these classes of action. 
Thus WSB's measurements of the interdependence of 'theory' 
and lexperimentt ultimately depend on how they allocated 
papers to these three categories. 
WSB place research papers in the three categories ost- 
ensibly by reading the formal text of each paper and by 
inferring from the text what kind of scientific action was 
involved in generating the text. Thus a 'basic experimental 
-9- 
paper' is one which 'is not explicitly related by its 
authors to any guiding theoretical worktl9. A t. theory- 
testing experimental paper' can be recognised when authors 
include a statement like the following: tThese theoretical 
considerations have stimulated us to undertake a search for 
20 long-lived neutral particles' Phenomenologic6l papers 
are said to involve ideally tan interface between theory 
and experiment 121 . They are treated as a distinct class 
of theoretical papers whose authors are concerned with 
'building mathematical models of faiily narrow categories 
of empirical data generated by experimentalists t22 . The 
authors of tgeneral theoretical paperst, in contrastp are 
dealing with tthe very nature of weak interaction, not with 
t23 any particular set of particle decays 
One immediate problem with this procedure is that it 
appears to take the formal text of the published paper as 
a reliable guide to the actions involved in producing it 
and to other actions an which it reports. Yet there is 
clear evidence that researchers can describe a given set of 
experiments in quite different terms, depending on the con- 
text. For instancep an experiment can be described in the 
published paper as a new method for measuring the known 
value of a well-established phenomenon, whilst being des- 
cribed in an interview as a moderately convincing test of 
24 
a controversial theory It is therefore suggested that 
there is no way in which WS8 can infer the nature of part- 
icipants' actions from the formal text alone. 
A second problem is that the scope of WSB's categories 
seems extremely vague. This is hardly surprising, given 
that they are taken over from the everyday discourse of par- 
ticipants. But while such loose terminology may be per- 
fectly adequate for the ordinary interpretative tasks facing 
participants, it furnishes an insecure basis for WSB's 
attempt at rigorous quantitative measurement of social act- 
ion. For instance, it is not easy to see any clear dist- 
inction between 'theory-testing experimental paperst and 
tphenomenology paperst dealing with the interface between 
theory and experiment. It is not even required that the 
authors of 'experimental papers' publish their own original 
data. For WSB count as experimental papers those where 
experimental particle physicists have obtained raw data 
- 10 - 
25, 
elsewhere and have analysed it * 
Similar problems beset their citation analysis. They 
assume that citations can be used as an indicator of 'dep- 
endence', or as they put it van indicator of the degree to 
which theory, phenomenology9 and experiment were found form- 
126 ally dependent on each other In a footnoteg WSB state 
27 
that 'formally' here means 'in the published literature' 
They havel thereforeg moved from the Lakatosian conception 
of dependence of theory on experiment to the much more res- 
tricted notion of 'dependence in the published literature'. 
This (unexplicated) translation allows them to maintain that 
they are measuring, solely by counts of citationg Lakatosts 
complex analytical terms dealing with scientists' actions 
and beliefs; for example, theory is treated as dependent on 
experiment if theoretical articles cite experimental artic- 
les. Yet they give no coherent rationale for this. The 
equation of tdependencel and tcitation' is established ent- 
irely by means of an analystst fiat. That this type of move 
is commonly made by other citation analysts does not justify 
it, particularly as in other cases citation data are taken 
to be a direct indicator of scientistst recognition or even 
28 
of the quality of the cited work Each of these variables 
is quite different and yet no argument is offered as to 
why citations should measure one rather than another in 
any given analysis. These analysts simply take over part- 
icipants' conventionalised versions of cognitive interdep- 
endence, which have been produced for the specific context 
of the formal literature, define them arbitrarily as equiv- 
alent to a Lakatosian concept, and treat the ensuring num- 
bers as analytically unproblematic. 
Even within WSBts paper there are indications that the 
notion of dependence is not exhausted by citation counts 
alone. Referring to a period when cross citation between 
'experimental' and ttheoreticalt articles was low, they say 
that they are: 
not suggesting that general theorists were unaware of 
experimental data, or thatihey did not try to influence 
the conduct of experiments during this period. We 
suggest only that their current research was not immed- iately dependent on cu; rent experimental results. (29) 
This passage makes it clear that WSB are quite aware that 
there may be connections between ttheoryl and 'experiment' 
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that is, between the actions of 'theorists' and 'experim- 
entalists', which are not revealed in their citation counts. 
This does notg however, lead them to search for more ade- 
quate indicators of 'dependence'. Nor does it lead them to 
state their findings in more modest form. Thus the figure 
which 5Ummarises their findings on weak interactions is 
entitled 'The Interrelationship of General Theoryp Phenom- 
enology and Experiment etc. 19 rather than 'Participants' 
Versions of Interdependenceg as expressed through their Cit- 
30 
ation5 to Various Categories of Published Papers' 
When we look at the manner in which WSB actually use 
their quantitative data, we find that they do not use it as 
a check on their qualitative material. Insteadq their int- 
erpretation of quantitative data is based upon a qualitative 
assessment of the field; which in turn seems to derive in 
31 
a largely unspecified manner from participants' accounts 
WSB introduce their quantitative data in the context of a 
brief intellectual history of weak interactions. If quant- 
itative data were being used to check qualitative material 
we would expect thatv in the case of disagreementl the 
qualitative analysis would be reworked. Yet, this is not 
the case. 
A good example occurs in the discussion of VrA theory. 
V-A theory is crucial to WSBIs analysis, because they pre- 
sent it as the turning-point in the development of weak int- 
eractions. They suggest that the quantitative data support 
their qualitative estimate that this theory led weak inter- 
actions to be thoroughly progressive; that it was 'an int- 
ellectual tour de force which anticipated experimental res- 
32 
ults for several yearst Their quantitative data consist 
of ratios which measure the rates of citation between the 
three kinds of research papers and which are taken to rep- 
resent interdependence between the corresponding kinds of 
social action. WSB use a ratio of 1.0 to represent random 
citation. Less than 1.0 means that one category is citing 
another less often than would occur if citation were random. 
More than 1.0 means that a category is being cited more fre- 
quently than in a random pattern. The graphs go from 0.0 
to 3.09 but the great majority of (non-self referring) data 
points are in the range 0.0 to 1.0. 
The V-A theory was published in 1957 and is described 
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by WSB as 'extraordinary in the degree to which it seems to 
meet or exceed all criteria by which theories are generally 
33 
evaluated' It is suprising to findq however, that WSBts 
quantitative data on the impact of V-A theory include only 
34 
one data point above 1.0 (1958 in Fig. 8) WSB point out 
that 'in the years 1957-60 the ratio of actual to expected 
random referencestg from experimental to general papers 
'was close to 1.01 
35 
and they describe this as a 'huge per- 
tubation relative to the years 1952-561 
36 
, when the value 
was close to zero. But this summary of the quantitative 
data omits 1951t which has a value close to 1.0 and above 
those for 1957 and 1960 when the V-A theorv is supposed to 
have been making experiment extraordinarily dependent on 
theory. 
Moreover, not only are data points below the random 
level taken as evidence of interdependence for the period 
immediately following the publication of the V-A theory 
(19599 1960), but this interpretation of the quantitative 
data is quite inconsistent with that carried out elsewhere 
in the paper. Thus in Fig. 59 WSB deal with citations in 
the opposite directiong that is, from theory to experiment. 
In this case a ratio of almost 1.0 (1953) and several close tO 
1.0 (1962-3) are simply discounted. WSB merely assert that 
the relatively high level of citation by theory of experim- 
ent in 1953 does not represent dependence of theory on exp- 
eriment. And despite an overall level of citation of exp- 
erimental papers by theorists which is at least as high as 
that of theoretical papers by experimentalists, W5B choose 
only to recognise the dependence of experiment on theory. 
Thus WSB's quantitative data, rather than furnishing a 
'finely calibrated assessment of the state of a research 
programme' 
37 
, is freely reinterpreted or ignored where 
it appears to conflict with the qualitative intellectual 
history that they decide to tell. It is by no means clear 
where this qualitative history of weak interactions comes 
from. Howeverp it seems likely that it derives in some way 
from that class of scientists' folk history in which crucial 
experiments and theoretical tours de force provide the mair 
38 interpretative components 
WSB's overall account of the development of weak int- 
eractions stays close to the interpretative conventions 
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which scientists maintain within the formal research liter- 
ature. Elements of social contingency hardly enter into 
their version of events; presumably bucause such elements 
are almost completely excluded from scientists' discourse 
in the formal setting. Thus the development of the network 
and the relationships between its members are presented as 
unfolding in accordance with, and as a result of, scient- 
ists' formulation of an increasingly accurate theory. The 
abstract accounts of 'theoretical' and 'experimental' act- 
ions which scientists employ in their papers providet for 
WSB, the appropriate categories for capturing researchers' 
concrete actions in the lab, the conference hall and at the 
coffee table. As we will see in the next section, a rather 
different kind of study is produced when sociologists focus 
on accounts produced in the relatively informal context of 
the scientific laboratory. 
The Constructivist Programme 
The term tconstructivism' has been used to apply to 
various kinds of social study of science. Gieryn, for 
example, brackets together work associated with Collins and 
Knorr-Cetinal along with studies of scientific discourset 
as the 'relativist/constructivist programme' 
39 
; and res- 
earchers concerned with the role of social and cognitive 
interests have frequently stressed the constructivisýt nat- 
40 
ure of science Here, howeverg I will concentrate spec- 
ifically on the work 
, 
of two researchers: Karin Knorr-Cetina 
41 
and Bruno Latour While their approaches are not ident- 
ical they share a strong emphasis on the central importance 
of scientists' practices within the laboratory along with 
an associated methodological stress on the need for direct 
observation of scientists going about their daily tasks. 
In this section my concern will not be to detail points of 
agreement and disagreement between ihese researchers but to 
show how their general theoretical perspective is based on an 
analytic approach which has certain crucial shortcomings 
associated with its unselfconscious use of scientistst dis- 
course. 
Both Latour and Knorr-Cetina contrast their perspect- 
ives with those of traditional philosophical and socialog- 
- 14 - 
ical approaches which emphasise the central role of soc- 
ially invariant criteria in the constitution of knowledge 
and which suggest that scientists are principally concerned 
with describing reality. Knorr-Cetina stresses the break- 
down of this 'objectivist' view of science which assumes 
that 'the world is composed of facts and the goal of know- 
ledge is to provide a literal account of what that world is 
liket 42. Instead, Knorr-Cetina suggests that facts are 
fabricated or constructed. 
Rather than view empirical observation as questions 
put to nature in a languaoe she understands, we will 
take all references to the "constitutive" role of 
science seriously, and regard scientific enquiry as a 
process of production. Rather than considering sci- 
entific products as somehow capturing what isq we 
will consider them as selectively carved out, trans- 
formed and constructed from whatever is. And rather 
than examinE the external relations between science 
and the "nature" we are told it describesq we will 
look at those internal affairs of scientific enter- 
prise which we take to be 
, 
constructive. (43) 
This stress on the constructed nature of facts9 along 
with the suggestion that scientists are not orientated 
towards a natural reality is mirrored by Latour and 
Woolgar. 
If facts are constructed through operations designed 
to effect the dropping of modalities which qualify 
a given statement, and, more importantlyv if reality 
is the consequence rather thanthe cause of this con- 
structiong this means that a scientist's activity 
is directed, not towards "reality", but towards these 
operations and statements. (44) 
For both Latour and Knorr-Cetinag then, 'reality' is seen 
as a', 'product' of scientists! laboratory practices rather 
than the object with which these practices are concerned. 
The explicit epistemological consequences of these 
proposals are unclear. Latour and Woolgar, for exampleg 
oppose their constructivism to the realist philosophy esp- 
45 
oused by Bhaskar For them the realist position depends 
on the circular argument which explains the findings of 
science as a product of tthe natural world' and 'the natural 
world' as a discovery made using the methods of science 
46 
For instance, Latour briefly reconstructs the history of 
paleontology in an attempt to illustrate a continual and 
viciously circular alternation between explaining the real 
nature of dinosaurs in terms of science and the findings of 
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science in terms of the real nature of dinosaurs. 
Knorr-Cetinaq on the other handq draws more approv- 
ingly on Bhaskarls work. Indeedl she implies that his pos- 
ition, while retaining an outmoded notion of the goal of 
science being to decipher natureq can underpin a construct- 
ivist approach to science through stressing, for instancep 
the causal role of experimenters in creating lawlike con- 
48 junctions of events Moreover, Harre, in his preface to 
Knorr-Cetinals The Manufacture of Knowledqe, is even less 
ambivalent about the realist nature of Knorr-Cetinals work. 
He suggests that science only makes sense in realist termsq 
and that Knorr-Cetinals research 'is a realist enterprisep 
an attempt to truly represent the social order of life in 
laboratories and institutes of research, just as they are' 
49. 
And indeed Knorr-Cetina draws heavily upon Harre's letho- 
genic' theory of social life, which attempts to reveal the 
structure of the social competence which he takes to enable 
50 the generation of social activity 
Whatever their detailed epistemological proclivitiess 
both these authors stress that the production of knowledge 
is intimately bound up with the idiocyncracies and possib- 
ilities inherent in particular scientific locations. For 
Knorr-Cetina the products of science are, 
contextually specific constructions which bear the 
mark of the situational contingency and interest 
structure of the process by which they are generated, 
and which cannot be adequately understood without an 
analysis of their construrtion. (51) 
Similarlyl Latour and Woolgar emphasise the role of the 
specific social context andg moreover, the way scientific 
products are constructed to appear independently of it. 
They claim that, 
science is entirely fabricated out of circumstances; 
moreover, it is precisely through specific localised 
practices that science appears to escape all circum- 
stances. (52) 
Latour and Knorr-Cetinals analytic emphasis on the 
central importance of ethnographic, observational studies 
of scientists' practice flows directly from their theoret- 
ical insistence on the dependence of scientific products on 
the contingencies of specific locations. For Knorr-Cetina 
in Particular it sometimes seems as if the metaphor of 
knowledge manufacture is taken so literally as to imply 
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that knowledge is produced in the laboratory like loaves 
of bread in a bakery: 
... it is clear that 
the question of how scientists 
produce and reproduce their knowledge refers us to 
the site of scientific action. It prompts us to 
look7-and as closely, as possible) at the process of 
manufacture of knowledge on the spot. In other words9 
we must dismiss the battery of intermediary tools 
normally used to negotiate with social realityg and 
immerse ourselves directly in the stream of scientific 
action. (53) 
It is interesting to note that, despite Knorr-Cetinals 
swingeing attack on notions of science which emphasise rep- 
resentation and description, visual metaphors of this kind 
are omnipresent when she characterises her own analytic 
practice. In the above extract, for instance, we are 
asked to 'look', and look 'closely'. and thereby become 
'directly immersed' in the 'flow' of scientistst actions. 
Furthermore, Knorr-Cetinals text is organised to suggest 
that there is a specific 'site' for productiong a Ispotl, at 
which to look for the formation of knowledge. Although 
this recurrent metaphor sustains the idea that ethnography 
is central for the study of scientific knowledge it does 
so only by presupposing a highly asocial conception of 
knowledge which places paramount stress on construction 
and validation processes occurring within the laboratory 
at the expense of broader social processes 
54 
. 
Latour and Woolgar take a rather broader view of the 
process of fact construction. In their analysis of the 
making of a particular fact they treat the factual status 
of scientists' claims as dependent upon broad acceptance 
55 by a particular scientific community The actions found 
within any s2ecific 
, 
laboratory can be at most only part of 
this process. This means that the kind of close observat- 
ional study advocated by Knorr-Cetina is quite impractical 
when dealing with the entire process of scientific knowledge 
production 
56. Not onl- is the process dependent upon the y 
responses of a dispersed social network but it is most be 
unclear what exactly one wouldkseeinn which would constitute 
the acceptance of a fact. Latour and Woolgar use a citation 
analysis and study the changing modalities on claim state- 
ments as indicators of the taken-for-granted status of a 
fact. Knorr-Cetina wishes to transcend such intermediary 
tools; yet what is observable without them she never makes 
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clear. 
Despite being forced back on to indirect measures in 
their study of the construction of a factv Latour and 
Woolgar appear to concur with Knorr-Cetina an the issue of 
the mediation of scientific reality. They suggest that 
observation can avoid the problems which arise when trying 
to use scientists' accounts of various kinds which may be 
misrepresentations or merely conventionalised reconstruct- 
ions of scientists' actual practices. 
scientists' statements... systematically conceal the 
nature of the activity which typically gives rise to 
their research reports. ... the fact that scientists 
often change the manner and content of their state- 
ments when talking to outsiders causes problems both 
for outsiders' reconstruction of scientific events 
and for an appreciation of how science is done. 
... it is necessary to show through empirical invest- igation how such craft practices are organised into a 
systematic and tidied research report. In short, how 
is it that the realities of scientific practice become 
transformed into statements about how science has been 
done? (57) 
It is only through examination of scientific practices at 
a sufficiently close levelt argues Knorr-Cetinat that the 
analyst is able to 'differentiate between knowledge- 
58 
constitutive procedures and rationales' 
Despite their stress on observation as a solution to 
problems of unreliability in characterising actions from 
scientific discourseq both Knorr-Cetina and Latour accept 
that in practice there can be no simple distinction between 
observation and the use of scientific accounts. For sci- 
entific accounts must be used to make sense of observations; 
the observations are only given meaning in terms of scient- 
59 ists' local semiotic systems Or, as Knorr-Cetina puts 
ito 
... understanding... cannot be gained by observation 
alone. We must also listen to the various forms of 
talk about what happens ... For the scientists, the 
savage meaning of things is contained in their lab- 
oratory reasoning; and the talk which centres around 
this reasoning must be our major source of informat- 
ion. (60) 
Furthermorev when we examine Knorr-Cetina's analytic 
practice this caveat takes on a crucial importance. In 
virtually no cases does Knorr-Cetina present data in the 
form of direct observations. Instead it takes the form of 
either excerpts from drafts and papers 
61 
, sections of sci- 
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entists' talk 
62 
, or vignettes describing broad social epi- 63 
sodes Likewise with Latour: the vast majority of the 
data he presents consists of verbal or written traces of 
64 
one kind or another It seems, then, that in the work 
of both Latour and Knorr-Cetina there is an important ten- 
sion between the analytic claim to be observing scientistst 
so as to avoid the distortions of indirect measures, and 
the analytic practice which is heavily dependent upon sci- 
entists'versions of their actions embodied in their discourse. 
The implications of this can be seen more clearly by exam- 
ining the way specific analytic claims are arrived at. 
Let us take as a specific research example Latour's 
paper: Ts it possible to reconstruct the research process?; 
65 Sociology of a brain peptide This article is particularly 
apposite for examination here because it claims to be illust- 
rating the utility of the constructivist approach to science 
by reference to a particularly straightforward case study. 
It also shares many features and claims with Knorr-Cetina Is 
work. Latour describes the goal of the paper as being to 
demonstrate the appropriateness of a number of 'external' 
concepts in the social explanation of the synthesis of a 
single brain peptide. He starts it off by commenting on the 
traditional distinction between lexternalt (social) and 
'internal' (rational, cognitive) factors in the production 
of science, and he suggests that concepts traditionally used 
to explain 'external' factors have been shown by recent soc- 
ial studies of science to be equally applicable to 'internal' 
factors: lindeedt the whole process of fact construction has 
been shown to be accountable inside a sociological frame- 
66 
work The paper is organised in sections which suggests 
in turn, that the research process is 'contextual's 'hetero- 
geneous', topportunistic's 'idiosyncratic' and 'fiction 
building'. I will follow Latour's sequence, and for the 
sake of brevity concentrate in detail on only the first three 
67 
of these concepts 
Latour claims that the research process is 'contextual's 
that isq that the meaning of scientific statements is dep- 
endent upon the context in which they are produced. Howeverg 
he does not wish to restrict his claims simply to nominal 
features of scientific talk; Latour suggests that whenever 
the peptide somatostatin is used in a new research programmes 
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the meaning of the original molecule, and then the 
very nature of this molecule, is modified and rec- 
reated. (66) 
We must be clear about what Latour is claiming here. On a 
first reading it might appear that Latour is implying that 
the actual physical makeup of the molecule is changed when- 
ever it is used in a new research programme. Howeverg it 
is clear from the discussion of contextualisation in Latour 
and Woolgar 
69 that this is not what Latour intends; rather 
he is proposing that as the 'meaning' of the molecule 
shifts so the participants will see the actual structure 
of the molecule differently. 
For example, Latour describes how prior to 1974, in a 
particular laboratory, the. somatostatin structure-meant 
t70 'an order from the brain to stop releasing growth hormone 
After this time, however, in another laboratoryq it was 
suggested that the peptide inhibits insulin. This in turn 
led to a search for a form of the peptide which would in- 
hibit the glucagon that is dangerous to diabetics while rel- 
easing the vital insulin; and this was big business. 
Of all possible analogs, the ones that have to be dev- 
ised in priority are the ones able to mean: "block 
glucagon, release insulin", because each ofthem is 
worth millions of dollars if it could be some help in 
treating diabetes. (71) 
In what sense has the 'meaning of the molecule' changed 
across these different contexts? Take, for instance, a hyp- 
Dthetical example. A coffee grinder is initially used for 
grinding coffee; it mightq however, be later noted that it 
can be used for grinding nuts to go into vegetarian rec- 
ipies (on a large scale, surely a multi-million pound ind- 
ustry! ). The sense in which the meaning of 'coffee grinder' 
has been modified when it is given this new function seems 
to be trivial; it is not at all clear that users (and they 
are crucial for Latour) would say that the very nature of 
the coffee grinder had changed. Likewise, we would not 
expect a traditional historian of science necessarily to 
claim that the meaning, and therefore the users' under- 
standing, of the nature of somatostatin has been changed 85 
new uses are found for its derivatives; and this is crucial 
because Latour's account is essentially based on just such 
a traditional reconstruction. He simply takes what must be 
a typical participants' potted history and recasts it to 
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produce the effect 
, 
of meaning change; that isq despite his 
stress on contextual changes in meaning he presupposes a 
a high level of meaning invariance. 
We can see why this is so, if we examine his notion 
of context more carefully. Essentially he has taken over 
this notion from participantst conventional classifications 
which divide science into broad units such as research pro- 
grammes. These are seen as organised around specific quest- 
ions: can we find a way forthispeptide to inhibit glucagon?; 
can we make it release insulin? Such questions are likely 
to appear prominently in grant proposals and in participants' 
generalised characterisations of other groups in the area 
of neuroendocrinology. Latour thus seems to take his 
analysts' category of context directly from participants' 
own representations of divisions within the discipline. 
The only time he identifies meaning change is when partic- 
ipants' identify a shift in research programme. Moreoverp 
as I have tried to suggest with the coffee grinder examplep 
it is not clear that participants would treat Latourts 
analysis as anything more than a redescription of their 
own folk version of the changing research process and the 
way attitudes to the molecule and emphasis on different 
aspects of its structure change according to the goals of 
the programme. 
All this is not to suggest that the meaning of somat- 
astatin is not variable; rather it is intended to illust- 
rate the inherent limitations of Latour's specific approach 
to variability. His stress an the significance of scient- 
ists' statements of the molecule's structure ought to have 
allowed him to look at how they were modified across dif- 
ferent contexts. Yet he was constrained by his simplified 
participants' definition of a context. If he had examined 
neuroendocrinologists' discourse more critically, with a 
more sophisticated conception of contextq he might indeed 
have been able to show that the very structure of the mol- 
ecule was differently understood or formulated in various 
contexts. For instance, we might speculate that certain 
kinds of version of somatostatin's structure (for example 
those stressing its potential for alleviating diabetes) 
would be regularly used in proposals for obtaining funding 
72 or in the presentation of the field to laypeople it 
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might also be the case that neuroendocrinologists would use 
different versions of the structure of TRF, the moleculeg 
when emphasising or denying their shared membership of cer- 
73 
tain categories of scientists This approach could have 
provided strong evidence for the socially occasioned meaning 
of somatostatin; yet it is closed Off to Latour by his over- 
ready acceptance of broad participants' glosses which obsc- 
ure exactlythe sorts of discursive variability which would 
have been analytically interesting. 
Latour's second claim is that the research process is 
'heterogeneous'. By this he means that 'no matter how 
close one tries to be from (sic) the research process, no 
homogeneous set of factors that could be called linternalt 
74 
or 'purely internal', is visible' Insteadt many factorsp 
originating in different areas of the social world contrib- 
ute to the production of any particular findings. Latour 
uses extracts from interviews as support for this claim. 
These suggest the importance of 'gut feeling' and chance in 
addition to rational consideration. 
All the Alanine modifications had been done... From 
the literature it is known that Trvptophane is imp- 
ortant biologically... There is also a gut feeling ... 
I just had received some D-Trp ... for LRF ... I tried the first D-modification (instead of the levoratatory 
form only existing in nature). It turned out that I 
hit right in the bull's eye. (75) 
They also suggest the importance of issues concerning power 
and authority between individual scientists. 
There were tensions in the laboratory,.. also I had 
trouble to cyclize somatostatin... something seemed 
to be missing. Then I supposed that the structure 
of natural somatostatin was not the published one 
and that homocystein was necessary; the synthesis 
would have been made easier and I would have proven 
that X Ehis chemist competitor in the lab] was 
wrong... (76) 
For Latourt the heterogeneous nature of the research 
process is documented by jumps between one line of reason- 
ing to another in these extractsl from social to rational 
considerations. However, it is even more strongly in evid- 
ence, suggests Latourl when these accounts are compared 
with those from other scientists who formulate totally con- 
trasting versions of these actions. For instance, Latour 
cites another scientist's reaction to the first of the two 
extracts quoted above. 
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It is not by chance at all! N came with a model of 
the molecule; he gave a seminar or something; his 
molecule was folded at the eight position; I immed- 
iately suggested to put a D-Trp at this position; 
that was the only way of reinforcing the moleculet 
probably# N's model was wrong, we know that now... 
Anyway, we would have done it sooner or later. That 
was systematic. But we saved, maybe a year by doing 
it in the first place. (77) 
As we will seep this problem of variability within and 
between scientists' accounts has been found to be pervasive 
in studies which attempt to use scientists' discourse in 
76 
whatever form However, Latour's response to the problem 
is deeply flawed; he takes these contradictory accounts as 
evidence that the actual process is in fact heterogeneous. 
That isq he treats variability in accounting'as an indicat- 
ion that various different processes - some rational, some 
social - all have an impact on scientistst practice. The 
implicit approach seems to be that there is a core of truth 
in all accounts even though they can be contradictory. It 
seems that Latour accepts that there are no criteria for 
separating those accounts which are true from those which 
are false; yet at the same time he wishes to infer from 
them substantial claims concerning scientists' practice. 
He thus adopts this compromise position which implies that 
there is some, but not the whole, truth in each account. 
This, howeverg forces Latour into the uncomfortable pos- 
ition of having each additional account imply that the res- 
earch process was actually that bit more hetrogeneous. The 
more variously accounted an episode (think of Galileo and 
planetary rotation! ) the more heterogeneous they actually 
become. This approach to scientists' discourse is all the 
more surprising as elsewhere in the paper Latour notes that 
'there is nowhere any account of research that could be 
79 
something more than a fiction' Taken seriously this 
might have been the basis for a more viable analytic pract- 
ice (this is discussed above); indeed, Latour might have 
found that there was a highly organised structure to the 
accounts whichl taken literally, implied only chaos and con- 
60 fusion As it is, this claim stands in uneasy tension 
with his analytic practice. 
If we examine Latour's next claiml that the research 
process is 'opportunistic'. a very similar difficulty in 
in the use of participants' accounts becomes apparent. 
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Latour takes 'opportunism' to mean that scientists react 
to local circumstances by creating context dependent chains 
of reasoning and formulating provisional rules, rather 
than by the application of generalised, preformed ration- 
ales. Againg this is an interesting and important claim; 
yet Latour's evidence for it is by no means unproblematic. 
He contrasts two sorts of account of the research process. 
one of these depicts it as being a logical sequence of 
reasoning and operations derived from a small number of 
broad premisses. For instance, 
If you give me a peptide, I could devise several hun- 
dredsof analogs, just from what is already known in 
the literature: the D-series, the Alanine seriest the 
replacement by Gly; the deletion series; all that is 
knowng it is logical. (61) 
The other kind of account characterises the research proc- 
ess in a much less systematic fashion. 
But see you have to be systematic and opportunistic 
this little word land', is the reason why JR so much 
despises 'industrial scientists': 
They do everything systematically; they screen every- 
thing; just screen; it's not science; it's just a 
computer job. (82) 
Latour clearly treats the latter kind of account as 
providing a more correct version of what actually goes on 
in the process of investigation. His overall description 
of the opportunistic nature of research is virtually a 
gloss on the second of the two extracts; and his detailed 
account of the different modifications of the peptide anal- 
ogues is apparently based on just such informal accounts. 
Yet he offers no criteria for accepting the latter kind of 
account rather than the former. 
Further on in his paper Latour shows that the more ord- 
erlyq rational version of the research process, as seen in 
the first of the two extracts abome, is the one used in the 
research literature of the field. The pattern of accounting 
he discovers thus mirrors that found by Gilbert and Mulkay 
in their study of formal and informal accounts of the res- 
83 
earch process. However, instead of looking at the 2Z27 
anisation of these different forms of accounting, and the 
way they are fashioned to fulfill specific interpretative 
tasks as Gilbert and Mulkay do and as is advocated here, 
Latour's concern is with the facticity of accounts and what 
they can reveal about the scientific practice which he sees 
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as lying beyond them. To take one particular example, 
Latour describes the rules used by these scientists as 
small scale and flexibly moulded to meet specific con- 
texts. Yet he nowhere examines the interpretative uses 
which participants make of such rule formulations or the 
64 
systematic variation of such claims to rule use If he 
had done this he might have come to very different conc- 
lusions about the significance of his data. 
Overallq theng Latour's analysis has an ambiguous 
observational status. As we have seen, his account seems 
to be more often built up from participants' discourse of 
various kinds; yet in doing so he selectively ironises and 
reifies participants' versions in order to achieve his 
unified analysts' version of what goes on in the scientific 
laboratory. Furthermoreq although I have not discussed it 
here in detailq the same critical points are applicable to 
Knorr-Cetinals work. She too makes selective and incon- 
sistent use of participants' interpretative formulations 
with the final goal of recovering the actual practices 
through which knowledge is constructed. 
The Theory of Social Interests 
In this section I will discuss the theoretical pers- 
pective which attempts to explicate the content of scient- 
ific knowledge in terms of various kinds of social inter- 
ests. Some of these interests may be sited in the local 
disciplinary context in which scientists work, and to this 
extent there may be a limited overlap with the studies of 
laboratory practice discussed in the previous section and 
also with the 'relativist' perspective discussed in the 
next. However, this approach is distinctive in stressing 
the influence of scientists' background culture and social 
allegiance and it is this aspect of the approach an which 
I will concentrate here. 
The theory Of 50Ci8l interests is often referred to as 
85 the 'Strong Programme' in the sociology of science This 
title is intended to contrast it to traditional sociology 
of science which is taken to be concerned only with the 
explanation of scientific error and the elucidation of the 
conditions which facilitate the formation of correct sci- 
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belief. This Pubition is particularly associated with 
Barry Barnes 66 and David Bloor 
87 
and has been developed in 
empirical studies by their associates Shaping Mackenzie, 
Wynne and others 
88 
. 
In this chapter I will not be primarily concerned with 
the epistemological features of interest theory. These 
have been critically discussed elsewhere from a number of 
89 
contrastinq positions Furthermoreg unlike the other 
perspectives discussed in this chapter, there have recently 
been two detailed critiques of the analytic practice of int- 
90 
erest theorists These critiques use an approach very 
similar to the one adopted here and will bie drawn upon 
throughout this section. Although my intention is to con- 
centrate on the specific form of analysis conducted by 
these theorists, it is necessary to give some account of 
their general epistemological stance in order to show how 
it underpins their particular analytic approach. 
One common device which interest theorists use to 
characterise their stance is the 'Hesse-net'91, a metaphor 
derived explicitly from the'Quine-Duhem thesis' 
92 
which 
treats scientific beliefs as necessarily being joined to 
and acquiring their meaning from an interconnecting web or 
network of inference relationships. In its classic Quinean 
form, of course, this metaphor was meant to demonstrate the 
indeterminate effect of sensory evidence on a system of 
knowledge. Because of its interconnected nature - the arg- 
ument runs - any. particular belief ! statement may be retained 
in the face of a contradictory observation statement by 
making a readjustment somewhere else in the system: by mod- 
ifying or abandoning a general theory, say, or even a log- 
ical law 93 * 
The ultimate consequence of this model is that there 
will inevitably be a conventional element in any scientific 
evaluation. For, with every novel observational or theor- 
etical statement, a range of adjustments in the network will 
be possible. Therefore the actual effect of any novel 
statement will be dependent not only on the meaning of the 
statement, but also on some general coherence conditions 
which specify what sorts of transformations of the network 94 are acceptable It is these coherence conditions 
which will be conventional in character. As Barnes puts its 
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different nrts stand equivalently in relation to 
Ire ýlitET_Dr to the physical environment. ae 
alternative classifications are conventions between 
which neither 'reality' nor 'pur7reason' can dis- 
criminate. (95) 
In his original article Quine talks only in vague terms 
of the network tending towards conservatism and simplicity. 
The point made by the interest theorists is that criteria 
such as theseq or the more elaborated lists which have been 
produced more recentlyg are insufficient for making deter- 
minate evaluations. Following Mary Hesse 
96 they argue that 
coherence conditions are made up not only of general crit- 
eria such as simplicity, or even utility, but are also a 
product of scientists' goals and social interests. Bloor 
summarises this point, 
[coherence conditions] can come from nature being Put 
to social use as well as practical use. Certain laws 
are protected and rendered stable because of their 
assumed utility for purposes of justificationg legit- 
imation and social persuasion. Since these activities 
are meant to further interests we can say that inter- 
ests are coherence conditions. And since interests 
derive from, and constitute social structures, it will 
be no suprise to find that putting nature to social 
use creates identities between knowledge and society. 
(97) 
Overall this position claims to be opposed to the 
'Manichean mythology' 
98 
which treats the development of 
knowledge as a struggle between the forces of 'good' and 
the forces of 'evil' (objectivity and-reason vs. culture 
and convention). It argues that all systematic knowledge 
is necessarily dependent on both of these thiRgs. Indeedl 
it is claimed that without the goals and interests which 
underpin particular coherence conditions there would be no 
way of dealing with the world at all. This is because 
goals and interests are seen as necessary for making int- 
elligible particular criteria of technical and empirical 
adequacy; i. e. it is only in the light of a particular 
goal that a decision is possible, sayq about whether a find- 
99 ing is technically adequate 
Expressed in programmatic terms interest theorists 
suggest that the proper sociological study of science ought 
100 to be naturalistic ., For Bloor this means that the 
Strong Programme should be: 1) causal, 2) impartial, 3) 
symmetrical, and 4) reflexive. We can see how the discus- 
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sion of Hesse-nets may lead to tenets 1,2 and 
3. In the 
first case, as goals and interests are taken to be proper- 
ties of broad social groupst the interest theorist will be 
concerned to elucidate causal links between the goals and 
interests of social groups and the contents of particular 
scientific knowledge claims or cognitive systems. Secondlyq 
analysis will deal impartially with beliefs considered 
true and beliefs considered false. As we have 5eeng it is 
argued that all knowledge is dependent upon interestsp not 
just that which is considered false. Moreover, interest 
theorists claim that they are not explaining away knowledge 
by adducing interests and therefore claim social interests 
are irrelevent to the perceived correctness of knowledge. 
(This kind of argument is developed more fully in the rel- 
ativist programme discussed in the next section). Thirdly, 
and for the same reasons used to support the second tenet9 
explanations of scientific belief are applied symmetrically. 
The same kihd of explanation is used irrespective of the 
101 
truth or falsity of beliefs 
As before, I will not attempt to discuss critically 
the whole body of analysis linked to this perspective. 
Rather I will concentrate on a representative study. In 
their critiques both Woolgar and Yearley concentrate on 
Mackenzie's study of the role of interests in statistical 
102 theory This was chosen because of its sophistication 
and detailed documentation and because it is highly regarded 
by interest theorists. However, rather than produce yet 
another critical gloss on Mackenzie's paper I will apply 
a number of Woolgar and Yearleyts points to Brian Wynne's 
paper: Physics and Psychics: Science, symbolic action and 
103 
social contol in_late. Victorian Enqland The ground for 
this choice are similar to those for choosing Mackenzie's 
paper: it is a detailed historical study which draws strong 
conclusions about the social determinations of an area of 
important natural scientific knowledge. It is taken to be 




, and reproduced as such in Barnes and Edgets re- 106 
cent collection Moreover, in his recent book on Kuhn 
Barnes selects Wynne's study to present as a detailed exem- 
plar -a paradigm case! It is, he claims, 'as good a model 
as any of what is needed'107. 
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The central argument of Wynne's paper is straightfor- 
ward. Wynne is cuncerned to show the role of social int- 
erests in the transformation of the concept of the tether' 
employed by the 'Cambridge physicists' during the last 
century. He wishes to demonstrate that their concept of 
the ether systematically reflected features of their social 
circumstances andq moreoever, was used as part of a moral 
discourse to legitimate their own social ideals. In part- 
icularl it is suggested that the Cambridge physicists' 
social interests led them to invert the traditional mater- 
ial theory of the ether and to produce an etherial theory 
of matter which held that the ether was a fundamental uni- 
fying entity underlying matter and giving coherence to a 
variety of physical phenomena. 
Wynne claims that the etherial theory of matter mir- 
rors the general social and religious beliefs of the 
Cambridge physicists which stressed the 'organic unity of 
108 
knowledge, metaphysical realism, and the unseen world' 
Furthermore, these Social beliefs are seen as opposing the 
fast growing secular ideology of scientific naturalism and 
individualism which, according to Wynne, was a byproduct 
of industrialisation and the incre . asing power of the bour- 
geois middle class. For Wynne, theng there is a two way 
causal connection between the different contexts in which 
the concept of the ether was used: its formulation was 
influenced by broader social concerns and it was also used 
109 to effect those very concerns 
I will discuss a number of interrelated issues in turng 
each of which has parallels in Yearleyts and Woolgar's 
critiques of Mackenzie. First of all I will take the 
question of Wynne's causal explanatory structure. As I 
have no'ted above, in their general, programmatic state- 
ments advocates of the Strong Programme tend to character- 
ise the proper explanation of the content of scientific 
knowledge as causal. At the start of his paper Wynne fol- 
lOws'suit by stressino that his study is aimed at elucid- 
ating 'causal connections' between social and scientific 
contexts in both directions 110. He cites Mary Douglas in 
support of the general claim that the set of causes which 
will be found in nature is 
-generated 
by an understanding of 
what is necessary and right in society"'. However, in his 
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analytic practice Wynne formulates these relationships in 
interpretative rather than causal terms. For example, he 
attacks the idea that there can be any necessary connect- 
ion between ideologies and social practices, stressing 
instead the role of ideologies as social resources and the 
importance of the understandings which members have of 
these connections. Thus he suggests that although it is 
widely held that 
ideologies contain an intrinsic, ideal logic which 
leads inevitably to the related social practices. 
it is more valid to see them as weapons in an autý- 
ority struggle with the ideological justifications 
of threatening social groups. (112) 
In practices then, Wynne takes the connections between 
systems of belief and activity to be interpreted according 
to the specific occasion of use; beliefs or systems of 
ideas are not seen to causally constrain actions in these 
detailed formulations Whenever they make use of this 
dual emphasis, interest theorists seem to be trying to 
have their cake and eat it. Their general epistemological 
warrant for the theory of interests is based on an assumpt- 
ion of direct causal connections between the interests of 
social groups and the content of natural scientific know- 
ledge. Yet in their actual analyses (at least in Wynne's 
and Mackenzie's case 
114 ) this is dropped in favour of the 
empirically more fruitful interpretative formulation of 
the connection. As a consequences the central explanatory 
notion which takes scientific knowledge to be a reflection 
of social interests becomes problematic. 
A second difficulty becomes apparent when we examine 
the way Wynne prepares the way for a social explanation of 
the Cambridge physicists' scientific beliefs. One problem 
for interest theorists is to justify imputing social inter- 
ests when purely technical accounts of the knowledge being 
examined are available. As we have seen, it might be argued 
that the technical standards themselves are related to soc- 
ial interests. Howeverg it is not clear how this could be 
demonstrated in actual cases. Wynne's response to this 
issue is to suggest that the content of the Cambridge phy- 
sicists' beliefs cannot be understood by reference to tech- 
nical standards alone: 
this transformed conception Lof the ether] is not 
readily intelligible as being "required by the state 
of experiment and observation" (-115) 
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for all that they had a received concept of ether, 
the ether of the Cambridge physicists was essent- 
ially their own construction. And it was a con- 
struction which other physicists did not deem to be 
required by the technical state of their discip- 
line. (116) 
This characterisation paves the way for Wynne's social exp- 
lanation of the content of these beliefs. For insofar as 
they cannot be understood in purely technical terms9 it 
seems to follow that there must be a further process at 
work: 
Although the constructed ether and associated meta- 
physics of the "Cambridge School" are difficult to 
understand entirely in relation to the technical 
concerns of the esoteric scientific context, they 
are very readily intelligible in the more general 
[social] context of use. (117) 
How is it that Wynne can claim that the Cambridge 
physicists' beliefs are not in fact a result of purely 
technical concerns? He is doing more than reproducing the 
implication from the Quine-Duhem thesis that any scient- 
ific evaluation is underdetermined by evidence. He claims 
a specific and important disjunction between 'technical 
conditions' and the actual transformation of the concept 
of the ether produced bythe Cambridge physicists. One 
possible answer is implied by the extract cited above. In 
this Wynne suggests that it was 'other physicists' who saw 
a disjunction between the technical conditions of the di5- 
cipline and the specific theoretical formulations of the 
Cambridge physicists. It thus appears that in his analysts' 
account Wynne has implicitly adopted the participants' 
evaluation of certain (anonymous) tother physicists'. 
It is important to note that as far as one can tell 
from the extracts quoted in Wynne's text the Cambridge 
physicists are not without argume-nts which they treat as 
providing a technical justification of their theoretical 
position. For instanceg one extract stresses the role of 
the theory of the ether in simplifying important areas of 
physics. Moreover, the writer suggests thatthe concept 
would be abandoned if it ceased to provide this orderly, 
simplifying role. 
Our conviction of an orderly connection between 
things constitutes the conception of a cosmos... The only ground for postulatinq the presence of this medium is the extreme simplicity and uniform- ity of the constitution which suffices for its func- 
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tions. Needless to say, there remain many unres- 
olved features, some still obscureq but hardly con- 
tradictory. But should it ever prove necessary to 
assign to the aether as complex a structure as 
matter is known to possess9 then it might as well 
be abolished from our scheme of thought altogether. 
(118) 
This scientist goes on to emphasise the drawbacks of an 
alternative phenomenalist science which shies away from 
the postulation of generative mechanisms. This is echoed 
in the following extract by another scientist. 
Consequently, [Ostwald's] attempt to deal with nat- 
ure in a purely inductive spirit is unphilosophical 
as well as unscientific. The view of science which 
he puts forward -a sort of well arranged catalogue 
of facts without a hypothesis - is worthy of a German 
who plods by habit and instinct. A Briton wants 
emotion - something to raise enthusiasm, something 
with human interest. He is not content with dry cat- 
alogues, he must have a theory of gravitation, a hyp- 
othesis of natural selection. (1-1,9,31 
This scientist can be seen to argue against inductivism 
in favour of a realist or hypothetico-deductive view of 
science whichq shorn of its jingoism, would not be out of 
place in a modern context. 
Clearly, theng technical or rational grounds are 
adduced (at least as far as the Cambridge physicists are 
concerned). Yet Wynne treats these as insufficient and 
adopts the evaluation of other (critical? ) physicists who 
dispute the technical basis of the Cambridge physicists' 
theory of ether. In this case Wynne appears to have aban- 
doned the impartial stance towards different scientific 
beliefs specified in tenet 2 of the Strong Programme. 
Indeed, he has produced a classic (6rror account' which 
120 explains away false belief as a social product In doing 
so he has started to side with certain participants, accept- 
ing their evaluations but not those of the Cambridge phys- 
icists. 
Wynne might have avoided this if he had looked more 
closely at the orqanisation of these different accounts 
of the inadequacy of the ether theory and examined the way 
the appearance of technical adequacy was achieved or cont- 
ested in particular interpretative contexts. But he does 
not do this. Nor does he take seriously the possibility, 
implicit in the 'post-empiricist' philosophy of Kuhnj 
Lakatos and the rest, much drawn on by interest theoristsl 
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that the connection between technical criteria and specific 
theoretical formulations is itself interpretative. It is 
only through presupposino that he can formulate a definit- 
ive analysts' account of the connection between technical 
criteria and theory that Wynne's specific social explanation 
can begin to bite. 
This raises the general issue of the way Wynne deals 
with participants' discourse. He uses a number of extracts 
from scientists' writings to document his. claims. For 
instanceg 7 extracts from the writings of Cambridge physic- 
ists are used to illustrate the nature of their broad the- 
121 
oretical beliefs However, the way this is done presup- 
poses a highly oversimplified and asocial model of the 
workings of scientific texts. Extracts from different 
authors or different papers from the same author are com- 
bined to reveal a single theoretical position. These texts 
are treated as neutral documents which, when assembledl 
can disclose a coherent entity beyond them, namely the 
ether theory. Quite apart from basic analytic questions, 
such as whether these extracts are typical of the Cambridge 
physicistst work as a whole, or even of the particular 
author quoted, this technique presupposes that scientific 
writings are neutral documents which innocently depict 
theories, results9 the actions of scientists9 the beliefs 
of competitors and so on. Yet, as we will see, there is a 
fast-growing body of work which suggests tht this notion of 
texts is no longer adequate 
122 
0 
To take one example, Yearley has shown that there are 
systematic modifications made when scientific analyses are 
123 formulated in summaries or introductions And it may 
well be that Wynne has used extracts from broad formulations 
of the ether theory which have tended to emphasise its 
grander, more metaphysical aspects at the expense of its 
limitations and empirical uncertainties. We are not told 
if in other contexts the Cambridge physicists gave accounts 
which were more modest about its worth and more concerned 
with its consistency with experimental findinas. 
The same sort of simplistic notion of textual function- 
ing is apparent where Wynne documents examples of the ether 
notion being used as an 'explicit weapon' 
124 
against mat- 
erial cosmologies. This identification of the social func- 
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tioning of ether theory is important because it is used 
to warrant the attribution of an implicit social function 
to the general theoretical writings of the Cambridge phys- 
icists. It is, howeverg very difficult to evaluate because 
it is presented almost entirely in paraphrased form. 
Take the following extract from Wynne's paper. 
Stewart, an SPR [Society for Psychical Research] mem- 
ber, also wrote a paper which appeared as an appen- 
dix to Barrett's book On the Threshold of the Unseen 
(1895) in which he sought 6 "higher law" than the mat- 
erialists could see in nature. It was a cardinal tenet 
that this "higher law" - of manifest moral significance 
would make itself known in as (sic) experimental sci- 
ence, which was why the SPRIs activities were "of 
unusual importance. " Spiritual realities would be 
incorporated in a higher natural law, and thus be dem- 
onstrable through science. (125) 
For Wynne this is a revealing example of ether theory being 
used as part of a legitimatory moral discourse. Yet, even 
in Wynne's paraphrase, it by no means forces a functionalg 
legitimatory reading. It could easily be read, for examplet 
as expressing touching faith in the possibility of 'spirit- 
ual realities' being scientifically demonstrated. It is 
not clear that because certain scientists can connect the- 
oretical and deistic notions in this way that there were 
deistic motives behind the formulation of ether theory. 
Indeed, as we have seen, the interpretative connection bet- 
ween systems of belief which Wynne uses elsewhere in the 
paper questions the possibility of any straightforward 
causal influence across the two realms. This is not to 
claim that religious or similar notions could not have 
been involved in the formation of ether theory - it is mer- 
ely to suggest that the kinds of homologies that are adduced 
between realms of ideas are not necessarily indicators of 
causal influence. Such homologies could equally stand as 
a testament to the interpretative skills of the particip- 
ants in making different sets of ideas appear 'the same'. 
What for Wynne is an analytic resource used to justify the 
claims of causal connection couldq for the participants, be 
the interpretative achievement 
, 
of characterising religious 
beliefs as justified by scientific beliefs. 
As a final issue I will examine more directly the 
'work' done in Wynne's own text to achieve his coherent 
account of the social ideologyj scientific beliefs and soc- 
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ial positions of the Cambridge physicists and the way these 
differed from the scientific naturalists. I will consider 
the way Wynne constructs the different 'sides' of the deb- 
ate. The notion that there existed two coherent sides is 
absolutely fundamental to Wynne's analysis. However, they 
are by no means empirically self-evident entities. As 
space is short I will concentrate only on the identification 
of the membership and not consider the important issue of 
the identification of the content of the scientits' bel- 
126 iefs 
Wynne's construction of the membership of sides dep- 
ends on a variety of what I will call 'homogenising dev- 
ices'. These can be thought of as membership descriptions 
which are used in an unselfconscious manner to warrant sim- 
ilarity of beliefs and interests. The most fundamental 
of these in Wynne's text is the category 'Cambridge'. 
Teaching or working at Cambridge is taken to be a strong 
warrant for the possession of a certainset of social bel- 
iefs, even for those physicists who subsequently left 
Cambridge. This social ideology is explicitly documented 
only for the 'Cambridge intellectuals' Maitland, Seeley, 
127 Sidgwich and Maurice The analysis depends on this set 
of beliefs beino shared by the 'Cambridge physicists'. Yet 
these bL-liefs are not documented for the physicists them- 
s elves. Rather it is assumed that as they too were at 
Cambridge, they must share the same beliefs. Cambridge is 
thus taken to be an undifferentiatedl unified whole rather 
than an internally structured grouping, whose members have 
conflicting beliefs and interests. Furthermoret early in 
Wynne's text he notes specifically that proponents of sci- 
entific materialism (the position the Cambridge physicists 
were supposed to be implicitly attacking) were to be found 
128 
within Cambridge itself Yet this allusion to fragment- 
ation does not prevent Wynne from assuming its homogeneity 
elsewhere in the text. 
In the same way, a whole set of homogenising resources 
are used to sustain the identity between Cambridge phys- 
icists and supporters of the Society for Psychical Research 
(where it is alleged that the ideologically potent features 
of ether theory are most apparent). Houeverl these varied 
resources - mainly the role relationships: friends, col- 
- 35 - 
leagues, research assistant/researcherg between Cambridge 
physicists and SPR supporters 
129 
_ are assumed in an 
uncritical way to indicate identity of beliefs. It is imp- 
ortant to ask if these relationships do indicate such an 
identity andq moreovert whether there were not similar 
relationships between Cambridge pt-icists and people of a 
more scientifically naturalistic bent; a question which 
Wynne's text nowhere addresses. 
Finally, there are indications in the text that the 
Cambridge physicists are not such a homogeneous group as 
is repeatedly suggested. For instance, Lodge, who is 
quoted more than any other single physicist as exemplifying 
support for the ether theory combined with an interest in 
psychical researchg is described as having tutilitari&n 
leanings' which contradict the spiritual, organic emphasis 
130 
of the other Cambridge physicists Unless we are to 
assume that he is engaged in an implicit attack on his own 
political beliefs, we have further evidence here of the int- 
erpretative connection between sets of beliefs as well as 
the fragility of Wynne's social categories. 
The Relativist Programme 
In this fourth section I will examine a perspective 
on scientific knowledge which its author refers to as the 
1 131 132 empirical relativist programme' or'special relativism' 
Collins argues that such an approach is a necessary prerequ- 
isite for the study of social processes in science. He 
maintains that any non-relativist programme will end up 
explaining what went wrong in cases of beliefs considered 
false, and how processes of knowledge production worked 
smoothly in cases of beliefs considered true. Such appr- 
oaches, claims Collins, assume that what is taken to be 
valid scientific knowledge needs no socioloqical explanation; 
scientists' acceptance of such knowledge is thought to be 
adequately explained by the nature of the phenomena under 
investigation. The ultimate function of any such prog- 
ramme will therefore be to legitimate any current scientific 
status quo. 
The correct approach, accordino to Collinsl is to 
assume that 'the natural world in no way constrains what 
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is believed to be t133 0 This means that scientists' claims 
about the truth or falsity of different accounts of the 
natural world cannot be used by the analyst as a resource 
for the construction of sociological explanations. Insteadq 
if they are considered at all, they must be treated as a 
topic to be explained. What is of interest to the analyst 
is not the natural phenomena themselvesq and not the qual- 
ity of any explanations of the phenomena, but participants' 
beliefs about the phenomena or about the quality of explan- 
ations andq furthermoreq the effects of different scient- 
134 ists' actions on those beliefs 
Collins argues that this approach is a necessary cor- 
ollary of tenets (2) and (3) of the Strong Programme which 
135 
was discussed in the previous section For, if the 
sociologist is to be impartial with respect to the truth 
or falsity of scientists' beliefs, and approach each sym- 
metrically with the same style of explanation, 9 no use can 
be made of the natural world in constructing explanationsp 
nor of the related concepts of truth, rationality and sci- 
entific progress. If such notions did enter the sociolog- 
ists' explanation as resources then it would cease to be 
impartial and symmetricall because one set of beliefs would 
136 have been given priority over another Such categories 
can only be used as a part of a sociological explanation 
when they are treated strictly as actors' categories which 
the analyst wishes to explain. As Collins puts it: 
This is not to say that we must eschew all mention, of 
truttj rationalityg success or progressiveness, but 
only that any such mentions must be made in such a 
way that they are applicable symmetrically to that 
which is falsev irrationalg unsuccessful and degener- 
ative. This is possible if the categories are onl 
mentioned and treated as actorts cateqories. (137ý 
Thisq then, is Collins's basic theoretical and analytic 




Collins suggests that the activity of scientists falls 
into three distinct classes: that where there is a high deg- 
ree of consensus over methods9 problems9 findings and so on 
(which Collins identifies with Kuhnian 'normal science' 
139); 
that where scientists attempt to undermine the consensus 
and propose an alternative set of methods, problems etc.; 
and that where scientists attempt to make partial changes 
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in the consensual --tructureg and consequently become emb- 
140 
roiled in controversy It is the last of these which 
is seen as the most fruitful as far as sociological res- 
earch is concerned. For in this case all the taken for 
granted rules and practical competences on which scientific 
activity depends are thrown into question. This has the 
twin payoff that these rules and competences are more 
likely to be explicitly formulated by participants, and 
therefore are more available for study, and also that the 
researcher is better able to maintain the relativistic 
attitude of indifference to the way things 'really are' 
because this will be anyway in dispute. I will later sug- 
gest that both of these justifications are suspect. For 
the momentg however, let us examine in more detail the way 
Collins sees the specifics of the relativistic study of 
science. 
Collins treats the study of controversy in science as 
141 
falling into three discrete stagesý The first two are 
the most significant for, as Collins notes, the third is 
only a conceptual possibility at the present time. Studies 
which move through stages one and two are typical of this 
research; Collins describes them as follows: 
The first stage is the empirical documentation of the 
interpretative flexibility of exDerimental results. 
This part of the work has shown what part experimental 
data plays in the practice of science, and what part 
is played by the touphstones of certainty such as rep- 
lication. The second stage... is concerned with the 
way that the limitless flexibility of data are closed 
down. The mechanisms of closure have been found to 
include various rhetorical presentational and instit- 
utional devices working within a context of 'plausib- 
ility' and other conservative forces. (142) 
What exactly is involved in these two stages is clar- 
143 ified in an exchange between Collins and Knorr-Cetina 
She suggests that Collins's approach has converged with 
that of certain modern philosophers of science (notably 
Mary Hesse 144) who suggest that although no single experim- 
ent or finding will be beyond criticisml rational scientific 
choices can nonetheless be made on the basis of an accumul- 
ation of experimental data along with criteria of coherence 
with other findings and theories145. In reply, Collins 
acknowledges that his own work9 along with that of other 
authors working within the relativist programmeg does ill- 
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u!, trate the importance of accumulations of evidencc and 
coherence with existing program-,, -- in restricting scient- 
ific action; yet he maintains it shows more than just this. 
It shows that the role of social and political interests is 
also crucial in limiting scientific debate. For instance 
he describes his later work on gravity waves as stressing, 
that accumulation of experimental results was not, 
and could notq be decisive in settling the controversy. 
Here we see that a variety of political and rhetorical 
strategies were mobilised to end the debate. (146) 
Collins accepts that Knorr-Cetina would have been 
right if his study and ones like it had been documenting 
just the significance of coherence and accumulated evid- 
ence. It is clearly essential for Collins's position, 
therefore, that he satisfactorily document the constrain- 
ing function of these shared. extra-rational factors on 
scientific activity. So let us now examine in more detail 
the example that Collins cites above as doing exactly this. 
Collins's paper Son of seven sexes: The social dest- 
ruction of a physical phenomenon 
147 is a continuation of 
his earlier research on gravitational radiaLion and the 
claims of Professor Joseph Weber to have detected it under 
14B 
experimental circumstances In this later paper the 
emphasis is on the way scientists in the field of gravity 
radiation came to disbelieve Weber's claims to success. 
The aim of the paper is, 
to show that there were no purely cognitive reasons 
that would 'force' scientists to disbelieve Weberts 
claims. Their incredibility is a social product - 
though they are none the less incredible for that. 
(149) 
In the light of Collins's response to Knorr-Cetina we 
are able to disregard a large part of the paper, which is 
concerned with documenting the facts that no sin2le 
, 
study 
is taken unequivocally to undermine Weber's claims and that 
the accumulation of different experimental findings 
150 
along with the lack of coherence of Weber's findings with 
the predictions of relativity theor Y15L is central to the 
change in belief among scientists in the field. We need 
not examine these findings because, as Collins himself 
notesl they are not what is crucial for deciding whether 
his own relativist Position is supported or not. Insteadq 
let us concentrate on his documentation of the 'Political 
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and rhetorical strategies' used by participantsq for it is 
these that we at the crux of his claim that 'the physics 
and politics of experimentation are not seperablet 
15 2 
and 
that extra-scientific means must be used to end scientific 
153 debates 
For us, therefore, the crucial part of the paper is the 
section where theresponses of a scientist called Quest to 
Weber's work are described. It is Collins's explication of 
these responses which constitutes the second stage of his 
relativistic analysis; for he sees their function as being 
to close down the potentially limitless debate over the 
status of gravity waves. 
Quest acted as though he did not think that the sim- 
ple presentation of results with only a low key com- 
ment would be sufficient to destroy the credibility 
of Weber's results. In other words, he acted as one 
might expect 4 scientistý to act who realized that 
simple evidence anderquments are not sufficient to 
settle unambiguously the existential status of a 
phenomenon. There is no reason to think that Quest 
was unsuccessful in his aims... (154) 
Collins's argument thus becomes dependent upon two 
separate claims: firstly that Questts papers did 'settle 
unambiguously the existential status' of the phenomenon of 
gravity waves andt secondly, that they did so not through 
mobilisinq arguments and data but through 'rhetorical' 
presentation and utilisation of 'popular' outlets. Each 
of these claims becomes suspect in the light of a careful 
examination of the examples of participants' discourse 
cited in Collins's paper. Moreover, as we will see, 
Collins can only sustain his version of events by a pro- 
cess of selectively ironising and reifying this discourse. 
I will illustrate this for each of these basic claims in 
turn. 
Let us take the suggestion that Quest's papers were 
155 significant in ending the controversy first Collins's 
data in support of this claim are rather thin. Although 
in a number of places in his text Collins asserts that this 
was the case, his documentation amounts to three short ext- 
racts from interviews with gravity wave experimenters. 
Before discussing these it is important to digress for a 
moment to note how Collins intends such extracts to be taken. 
They are not so much intended to be data, but 'dramatic 
indicators and aids to communicationtl56 9 and they are 
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meant to function as illustrations of wh± the social res- 
earcher has come to understand through participating 
157 
with the scientists he is studying. That they arc intendec 
in this way, howeverg makes it all the more surprising that 
the extracts implying that Quest had a significant impact 
are balanced out by extrauts which queried his importance. 
In the following interview fragment Quest's actionswe 
described as unscientific and to constitute 'going after' 
Weberl 
I felt that it spoke for itself, and that those few 
people who knew about it were enough. But Quest did 
not feel that way and he went after Weber... and I 
just stood on the sidelines covering my eyes because 
I'm not really interested in that kind of thing, bec- 
ause that's not science. (158) 
Collins also describes how other scientists claimed they 
were tempted to disregard Quest's experimental results 
because Quest embarked on this as a sort of holy crusade 
159 
160 
and that Quest was a tdangerous man' And he gives a 
further example of a scientist critical of QLmtls actiong 
[Quest and his group] are so obnoxious, and so firm 
in their beliefg that only their approach is the 
right one and that everyone else is wrongt that I 
immediately discount their veracity on the basis of 
self delusion. (161) 
Weber himselfl of course, is shown as disagreeing uith 
Quest's position. Interestingly, howeverp the largest 
part of Collins's discussion of Weber's reply to his critics 
is not taken up with his response to Quest. Indeed Quest 
is mentioned just once in the entire discussion of Weberts 
responses. The majority of Weber's comments concern the 
experiments on gravity waves whichp according to Collinsq 
were accepted as satisfactory by all of Weberts critics. 
This seems rather surprising if Weber believes that it is 
Questts work which is crucial in closing down the debate 
and settling the existential status of gravity waves. 
Surely if that were the case Weber would have attempted to 
undermine this work above all. Moreover, it is hard to 
believe that the other scientists mentioned by Collins are 
both highly critical of Quest and fully persuaded by him! 
As Collins himself notes, Quest's work was 'nearly always 
discussed with reservations'162. 
It is of course possible that these scientists were 
persuaded by Questp and that his work did decide the status 
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of gravity waves by closing down the debate; yet Collins's 
selections from scientists' talk are verv far from exemp- 
lifying this in an unambiguous fashion. Some extracts 
seem to suggest the debate is clrsed down and others that 
it is not. Othe. rs seem-to suggest that, insofar as the 
debate is closed, it has been made so by contributions 
quite separate from those of Quest. Collins gives no crit- 
eria which justify his readings or, as he would have it, 
his participants' knowledge that Quest's papers had the 
claimed effect. Indeed, he does not even clearly demon- 




; even though this is the central plat- 
form on which his explanation is erected. 
What about Collins's second claim, that it was the 
rhetorical, extra-scientific features of Quest's work which 
were crucial? For, as we have noted, even if Questts work 
was persuasive Collins's argument rests on the suggestion 
that it was more than its scientific merit that made it so. 
This immediately seems to conflict with the participants' 
claims (mentioned above) that Quest's 'holy crusade' made 
the, m wary of, or even reject, his experimental results. 
In these cases Collinsts suggestion is inverted: instead 
of experiments being a vehicle for powerfully persuasive 
rhetoric, Quest's manner of presentation is treated by mem- 
bers as casting doubt on the veracity of his experiments. 
Nevertheless, let us examine Collinsts evidence for his 
suggestion. 
It is worth discussing in some detail the three extracts 
from interviews (mentioned above) which are taken by Collins 
to show that Questts work had a high impact 'because of the 
165 
way it was presented' 
... as far as th-e scientific community in general is 
concerned, it's probably Quest's publication that 
generally clinched the attitude. But in fact the 
experiment they did was trivial - it was a tiny thing 
... but the thing was the way they they wrote it up ... 
Quest had considerably less sensitivity so I would have thought he would have made less impact than any- 
oneg but he talked louder than anyone and he did a 
very nice job of analysing his data. 
[Quest's paper] was very clever because its analysis 
was actually very convincing to other peopleg and that 
was the first time that anybody had worked out in a 
simple way just what the thermal noise from the bar 
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should be... It was done in a verv clear manner, and 
they sort Of convinced everybody. (166) 
Collins uses these quotes to show that the impact of 
Quests's study was due to its form of presentation rather 
than its scientific content. Yet, how is the analyst to 
decide what is the form of the presentation and what the 
scientific content? The extracts makes reference to things 
like 'the way [Quest] writes up', and that Quest ttalked 
louder than anyone'. Howeverv they also-note Quest's 'very 
nice job' of data analysisq his clarity and his novel sol- 
ution to a particular problem. Are these things necess- 
arily part of a paper's form rather than its content? 
Collins certainly takes them to beso but - and this is the 
crucial thing - how do the participants view them? Are 
there tacit criteria (as Collins appears to assume) for 
dividing form from content in this field? Collins's model 
of closure demands that extra-scientific, rhetorical dev- 
ices were mobilised; however, he is nowhere explicit about 
how this category of 'the rhetorical' is arrived at. If it 
is a participants' category we need to know if it is con- 
sensual; if it is an analystst category we need to know how 
it can be impartially and symmetrically applied. 
There is a further interesting feature of these ext- 
racts. Each of them is concerned with the effect of the 
paper on other scientists. The speakers do not character- 
ise themselves as taken in by what they see as the papers') 
style. We therefore have to take on trust that these speak- 
ers can give an accurate social account not only of the 
influence of the papers on a'large number of other scient- 
ists but also of exactly what feature of the papers was res- 
ponsible for the influence. Of course, Collins treats such 
extracts as examples of his own participant's understanding; 
yet this must have been generated with the aid of just such 
accounts. Uhat Collins does not do is treat them as utter- 
ances constructed to perform particular interpretative 
tasks. For instancel these speakers may be engaged in 
'accounting for error' 
167 (a notion that we have seen in 
the previous section and will meet again on a number of 
occasions in coming chapters). In this case the error 
account might be used to make sense of the conflict bet- 
ween what the speaker views as the triviality of the work 
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and the fact that it became widely accepted. This pot- 
ential conflict is eliminated by deploying the notion 
that the work 9 though trivial , is packaged in a way which 
is rhetorically very effective. I will not elaborate on 
this suggestion here; all I wish to indicate is that there 
are ways of analysing such accounts which we not dependent 
upon extrapolating from them to the realities of the sci- 
entists' social world. 
If we return briefly to Collins's rationale for the 
stud, y of controversies, it can now be viewed rather differ- 
ently. It is possible to see that what may be interesting 
is not that they ma 
, 
ke normally tacit rules explicit, but 
that controversies occasion a more elaborate repertoire of 
accounting procedures. For example, there may be little 
need for error accounting except when there is conflict 
between scientists' claims. One danger for Collins's 
approach is that it reifies occasioned practices of accoun- 
ting as normally tacit rules of conduct. Moreover, although 
the conflicting views of participants in controversies may 
attune researchers to the contingency of scientists' bel- 
iefs, it may also obscure the analytically important dif- 
ference within the discourse of individual scientists. 
The most significant implication of the way Collins 
deals with participants' discourse within his own relativ- 
istic framework, is that it actually ldads him away from a 
neutral, relativistically indifferent stance with regard to 
questions concerning the real existance of gravity waves. 
To accept evaluations of experiments in the way he doesq 
as providing neutral indices of the experiments' worth, 
amounts to the same thing as evaluating the relative worth 
of two different accounts of the natural world. To para- 
phrase one of Collins's own conclusions from the earlier 
gravity wave work 
168 
: negotiEtions about the value (rhetor- 
ical or genuine) of a particular experiment are, iPso-factot 
negotiations about the character of gravitational radiation. 
Thus, when he accepts certain participants' evaluation 
(that Quest's work was trivial but rhetorically effective) 
he is inevitably starting to make judgments about the nat- 
ural world. Collins's social tersion of events in the fieldt 
theng cannot be consistently separated from participantst 
own versions of how to allocate truth, rationality and sci- 
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entific progress. As long as Collins attempts to 'read 
through' participants' accounts to one single definitive 
version of actions and beliefs in the field he is forced 
both to ironise and to reify members' accounts; thereby 
tacitly rejecting and appropriating the positions produced 
by various scientists on specific occasions. 
Let us take one final example from Collins's paper to 
clari fy this. Collins notes that Quest! & group performed 
a later experiment with slightly different equipment to the 
earlier ones. He describes Questts rationale for this as 
being to utilise available equipment in the most profitable 
way. Howeverg one of Quest's co-workers gives a-rather 
different justification: 
we just felt that we hadn't been convincing enough 
with our small antenna. We just had to get a step 
ahead of Weber and increase our sensitivity too. 
At that point it was not doing physics any longer. 
It's not clear that it was ever physics, but it 
clearly wasn't by then. If we were looking for grav- 
ity waves we would have adopted an entirely different 
approach... 
there is no point in building a detector like 
Weber's other than the fact that there's someone 
out there publishing results in Physical Review 
Letters... (169) 
Collins clearly treats Quest's own account as a def- 
ensive gloss, which does not reveal what the research was 
actually intended for. He concentrates on the implications 
of the alternative account, treating it as an accurate 
170 
characterisation of Quest's research Collins concludes 
'it can be said with some degree of certainty that Quest 
and his group set out to kill Weber's findings in the short- 
171 
est possible time' In this case, theng Collins iron- 
ises Quest ts account while reifying an alternative in order 
to maintain his own specific conclusion and thereby to sup- 
port his general analytical position. Yet he offers no 
criteria for his contrasting practice in interpreting acc- 
ounts (except, perhaps, his ana'lytically unavailable 'exp- 
erience' of the field). Moreoverg when Collins accepts the 
account which (he claims) depicts the work as unscientific 
he begins to accept certain claims about the natural uorld 
and how it is, or is not, revealed in the Quest group's 
experiments. 
To put this another way, the analysts' ability to dec- 
ide whether Quest's experiments are scientific nor mere 
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vehicles for rhetoric depends on his specifying further 
features of the situation andq in particular, beliefs 
about the reality with which these experiments are con- 
cerned. Thus when Collins decides that these experiments 
have rhetorical rather than scientific significance he imp- 
licitly sides with supporters of certain beliefs against 
the supporters of alternative beliefs; thatisg hetreats some 
beliefs as literally constitutive and othersasnot. It 
is impossible for him consistently to maintain his neutrall 
relativistic stance and give definitive social accounts of 
172 
actions and beliefs in his area of study Ultimately, 
then, his analytic practice ends up in subverting exactly 
the main pillar of justification of the relativistic 
approach, namely that it should remain neutral with regard 
to the status of different accountsof the natural world. 
At places in his work it appears that Collins has 
started to recognise this problem. For instance, he has 
characterised the goal of relativistic analysis as being 
to 'describe what kind of talk is reasonable talk in the 
Escientific] society in question' 
173 
and to elucidate 
174 
'what was counted as acting rationally' Furthermorel 
he has claimed that instead of treating beliefs as act- 
ually being of sucb and such a kind - out of touch, say - 
'attention [should be] immediately shifted to the ways that 
competing sets of beliefs are made to appear out-of-touch 
or unprofessional' 
175 
@ At the same time he argues that 
the investigator cannot concentrate on those beliefs held 
by the most prestigious members of a scientific community; 
impartiality with respect to such things is essential 
otherwise the research may simply naturalise a prestige 
176 
relationship which is actually a social construct if 
Collins had followed these suggestions through in practice 
he would have arrived at a position very similar to the 
one advocated in this thesis. His concern would have 
been with methods of sense making and systems of accounting. 
Why, then, if Collins is suggesting this approach to 
scientists' social life, does he need to make the radical 
distinction between the way the sociologists must view the 
physical and social worlds177 9 Why could not Collins 
approach the social world in the same relativistic fashion 
as he does the physical? If he had stuck to the questions 
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concerning the way beliefs are made to appear out-of-touch 
and so on he could have done so. However, as we have seeng 
in practice Collins wants to do more than this; he wants to 
provide definitive accounts of particular social events 
which go beyond the perceptions and characterisations of 
the participants andkclaim to reach the actual social pro- 
cesses themselves. Instead of documenting the way that, 
say, Quest's work was depicted as rational or rhetorical by 
different participants in the course of accounting, Collins 
attempts to make much stronger claims which treat certain 
actions as in fact rhetorical and others not. 
Collins's radically different approach to the physical 
and social worlds is intended to allow a naturalisýtic 
approach to social life to be combined with a relativistic 
approach to physical reality. Yet, as we have seeng the 
distinction cannot be maintained: as he starts to make def- 
initive characterisations of social processes he ceases to 
remain neutral with regard to the natural world. He cannot 
decide that an experiment was really done for rhetorical 
purposes and claim to be suggesting nothing about its sci- 
entific quality. At presentl then, although some of Collinsts 
theoretical claims suggest a more consistent analytic pract- 
ice, his research embodies fundamental inconsistencies which 
undermine its relativism. 
A Systematic Analysis of Scientists' Discourse 
In the first sections of this chapter I have outlined 
four very different methodological and epistemological 
positions and discussed the various different ways in which 
their conclusions become dependent on participants' dis- 
course. Because this discourse varies systematically in 
accordance with changes in interpretative context, it is 
possible for analysts to produce conclusions which are 
plausibly based upon that discourse, yet which are radic- 
ally different. I have suggested that the conclusions of 
these analyses are open to a range of objections, many of 
which derive from analysts' failure to deal in a satis- 
factory manner with the interpretative work embodied in sci- 
entists' discourse. I will first summarise these objections 
for each of the approaches in turn and then outline an alt- 
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ternative perspective which is intended to respond to these 
problems. 
In the case of WSB# I have suggested that their anal- 
ysis is composed of three elements which are taken over 
from participants' discourse: sometimes they adopt the 
terminology and the accounts of action and belief explicitly 
provided by scientists in the formal literature; at other 
items they adopt the notions of cognitive interdependence 
which are taken to be implicit in scientists' patterns of 
citations; and at certain important junctures they re-state 
what they take to be the general view of the field as 
expressed in participants' empiricist folk-history. The 
central defect in their analysis is th8L it is P8rtiCip- 
ants, rather than analysts, who carry out crucial parts of 
the sociological interpretation. The major contribution 
made by the analysts is that of selecting out and ordering 
a limited class of interpretative material taken from the 
full range of such material actually generated by partic- 
ipants. 
Because WSB base their analysis primarily on the dis- 
course characteristic of the formal scientific literature 
and because they consider only those social actions which 
participants subsumed under the formal concepts of 'theory' 
and texperiment', their interpretation closely resembles 
the formal scientific literature in eliminating virtually 
all reference to personal or social contingency. As a res- 
ult, their version of even'ts inevitably provides a rational 
reconstruction of scientific development which, although it 
differs in detail from that of Lakatosy continues to repres- 
ent science as a self-containedt progressive and internally 
coherent endeavour. This view of science is given its ult- 
imate validation by reference to scientistst own accumulated 
wisdom. 
Hcwever, the apparent plausibility of WSB's analysis 
is achieved only by ignoring certain important aspects of 
scientific discourse. In particular, WSB undertake no 
systematic examination of scientists' informal discourset 
in the course of which quite different, and often highly 
variable accounts of action, belief and scientific devel- 
opment are likely to occur. Furthermore, WSB make no 
allowance for the fact that scientists, accounts vary from 
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one social context to another; for instanceg from the 
formal to the informal context. Once these features of 
scientific discourse are acknowludged, USB's conclusions 
come to be seen as essentially a by-product of the analysts' 
highly selective adoption of one context-dependent form of 
scientific discourse. 
Although the conclusions of the constructivi5t re5- 
earchers Latour and Knorr-Cetina are very different from 
those of WSB, and although their methodological approach to 
the social life of scientists contrasts markedly with that 
adopted by W589 their research is also flawed by fundamental 
problems associated with the use of participants' di5course. 
Latour and Knorr-Cetina have made much of the supposed 
methodological value of direct observation of scientific 
activities as they happen in the scientific laboratory. 
In their emphasis on observation they appear to be formul- 
ating a considerably more critical approach to participants' 
discourse than WSB's. Indeed, they stress the difficulty 
of producing descriptions and explanations Of scientific 
activities because scientists often provide conventional- 
ised reconstructions or self-serving rationalisations of 
events. And they display considerable scepticism about the 
veridicality of accounts of activity embodied in the formal 
scientific literature. Yet, having addressed this problem 
and stressed its seriousness, their attempt at a solution 
is inadequate. 
In the first place, their proposal to replace indirect 
indicators of action and belief with direct. -observation is 
unworkable; and in fact they accept in practice that sci- 
entists' accounts are essential for the interpretation of 
observations. Thus the latter cannot be used as an unprob- 
lematic data base. Moreover, very little of their empirical 
analysis is based directly on 'observational' data. For 
the most part verbal or written traces of one kind oranothEr 
are drawn upon. In other wordsv despite Latour and Knorr- 
Cetinals evident recognition of the shortcomings of using 
discursive data as a basis for the construction of definit- 
ive accounts of scientists' activity and belief, this is 
often exactly what they attempt to do. 
This vacillating over the status of observations is 
compounded by Knorr-Cetina when she treats the metaphor of 
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knowledge manufacture as if it were literally true. Des- 
pite attacking models of science which take it to be obs- 
ervational or descriptive in essence, she continually 
characterises her own practice in visual terms; she 
takes ethnographic observation of scientists in the lab- 
oratory to capture the manufacture of knowledge 'on the 
spot'. The implication that there is a single, ider; tif- 
iable site for manufacture leads to a highly asocial con- 
ception of scientific knowledge, which emphasises those 
events occurring within the laboratory at the expense of 
broader social processes, 
Like the approach developed in this thesisl Latour 
stresses the context dependence of scientific claims. How- 
ever his notion of context dependence is very limited. 
Indeed, he appears to have taken the noticrn over from the 
participantst classifications of their fields into convent- 
ionalised research units. His account of the way meaning 
changes across contexts thus becomes no more than a redes- 
cription of the differences between the aims of competing 
research groups. If Latour had examined endocrinologistst 
discourse more critically he might well have developed a 
more sophisticated notion of context and even demonstrated 
change in the way the meaning of the molecule was charact- 
erised. However, he failed to take this opportunityq and 
his findings remain crucially dependent on participantst 
own self images. 
Unlike WSB, Latour and Knorr-Cetina place much of 
their emphasis on informal accounts, that is on interviews 
and conversations with single scientists, and participants, 
descriptions of events which occurred within the laboratory. 
In so doing they start to build up a picture of scientific 
activities which differs significantly from that of WSB. 
This picture stresses the role of socially contingent 
factors in the production of scientific knowledge and the 
way ideosyncratic, localised events impinge upon this pro- 
cess. Even where informal accounts which stress the order 
and logic of the process are given they are not taken to 
reveal the genuine organisation of scientific procedures. 
It is therefore possible to see the difference between 
WSB's and Latour and Knorr-Cetinats analytic conclusions 
to be a direct function of the different forms of accounts 
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on which their studies are based. In each case the analy- 
tic findings become dependent on the participants' own 
interpretbtive work and the way this is organised according 
to the specific context of discourse. 
Despite marked theoretical contrasts9 and disagree- 
ments over methodological issuesq Wynne shares many feat- 
ures of Latour's and WSB's flawed approach to utterances 
and writings. In the first place, Wynne's general analytic 
goal is to provide a causal explanation of a specific set 
of scientific beliefs in terms of the social interests of 
the scientists who hold them. However, he takes note of 
the shortcomings of traditional sociological explanations 
which infer causal links on the basis of analytically 
adduced homologies between the structure of scientific bel- 
iefs and the ideology or interests of social groups. He 
therefore emphasises the relevance of scientists' interp- 
retative accounts to his attempts to identify actual con- 
nections between social groups, their ideologies and the 
content of bodies of technical knowledge. Yet if he had 
done this systematically he would have been forced to 
abandon his general causal approach. For there is no nec- 
essary relation between participantst accountino and act- 
ual causal processes. Indeed, scientists' accounts of the 
connection between background culture, social interests 
and so on and scientistst beliefs are highly variable. 
Only by a process which selectively ironises certain 
accounts and reifies others could any semblance of a causal 
model be maintained. 
This, however, is exactly what Wynne does. He treats 
certain accounts as if they were literal descript-ionsg 
others as if they embodied implicit social ideas and cert- 
ain accounts are disregarded altogether. Thus Wynne clearly 
treats certain physicists' descriptions of what the 'tech- 
nical state of the discipline requires' as literally cor- 
rect and incorporates them into his analytic account. By 
treating certain participants' accounts as literally cor- 
rect, Wynne is able to discount or to ignore those other 
accounts which suggest an entirely rational (non-social) 
explanation for the beliefs in question. 
In the course of his analysis Wynne treats a set of 
discrete texts as revealing a single theoretical perspect- 
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ive and claims a coherence in participantst beliefs an 
the grounds of their shared place of work (Cambridge)t 
relationships of friendship, and other associations. 
Again, such an analytic procedure is suited to producing 
apparently clearcut and consensual analytic entities 
(theories, social groupsq etc. ) which might be seen to 
stand in an orderly causal relation to one another. Yet 
such an analysts' construction is only possible through an 
extreme simplification of varied participants' accounts. 
For instanceg Wynne uses a number of extracts from phys- 
icists' writings to document the nature of the ether theory. 
Each is treated as a neutral document to the genuine nat- 
ure of the theory. However, this procedure ceases to be 
satisfactory if we allow that different versions of a the- 
ory may be formulated in different contexts; stronger 
versions in summary conclusions than in results sectionsp 
say.; - Once we start to take all participants' discourse 
equally seriously, and not attempt the futile task of 
sifting the literal from the rhetorical, the possibility 
of clearcutg definitive explanations fades into the dist- 
ance. 
Like Wynne and Latour, Collins draws upon a much wider 
range of discursive material than. WSB. He also recognises 
the constructed and occasioned nature of participants' dis- 
course. Neverthelessp instead of treatinq all discourse 
in the same even handed fashion - which he might have 
been expected to do if he had taken his general relativistic 
premise seriously - he adopts an innappropriate form of 
analysis which leads him to accept certain participants' 
accounts as literal. These become a basis for Collinst 
analytic conclusions. 
The way Collins selectively deals with participants' 
discourse to enable him to construct a definitive version 
of the effect of social processes on scientific events is 
very like the approach taken by Wynne. Collins adopts 
as quite literal certain scienti-sts' third person accounts 
of the role of social processes in a widely distributed 
social networkv while rejecting certain other scientists' 
first person accounts, which explain the same knowledge 
in rational terms. In this way Collins comesto reify 
certain structured variations in scientists' discoursel as 
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did the researchers discussed earlier in this chapter. 
His approach can be seen to make the inverse error to 
WSB who simply adopted sciertists' formal, first person 
accounts along with a version of participants' folk 
history of their field. In each case insufficient attent- 
ion is paid to the interpretative functions of accounting. 
Collinsv of coursel does suggest a criterion for the 
choice between alternative accounts, which is his 'part- 
icipants' experiencet of the field. He suggests that it 
is this which enables him to divide accounts into the 
true and false, literal and rhetorical. Howevers not only 
does this raise the general issue of how research based on 
a completely unavailable entity such as this may be asses- 
sed, but it can also be seen to be unsatisfactory in pract- 
ice. For, as we saw aboveg even the quotes from particip- 
ants which Collins uses to typify particular findings are 
open to varied and contradictory readings. 
Despite thisq many of Collins's broader analytic 
claims are closer to the position adopýted here than either 
Wynne or Latour and certainly WSB. He places considerable 
stress on the centrality of participantst own categories 
and interpretations and the way their discourse is organ- 
ised to create certain kinds of effects. If these suggestions 
had been consistently followed through his research would 
have been quite compatible with that advocated here. Unfor- 
tunately, in his attempt to produce strongly social explan- 
ations which connect contingent social events to the for- 
mal constitution of knowledge, Collins is forced to reify 
and ironise scientistst own interpretative work and he 
ends up far away from his relativist ideal. 
Let me now draw out some of the more positive implic- 
ations of these points. The goal of my discussion of these 
studies has not been merely to demonstrate their inadequac- 
ies as such. My main-concern has been to elucidate certain 
fundamental and unresolved methodological problems with 
the way social studies of science have dealt with partic- 
OF ipants' discourse in its varied kinds. Some&the main con- 
clusions of this discussion can be summarised as follows. 
1) In each of the studies discussed above scientists' 
discourse in one form or another constituted 
the fundamental analytic resource. 
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2) The sucial researchers' conclusions and analyses 
were built up in part from participants' own int- 
erpretative work which was adopted without serious 
critical examination. 
3) In no case was sufficient attention paid to the 
variability of scientists' discourse and the man- 
ner in which it is socially generated. 
The overall implication from this aiscussiong then, is 
that there is a need for a systematic and rigorous invest- 
igation of the way scientific discourse is produced in dif- 
ferent social circumstances. Indeed, insofar as research 
throughout the various approaches to the social study of 
science is flawed by an inadequate and unexamined approach 
to discoursel such an investigation will be an essential 
precursor to more traditional forms of research. It rem- 
ains to be seen how far such an investigation would event- 
ually place this traditional research on a firmer empirical 
basis or if it will only provide an even more comprehensive 
demonstration of its essential misconception. As long as 
analysts continue selectively to adopt scientists' own 
interpretative formulationsg and as long as they continue 
to disregard the contextual dependence of scientific dis- 
course, they will fail to provide viable descriptions or 
explanations of scientists' acts, beliefs and social circ- 
umstances. 
The most fundamental shift adopted by this new app- 
roach is - to use a rather well wocrn phrase - 
that sci- 
entistst discourse is tre. ated as a topic rather than a res- 
ource. In practiceg this means that when an issue such as 
social categorisation is dealt with, instead of treating 
scientists' categorisations as more, or possibly lessp 
accurate descriptions of actual scientific groupings, they 
are examined in terms of their construction, organisation 
and function. That is, we start to ask: how are certain 
textual formulations made to appear as literal descriptions 
of categories of scientists?; what different kinds of cat- 
egorisation accounts are there and in what interpretative 
contexts are they used?; and what consequences do different 
kinds of accounts accomplish? 
The significance of these questions is that they imply 
a different approach to the data on which all forms of 
- 54 - 
analysis are ultimately based: scientific discourse. In 
those studies discussed in the early sections of this chap- 
ter discourse is treated as a pathway to theactions, bel- 
iefs, events, etc. which are considered to be the real topic 
of analytic interest. The discourse itself is only consid- 
ered interesting insofar as it provides an indirect discov- 
ery technique. However, with the kinds of question which 
are the concern of discourse analysts it is the discourse 
itself which is the central topic for study. Language is 
treated as its own reality rather than as a medium through 
which reality must be teased. This is not to say that sci- 
entific discourse is somehow transparent or immune from 
interpretative disputes 178 _ indeed such disputes are exactly 
179 the analytic topic of chapter 7 of this thesis Rather, 
this approach is meant to avoid unwarranted extrapolation 
from scientists' discourse to the 'entities' - theoriesp 
choices, ideasq interestsl paradigms, etc. - which it per- 
petually formulates. 
A fundamental assumption of this approach is that sci- 
entists' accounts are highly variable; specifically that 
they vary in accordance with the constraints and opportun- 
180 ities provided by particular interpretative contexts 
This, of course, is a. claim with empirical implications. 
I have documented in the above discussion of more custom- 
ary analytic positions a number of instances of significant 
variability in the scientists' discourse which is quoted 
or referred to. However, this does not show the full extent 
of this variability, nor the regularity of its organisation. 
In the chapters to come I will document systematic variation 
not only between different scientists - which is quite unex- 
ceptional in controversal fields - but also within the dis- 
course of single scientists. The approach adopted here 
does not presuppose the homogeneity of individuals' beliefs 
and actions as they appear in their accounts. On the cont- 
rary, it is suggested that the same scientists will char- 
acterise scientific beliefs, actions, the nature of theor- 
ies and so ong in systematically varying ways according to 
the specific interpretative task at hand. 
Furthermore, the same goes for the texts of a partic- 
ular author or even an individual scientific text. In each 
case significant variability in accounting has been docu- 
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mented 
181 
9 It cannot be assumed - as do all the analysts 
discussed above in one way or another - that texts or 
bodies of texts are seamlessp unifiedt coherent entities; 
or that those textual features which are problematic can 
be excluded as inconsistent with the essential or overall 
meaning of the text. Of course, as we have seen the flex- 
ibility of ordinary language is such that a unitary version 
182 
of a text or an event can always be produced Howeverg 
a close analysis of the procedures used to do this - such 
as that I have begun to carry out on the studies above - 
will reveal the selective process of reifying and ironising 
scientists' accounts and the unexamined dependence of anal- 
ysts' claims on participants' repertoire of sense-making 
resources. 
One of the main concerns of participants is with the 
creation and sustenance of coherent versions of their soc- 
ial worlds suitable for specific interpretative contexts. 
They draw upon their repertoire of available resources 
accordingly. Yet as analysts have customarily adopted this 
same goal (in some form at least), they end up competing 
with scientists themselves on more or less their own terms. 
Analysts may legitimate their activity by describing it as 
social research on science but the fact remains that their 
techniques and procedures are glorified versions of those 
of the actors they are supposedly studying. 
Discourse Analysis and Ethnomethodoloqy 
So far I have been Concerned to show how a programme 
of discourse analysis arises directly from the inadequacies 
found in more traditional studies of science. At its most 
basic, it can be argued that a more careful examination of 
discursive data coupled with a consistent adherence to the 
tenets of symmetry and impartiality requires a systematic 
analysis of discourse. The careful examination of discur- 
sive data would acknowledge its pervasive variability; and 
a rigorous impartiality would prevent the treatment of cer- 
tain accounts as more true than others. Furthermore, taken 
seriously, impartiality would prevent the analyst elevating 
any one accounting context - the formal research paperl sayt 
or the 'revealing' informal interview - over others - coffee 
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table anecdotes, perhaps, or scientific jokes. Discourse 
from any of these contexts would be treated as an equally 
viable accountg from an analysts' point of view, of sci- 
entists' actions and beliefs. The logic of this process 
can be clearly seen in Collins's ITRASPt paperg to which 
I referred earlier, in which he generates a position very 
Close to discourse analysis by direct extrapolation from 
tenets 2 and 3 of the Strong Programme. It is only his 
desire for a more definitive (but therefore more partial 
and less relativist! ) story which eventually prevents him 
from arriving at a full blown programme of discourse anal- 
ysis. 
In addition to the emphasis in the foregoing discus- 
sion on the necessity for discourse analysis as a response 
to problems inherent in more traditional studies of science 
it is also compatible withl and indeed may be warranted 
by, a number of recent developments in sociolinguisticss 
semiotics and ethnomethodology. This is not the place for 
an elaborate theoretical discussion which would fully doc- 
ument the areas of agreement and disagreement. In later 
ch-apters I will draw upon and discuss some of the theDret- 
ical notions of Halliday and his followers and use certain 
of the concepts developed by the continental semiologist 
Barthes. To end this chapter, however, I intend to address 
some questions concerning the relationship between disc- 
ou. rse analysis and ethnomethodology. 
These questions are significant because of the recent 
appearance of explicitly ethnomethodological studies of 
science. It is important to know whether these studies can 
simply be combined with those done under the rubric of 
discourse analysis as a general lethno-discursivel prog- 
ramme, or whether there are significant disagreements bet- 
ween their methods and claims. In addition, a discussion 
of the differences and similarities of these two approaches 
will provide further explication of what is contained in 
the proposal for an analysis of scientists' discourse. 
It would, of course, be an enormous task to try to 
distingbish discourse analysis from ethnomethodology in 
general as the latter now consists of a huge and heterog- 
eneous body of work. Moreoverg it could involve dealing 
with basic questions such as whether Garfinkel and 
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Cicourel originated different basic approaches 
183 
or 
Uhether conversational analysis constitutes a separate 
field with its own methods and theoretical perspective. 
However, the task can be made considerably more manageable 
by concentrating mainly on those studies which explicitly 
attempt to formulate an ethnomethodological a. pproach to, 
184 
science 
In their overview article Temporal order in labor- 
atory work 
185 Michael Lynch, Eric Livingstone and Harold 
Garfinkel (henceforth LLG) deny that their article is 
meant to 'define a programmatic basis for ethnomethodol- 
ogical studies of uork in the scierLces' 
186 Neverthelessp 
they do make some general assertions as to the nature of 
an ethnomethodological approach to science which are of 
interest h: ere. One focus for their studies of scientific 
work is the relationship between 'instructions' and 
'practices'. They note that rules can never be suffic- 
iently explicitly formulated to fully 
, 
specify the actions 
they are intended to guide; that isl they note that "some- 
thing more" is necessary for engaging in actual practice 
than even the most detziled of instructions. This ident- 
ifies a topic for ethnomethodological analysis. 
It is this ubiquitous "something more" that delim- 
its a field of investigatable phenomena which is 
not thematized in formal accounts of scientific 
methods. (187) 
One of the features of this topic is its concern 
with a phenomenon which is not explicitly formulated in 
formal scientific writings. LLG's topic is thus the 
practice of science, the actual activities of scientists 
in the laboratoryl rather than formal accounts of that 
practice: 
ethnomethodological studies attempt to discover and 
to demonstrate the ways in which various scientific 
practices compose themselves through vernacular con- 
versations and the ordinariness of embodied discip- 
linary activities... Fthey] consult locally observ- 
able sequences of conjuct that make up the details 
of a discipline's daily uork. (188) 
These practices are not captured in formal scientific dis- 
course; 
accounts of scientific activitiesq i. e. 9 "inscript- ions, " factual statements, documentary recordsq and 
published reports, become disengaged from the actual courses of scientific activity that produced them. 
(189) 
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%ot only is this Practice not fully and explicitly 
formulated in scientists' formal accounts butv according 
to Lynch, it contrasts with accounts produced by social 
researchers concerned with scienne: 
[The participatinq ethnomethodologist] can begin 
to specify the numerous ways in which the actual 
practice of science contrasts with the many ver- 
sions of science which are extant in the science 
studies literature. (190) 
When LLG and Lynch formulate the ethnomethodological 
programme for studyinn science in this way it becomes 
almost indistinguishable from the methodological (as 
opposed to theoretical) claims of constructivist resear- 
chers such as Knorr-Cetina and Latour. Indeedq LLG sug- 
gest that Latour and Knorr-Cetina have 'taken up topics 
tigi affiliated to the literatures of ethnomethodology 
Both of these approaches stress the importance of examin- 
ing the actual practices of scientists because of the fal- 
libility and distortions inherent in accounts of activity. 
The main difference between them comes in their theoretical 
aims: Latour and Knorr-Cetinals goal is the production of 
a constructivist theory af scientific practice; while LLG 
oppose exactly that. They describe constructivism asq 
a theoretically postulated descriptive philosophy: a 
philosophy that remains endlessly embedded in academic 
arguments about science with no attention being paid 
to the endogenously produced variants of argument and 
practice that constitute the technical development of 
ordinary scientific inquiry. (192) 
This methodological convergence between ethnomethod- 
ology and constructivisM 
193 
raises the issue of whether 
they are prey to the same problems. For instance, in 
their suggestion for studying the "something else" invol- 
ved in rule use LLG seem to suggest that a definitive account 
of that "something else" is possible, thus allowing the 
ethnomethodologist, to show exactly how a rule is followed. 
Despite their rejection of theorising and their rejection 
of other research on science, this analytic goal is a very 
traditional one in sccial studies of science 
194. It is 
very like the question of how rules, for defining a proper 
195 replication, say, really operate In chapter 51 will 
develop a rather different approach to rules196 0 
I will examine this question of the convergenceV 
divergence between ethnomethodology and discourse analysis 
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in more deta. J.. '. with Garfinkelq Lynch and Livingstone's 
(henceforth, S'-L) paper: The work of a discovering science 
Construed Lith materials from the optically discovered pul- 
sar 
1! ý 7e This is based on the analysis of a tape recording 
and laboratory notes made 'on the evening of the discovery 
19B 
of the optical pulsar at Steward Observatory' I do not 
intend to produce a detailed critique of this entire paper. 
Rather I shall concentrate on its status as study of Idis- 
199 
coveryl 
In my discussion of Knorr-Cetinal work on the prod- 
uction of scientific knowledge (pp. 16-18 above) I noted 
that by treating knowledge as if it was 'manufactured' at 
a geographically specific location she produced a highly 
asocial conception of knowledge. Effectively she ignores 
any broader social processes which might be involved in the 
constitutior of knowledge and in particular she giveG no 
account of its acceptance (or not) by the relevant scient- 
ific community. The issue of scientific discoveryt which 
is never explicitly raised in GLL's paper is of the same 
order. Brannigan has stressed the significance of a number 
of essential contextual features without which the term 
'discovery' is unlikely to be applied by scientists. 
The attribution of the status, discovery, is founded 
on the processes of social recognition by which the 
announcement of an achievement is seen to be a sub- 
stantively relevant possibility, determined in the 
course of motivated scientific investigations or 
schemes of research, whose conclusion or outcome is 
convincingly true or validl and whose announcement 
is, for all appearancest unprecedented. These are 
the central elements in the apprehension of scient- 
ific discoveries, both for the individual scientist 
and his or her community. (200) 
Furthermorel Brannigan has stressed that discoveries are 
made out as such; that is, discovery accounts have an irred- 
ucably performative status and cannot be taken as mere des- 
criptions of 'natural' objects. 
It seEMS, however, that GLL fall into exactly this 
trap. Thrcughout their paper they assume the unproblematic 
status of the discovery of the optical pulsar. When GLL 
list the constitueots of the essence of the astronomers 
Cocke and Disneyts 'discovering work' no reference is made 
to the processes through which the observational runs are 
constituted as a discovery by the scientific community. 
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As Collins has pointed out 
201 
9 this means that GLL's 
analysis does not even address the issue of the social 
constitution of the discovery. The analysis would, in 
other words, be identical even if it were later decided 
that the findings did not after all indicate the presence 
of an optical pulsar but simply a fault in the apparatus. 
Under these conditions GLL's claims to be looking at the 
essence, the 'quiddity', of discovering work becomes 
rather far fetched! 
In generalg LLG suggest that they are explicatingg 
the geneology of the object by tracing the "Galilean 
Objects" of science back to their origins in the emb- 
odied inquiries that make up ordinary technical act- 
ivities in science. (202) 
Howeverg this notion of -'origins' is highly simplistic. 
Like Knorr-Cetinals image of knowledge being manufactured 
in amongst the chemicals on the lab bench, it seems to 
owe much to scientists' own folk models of knowledge prod- 
uctiong whilst paying scant attention to the role of the 
scientific community in warranting knowledge and the inter- 
pretative contexts in which knowledge claims are formul-! - 
203 
ated 
It seemsq thenj that ethnomethodological approaches 
to science will not necessarily mesh with discursive app- 
roaches. There will be areas of methodological and theor- 
etical disagreement: in the case discussed, disagreement 
over how discoveries may be studied and over what sort of 
entity discoveries can be. This does notq howeverg imply 
that there will be a general incompatibility between ethno- 
methodological approaches and discourse analysis. Indeed, 
with respect to discoveryq Brannigan's own work is explic- 
itly derived from the literature of ethnomethodology; yet 
it is wholly compatible with a discourse analytic approach. 
Likewise, Woolgar's work on scientific texts, which will be 
drawn upon in later chapters, has ethnomethodological 
sources 
204, but can be easily integrated into the present 
framework. 
More generally, there is a considerable stress in bcth 
of these approaches on the indexicality of expressions 
20E 
and the treatment of participants' ways of making sense of 
206 their worlds as a topic rather than a resource Howeverg 
as I have indicated, these emphases have arisen in discourse 
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analysis in respunse to fundamental analytic issues con- 
cerning the study of science rather than in the central 
theoretical and methodý, loqical problematics of ethnometh- 
odology. Indexicality - the occasioned nature of scient- 
ists' discourse - becomes a crucial and unavoidable issue 
when the pervasive variability of scientistst accounts is 
recognised. Furthermoreq a rigorous adherence to symmetry 
and impartiality prevents the analyst from adopting part- 
icipants' own interpretative work. For to do so would be 




I have now outlined six different programmes for the 
social study of science: quantitative analysis; construct- 
iVi5M; interest theory; relativism; ethnomethodology and 
discourse analysis. I have raised serious problems with 
each of the first four of these programmes which are cent- 
red on the way they deal with scientific discourse. None 
of these programmes develops an analytic practice which 
deals satisfactorily with scientists' writings and utter- 
ances. I have argued 
2018 that if these problems are to be 
resolved a shift in perspective must take place such that 
analysts approach scientists' discourse directly and explic- 
itly rather than considering it as a mere pathway to recov- 
ering scientists' actions and beliefs. The discourse anal- 
ysis which I am advocating has a number of similarities 
with ethnomethodology which has led to a similar set of 
criticisms of more traditional research. Howevert not all 
of its claims or practical analyses are compatible with 
discourse analysis. 
Having established in general terms the need for an 
analysis of scientific discoursel the next task is to out- 
line the specific research topic for the present thesis 
and the analytical problems it raises. 1n the chapter which 
follows I will discuss issues of a practical nature to do 
with the problemsof data collection and transcription, and 
give an initial account of the contexts in which data were 
gathered. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ANALYTIC PRELIMINARIES 
In this chapter I intend to describe the analytic mat- 
erials which will be used in the five emprical chapters 
which follow; namely transcripts of scientific conferences 
attended by psychologists. Conferences have received rem- 
arkably little attention by those interested in social 
processes in science. Just over a paragraph of Ziman's 
Public Knowledge 
1 
makes up virtually the entire corpus of 
work which considers the general role of conferencesy and 
this only consists of a brief unsupported speculation can- 
2 
cerning their role in displaying scientific consensus 
There is a study - by Ian Lubek - which attempts to 
perform an analysis of conference proceedings and thus 
show how they were influenced by the 'power relationships' 
between the different participants. In particular, Lubek 
suggests that the 'power structure of the discussion' will 
3 
reflect the power structure of the discipline as a whole 
Unfortunatelyq what the study does best is illustrate the 
pitfalls of traditional approaches and premature quantific- 
ation. The author divides participants into Ivisiblest 
and 'not-so-visibles' according to how recognisable their 
names would be 'to a large number of North American and 
European' scientists in this field (social psychology). 
By analysing the quantity of contributions to the discus- 
sion Lubek shows that visibles contributed disproportion- 
ately more than not-so-visibles. However, as a demonstrat- 
ion of power relations the study is totally inadequate. ' 
There is no evidence that the not-so-visibles were forced 
to act in that way; indeed, they are actually more repres- 
ented in the discussion after editing (suggesting benevol- 
enceg perhapsv rather than despotism! ). In fact Lubek's 
findings appear to be totally circular - the not-so-visibles 
are merely acting according to their classification. Fur- 
thermoreq Lubek accepts that the content of the discussion 
(about the nature of the discipline) shows that some visib- 
les were highly critical of the 'Present order' while some 
I 
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'not-so-visibles manifested clear aspirations to the leg- 
4 itimate ordE.. rl Overall, then, the study suffers from 
exactly the flaws of quantitative methods discussed in the 
first section of chapter 1. 
In some respects this general absence Of serious res- 
earch on conferences is surprising; conferences are virt- 
ually the only situation where scientists from different 
establishments and theoretical persuasions are gathered 
together for face to face communication and are enabled to 
confront each other's knowledge claims with immediate feed- 
back. In many ways conferences seem like a prime site for 
revealino the operation of a variety of social processes 
in science. 
Some of the possible reasons for this neglect will be 
discussed below. However, I will argue that despite the 
lack of attention paid to them conferences are occasions 
where many different kinds of scientific account are prod- 
u-ned, and they therefore provide an ideal data base for 
addressing questions concerning the natureq organisation 
and function of scientific discourse. After this I will 
describe some of the more pragmatic considerations which 
led to the selection of the particular conferences for study 
and then discuss the technical issues which arise in trans- 
cribing scientific discussions and the preparation of 
such transcripts for analysis. 
Throughout this chapter I will draw on Arthur 
Koestler's book: The Call Girls as a heuristic device for 
clarifying some of the issues involved in studying con- 
5 ference discourse This book is a fictional account of an 
international symposium concerned with the 'survival of the 
human species'. A number of 'colourfull scientific auth- 
orities in different fields (mainly related to social sci- 
ences: behaviourismg psychoanalysis, developmental psych- 
ology, cybernetics, neurology) are gathered for a week at 
an exclusive Swiss conference centre. Outside of their 
ivory tower there exists an international crisis and rum- 
ours of war. Koestler ironically contrasts the pettyness 
of the scientists' squabbles, and their moral impotence, 
with the potentially grave significance of their research 
for the broader international situation - As the dust cover 
notes: the book moved the Evening News to suggest that 'scientists 
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and philosophers ... are just like ordinary peoplell E)es- 
pite its status as a work of fiction (or partially so: 
'the authDrsv publications and experiments quoted by 
[the characters] are authentic 16) it is probably the most 
complete account of a scientific conference which exists 
at present 
7. 
My interest in Koestler's book, is not with its acc- 
uracy in capturing the essentials of scientists' activit- 
ies at conferences. Its purpose here is to provide a con- 
venient checklist of some of the various kinds of activit- 
ies which are taken to occur at conferences and some of 
the ways they are made sense of: indeed, Koestler's book 
itself can be seen as another form of discursive data. 
Likewiseq my general approach to conference-discourse is 
not with the goal of reconstructing what went on at any 
conference: the nature of alliances, the persuasive power 
of presentations and so on. As I have emphasised in the 
previous chapterg the aims of discourse analysis are not 
of this kind. Instead conferences are of interest because 
they provide a rich source of data which throws light on 
the way participantst construct their discourse in accord- 
ance with specific social circumstances. 
Conference Discourse as Data 
A) Advantages 
As I have indicatedg there are a number of benefits 
which accrUe from the use of conference data. It is worth 
describing them in some detail. 
1) Conferences are a novel source of dbta. Two kinds 
of novelty are involved here. Firstly there is an absence 
of systematic researchq or indeed research of any kind, on 
the general topic of scientific conferences. More import- 
antly, there is also a dearth of research which examines 
direct, face to face interaction between scientists. Alth- 
ough the ethnographic uorkers Latour and Knorr-Cetina have 
stressed the importance of studying scientists in the lab- 
oratoryt very little of their analysis is based upon dis- 
course between scientists; the majority of their verbal 
data is collected in the more traditional fbrm of individual 
interviews. More recently exceptions have appeared to this 
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in the form of studies by Lynch 
a9 Garfinkelq Lynch and 
9 10 Livingstone , and Williams and Law The first two of 
these use transcripts of interaction produced in the course 
of experiments or observational runs; the third is based 
on a transcript of scientists discussing the redrafting of 
a paper for publication. 
A common feature of these latter studies is that their 
samples of scientists' discourse are produced in the course 
of joint activity, while participants are engaged in a 
shared project of some kind. They do not have the adver- 
sorial character which is a feature of much conference 
discussion. Koestler's fictional text strongly emphasises 
this feature. It is organised around a series of antag- 
onisms between speakers, and he indicates that undermining 
others' positions may be an almost ritualised aspect of 
conference interaction: 
After a few seconds' silence, Dr Valenti lifted 
a well manicured handq but Bruno got in first. He 
had missed his chance in the morning session to dem- 
olish Halder, but Harriet as a target would do just 
as well. He was not sure, he informed Mr Chairmang 
whether Dr Epsom had spoken in earnest, or, to put it 
in a different wayp whether she had intended her prop- 
osal to be taken into serious consideration... (11) 
In this passage Koestler implies that the victims are int- 
erchangable; it is the general procedure of demolition 
which is all important. Although only a few of the trans- 
cribed conference discussions I have examined could be 
Cla55ed as IdemolitionsIg searching, critical questioning 
is the predominant form. The conference transcripts are 
thus more variegated than those of the cooperating scient- 
ists which have been analysed up to now. 
2) Transcribing conferences allows data to be col- 
lected naturalistically. That isp the data are collected 
with almost no interference from the researcher in a sit- 
uation which would occur whether the researcher was present 
or not. Moreover, conferences and workshops are a common 
and routinised activity in all scientific disciplines. 
The importance of naturalistic studies for analysis 
Of scientific discourse is not the same as in more tradit- 
ional social research. They are not considered significant 
because they avoid interviewer biassing, for instance. Bec- 
ause in the case of discourse analysis the aim is not to 
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construct an accuratet unbiassed picture of actions and 
beliefs. Neverthelesst naturalistic studies do have cer- 
tain practical and theoretical advantages over interview 
studies, particularly those interviews in which graduate 
students interrogate high status scientists. As Gilbert 
has noted, such scientists typically present science in 
12 the way that they habitually presented it to students 
The problem is not that this form of scientific accounting 
is biassed, or even that it is uninteresting - it can be 
very revealing about certain features of scientists' int- 
erpretative practices - rather it is that in these sit- 
uations scientists are drawing on only a limited ran. ge of 
13 their accounting systems The conference data allows 
exploration of some of the systems which would not usually 
appear in interviews. (It must be rememberedg however, 
that there are certain systems which are readily used in 
interviews but more rarely so in conferences. ) 
Although the traditional question of bias is not rel- 
evant here, there is still a question ofthe generality of 
findings. Despite the fact that it is not assumed thaL 
interview talk can be used to construct what actually hap- 
pens in a particular social realm it is assumed that the 
interactional aid interpretative work within the interview 
is similar in some respects to that which occurs in more 
usual scientific contexts. It is thus essential to anal- 
yse naturalistic data, if only as a check on the general- 
14 ity of interview based findings 
As a final note on the naturalistic status of the con- 
ference transcripts: in three cases out of five I made my 
own audio recordings and drew attention to the possibility 
that participants' contributions would be used for res- 
earch purposes. This could, of course, have unspecified 
effects on the discourse. Howevert tape recording confer- 
ences is a regular practicel and it is not especially unus- 
ual for edited transcripts to be included in published 
versions of conference proceedings. In one form or another 
this was the intention in three of the conferences I used. 
It was also the intention of the organisers of Koestler's 
fictional conference. With its use being this common it 
seems unlikely that the tape recorder would have been an 
unusually disruptive influence. 
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3) At conferencesq scientists' positions are eval- 
uated by experts who have an authentic participants' und- 
15 
erstandinq of the fields in question This can be dup- 
licated in interviews to some extent by the social res- 
earcher having a thorough grounding in the relevant liter- 
ature, by joint interviewing by a social scientist and an 
expert in the field 
16 
, or by the interviewer participating 
17 in some way in the scientific area under study However, 
these are limitations on such approaches. It would clearly 
not be acceptable to generate too much conflict with the 
participants. Apart from any ethical consideration - which 
is no less important here than with 'ordinary people' - 
high conflict might lead to the termination of the interview. 
At conferencesl on the other hand, heavy sarcasm and aggres- 
sive criticism is not uncommon and considerable heat can be 
generated on occasion. 
More interestingly, conference discussions can allow 
for persistent and informed questioning by experts in a 
number of different fieldsdirected towards what are seen 
to be weak points in scientists' belief systems. Like- 
wise, replies must be formulated to satisfy a varied and 
skilled audience. It is this general level of participants' 
working competence that interviews wouldbe hard put to dup- 
licate. Such expertise may not always be an advantage, of 
course. Points directed at an interviewer who is seen as 
a lay person can be very revealing. Neverthelessq the 
conference may generate patterns of accounting which have 
a subtlety and technical complexity difficult to achieve in 
interviews. 
4) From the perspective of discourse analysis, one 
of the most important features of conferences is that their 
general structure allows for the production of a number of 
different versions of the same research. Typically there 
will be a written paper which will form the basis of a ver- 
bal presentation and will be published in a volume of pro- 
ceedings (some form of publication took place in three of 
the conferences I examined). There may be a first draft 
of this paper which is precirculated and subsequently mod- 
ified. There is also the version of the paper which is 
actually presented, the version 'in' the transcript. This 
may range from a reading of the written paperg which just 
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makes small adjustments for verbal fluency and timing, to 
the researcher speaking ofPthe top of his or her headq 
without notes, and with no existing paper necessary. In 
addition there are versions of the research which appear 
in discussion periods: speakers may redescribe their own 
research in response to questions and questioners may 
formulate the nature of the research in the course of 
asking or commenting. 
This multiplication of versions enables the analyst 
to start to relate the form of these various accounts of 
research and theory to the nature of the occasion of their 
use. In the analytic chapters which follow these kinds 
of comparisons will be made repeatedly. 
B) Disadvantages 
Despite the various advantages of using conference 
material as data there are also certain drawbacks. These 
can be classed as two kinds: pragmatic and theoretical. 
1) The central pragmatic disadvantage is the lack of 
control the researcher has over the course of the discus- 
sion. One of the great rewards of interviews is that top- 
ics can be addressed in a systematic fashion and each par- 
ticipant can be asked to comment on each topic. This 
allows for instanceg the analyst to compare every member's 
version of a particular issue. This is not always pos- 
sible with conference datag because not all scientists 
will address each point and often topics of interest 
appear in an ad hoc manner throughout a transcript. 
This difference should not be exaggeratedl however. 
Even with interviews9 topics can not always be easily con- 
fined to their scheduled Islott. It may be found that 
issues not initially scheduled by the researcher become 
important, yet not all participants have provided comments 
on them. With conference and interview data the approach 
is the same; every occurrence of a topic of interest is 
coded so that analysis can be based on as complete a sample 
as possible. Typically a number of different scientists 
will contribute to a topic and some will comment on a num- 
ber of occasions. This is often enough to document the 
existence of a particular interpretative practice, and its 
form; although it does not always allow the analyst to 
assess its generality. This lack of control does have a 
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payý)ff, however. It is likely that those topics which 
occur often do so because they are seen as important by 
the participants - this may not be true when they are 
scheduled in semi-structured interviews. In addition 
in intefview-s 
scientists4may pay unusual attention to proto-sociological 
speculations if they believe these to be the central int- 
erest of the researcher. 
2) The theoretical difficulty with conference data 
isq I think, one of the reasons why they have received 
so little serious attention in the past. It is centred on 
the suggestion that conference discourse is 'only rhetor- 
ical', that while scientists act in the laboratoryl they 
perform in the conference hall Koestler at one point 
has one of his characters emphasise this view of confer- 
ences. 
When you read [the participants13 stuff or get them 
alone in a relaxed mood, you realize their qualities - 
but the moment you put them together in a conference 
room, they behave like schoolboys performino a solemn 
play. They are worse than politicians, because polit- 
icians are ham-actors by natural disposition, whereas 
most academics seem to suffer from arrested emotional 
development. Politicians take their pride in making 
impassioned speeches and indulging in rhetorical fli- 
ghts; scientists pose as dispassionate servants of 
Truth, free from all emotional bias, while ambition 
and jealousy steadily gnaw away their entrails... 
Discussion? Interdisciplinary dialogue? There is no 
such thing, except on the printed programme. (19) 
Voestler distinguishes between the versions scientists prod- 
uce in different contexts9 stressing in particular the 
faults and biasses produced in conferences where present- 
ations we determined by psychological and sociological int- 
erests hidden behind a veneer of scientific objectivity. 
However, this sort of suggestion must be unpacked very 
carefully. 
The charge of purveying rhetoric rather than facts 
is not confined to conferences alone. In the previous 
chapter Collins's work on gravity wave scientists showed 
some of them claiming a particular journal article was 
rhetorical. Yet this claim was far from consensual among 
gravity wave scientists, and certainly could not be used 
as an unproblematic analytic resource. Likewise with con- 
ferences. Occasionally a presentation will be described 
as rhetoricalg but this is likely to be a signal for dis- 
Pute rather than agreement; speakers do not regularly des- 
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cribe their own presentations as rhetorical. The logic of 
discourse analysis's impartial stance towards accounts pre- 
vents the acceptance of either of these claims. Indeed, 
they take on an analytic interest in their own right. In 
the same way that I suggested that Collins should look at 
the way rhetoric is attributed and not attempt the futile 
task of trying to discern which articles are actually rhet- 
orical, the use made of such claims at conferencesq or 
about conferencesl can be examined. 
It is interesting to speculate on the origins of this 
jaundiced view of conference discourse. One important 
difference between conference presentations and formal res- 
earch articles is that verbal presentations are inevitably 
personalised. When speakers are presenting their own res- 
earch, it is not possible to achieve the homogenised imper- 
sonal style nor to easily avoid attributing agency to the 
researcher by devices such as 'results suggest', 'studies 
indicate' and so on. Furthermore, individual differences 
of various kinds (sex, tone of voice, heightt competence in 
delivery, dresss etc. ) are apparent between scientists. 
These are all features of the 'contingent repertoire' (see 
chapter 3) which is a system of concepts for explaining 
scientific belief not as a result of the application of 
procedures of rational assessment to experimental evidence$ 
but as a consequence of distorting social and psycholog- 
ical factors 20 . It thus seems likely that presentations 
of this kind will be seen as more rhetorical - or are 
liable to be described in more rhetorical terms - because 
of these features which conform to the contingent reper- 
toire. it will be more difficult to make the presentation 
appear to be simply describing features of the external 
world rather than directed at persuading the audience of 
some claim. It may be that only written papers can con- 
21 form fully to the impersonal empiricist ideal 
Another possible reason for the neglect of confer- 
ences by social researchers may be the implicit division 
between 'production' and 'context', with the production of 
scientific knowledge being treated as more important than 
the context in which it is evaluated and communicated. This 
sort of distinction can be seen particularly in the work 
of ethnographers and ethnomethodologists (documented in 
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chapter 1) where the wider context plays very much a sec- 
ondary role to the local site of Imanufacture's Howevert 
it must be reemphasised that there are no adequate grounds 
for this imbalanced perspective; a consistent and impartial 
approach must examine both - indeed, such a study may throw 
the distinction between production and evaluation into 
doubt. In general, the suggestion that conferences are 
'more rhetorical' must be resisted - it cannot form the 
basis for a viable analytic practice. 
Psychology as an Area of Science 
It is worth discussing one other topic to do with the 
suitability of the analytic materials; this is the quE? stion 
of the adequacy of psychology as a field in which to study 
scientific discourse. In many respects the arguments against 
this are like those concernino the rhetorical nature of 
conferences. The suggestion is made that psychology is not 
a 'true science' and thus to study it will not throw light 
on the actions of 'genuine' scientists. Again this is by 
no means a consensual suggestion. Indeedt many psychol- 
ogists regularly emphasise the scientific nature of their 
discipline and point to the heavily empiricist orientation 
22 
of the major journals Typically textbooks of psydhologY 
spend some part of their initial chapter emphasising the 
scientific nature of psychology. 
As with the 'rhetorical status' of conferences, it 
is not the place of the discourse analyst to intervene 
in such debates and legislate one way or another as to the 
status of psychology. What is of great interestj howevers 
is the way in which the such claims are proposed and def- 
ended. The manner in which the attribution of 'scientific' 
to a discipline or area is achieved in a particular context 
may be particularly revealing. Examples of this kind will 
be examined in chapters 5 and 6 below. The present approachl 
then, does not assume that the interpretative practices doc- 
umented in psychology will be exactly the same as those of 
sedimentology or biochemistry* However, just because the 
latter disciplines are commonly thought of as 'hard', 'nat- 
ural' sciences this does not mean that their interpretat- 
ive practices are necessarily identical either. In general, 
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discourse analysis takes a considerably more skeptical 
attitude to such global suggestions than traditional app- 
roaches. 
The Pragmatics of Conference Selection 
The conferences used in this study were selected more 
for their availability than by the systematic applicat-ion 
of criteria. This would perhaps have been unnacceptable 
if I was intending to use them for the construction of an 
overall picture of a particular research network, the 
state of belief in a particular field, or the kinds of com- 
munication which take place between specialties. It would 
also have been unnacceptable if I was attempting to explic- 
ate the specific nature of conferences as a social situat- 
ion. In the latter case the representativeness of the 
specific conferences examined would have been of particular 
importance; in the former their composition. Howeverv in 
the present study the role played by conferences is that of 
generating interactional material on a number of topics Of 
theoretical interest. Each satisfied this criterion and 
overall the transcripts have been found to be even more 
feitile than was expected. In addition to the studies dis- 
cussed in this thesis a variety of further questions of 
analytic interest may be elucidated through further anal- 
ysis in the future. 
All the conferences chosen did satisfy one general 
requirement: they programmed a much larger proportion of 
discussion than is usual. Typically conferences do not 
allow for much more than a brief few questions after each 
speaker and discussion periods can often be squeezed out 
for administrative reasons. Koestler sketches some of the 
problems of this kind of conference. 
CThe organisers] liked to cram forty to fifty pppers into a five-day conference, which put the particiP- 
ants. into a condition not unlike that of punch-drunk boxers, and left no time for discussions - although the discussions were the declared primary purpose of the whole enterprise. 11 am afraidt, the harassed 
chairman would say, tthat the last three speakers have 
exceeded their allotted time, so we are running behind 
schedule. If we want to get some lunch before the 
next paper, we must postpone the discussion to the end 
of the afternoon session.? But when the last paper cf the afternoon session had at last been delivered, it 
was time for cocktails. (23) 
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For the present purposes it was important to have as 
much discussion as possible so that the accounts of a var- 
iety of participants could be obtained. None of the confer- 
ences I have drawn upon had less than a third of their time 
devoted to discussion, and three had a format based almost 
entirely around discussion. 
Description of the Conferences 
Because of the requirement that the anonymity of par- 
ticipants be maintained the conferences will only be des- 
cribed in general terms. I have used the generic name 
'conferencet throughout this chapter as there are no pre- 
cise criteria for distinguishing symposia, workshopst 
etc.; some of the following might, however, be better des- 
ribed by the latter terms. They are presented in chron- 
ological order. 
1) The Goldberg Conference 
24 
This was a one day conferenceg attended by about sev- 
enty people (a mixture of lecturers, researchers and grad- 
uate students mainly from departments of psychology, soc- 
iology, and urban planning) convened to discuss the theor- 
etical perspective developed by a particular social scient- 
ist, Goldberg. Goldberg himself, on a brief visit to the 
UK, presented the first paper; his co-worker the next; and 
then there were presentations from British workers using 
the Goldberg theory. There were long discussion sessions 
inbetween papers. The presentations and discussions were 
videotaped by the organisers with the intention of prod- 
ucing a book of proceedings reproducing the main papers and 
some of the discussion. The organisers had the complete 
conference transcribed. Unfortunately the transcript did 
not identify individual participants, thus making it imp- 
ossible to compare all of a particular contributor's state- 
ments or to develop an accurate understanding of the org- 
anisation of the discourse. Consequently this conference 
is not used directly in any of the specific studies which 
f Ollow. 
2) The Theoretical Persoectives Conference 
At this conference psychologists gathered for four days 
to discuss fundamental theoretical issues; no participant 
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used the oppurtunity to present original data. All the res- 
earchers present uere invited to participate, the invit- 
ations being made according to the organisers' (and their 
advisers') understanding of which researchers had made imp- 
ortant theoretical contributions. Many of the particip- 
ants were established and well known figures within psych- 
ology. The graduate students who attended were nominated 
by their supervisors. 
Roughly half of the time was allotted to the formal 
presentation of papers, which were delivered from a raised 
podium at the end of the lecture hall. There were no par- 
allel sessions. All of the papers had been precirculated 
to discussants and other presenters. Non-pre5enters had 
been precirculated an extended abstract of each paper. The 
other half of the time was allotted to discussion. This 
was further split into specific sessions discussinq each 
paper (lasting 20 minutes each) and general sessions on 
conference themes which lasted for up to three hours. 
The papers and discussion were recorded (in triplic- 
ate! ) by the organisers. I obtained permission to use 
this recording for research purposes and transcribed all 
the discussion periods, giving a total transcript of about 
150,900 words. The recordinqs were of very high quality 
and there were few places where it was difficult to under- 
stand what was said (one European speaker with a strong 
accent caused slight problems). Furthermore, as particip- 
ants were asked to identify themselves before speaking 
there is very little ambiguity over who said what.. This 
transcript forms the basis for the analysis discussed in 
chapters 5 and 6. 
3) The Application Conference 
At this conference 13 European social psychologists met 
for a period of three days in a small seaside town. The 
conference was specifically convened to discuss issues 
surrounding the application of social psychology. In some 
cases this involved presenting particular 'applied' res- 
earch projects, in others the general practice of social 
Psychological application was discussed. As in the prev- 
ious case, the conference was attended by a mixture of res- 
earchers along with some graduate students. The group inc- 
luded three professors of social psychology and a number cf 
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respected researchers in the field; all had published art- 
icles or tooks on the topic of application. 
Each participant had prepared a paper for the confer- 
ence and these were circulated at the start so everyone 
had a written version of each talk available. For the 
most part papers were not read out but were summarised to 
provide a basis for discussion; each paper was discussed 
for about an hour. In between sessions the group ate meals 
together and went to local pubs together - clearly further 
discussion took place on the'se occasions which was out of 
reach of electronic ears. 
Each session was tape recorded, with all participants 
agreeing that their talk could be used for research purposes. 
Two half sessions were lost through a fault in the recording 
process. The recording was transcribed verbatim (1209000 
words). The quality of the recording was good and there 
was no difficulty in identifying the individual particip- 
ants. In only one case did a particularly thick accent 
lead to difficulties. This transcript forms the basis for 
the analysis discussed in chapter 4. 
4) The First Construct Theory Conference, 
Personal construct psychology is a slightly marginal 
area within academic psychology, although a significant 
number of UK researchers have done research using it. It 
is somewhat more established within the field of clinical 
psychology where a number of its leading figures are placed. 
At this conference, of the 12 participantsl 7 held clinical 
posts and 5 academic research positions. The meeting took 
place in a magnificently situated Lakeland hotel over a 
period of 3 days. There was no fixed agenda. Instead a 
number of themes were proposed at the start and a discussion 
loosely organised around them. One figure, a key person 
within UK personal construct psychology, described it thus: 
The whole workshop remains in my mind as a fantastic 
experience. I have never before been involved with 
a number of people with a common interest in such an 
unstructured situation for such a long period of time. 
(25) 
As before, each session was tape recorded, with all 
Participants agreeing that their talk could be used for 
research. Only the first session was lost, as it seemed 
inappropriate to broach the topic of recording during a 
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heated debate over the agenda and aims of the conference. 
A high quality recording made transcription straightfor- 
ward. This transcript (1300000 words) is used in chapter 
7. 
5) The Second Construct Theory Conference 
This was convened as a follow up to the first con- 
struct theory conference. It was held near an attractive 
South Coast fishing port. Seven of the original partic- 
Epants attended, along with four new people. Once again 
there was no formal agenda, and the first session was 
concerned with elucidating themes for discussion. 
As is described in detail in chapter 7. all partic- 
ipants received two extracts from the transcript of the 
previous construct conference prior to this meetingg and 
one session of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of 
these extracts. Although all of the session were recordedo 
only the discussion of precirculated extracts was fully 
transcribed. This forms the basis for the analysis dis- 
cussed in chapter 7. 
Transcription of Proceedings 
As I have indicated above, I transcribed all the con- 
ference recordings which were eventually used in the anal- 
ysis. This has the advantage of ensuring that the analyst 
was not only present at the original conferences but was 
forced to listen very closely to the entire audio recording 
of each. This familiarity eased the problems of the init- 
ial coding of data into topics for study. In fact, the 
process of transcription is not too dissimilar to the 
analytic process of 'slow motion' reading which Barthes 
26 
recommends The magnitude of the task should not, how- 
ever, be underestimated. At the top rate of about 11000 
words per hour the transcription of the materials for this 
study took about four months of continuous uork (in practice 
of course it was spread over a longer period with other 
work carried out at the same time). One of Koestler's 
characters notes 'transcribing tapes costs a lot of , 
money t27 ; he might also have added 'blood, sweat and tears'. 
The transcription was performed in a way intended to 
facilitate the maximum readability of the finished product. 
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It was structured into sentences and punctuated according 
to the conventions of written English. This is not to 
leaned up' in ay that the audio tape presentation was 1c. 
any way; word orders were not changed; hesitations and 
corrections were not deleted; and for the most part neither 
were filler words like lumt and lah'. Furthermoreq heavy 
stress was indicated in the transcript by underliningg 
while laughter and pauses were shown by these terms used 
in brackets. In this sense the transcript aspires to be 
as accurate a representation of the audio recording as 
possible. However, it differs from Gail Jefferson's, elab- 
orate system of notation 
28 
and even from the more rest- 
21.1 
ricted version described by Cuff For instanceg the 
Jefferson system attempts to capture the characteristics 
of speech delivery - extension of sounds, some kinds of 
inflection - and gives timings of spaces between utterances 
accurate (it is claimed) to within one tenth of a second. 
In addition, spellings may sometimes be altered to convey 
colloquial features of pronounciation. 
Although it is suggested that the use of thse elabor- 
ate conventions enables the transcript to 'look to the eye 
how it sounds to the earl 
30 it is not at all clear that the 
system facilitates the accurate use of verbal materials. 
Indeed, it places a particular barrier to those not versed 
in decoding such systems. It is also significant that con- 
versational analysts - who have predominantly adopted this 
system - rarely analyse segments of data more than a few 
sentences in length. The system appears to be particularly 
unwieldy for dealing with the extended monologues which 
are characteristic of scientific discourse at conferences. 
Many turns of talk are well over 300 words in length, and 
where research is being described in detail turns of several 
thousand words are cormon. 
Aside from these practical reservaticns, there is 
also the analytic qucstion of how useful such detailed 
schemes are. With the possible exception of projects which 
are explicitly concerned with intonation - which I will 
discuss in a moment - it is very rare for the extra inform- 
ation embodied in these elaborate schemes to be explicitly 
drawn an in analysis. Of course, it miqht be argued that 
the anblysts' interpretation of the transcript is dependent 
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L)n the extra infrýrmation providedo and it is merely that 
the nature of the dependence is not specified. Howevert 
in many cases it is very difficult to see how the analytic 
conclusions would be changed by the removal of pause times 
and semi-phonetic spellings. The necessity of marking these 
sorts of features has yet to be clearly demonstrated. 
The case of intonation is rather different. Its 
role in language has been a source of considerable debate 
amongst linguists.. For example, O'Connor and Arnold sug- 
ge5t that intonation conveys information over and above 
that which can be conveyed by words and their grammatical 
31 
structuring This additional information, it is claimedq 
is used to convey speakers' attitudes to their current sit- 
uation. In contrast, Halliday, while not denying that 
intonation can serve the attitudinal function that O'Connor 
and Arnold suggestq argues that it does the work of certain 
grammatical formsq tense for instance 
32. Brazil has devel- 
oped this suggestion further, and proposes that there act- 
ually exist two parallel 'channels' by which discourse 
can be formed: one via grammatical structuring and the 
33 
other using intonation patterns A particular section 
of meaningful discourse can thus be created by either using 
the appropriate grammatical construction or by drawing on 
a particular pattern of stress and voicing. 
All these views support the notion that intonation can 
be a significant carrier of information; although Brazil 
notes that it has yet to be demonstrated for an acceptable 
number of cases that intonation provides the sole real- 
34 isation of a distinction In a more recent study Marga 
Kreckel has suggested that families or close-knit groups 
of friends may develop specific and partially idiosyncratic 
systems of rules which they can use to decode the patterns 
of stress and tonicity to reveal the specific speech act 
35 
which an utterance performs For instance, a piece of 
speech which an outsider would classify as the act of 
'giving informationt could be described by a family mem- 
ber as lorderincl. 
The question raised by these kinds of studies is 
whether the present analysis is flawed because it fails to 
deal directly with the intonation information in the audio 
tape. Coulthart suggests that linguists 'ignore intonation 
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at their peril' Neverthelessq the dangers for the 
analysis of scientific discourse seem rather more circ- 
umspect. In the first place the enterprise is rather dif- 
ferent from that of the linguists discussed above. For 
instance, the way intonation is used to mark clauses in 
complex utterancesq or to mark speech acts as threateninq 
rather than informational, is not of great relevance to 
the kinds of questions to be addressed here. In partic- 
ular, the present concern is with the way discourse is 
organised over different occasions of use rather than its 
role in providing information about psychological states. 
And although the present analysis is fine-graing at places 
looking at substitutions of single words in sentences, it 
is not attempting to adbfess fundamental linguistic issues 
of how words may be constructed into sentences and sent- 
ences into coherent discourse. Those kinds of more basic 
process are largely presupposed in the analyses to follow. 
In the second place, all the data for the present 
study were collected from situations where groups of rel- 
ative strangers met. This meant that for the most part 
participants made points explicitly and in relatively 
formal terms. The kinds of eliptical and largely tacit 
communication which Kreckel documents arerare. In certain 
cases intonational information is essential for the det- 
ermination of meaningg for instance, when marking declar- 
atives as questions. Howeverl even here reference to the 
context can clarify meaning. Thus declaratives can be 
seen to be questions when thqy are treated as such by the 
following speaker. And in cases where the transcript alone 
was ambiguous it was generally possible to resolve the 
ambiguity by referrino back to the audio tape. 
It is also important to no'te that the discourse anal- 
ysis conducted here is not based on speech act theory. 
There need be no attemptg therefore, to use subtleties of 
intonation to identify the particular speech act performed: 
statingg threatening, promising or whatever. Indeed, the 
present emphasis on particpantst accounting skills and the 
pervasive reformulation of the meaning of actions and bel- 
iefs in the course of interaction is somewhat at odds with 
a theory which attempts to give definitive characterisat-, 
ions of the lillocutionary force' of statements37. 
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With these analytic preliminaries in mind it is now 
pussible t%D advance to the substantive studies which are 
the core of this thesis. The next five chapters are con- 
cerned with the detailed analysis of psychologists' dis- 
course. The first two concentrate on issues to do with 
the application of science. Following them are two chap- 
ters broadly concerned with the role of values in theory 
choice and the organisation of scientific categorisations. 
After than comes a detailed analysis of the way a partic- 
ular group of psychologists interpret and explain their 
own discourse. The final chapter will make more explicit 
some of the methodological and theoretical conclusions that 
these studies lead to. Before that, however, the issue of 
application. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NOTHING 50 PRACTICAL 
In this chapter and the next the analytic perspect- 
ive outlined in chapter one will be applied to a topic 
which, despite its considerable importanceg has been gen- 
erally neglected in the sociology of science, namely the 
I 
utilisation of *scientific knowledge for practical ends 
The significance of the question of application for those 
sociological theories which claim that scientific know- 
ledge is socially contingent will be discussed. Then the 
pervasive penetration of a traditional model of utilisat- 
ill be io'n'kdocumented in both philosophical and sociological 
arenas of meta-science. Broadly speaking this model imp- 
lies that modern technology is straightforwardly depend- 
ent on advances in scientific theory. The presence of 
this model will then be illustrated in two different areas 
of social psychological discourse: general articles con- 
cerned with the nature of applied social psychology and a 
transcribed interview with a particular applied social psy- 
chologist. It will be suggested that In the interview 
the traditional model of application is modified in a 
number of ways and considerably more socially contingent 
accounts of utility produced. 
The discussion in this chapter will pave the way for 
a more detailed analysis of utility accounting in social 
psychologists' discourse described in the following chap- 
ter. There I will also review some theoretical alternat- 
ives to the standard model of application and attempt to 
develop an approach which is consistent with the present 
analytic perspective. Let me startp however, by examining 




and Epistemoloqical Privileqe 
The question of the practical application of theoret- 
ical knowledge has particular significance for the soc- 
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iology of science. Its importance derives from a common, 
although often implicitq argument against the full- 
blooded sociological explanation of scientific knowledge. 
This argument assumes that the supposed 'products of 
science', such as bridges, atomic bombs, silicon chips, 
and so on, justify its having a special status vis a vis 
sociological analysis. Although much of the debate about 
the status of the sociology of scientific knowledge has 
been conducted in epistemological terms, this 'common 
sensicall supposition is recurrently drawn upon by Phil- 
osophersq sociologists and scientists themselves. It is 
worth giving some examples to illustrate its pervasiveness 
in disparate areas of meta-science. 
Philosophers of science have generally been unconcer- 
2 
ned with science's application However, the notion that 
science has Oproductst (for which science was a necessary 
condition) has been used as a resource in certain debates. 
For exampleg Shapere 
3 has criticised the strongly relativ- 
istic reading of Kuhn 
4 
which suggests progress in any sci- 
entific discipline is simply a sequence of incommensurable 
conceptual world views. Shapere argues that-science's 
'products' and 'increased control over the world' amply 
demonstrate progress. We all know, Shapere implies, 
about sciencets increased effectiveness over time, for its 
consequences confront us everywhere we look. It thus bec- 
omes absurd to question the generally progressive develop- 
ment of scientific knowledge. 
Similarly, sociologists of science have, for the most 
partp taken an intimacy between scientific knowledge and 
utility for granted. For example, the following quote 
is taken from a recent discussion of the sociology of 
knowledge-application. 
Science is mants most rigorous and successful mode 
of knowing the world of things. In this sense, sci- 
entific knowledge has a privileged status. The know- 
ledge system relying on science has very different 
consequences for the degree of control over itselfp 
than alternative types of knowledge systems ... There can be little doubt that there is a critical differ- 
ence between the science-based knowledge and competing beliefs with regard to adequacy for practical action in the external world. (5) 
As a consequence of this assumption sociologists have 
often suggested that science has a special status. For 
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instance Starkq in his classic work on the sociology of 
knowledge duPlicate5 the claim of the previous quote when 
he suggests that: 
whereas man has more than once shifted his vantage 
point for the consideration of social facts so that 
these facts appear to him in evex- new and often 
surprisingg outlinesq he has always kept to the same 
spot for surveying the facts of nature... so that 
these latter have always offered to him the self- 
same surface. He has merely learned to look more 
closely... (6) 
And Johnston has argued in a similar fashion. 
When we say that science 1works19 what we mean is 
that it provides us with the capacity to manipulate 
and control nature... the enormous attainments of 
modern natural sciences. os represent a fairly con- 
clusive proof of their superiority over other syst- 
ems invented by man... (7) 
In each case the special nature of science is warranted by 
pointing to its supposedly uniquely powerful understanding 
of and control of nature. 
Claims such as these are not restricted to mainstream 
sociology. Certain traditional Marxist perspectives have 
claimed that scientific knowledge should be tested through 
practical application. When it is correct, scientific know- 
ledge would enable new forms of practice. Lening for 
instanceg argued that a leap forward in knowledge is nec- 
essary for the realisation of any radically new forms of 
action in the world 
B. Cornford is explicit on this rel- 
ation between science and utilisation: 
up to modern times people had only superficial know- 
ledqe of chemical processes, and so there could be- 
little effectively planned use of the processes in 
production. But modern chemistry enables us to break 
substances down... split atoms ... even create new 
man-made elements. (8) 
Other quasi-Marxist positions are more concerned with 
processes of structural determination than the epistemolog- 
ical foundations of knowledge. Even so, they draw upon 
the same set of basic assumptions. Albury and Schwartz 
suggest that a modern mythology has arisen which devides 
science into the 'pure' and the lapplied"O. This division, 
they claim, mystifies the political and economic regulation 
and consequences of science by implying that much of it is 
concerned merely with generating knowledge in the abstract 
with no practical consequences. Yet this, it is suggestedg 
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is an ideological myth which obscures the central role of 
science in providing material support for the state and 
its apparatusms. For instanceg in 
'defence, (war) research the myth of 'pure curios- 
ity, ... serves a purpose. In order to provide a 
veneer of respectability the military often give 
money for what they claim to be pure or basic res- 
earch so that scientists can accept it gracefully 
without political or economic qualms... 'basic res- 
earch' with its connotations of truth, impartiality 
and objectivity is an excellent place to hide milit- 
ary. science. (11) 
This final perspective has an interesting double imp- 
lication for the sociology of science. It suggests that 
there ought to be a structural analysis of the role of sci- 
ence which treats it as an institution as embroiled in soc- 
ietal conflicts as any other. At the same time it strongly 
implies that a sociological anlaysisq however radical its 
Perspective on social structurev will have little to say 
about the contents of scientific knowledge itself. In 
this view the very political potency of science is derived 
from its uniquely effective manner of commanding nature. 
In general, if we accept the assumptions behind these 
kinds of claims, namely, that successful practical applic- 
ation provides uneqivocal validation of scientific theories 
and that a substantial proportion of scientific theories 
have been validated in this wayt we seem to be led inexor- 
ably to the following conclusion: that manyv and perhaps 
mostv scientific theories transcend the limits of social 
context and that they must be accepted as epistemologically 
and sotiologically privileged. If this strong connectio6 
between knowledge and utility is upheld, it can be plausibly 
argued that the scope of the sociology of science is drast- 
ically truncated. Org to put it another way, it seems hard 
to reconcile the notion that scientific theories are the 
contingent products of socially contextualised interpret- 
ations with the idea that they produce vaccinesl Saturn 
rockets and non-stick frying pans. To take a specific exam- 
ple, if scientific knowledge is socially contingent, and if 
aeroplanes are a direct result of the application of such 
knowledge, how is it that aeroplanes fly successfully 
across social boundaries? By such references to the univ- 
ersal effectiveness of modern technology it can well be c: ia'trned 
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that 'practical applicationt provides a socially invar- 
iant criterion which validates the bulk of scientific 
knowledge and shows the nature of its content - if not the 
choice of topics to research - to be independent of soc- 
ial factors. 
In the next chapter I will discuss criticisms of this 
argument which question whether 'products' validate sci- 
ence in the way impliedg and even whether much technolog- 
ical innovation is dependent on science at all. For the 
moment, howeverp having shown the significance of this 
argument for the sociology of sciencel I intend to examine 
the role of this model of application in scientific dis- 
course itself, and in particular in the writings and talk 
of social psychologists. 
Social Psychologists'General Accounts of Application 
In this section I will look briefly at social psychol- 
ogists published characterisations of the applied nature 
of their discipline. This in no way claims to be a survey 
of the generality of the model discussed - although an 
initial examination does suggest it is quite widely dist- 
ributed. It is merely meant to illustrate the presence to 
of a particular model andýindicate a few of its formal feat- 
ures. The articles examined can be thought of as particip- 
ants' own meta-science. Although social psychology does not 
abound with such articles discussing application in general 
terms they do exist andl irrespective of whether they 
affirm or deny the applied potential of social psychology9 
they tend to draw upon a standardised version of the 
science-utility relationship. 
Take, for exampleg an article by Helmreichl2 which gen- 
erated a large secondary literature 
13 
and argues that social 
psychology is not fulfilling its applied potential. 
Helmreich diagnoses a number of problems which beset applied 
social psychology: simplistic statistics9 student subjects, 
aimless experiments; but he sees as crucial a 'pernicious 
schism' between theoretical and applied social psycholgy. 
There are two camps of researchers: 
those whose applied interests focus on theory valid- 
ation in natural settings9 demonstrating replicability 
of theoretically important findings, and making data 
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available for application and those social psychol- 
ogists who feel that the dominant concern of the 
profession should be social engineering and imp- 
rovement of society. (14) 
Both camps, argues Helmreicho contribute to application. 
The former has potential for application and can be trans- 
lated into practice. The latter are engaged in that pract- 
ice in various ways. Awareness of this line between inqu- 
iry and implementation shouldg Helmreich claims# ameliorate 
some of the criticisms that are commonly made about applied 
social psychology: 
if the line... were drawn somewhat as I have suggested, 
it seems that social psychologists could work on both 
theoretical and applied problems in the laboratory and 
the field without perceiving a difference in orient- 
ation. (15) 
Helmreich can thus be seen as perceiving a dislocation 
of the tnaturalt continuum between theory and application 
and suggesting that repair of this continuum would cure the 
(putative) lack of social psychological application. Yet 
his conclusion appears to be more a product of the standard 
model of application than any data he has produced to dem- 
onstrate the potential applicability of theory in social 
psychology. The implication is that effective practice must 
be dependent upon theory, so if there is a paucity of suc- 
cessfully applied social psychology this must be because 
practice and theory have somehow become dislocated. 
When we examine another example, which gives a con- 
siderably more favourable assessment of the applied potent- 
ial of social psychology9 the same general form of applic- 
ation account can be detected. Eiser argues that the prac- 
tical returns from social psychology accrue from the applic- 
ation of theory to treal-lifel situations: 
there exists a strong body of [social psychological] 
theory which, while it may not necessarily deal with 
universal principles, is still sufficiently general 
and integral to encourage the hope that it will be 
applicable to real-life situations. (16) 
He treats the process of application, much as Helmreich 
does, as being one of putting the symbolic generalisations 
of social psychology to work in practical contexts. Social 
psychology is taken to require no special features in order 
to make it applicable: 
"basic" academic research questions in social psy- 
chology can be studied in applied settings. All that 
is needed is a greater responsiveness to contemporary 
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social situations and a greater willingness to pre- 
sent the reasons for one's research in a way that is 
intelligible to people outside one's own discipline. 
(17) 
If we finally examine an introductory textbook on 
social psychology (Goldstein'8)t which includes a chapter 
on applicationg we can see that it mirrors an increasing 
quantity of social psychological publications which refer 
back to the writings of Kurt Lewing who was an influential 
social psychologist writing in -America in the 1940's and 
19 1950's The striking thing about these references is 
that they generally do not talk about Lewin's own applied 
work (which has been dismissed as trivial by at least one 
commentator 
20 ) but use a single quotation: "there is nothing 
21 
so practical as a good theory" Goldstein's introductory 




The significance of this quotation is that it encap- 
sulates, very economically, the standard utility account 
which was used in more extended form in the previous two 
articles. It is highly ambiguous, and merely suggests 
that the most practical theor. y will be the 'good theorytp 
while giving no indication of what should count as a good 
theory. It deals, as it were, with the hows and whys of 
application in nine short words. Some possible functions 
of these sorts of account will be discussed in the next 
chapter; for the moment it can be taken as a further indic- 
ation of the pervasiveness of the standard model of utility. 
Examples such as these suggest that there is a con- 
gruence between the model of utilisation which is common 
in sociology and philosophy of science and the model which 
scientists themselves use. In many ways this is hardly a 
startling idea; after all, the very language used for 
23 talking about science encourages and underpins this model 
What scientists do is said to thave application to the 
real world'; bridges and non-stick frying pans are taken 
to be the 'products' of science. On television 'TomorrotJs 
World' and 'Horizont tell us how science is 'changing our 
livest and advertisments show us fridges and washing mach- 
ines 'beamed down' from the space ships of the planet 
Zanussi , as I the appliance of science I. Nevertheless, 
when we take even a single researcher's account of the 
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practice of applied social psychology and examine it in 
detail the picture becomes considerably more complicated. 
In fact it becomes very difficult to see the 'standard 
model' of application as a straightforward representation 
of the science-utility relationship. 
Social Psychology and Social Skills Training 
The remainder of this chapter will consist of a det- 
ailed analysis of an account given by an applied social 
psychologist. This psychologist specialises in social 
skills training and the account centres on his practice 
and its relationship to social psychological theory. 
What connection is there between the theoretical form- 
ulations of social psychology and the activities and tech- 
niques involved in social skills training (henceforth 
SST)7 I will examine in turn the synchronic and diach- 
ronic interrelations depicted between theory and utilityt 
the transformation of theory in the process of application 
and the way broader social influences are said to direct 
the form and content of SST. Before this, however, some 
general comments concerning SST and about the particular 
practitioner interviewed. 
Social skills training has been arguably the area of 
most growth in applied social psychology in recent years. 
The number of practitioners at present doing this work in 
Britain is in the hundreds. A range of social skills are 
taught in a variety of different settings. It is probably 
most commonly associated with clinical work, where people 
who are socially inadequate in various ways are taught 
basic skills such as shoppingg dating, opening conversat- 
ions and posture. At the other extreme business men may 
be trained in handling clients and subordinates. SST is 
also used in the penal services, by councilors of all kinds9 
and in womens' groups as assertion training. 
SST involves a variety of techniques. One of the most 
common is 'role play' where the client is taught a skill 
or a set of skills by getting them to act out a particular 
role. For exampleg a client may act out the role of buy- 
ing groceries from the supermarket. This may involve the 
trainer emphasising that the client adopts normal posture 
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whilst shoppingg makes appropriate conversation whilst 
paying for the groceries accompanied by eye-contact which 
is neither furtive nor staring. 
Typically it is theories of non-verbal communication 
and non-verbal behaviour (by no means regarded as the same 
thing) which are associated with social skills; there is 
not the same amount of theoretical development in the area 
of verbal skills. To give a simplified example to illust- 
rate the general principlel Hall 
24 has suggested that there 
are various normal distances for standing apart from 
others. These depend on the iriteractants' degree of int- 
imacyl the number of people present and the public or 
private nature of the situation. It appears to be only a 
small step from talking about correct distances for inter- 
action to attempting to train people with problems how to 
25 
stand at the correct distances 
There are a number of reasons why social skill's train- 
ing should serve as a particularly apposite case study of 
the application of social psychology. First, as noted 
above, there appears to be a relatively developed body of 
theoretical work associated with the area. It thus seems, 
a priori, to be an area where the traditional model of sci- 
entific application should hold true. Secondly it is a 
clearly social psychological area of application. It can 
be argued that social psychologisto attempts to deal with 
prejudice for example, or unemploymentq may be ineffective 
because they try to deal with essentially political or 
economic problems as if they were social psychological. No 
utilisation is fully immune from such criticisms, but they 
seem less relevant to SST. Thirdly, as a relatively new 
field it might be easier to trace the role of theory. It 
might, for instance, be the case that in relatively est- 
ablished fields theoretical notions have become lembodiedt 
in standard procedures in such a way that participants can 
no longer recover them in formalised terms. Also, compared 
to say advertising or organisational interventions, the 
impact of the practice might be more clearly assessable. 
This was not important because I wished to evaluate the 
success of the practice -I did not; rather it was to fac- 
ilitate the collection of the respondent's accounts of 
criteria for success. 
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The particular respondent was chosen because of his 
respected position within the community of social skills 
trainers. He was legitimated by having both a university 
and a hospital based position which involved him in both 
teaching and clinical practice and by contributing to 
both conferences and the literature of SST. Of course, 
S 
itýýnot possible to claim that his practice was not dev- 
iant in any way, for deviancy is clearly a highly index- 
ical term. However, no reason was found to doubt that 
hiý practice was considered anything but top rate amongst 
other trainers. There was no hint from the interview that 
the respondent's practice was abnormal or unusual. 
The interview schedule was const-ructed using a fairly 
simple theoretical model of the relationship between theory 
and application with the aid of the social studies of sci- 
ence literature (see Appendix A). The respondent was int- 
erviewed for about 2 hoursq covering the questions on the 
schedule. Subsequently the recording of the interview was 
fully transcribed verbatim. The following discussion is 
based on this transcript. 
Synchronic Interchanqe Beteen Theoryand Application 
The section from the interview which is reproduced 
below shows the point at which the interviewer first 
broached the qustion of theory in SST. 
Interviewer. (1)What would you say were the import- 
ant theories that you use in social skills training? 
(2 )(Pause) 
Respondent. (3)Important theories? 
Interviewer. (4)Yes. 
Respondent. (5)1 suppose it's a learning theory model 
really, or what I consider learning theory to be. 
(6)1 see social skills training very much, reallyq as 
based on an educational model. (7)It is skills 
training. (B)And one can relate to much Fore to an 
education type viewpoint, which is based on learning 
theory. 
Interviewer. (9)And how about the particular theories Bf Argyle and Dean on gaze and Eckman and Birdwhistle 
on kinesics and so on? 
Respo ndent. (lo I don't take much notice of those I 
must admit. (1flI meanj obviously their stuff is very 
useful in providing informationg and in terms of inst- 
ructing clients one usually gives a talk on, say, eye 
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gaze, and that may draw on the wurk of Argyle to just 
indicate the way in which eye gaze is used. 
It seems clear that the interchange described by the 
respondent does not conform to the standard model of util- 
isation. Yet how are we to disentangle exactly what is 
going on in this extract? Up to now I have only talked in 
very general terms about the approach taken by discourse 
analysis to specific materials. It is now necessary to 
describe some more specific features: in particular the 
idea that scientists use more than one conceptual system 
when accounting for their activity. In the analysis which 
follows, and throughout the rest of this thesis, I will rep- 
eatedly draw on the notions of 'accounting system' and 
'context of discourse'. 
An example from Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay's 
work on biochemists will illustrate the use of these con- 
26 
cepts These researchers compared the formal accounts 
given in the introductions and methods sections of bio- 
chemistst articles with informal accounts given in letters 
they wrote to each other and in interviews. For the most 
part they found striking dissimilarities between accounts 
in the formal and informal contexts. In the formal con- 
text, scientists consistently adopt an 'empiricist' dis- 
course about science; that isp scientific knowledge is pre- 
sented as being determined by the controlledq experimental 
revelation of tthe facts' about the natural world. The 
production of experimental facts is taken to follow from 
scientists' implementation of impersonal procedural rules; 
and theoretical interpretation is portrayed as deriving 
unproblematically from the factsq as long as no personal or 
social factors are allowed to influence scientists' judg- 
ments. 
In informal social situations, although this 'empir- 
icist' conception of scientific action and belief is still 
used, and indeedq although it still continues to be primary 
in an important sense, an alternative repertoire is avail- 
able for depicting science in general, one's own actions 
and beliefsq and those of other scientists. This second 
interpretative repertoire is termed 'contingentlp because 
it treats action in science as much less uniform and sci- 
entific belief as much more open-ended. Emphasis is placed 
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on the importance of personal commitment, intuition and 
practical skill. The production of data is taken to be a 
highly individual accomplishment. Theoretical interpret- 
ation is regarded as problematic and only partially const- 
rained by experimental findings. It is accepted that soc- 
ial factors influence the actions of all scientists. In 
its strongest formulatiors, this repertoire enables the 
speaker to treat scientific knowledge merely as those bel- 
iefs which specific collections of specialists happen to 
have adopted for whatever reason. 
It appears, thent that scientists have at their disp, 
osal two rather different vocabularies or accounting syst- 
ems for describing scientific action and belief; and that 
each vocabulary implies a different conception of scient- 
ific knowledge and rationality. Thus an accounting system 
may be considered as a discourse which has its own logict 
or its own set of rules for interpreting and portraying 
social action. As I have notedt different accounting syst- 
ems seem to be used in different social situations. Although 
formal research papers contain almost exclusively lempir- 
icistt accountss which eliminate direct reference to soc- 
ial actors or to the social contingency of scientific know- 
ledgeq in interviews and other informal situations both 
accounting systems are used, depending on detailed changes 
27 in the specific interactional context 
Coming back to the social skills transcriptq it is 
possible to detect the presence of two accounting systems 
at wDrk', here also. One of these is very similar to the 
traditional model of application discussed in the first 
sections of this chapterg the 'standard utility account'. 
It takes the theoretical knowledge of science to be rout- 
inely and naturally applicable and treats practice as dep- 
endent on theory. In many ways it can be seen to correspond 
to Gilbert and Mulkay'stempiricist account'. The other 
treats the relation between science and utility as far more 
problematic. Like the 'contingent repertoirelg expertise 
and considerations of a non-formalisable nature are indic- 
ated, and on occasion it is suggested that practice is 
entirely indepen-dent of theory. Let us examine some 
instances in detail. 
At the start of the interaction quoted above (extract 
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1) the respondent is non-plussed by the interviewer's 
question which, it should be notedt already assumes the 
idea that theories are employed in social skills training 
28 
The respondent theng somewhat tentatively, proposes an 
example: 'I suppose it's a learning theory model really' 
(1.5, emphasis added). Howevert this proposal is then 
qualified as only the respondent's interpretations of the 
theory: twhat I consider leaning theory to be' (1.5, emph- 
asis added). Social skills training is then distanced 
from learning theory by proposing an intermediate model: 
'I see social skills training as based on an educational 
model' (1.6). The initial proposition has now been twice 
qualified. Then the repondent emphasises that it is 
'skills training' (1.7), which seems intended to suggest 
that it, therefore, must involve learning theory. This 
final point can hardly be viewed as a reply from exper- 
ience, it seems almost philsophical in nature. The resp- 
ondent appears to be directino the interviewer to attend 
to the meaning of the term skills training and thus the 
implication that education must be involved. 
In the next interchange the respondent is questioned 
about more directly social psychological theories. He 
produces an apparently contradictory reply: 11 don't take 
much notice of those' and 'obviously their stuff is very 
useful' (1.10-11). However, it is possible to see these 
comments not as straightforward conradictions but as prod- 
ucts of different accounting systems. One system, the 
standard utility accountg embodies the notion that relevant 
theories are 'obviously. *. very useful'; whilst the resp- 
ondent's more contingent account suggests that this is not 
the case, that theories were not found useful. 
The initial interchange (1.1-8) can also be looked at 
in this way. On the one hand the standard utility account 
(which was already implied in the interviewer's question) 
suggests that an answer should be provided. On the otherp 
the respondent is not happy with thisq in the context of a 
contingent account, and qualified the reply in the ways 
discussed. 
The patterns analysed above are not unique to the par- 
ticular extract cited. For example, a similar analysis 
may be performed on the following passage: 
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2. Interviewer. Have changes in theory, or improve- 
ments i ose theories inputted into your practice 
in any way at all? 
(Pause) 
Respondent. I think they have. They inevitably have. 
But I don't think I have consciously applied them. 
Certainly in terms of one's reading and correcting 
onets knowledge. That obviously is used in terms of 
what you do, when you are working, in fact. But I 
can1t say that I have consciously taken them and 
applied them. 
Here we see that the input of theory into prxactice is 
'certain', 'inevitable' and 'obvious'. And yet9 within the 
space of a few seconds, the respondent twice notes that there 
was no conscious application. Againt the apparent contrad- 
iction can be resolved by seeing these utterances as prod- 
ucts of two different accounting systems. It is important 
to note that the suggestion that the respondent uses two 
systems to answerquestions is not intended to imply that he 
is reasoning poorly or contradicting himself. He is Simply 
drawing upon two commonplace resources for answering the 
questions: the contingent and empiricist versions of the 
application process. 
Later in the interview the respondent addressed more 
directly the problem of talking about the use of theories; 
3. Respondent 
,. 
I think why I find it difficult to think 
about the theories is that I am not familiar with the 
field from a theoretical point of view. 
The respondent here straightforwardly describes his 
knowledge of theories in a way very difficult to recon- 
cile with the traditional model of application. In partic- 
ular it seems difficult to believe that the respondent 
could be both applying certain theories and unfamilar with 
those same theories. It could be that the respondent is 
implying that theories have become embodied in the the pro- 
cedures of SST in some way. However, accounts of diach- 
ronic interchange between theory and application which 
stress the centrality of practice cast doubt an this. 
Overall the analysis of this section illustrates that 
the apparently contradictory statements by the respondent 
can be made intelligible by viewing them as a product of 
two alternative accounting systems. The traditional view 
of application is consistent with those statements descr- 
ibed as the standard utility account; the more contingent 
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versiong howeverp does not fit well with the traditional 
view. On the one hand the respondent stressed that the- 
ories are important; on the other he was hard put to 
give specific instances of theories whith he had utilised. 
This point will be elaborated in an examination of more 
diaphronic featuresof interchange. 
Diachronic Interchanqe between Theory and Application 
The traditional view of the science-utility relation- 
ship implies that continual interchange between the dif- 
ferent contexts is a characteristic and pervasive feature 
of applied science. Not only that, but the direction of 
interchange is said to be predominantly from science to 
technology; problems are solved in the context of science 
and then the answer is used in the context of application. 
Or, as Barnes and Edge formulate it, 
the production of new knowledge is the concern of sci- 
ence: scientists creatively construct new hypotheses 
and theories, and rigorously evaluate them against 
observations and experimental results draws from nat- 
ure. Technology is then the routine activity of 
working out and realising the 'implications' of sci- 
entific theories. It is a humdrumq uncreative 
activity crucially dependent on basic science. (29) 
There is very little actual research on the longitudinal 
features of interchange. The social skills practitionerg 
howeverg provided a detailed account of these features of 
his work. 
The respondent described the developmentg with an 
astociateg of a package for SST: 
4. Interviewer. You say you use a package. Is this some- 
thing t you developed yourself in practice? 
Respondent. This is something we have developed our- 
selves... the package we have worked out over the 
years, and we use the same basic format for each 
session and we just use different exercises; change 
the exercises but the format of most of the sessions 
is exactly the same. 
Interviewer. Now, you say you have modified your pro- 
cedure in various ways. Has this modification come 
mainly from your own expereince of trying to do it or 
throuýh the changing literature of social skills? 
Respondent. Through our own experience, that's all. Because the basic material and the basic techniques 
that we use are the same really, it's just that with 
a group you have got the added dimension of having a 
group andt you knowl all that that involves. And one 
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has to introduce things other than strictly speak- 
ing social skills methods to make it function as a 
group [inaudible]. So we have really modified 
things from our own experience. 
The interviewerts questions in this interaction 
quite broad, referring not just to utilisation of social 
psychological not just to utilisation of social psychol- 
ogical theory but also to the general literature on social 
skills. Even sog it is clearly experience that is seen 
by the respondent to be the crucial or possibily the sole 
factor in the development of his practice. If we look 
more closely at this passage, and note the nature of the 
exercises referred to - clients reporting a good thing 
that had happened to them recently, or role playing an 
every-day encounter for the group to give feedback - it is 
clear that a number of craft skills are being alluded to. 
As with all skills 
, 
of this kind, it seems unlikely that 
the ability to teach these exercises could be fully form- 
alised and communicated solely in the published literat- 
30 
ure In fact, the respondent suggested that those who 
attempted to set up social skills groups with only know- 
ledge of the literaturel without any training and exper- 
ience of the lbehavioural approach', often ran very poor 
-training sessions: 
5. Respondent. Some of them are already doin'g it ýrun- 
ning social skills groups without experience an 
training]. They have read Argyle and Trower's book 
and they have started. 
Interviewer. And you think it would be very dif- 
ficult for someone who has just taken a part of the 
literature - or something like Argyle and Trower's 
book - rather than talked to people who have been 
in clinical practice, to be very successful at it? 
Respondent. What happens you see is that -I will 
give you a typical example. We are in a day hospital 
setting and we have got all these patients; why not 
social skills training? And so they take anybody 
indescriminately into the group. They don't assess. 
They just take them into the group. And they look 
at a couple of Argyle exercises. They may-look at 
so and so's feeling about so and so. And that's 
the way they operate ... they may well do some goodp 
somewhere; but you don't really know what they hell 
they are doing. And they may do some harm. 
It should be noted here that the suggestion that the 
knowledge needed to carry out SST is not fully available 
from literary sources is not meant to imply that literary 
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sources are entirely useless. Rather, the necessity for 
a set of interpretative skills and resources iL implied, 
For instance, it may be that practitioners who already 
possess certain skills and knowledge may read and assim- 
ilate the literature in a different way from naive read- 
ers. The important point is that this knowledge is treated 
as not completely formalised, and therefore the literature 
of both the theoTy of social skills and the practice of 
SST is seen as insufficient on its own for carrying out 
SST. 
When questioned about the possibility of interchange 
from practice back to science, that is 9 feedback of know- 
ledge aquired from 5ST into the theoretical literature on 
skills, the respondent said that British trainers 'are not 
interested in theory as such'. However, he did suggest 
that a contribution to the theoretical literature was a 
possibility. 
6. Interviewer. Do you think that the results of clin- 
ical pr ce like yours could have an important role 
in evaluating theories, I mean, if you were interested 
in it? 
Respondent. Yes, I am almost sure it could. Yes of 
course it could. If one were prepared to do a lot 
of painstaking work. I mean, just thinking about 
eye gaze, if one really looked at that in the context 
of social skills work I am sure you could get an 
enormous amount of data to feedback. And it would 
challenge most of the ideas. Because most of the 
experimental work has been done out of context and it 
would be very nice to replicate that. Not that soc- 
ial skills is a very real context, but it is a dif- 
ferent context that one might use. 
The respondent here describes an inadequacy in what 
he sees as a central area of the theoretical literature 
of social skills. This again illustrates the deviation 
from the standard model of utility. Furthermore, the exp- 
lanation given by the respondent for the inadequacy of the 
theoretical work on gaze indicates a further contingency 
in the application of social psychological theory. The 
respondent argues that most of the experimental work on 
gaze has been done in contexts which may not correspond 
to the natural contexts in which interaction occurs. 
He suggests that even though social skills training itself 
is not totally naturalistic, it could still be used to 
challenge the experimental work. A further implication of 
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this argument seems to be that the experimental work on 
gaze would not support an effective practice unless, per- 
haps, some way could be found to translate it into more 
life-like contexts. The respondent himselft theng has a 
notion of the context dependence of reseach; unfortunately 
the transcript does not contain enough information to 
assess exactly how elaborate this notion is. 
In one place in the interview the respondent discus- 
sed a theoretical issue which he and his co-trainer had 
'directly addressed': 
7. Respondent. In the early days we were very much int- 
erested in the difference between social anxiety and 
social behaviour. And we assumed that social skills 
was much more suitable for people who have social 
skills defecits 9 behavioural deficits, and 
it wasInt 
particularly suitable, sayg for social phobics who's 
fear of social situations was based on anxiety rather 
than lack of skills. And so our assessment in the 
early days was really geared to looking at that. And 
we used to give them measures of social anxiety as 
well as social skills to see if there was any dif- 
ference between the two. And what we tended to find 
was that social anxiety reduced as social behaviour 
improved rboth laugh]. Even in our early groups. 
And as we 
L 
proceeded it became increasingly clear that 
the two hold together. And now we donft worry about 
distinguishing between the two. 
Here the respondent had assumed that the theoretical 
distinction between social behaviour and social anxiety 
would be important for practice. This was not found to be 
the case. The process of modification is depicted in a 
way contrary to the standard utility account here. Instead 
of practice being dependent on theory, theory is described 
as actually undermined by an understanding of the phenom- 
ena developed through practical experience. 
On the wholet little of the respondent's detailed 
description of diachronic interchange is in accordance 
with the standard model. Althoughq as we saw earlierg this 
model is drawn upon in broad glosses of the work, it does 
not appear in the more detailed descriptions. Modifications 
in training methods are described as consequent on previous 
practical experience rather than on any theoretical devel- 
opments in the area. The formal literature of'SSTI even 
when it is specifically orientated towards the pragmatic 
details of trainingg is described as insufficient by itself 
to sustain an effective and competent practice. Indeedq 
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it is suggested that careless use of furmal manuals might 
even lead to harm to patients. Furthermoret it is sug- 
gested that experimental research which abstracts social 
skills such as eye gaze from the everyday contexts of use 
might not hold good for those more natural situations. In 
fact, the respondent suggests that the understanding devel- 
oped through skills training might well undermine theoret- 
ical beliefs about such skills. This idea is supported by 
a second example in which a particular distinction, which 
was expected to hold on theoretical grounds, did not do so 
in practice. Nevertheless, the respondent indicated that 
no formal attempt to evaluate theory in this way was 
taking place. Theoretical and practical concernsq then, 
were depicted as generally developing along separate lines 
with little formal exchange between them. The idea that 
practice must be dependent on theory ceases to be drawn on. 
Transformation in the Process of Application 
Philosophers of science in the tradition of Kuhn 
31 
and Hanson 
32 have been less willing than their predeces- 
sors to talk of facts and theories as stableg unnegotiablet 
objects. For example Ravetz 
33 
suggests that facts and 
theories undergo radical reinterpretation when they pass 
form the contexts of pure science to those of practical 
application: 
it can be seen that a version of a standardised fact 
which is good enough for one function can be quite 
inadequate for another... (34) 
Various studies have examined this argument about the 
35 
contextualisation of facts and theories emprically 
Mulkay concludes that: 
the formulations of basic science ... undergo major transformations of meaning as they come nearer to 
the realm of practical application. (36) 
Some theoriesq of course, explicitly predict contextual 
changes: acceleration is not expected to be constant in 
different gravitational fields; cognitive dissonance is 
only expected to result where experimental subjects have 
a choice of different responses37. The transformations 
referred to by Mulkay, howeverl are not of this kind; they 
are changes in the theories themselves. Some more elabor- 
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accounts of the theory-utuility relationship will be dis- 
cussed in the next chapter. For the moment I will conc- 
ac Lu 
entrate on the respondenUV'WtAch involve transformation. 
The notion of transformation cannot be straightfor- 
wardly illustrated in the social skills transcript because 
there is no instance where the respondent is unambiguously 
claiming to use a particuler theory. Nevertheless, there 
is some information relating to this phenomenon. For inst- 
ance, the respondent referred to the Argyle approach, some- 
times as a body of literature, sometimes a set of practices. 
While the respondent clearly felt he was using, at least 
to some extent, an Argyle type approach he considered the 
emphasis to be different in significant ways. 
a. Respondent. I don't accept the idea that there are 
basic social skills and that we all have themq that 
we can then teach if they seem to be deficient in some 
way. I don't believe in teaching people particular 
ways of behaving. I believe in providinq people with 
enough practice so that they can use their skills in 
whatever way they feel is useful to them in order to 
achieve their needs; which I think is a different 
emphasis really from the Argyle approach. 
The distinction the respondent is making between his 
approach and Argylets seems to be betweenj on the one hand 
giving clients practice in using a variety of skills which 
can then be used in any way they please, and on the other 
teaching them a universal set of skills appropriate for 
each particular situation. Unfortunately it is not entir- 
ely clear from the interview whether the respondent is 
claiming to have taken something like an Argyle approach 
and then transformed it in his own practice, or whether 
he is simply describing certain differences between basic- 
ally similar approaches. Whichever of these is the actual 
claim, the possibility of transformation in this way is 
illustrated. 
One candidate for the title of a classically applied 
theory is learning theory, or the Ibehavioural approach' 
(as illustrated in extract 1.8). The respondent suggested 
that knowledge of the behavioural approach might be a pre- 
requisite for doing efficient social skills training: 
9. Respondent. The problem that we have in training 
non-psychologists is that they don't know what the behavioural approach isq they have never actually 
assessed problems in the sort of detail that is nec- 
essary. They are not used to even looking at behav- iour as such. 
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Despite these strong claims for the importance of the beh- 
avioural approachg when elaborating this Point later in 
the interview the respondent suggested some problems with 
it. 
10. Respondent. I think I see a lot of problems myself 
with things like conversational skills. OK9 you might 
teach someone a set of skills of how one might go 
about having a conversation. The assumed goal is that 
there is some end point, butp in fact, half the pleas- 
ure of having a conversation is just having the-con- 
versation with someone. *e I suppose what I am saying, in a very confused way, is that the behavioural model 
isn't a sifficient explanation of social behaviour. 
Social skills training is really based on learning 
theory. I think it works, but at a theoretical level 
it is not a sufficient explanation for what is hap- 
pening. 
It seems, theng that the behavioural approaoh is not 
simply a theory put into practice; certain craft skills are 
hinted at - detailed assessment, looking at patients prob- 
lems in a certain way - whilst as a theory the approach is 
seen as insufficient. Thus although in some respects this 
description seems to correspond to the standard utility 
accountt particulary with the claim that the practice of 
skills training is based on learning theory, this ground- 
ing is described in pragmatic rather than epistemological 
terms. Learning theory is adequate for practiceg but not 
as a theory. As before, even though the standard model 
of application is drawn upon in the general glossg when 
more detail is added it is is undermined. 
Another sort of transformation which the respondent 
described concerns the differential interpretation of 
methods by practitioners. 
11. Res2ondent. Because it is such a bandwaggon using 
social skills, quite a lot of people are misusing it... 
To give you an example; they might get somebody to 
role play being assertive and they will get them to do the role play and then they will start asking them 
how they felt about it and go into the feeling, the 
dynamics... That is using a different sort of model to get at it. 
Interviewer. Would someone from an analytic perspect- "I- ive, a psychoanalytic perspectivep interpret the theor- 
ies on gaze and body positionsq and so ong in terms of 
a different kind of framework? 
Respondent. Yes. You see there is a lot of overlap h other sorts of activity type therapies. I mean dramat psychodrama, there is an awful lot of it going 
on... you might get people doing very similar sorts of 
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exercisesp but they will use them in an interpret- 
ative way. They will not be trying to t-each the 
client behaviours. 
Despite the formulation of the question in terms of 
theories of gaze and body positions the reply is concerned 
with practical social skills exercises. It is these that 
are seen to have different meanings dependent on the broad 
perspective within which they are used. An activity which 
for one therapist may be training the client skills becomes 
for another the use of a diagnostic tool for revealing 
underlying problems. This again raises the possibility of 
transformation. 
The lack of any clear cut description of the utilis- 
ation of theory by the respondent makes it difficult to 
talk in specific terms about the transformation of theories 
during application. However, as I have illustrated, there 
are a number of sections of the interview which are relev- 
ant to this issue. The respondent mentioned the theory of 
gaze as one which would be found wanting in the practical 
context of social skills groups. In contrast he mentioned 
learning theory as a theory that worked in practice but 
was, as a theory, insufficient for explaining what was hap- 
pening. In additiong the respondent describes certain pro- 
cedures being modified in an ad hoc way tb fit in with 
different therapeutic concerns. These instances, then sug- 
gest further possible departures from the standard utility 
account. 
The Societal Context of Theory and Application 
Another modification of the standard model comes when 
the role of broader social factors and interests is int- 
roduced by the respondent. In chapter one I developed a 
number of criticisms of the way 'social interestst have 
been drawn on as an explanatory resource by sociologists 
Te 
of science While criticising their deployment as unprob- 
lematic theoretical entities by sociologists, the argument 
was not meant to suggest that social interests, or at 
least their invocation by memberst is not an interesting 
topic for analysis. Clearly it may be very revealing. In 
the present discussion the respondent draws on certain 
social interests when explaining the popularity of SST 
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in a way which elaborates on the more contingent version 
of theory application. 
The role of the broader societal context in SST is 
particularly discussed in the various sections of the int- 
erview concerned with the growth of SST in the UK. The 
respondent's explanation indicates that the burgeoning pop- 
ularity of the field does not arise from purely scientific 
considerations. 5ST is seen to fit with a growing trend 
in the social services towards community based treatment: 
12. Respondent. I would think that people are, in most of 
the services, becoming much more community orientated. 
In other words getting away from some sort of instit- 
utional model of dealing with problems, punishing for 
crime and so on. And they are moving much more into 
the ideal of working with the community in trying to 
rehabilitate them. And that assumes that you have got 
to teach these people how they are going to fit into 
society, into their community. And I suppose the 
idea of then improving on social skills is one way of 
making it fit the model you use. 
The respondent points out that there is a move away 
from punishment towards rehabilitation. The propriety of 
this trend is not decided by scientific factors for it 
is a moral and political issue. The attention shown by 
the Women's Movement to SST was seen as another factor 
influencing growth. 
13. Respondent, One of the areas in which it is widely 
used is in assertion traininq for women*" That is 
very much the thing in the Womenl. s Movement. And 
assertion training in Britain has almost become syn- 
onymous with women's groups. 
The implication is that any attempt to fully explain the 
increase in the popularity of social skills training in 
this country might have to take into account of the part- 
icular interests of the Women's Movement. 
The respondent also suggested that the social skills 
trainer's i-. tance towards their clients might aid its 
nn 
popularity because of its emphasis on4internal locus of 
control. 
14. Respondent. ... they see it as a less mechanical 
process than the other approach, and they see it as 
a way of people getting or achieving goals for them- 
selves. I suppose that there is the implication 
that it is moving towards a more internally locus of control type behaviour therapys in the sense that the individuals tend to have goals and are given the skills with which to achieve those goals. 
This was notg howevert seenas a feature of the Argyle 
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type approach. In this extract, as with the previous onesq 
it is some extra scientific factor rather than any break- 
through in theory which is seen as leading to the growth of 
SST. The implication is that the choice between SST and 
alternatives such as traditional behaviour therapy is 
not guided by purely technical considerations but is part- 
ially dependent on broader social factors. 
In each of these cases broader social concerns are 
depicted by the respondent as influencing the popularity 
of SST. The use of 5ST is taken to be congruent with a 
number of societal phenomena: the growth of the Women's 
Movement; the increasing emphasis on community rather than 
institutional treatment. Its popularity is also related 
to its stress on patients' responsibility for their own 
actions rather than being constrained by the will of the 
therapist. The respondentg, howevert although duplicating 
many features of the explanations used by interest theoriAl 
does not relate the factors leading to the growth of SST 
to any explicit political or moral philosophy. 
Discussion: Standard and Contingent Utility Accounts 
In this chapter I have outlined the form of the stand- 
and utility account in a preliminary fashion and documented 
its existance in a number of different areas of meta- 
science. I showed that in philosophy of science the trad- 
itional model could be used to undermine theories which 
cast doubt on the progress of scieme; progress is taken 
to be assured by the multifarious 'products' of science. 
In sociology the effects of the standard account are to 
direct attention away from a thorughgoing social analysis 
of the contents of science. It is implied that social 
influences and distortions must be all but irrelevant in 
the procedures of science because these procedures lead 
to products which display, or appear to displayp no social 
contingency at all, Even where a strongly sociological 
analysis of the role of science as an institution is sug- 
gested it is Presppposed that science is in fact respon- 
sible for the technological artifacts which we the cur- 
rency of modern capitalism. The very political importance 
of science is taken to lie in its lack of social conting- 
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ency and thereby its practical potency. In each of these 
cases it is assumed that successful practical application 
provides a clearcut validation of scientific theory and 
that a large proportion of scientific theories have been 
validated in this way. 
I went on to show that the standard model is not lim- 
ited to analysts' discourse, but also appears in partic- 
ipantst own accounts of the applicability of their discip- 
line. In general, characterisations of the applicability 
of social psychology articles were shown to reproduce the 
notion that successful practice is based on correct theory. 
Indeed this was encapsulated into the regularly repeated 
slogan that "there is nothing so practical as a good the- 
ory", 
When a detailed account, by a single Social psychDl- 
ogist, was examined the picture became rather more CDMP- 
licated. The standard utility account was certainly used 
to characterise application in places in the trans- 
cript. Howeverg a rather different type of account was 
also apparent. This was less unified than the standard 
account. In places it simply implied that there was no 
relationship between social psychological theory and the 
practice of SST. 
In other places a more complex ralationship was imp- 
lied. This described social psychological theory as being 
transformed in certain ways when put into practice. For 
instance, the emphasis can be changed to suit training 
sessions in which clients are actively involved; or a 
theoretical approach can be used merely as a heuristic 
device in spite of basic theoretical inadequacies. The 
alternative to the standard approach also suggests that 
the formal literature on its own (even when orientated 
towards practical rather than theoretical concerns) is not 
sufficient for sustaining an effective and successful pract- 
ice. Finally this alternative treated the choice of train- 
ing techniques as partially dependent on broader social 
influences. Thus it was implied that the choice between 
using social skills or other behavioural techniques is 
not merely dependent on technical criteria but is also a 
function of the 'philosophical' perspective taken. 5ST 
would be chosen by those therapists, it is implied, who 
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stress the autonomy and self-directedness of their pat- 
ients. 
Overall, this analysis shows that it is not possible 
to recover from the interview transcript one unified 
account of the way social psychological theory is util- 
ised. For at different points in the interview contrast- 
ing versions of the theory-utility relationship are prof- 
fered. So far I have made little attempt to identify 
systematic relationships between the interpretative con- 
text and the form of these different accounts. All I have 
done is suggest that there seems to be a broad correlation 
between the contingent account and informal discourse; 
that is, although the standard account appeared in both 
the general articles and the interview transcriptq the 
contingent version was restricted to the transcript. 
Clearly what is needed is a more detailed examination of 
the contingences of use of these differing accountst so 
that we can improve on the gross, and in many respects mis- 
leadingg distinction between formal and informal contexts 
of discourse. That is the task of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MAKING THEORY USEFUL 
In the last chapter I documented the existence of a 
widely distributed view of the way science is applied: 
the standard utility account. In this chapter I will dis- 
cuss some theoretical and empirical problems with this acc- 
ount of application. One approach to these problems has 
been to develop an alternative m9del of the science-utility 
relationship. A model of this kind will be discussed later 
in the chapter; however, this will not be the approach 
adopted here. My concern will be to develop a more system- 
atic analysis of the way scientists themselves account 
for the utility of their work. Building on the findings 
of the previous chapter, I will examine the way application 
is depicted by a group of social psychologists at a con- 
ference convened to discuss applied research. In partic- 
ular, I will try to explicate what is achieved, by different 
accounts of the utility of theory and how such accounts are 
fashioned to suit specific interpretative contexts. The 
conclusions of this analysis will then be used to make 
some more general comments about the role of utility acc- 
ounting in variDus different kinds of discourse. 
To start withq thenj I will discuss research which is 
critical of the staodard account of application. There are 
two obvious ways of challengingg or testing, this view. 
One is to--examine whether successful practical application 
actually does validate the knowl edge claims to which it is 
linked. The other is to question whether there is, in 
fact, a close relationship. between theoretical scientific 
knowledge and effective Itechnologyl. I will take them in 
turn. 
Questioning the Standard View: (l) Validation 
As I indicated in the previous chapter, the notion 
that scientific theories are validated by successful pract- 
ical applications is deeply embedded in the literatures 
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of both science and meta-science. Howeverg studies and 
arguments exist which suggest we should treat this notion 
with considerable skepticism. Not all of these can be 
discussed hereq but I will describe some examples to ill- 
ustrate the sorts of findings and arguments which are 
relevant. 
In an important discussion of the issue of practice 
validating theories Bunge 
1 has proposed a number of con- 
siderations that suggest problems with the standard model. 
By attempting to explicate exactly what would be involved 
in the process of validation he shows the futility of the 
exercise. He notes that because theories are typically made 
up of networks of ideas and propositions, and because not 
all of these would be equally involved in any practical 
utilisationg at most only part of a theory could be val- 
idated. Furthermorev because of the contingencies and 
uncertainties of the practical context there will be no 
attempt made to clarify what particular parts of the theory 
are relevant; indeed such an attempt would be doomed to 
fail. As Bunge puts it: 
A careful discrimination an6 control of the relevant 
variables and a critical evaluation of the hypotheses 
concerning the relations among such variables is not 
done while killingg curing, or persuading peoplet nor 
even while making things, but in leisurelyg planned, 
and critically alert scientific theorizing and exper- 
imentation. (2) 
This means that it is not possible to specify which parts 
of a theory are validated - the possibility of invalidity 
will always remain. 
A further consideration is the difference between the 
requirements of accuracy in scientific and practical cont- 
exts. Bunge suggests that in applied situations the con- 
cern with accuracy is merely that it should be sufficient 
or safe; a high degree of accuracyg the espoused goal of 
much scientific research, would actually impede effective 
interventions in the uncontrolled and unpredictable envir- 
onment that is the 'real world'. Coupled with this, the- 
ories may be reformulated or transformed in practical con- 
texts. Some arguments to this effect were discussed in the 
previous chapter (pages 100-103 above). It is worth noting 
a few features of a detailed empirical study of transform- 
ation conducted by Ronald Rice and Everett Rogers3. 
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Rice and Rogers propose the term Ireinvention' to 
refer to the way 'innovations' are changed in the process 
of adoption and implementation. This concept describes 
the situations where the actual use of a specific innov- 
ation is different to what was originally intended for it. 
Like Bungel these authors stress the structured nature of 
theories and the possibility of selective adoption. 
The concept of reinvention also recognizes that an 
innovation is often really a bundle of components; it 
is possible to adopt some components and change or 
reject others. Typically, diffusion studies assume 
the existence of technical experts who ultimately 
make the decision to adopt or reject a monolithicq 
prepackaged innovation. In fact, there may be a fair 
amount of groping for a solution by concerned indiv- 
iduals, leading to alterations and later corrections 
to, the original innovation. (4) 
Taking the case of 'Dial-A-Ridel responsive transport- 
ation systems, Rice and Rogers compared 10 of the systems 
adopted during the 1970's after promotion by the Urban 
Mass Transport Administration of America. They showed 
that reinvention was a pervasive feature of their case 
studies and involved a number of different phenomena. Thus 
some reinventions were planned and some reactive; some 
involved the technical hardware and others the organisation 
of operation. Despite a rather simplistic methodology and 
conception of innovationg and a case which is bordering on 
the non-scientific, this study is indicative of the possible 
transformation that can occur in utilisation. Indeed, it 
may underestimate the opportunities which wise when highly 
abstract and arcane natural scientific theories are applied. 
The important point as far as the validation of theor- 
ies is concerned is that if the theory is transformed in 
practice it becomes impossible to separate the effect of 
the change from the efficacy of the original theory. More- 
over, if this is coupled with Bungets observations about 
the complexity of practical situations and the different 
accuracy requirements of practical contexts9 the possibility 
of any clearcut assessment of validity becomes remote to 
say the least. This means that theories which embody dif- 
ferent assumptions and made different predictions in the 
scientific context can lead to equivalent results when used 
in practice. An examination by Wood of the use of child 
development theories in education appears to show exactly 




5 this When he looked at the utilisation of four cont- 
rasting perspectives on child development - those of 
Piaget, Chomskyq Bernstein and Vygotsky - he found a con- 
siderable agreement in the educational practices that 
were founded on them. 
Exactly how common this phenomenon is is not the imp- 
ortant issue. Simply the existence of such findings sug- 
gests the possibility that false 
, 
theories can lead to suc- 
cessful practice; and this is surely the most damning 
finding against the idea that theories can be validated 
through application. Of course, this involves certa-in 
problematic issues: how are we to identify 'false theories'?; 
how can we ensure that a utilisation is in fact based on a 
particular theory? Nevertheless, there are -numerous exam- 
ples which appear to show that false theories can sustain 
effective practices. Cardwell describes a specific inst- 
ance. 
In 1804 the Cornish engineer Arthur Woolf patented a 
new form of steam engine. The basis of the patent was 
a law of steam expansion that would appear to be com- 
pletely wrong. By 1814 after some trial and error 
Woolf's engine was producing performances that one 
modern authority says "represented something like a 
100 per cent improvement on the best performance of 
the Watt low pressure engine. " (6) 
Bryant gives a very similar account of the 'Silent 
7 Otto' engine which appeared 60 years later Again the 
engine was taken to be successful yet the theoretical prin- 
ciples used for its design were later seen to be mistaken. 
Even in the short participaries account discussed in the 
previous chapter we saw an example of a theory'which the 
social skills trainer takes to be both false and effective 
in practice (extract 109 page 102). 
It seems9 therefore, that there are good reasons for 
doubting that pp, ccesisful practical application can be taken ýý, Ve, VOY A ýý? 44P 1ý0 XMý 41, y eell ft 1ýý Ae, t4i ec, 
0u to validate theories. A here is no u iform relationship 
between those theoretical formulations of science which 
are accredited as true and those utilisations that are 
accredi, ted as successful in practical contexts. As Bunge 
has clearly demonstrated, 'the practical success or failure 
of a scientific theory is no objective index of its truth 
value' 
8. But this still leaves the question of the general 
quantity of application: is it the case that most technolog- 
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ical innovation is dependent upon science? 
Duestioning the Standard View: (2) Dependence 
There has been considerably more research into and dis- 
cussion of the issue of dependence; that is, the claim that 
regardless of whether scientific knowledge is validated 
by technology, a great deal of modern science has in fact 
led to successful application and that most modern tech- 
nology is science based. As Layton has noted, the results 
of this body of research are far from conclusive and the 
findings of particular studies are often contradictory 
90 
However, although studies exist which do suggest that there 
is a strongs unidimensional relationship between science 
and practical application, numerous other studies come to 
the opposite conclusion. I will describe a few of these 
latter examples to illustrate the problems they raise for 
the standard model of utility. 
In early research on the science-utility relation- 
ship, Price 
10 
examined the organisation of the literatures 
broadly concerned with theoretical science and technology, 
He found these bodies of published work to be organised 
in strikingly different ways, with the technological lit- 
erature not displaying the intricately interconnected cit- 
ation structure characteristic of the literature of science. 
Furthermoreq there appeared to be little cross referencing 
between the two literatures, Pricefs conclusion is that 
there can only be-a weak interrelationship between science 
and technology, and that on the whole science advances on 
the basis of past science and technology on the basis of 
previous technology. 
A number of large scale studies have tried to 'trace' 
technological 'events' back to their scientific origins. 
These studies seem to have been innocently modeled on the 
standard version of the science-utility relationship and 
have been remarkably unsuccessful in documenting, let alone 
elucidating, the dependence of technology on science. For 
examplet Sherwin and Isenson 
11 tried to pinpoint the 'site' 
of innovation in US weapons systems (for which there had 
been an expenditure of 10 million dollars on science res- 
earch). Their findings suggested that 91r" io of innovations 
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originated form inside technology itself and only 9% came 
from scientific research events. Moreoverg of these sci- 
entific events only 0.3% were in basic or pure science. 
And there was no suggestion that the O. 31/o of innovations 
from pure science were any different in quality from the 
91% from outside science altogether. A second project 
12 
was initiated to examine non-military innovation, but again 
was able to demonstrate very little connection betweent sci- 
entific events and industrial innovations. Barnes and Edge 
have recently suggested that these studies have become 
'empirical phenomena in their own rightg exerting a certain 
morbid fascination over those concerned with the history 
13 
of science policy' 
Other work has looked in more detail at the conting- 
endes influencing pure and applied research. For instancep 
Blume and Sinclair 
14 
studied chemists working within British 
universities. They found that chemists who worked closely 
with industry and the problems of industrial science were 
unproductive in comparison to other chemists. They also 
received poor evaluations from their peers. Blume and 
Sinclair conclude that 'British industry seems to have the 
attention of a minority of academic chemists whose com- 
mittment to the scientific community is at the same time 
15 
reduced' Moreoverg the attention industry does have is 
from the least productive of the academic chemists. 
On a more general level, one reply that might be made 
to this research goes as follow: even though detailed 
studies may fail to find a strong relationshipq the huge 
increase in successful technology in the 20th Century must 
be a consequence of the concommitant expansion of research 
using scientific procedures. Mulka Y16 has indicated some 
problems with this line of reasoning. The central diffic- 
ulty is that even if the growth in technology is a function 
of the growth in science - and after all many other changes 
have taken place in the 20th Century! - it might not be 
anything intrinsic to science which makes it applicable. 
Mulkay notes, for instance, that Babylonian mythological 
astronomy is now considered false, yet was responsible for 
applications considered successful 
17 
* It may thus be the 
systematic nature of knowledgeg or its detail, which leads 
to utility; its truth may be irrelevant. As Mulkay puts 
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it: 
given that industrial societies have devoted an ever 
increasing proportion of their immense 'surplus prod- 
uct' specifically to the production of systematic know- 
ledge, we would expect a dramatic growth of knowledge 
related technology in modern society, without having 
to assume that the epistemological character of know- 
ledge has altered with the advent of modern science. 
There is no need to assume that scientific knowledge 
is different in kind from 'pre-scientific' or craft 
knowledgeg or that the 'rate of practical return' on 
scientific knowledge is remarkably high. (18) 
Barnes has attempted to marshall the sorts of findings and 
arguments discussed above into an articulated model of the 
19 
science-technology relationship In the terms introduced 
in the last chapterv Barnes's model constitutes a contingent 
account of scientific application. It is summarised and 
20 
contrasted with the traditional model in Table 1 Barnes 
treats science and technology as two independent and 
broadly equivalent subculturest 'each with their own bodies 
of lore and competence t2l . Each can draw upon the other 
as a resource, but technology is not constrained by the 
limplicationst of scientific theories andq moreoverg an 
advance in technology will not necessarily be the result of 
an advance in science. When technology and science do 
influence one another the mediating agency is often the 
skills and knowledge of individual practitioners moving bet- 
ween realms rather than the formal, written communications 
found in journals and reports. Barnes does-not elaborate 
his model in any great detail; and for the most part it is 
merely a systematisation of the kinds of findings discussed 
earlier in this section. Nevertheless, it constitutes one 
form of response to these results: the production of a def- 
initive scheme for relating science to utility. The 
approach adopted here will be different. 
Discourse and Utility 
So far in my discussion I have documented research 
which shows that the traditional view of the strong relat- 
ionship between science and technology is questionable; 
indeedl an entire alternative model of the relation can be 
articulated. But this work does not succeed in demonstrating 
conclusively that the relationship corresponds to the alter- 
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TABLE I 
Conceptions of The Relstionskip Between Science (S) and Technology 
THE INSTITUTIONS 
COMPARED 'BAD OLD DATS' PRESENT 
2 Discovery S Invention 
FORMS OF Crest Ion d klodp 
ACTWITY T Applicalwa T Inv@ Id Ion 
Us* of kamimige 
MAJOR S Nature 3 Existing sciince 
RESOURCES T Science T Existing technology 
MAJOR 
CONSTRAINTS S State cc sabore 8 No single major constraint 
ON RESULTS T state of actruce T No single major constraint 
TORMSOF 2 creative /Co"tructive 3 Creative /constructive 
COGNITION 





Hierarchical depeadenett z6alitarLAS tnisfact" 
MAIN MEDIATING words people AGENCIES 
OUTCOUZ3 
a. For the development a. Predictable coasequeacea. a. No predictable consequences. 
of knowledge T deduco; the implications of I T makes occasional creative 
and gives dwm physical vasoll. Smakesocctakad 
representation. Waleadback creative see of T. 
from T to S. Woraction 
It. Tor the development It. S may make free creative we It. Not a @operate Ru@11104, 
of competence and Of T as reecumco In research. Intsrsetion as above. 
technique 
C. for the evaluation C. 2 evaluates discoveries in &A a. S and T. both being Inventive. 
of knowledge and wichanging Cooftrt-lindepandent both involve OvILluatim Is 
competence way. T is evaluslad according terms of ends. NO A Prior$ 
to its ability to War the reason Why Activity III T Should 
tmPlIesiboasaft. Swecessin not be evaluated by ref*rtacd 
T is proper ase of 8; failure to to ends relevant to agents Is 8. 
T is imoopetant see of S. or vice verb&. 
Table 1. Reproduced from B. Barnes (1982) 'The science- 
technology relationship: A model and a queryIq Social 
Studies of Science. 12.166-172. 
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native model. This latter claim remains no more than 
plausible. Thus we have a situation in which the anal- 
ytical literature contains two contrastingg yet highly 
plausible and documented, views of the link between sci- 
entific knowledge and utility. The normal response to 
this kind of situation would be to try to decide between 
these two viewsl between the standard utility account and 
Barnes's alternative. Guided by the general perspective 
of this thesis I wish to-adopt an alternative approach. 
It is suggested that the conflict between these two views 
is unlikely to be resolved because both views are contin- 
ually reproduced in the social world under study through 
the interpretative accomplishments of participants. Anal- 
ysts will be able to document both positions because they 
are both embodied in participants' discourse about theory 
application. For participants, the connection between the- 
ory and application, in general or specific instancesl 
can be depicted as weak or strong, depending on the context 
in which accounts are produced. This much was tentatively 
indicated in the previous chapter. I will suggest belowq 
however, that the traditional conception of a strong link 
between theory and practice is employed as a primary inter- 
pretative resource in certain important social contexts 
and that, as a result, it is this position which has come 
to be most firmly entrenched in the literature of meta- 
science. It is only recently, as a variety of data have 
been drawn upon, that it has been questioned. 
As I suggested in chapter one, the data on which anal- 
ysts base their versions of the relationship between theory 
and application ultimately consist of participants' own 
interpretative formulations. Co-nsequentlyg unless analysts 
pay attention to the systematic practices by which members 
interpret their own and others' actionsv their analytical 
conclusions are likely to do no more than reflect the res- 
ults of participantst interpretative procedures. There is 
no reason to think that the current sit tion in the study 
of theory-application is any different 
ý4 
other areas of 4 
the sociology of science. The analytic approach taken here, 
therefore, is not to try to infer from participants' sym- 
bolic products what is the actual relationship betwoon 
theory and application in specific realms of knowledge, 
- 117 - 
but to examine the interpretative repertoires and practices 
used by participants in organising their accounts of this 
relationship. I will not be concerned below with scient- 
ists' actions and beliefs as such, but with their discourse 
about action and belief. In other words, I will not offer 
another 'definitive analysts' version' of the connection 
between theory and application to add to the ones discus- 
sed in this chapter and the last; rather I will present 
some comments on how participants themselves construct 
their discourse on this topic. 
I will develop these points by examining material taken 
from the discussions at a conference of social psychologists. 
This material is described in chapter two (page 76-77). To 
recap briefly, the conference studied was convened specif- 
ically to address issues in applied social psychology. It 
was attended by 16 European social psychologists including 
a number of respected figures in the field. Most sessions 
consisted of a presentation in which research was describedl 
the comments of two discussantsl and then a more general 
discussion involving the whole group. All sessions were 
transcribed verbatim. 
I will examine three cases in detail. The first of 
these is not concerned with research conducted by the con- 
ference participants' themselves, but serves to articulate 
some of the analytic issues. The next two cases concern 
detailed pieces of research conducted by social psydholog- 
ists present ýat, the conference. The rationale for choosing 
. 
these particular cases is that they are describingg in con- 
crete termsq the application of specific pieces of research. 
Other participants either discussed problems of utilisation 
in general, talked about the application of disparate bodies 
of research, or discussed work on theories which were only 
22 described as potentially applicable The forms of 
accounting documented below are also present in these lat- 
ter examples; howeverg the cases examined pose as the most 
straightforwardly 'applied work' described at the conference. 
This makes them the most apposite for study. 
Example (1): Bridges and Physics 
In the following passageg participants are discussing 
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theory-application in general rather than specifically in 
Social psychology. The passage centreS on an interchange 
between Kopp and Leach, which refers back to a dispute bet- 
23 
wean two other participants, Dunn and Friedell The 
initial dispute concerned whether theories should be dev- 
eloped in naturalistic contexts (in order to accomodate 
the complexity of natural situations), or whether they 
should be developed in abstract contexts, and then applied 
, 
in combination to naturalistic contexts. Friedell takes 
this latter position, and supports it with an example. 
Friedell. There is nothing like a theory of bridge 
buildiný; that's an application of many theories 
(E13). 
Friedell suggests here that the practical implementation 
(building a bridge) is not in a one to one relationship with 
a single 'theory of bridge building', but is based upon 
'many theories'. Although Dunn and Friedell differ in cer- 
tain respectsv they both present versions of what I have 
been calling the 'standard utility account'; that is, they 
both presuppose a direct utilisation of theory in practice. 
In contrastg Kopp enters the dispute with an entirely dif- 
ferent picture of the relation between bridges and physical 
theory, which questions whether there is any kind of direct 
or indirect relationship between theory and the practical 
activity of bridge-building. This corresponds more to the 
view of sociologists such as Barnes who support a conting- 
ent version of utilisation. It is this claim which init- 
iates the interchange seen in extract 1. 
1. Kopp 
,. 
(1)But, can I just make a point about building 
bridges. (2)This is that when people build bridges 
they don't use theories from physics (3)And they use 
the tradition of building bridges. 
j4)They 
use tried 
and tested techniquesp which aren't theoretically art- 
iculated, but they find work. (5)And if they, and they 
build bridges, and they model them in wind tunnels; 
and if they break down they remodel them. () 
Leach. (6)0h, I think that is an awfully naive view 
of what civil engineering is all about. (7)(Kopp. 
But ... 
) (8)1 mean they don't useq spend five yearsp 
you knowq messing about with wind tunnels when they learn the theory of civil engineering. (9)And admit- 
tedly it won't be nuclear physics they are learningg 
but it will be derivations from pure physics research, 
which have been tried and tested and amended. () 
Kopp. (10)19 1 am actually, I mean, I would like to 
see, I mean that's the everyday; I think what you are 
saying is our commonsense notion. (11)But the research 
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I have read jusf-'doesn't support that. (12)1 mean, I 
would like to see where it is shown that you can see 
the development from the theoretical law, the physical 
principlesq or whatever being used by mechanics. (13) 
Because the studies which I have looked at just don't 
find that. (14)1 mean if you can show me I will jump 
[1au' for joy. Butooo ghs] 
Leach. (15)Lookg all I can do is point to, I meang I 
don': E know verv much about civil engineering. 
Kopp. (16)But I think, no, I think it is important.. 
Leach. (17)But my point is that there's people who do 
spend five years or whatever it is and architects 
spend five years, being trained . 
ý18)Now 
are they 
merely trained into the professional myth that there 
is a body of knowledge which they have got? (19)Is 
that the argument? (20)Or are they actually being 
iven pieces of information? (21)Codes of practice? 
22)And a code of practice in the last resort, becomes 
a theory (E15/16). 
In her first speech Kopp suggests that bridge building is 
a craft skillq based on its own traditions (3-4)9 and there- 
fore not a product of physical theory at all. In sentences 
6 and 8, Leach responds strongly to this point and accuses 
Kopp of naivety. Cutting off Kopp's protest (7)f Leach 
elaborates his point. Engineers, he tells the gathering of 
social psychologistsp do not spend 5 years simply messing 
about with wind tunnels. They spend this time, he suggestst 
learning the theory of civil engineering (8). While Leach 
notes that this will not be theory from nuclear physicsl 
he asserts strongly that civil engineers will be learning 
derivations from pure. physics research (9). 
Kopp's agitated response in sentence 10 eventually 
leads to the counter-assertion that it is-Leach who has not 
got beyond the commonsense understanding of bridge-building 
(10). In contrast. to his claimv she suggests that her own 
views are based on a body of research (11,13). Further- 
morel she asks Leach to show that his belief is based on 
more than common sense (12). She implies that she would 
like to believe in what Leach is proposingt but that the 
evidence precludes such a view (14). She thus formulates 
a distinction between Leach's 'Common sensicall view and 
here own 'research-based' understandinq of the relationship 
in question. 
Leach prefaces his reply to Kopp by saying 'I don't 
know very much about civil engineering' (15). This state- 
ment leads us to ask where he obtained the rather specific 
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information that appears in sentences 8 and 9; the inform- 
ation that civil engineers spend 5 years learning deriv- 
ationgfrom pure-physics research. I suggest it is adopted 
as part of a generalisedt taken-for-granted model of how 
application is related to theory; that is, Leach's state- 
ments about bridge-building derive from his reliance on the 
standard utility account. As in the case of the social 
skills trainer, this should not be viewed as poor reasoning. 
Leachhas simply made a routine inference about civil engin- 
eering from a common-place system of terms for talking 
about and making sense of a wide range of areas of practical 
action. The basis for this interpretation of Leach's dis- 
course becomes clearer as the interaction continues. Leach 
cuts off Kopp's reply (16) and formulates a series of semi- 
rhetorical questions which reconstruct the issue. Instead 
of basing his argument, as Kopp had sought to do, on putat- 
ive evidence about the nature of civil engineering, Leach 
attempts to show that Kopp's position is absurd in the 
light of what everybody knows. He asks in sentence 18: 
how could it be that civil engineers spend five years learn- 
ing a professional myth that they have a body of theoretical 
knowledge? This unlikely summary of the nature of civil 
engineering, which has in fact at no stage been an explicit 
part of Kopp's account, is contrasted with what is presented 
as the only other possibilityg namely, that engineers are 
lactuall. y being given pieces of information' (20, emphasis 
24 
added) In this passaget Leach makes no appeal to R2ec- 
Afic information or knwledge of civil engineering; the 
appeal irý to our common sense. It is this taken for 
granted knowledge which tells us that it is absurd to think 
that civil engineers are trained into a professional myth 
and, therefore, that Leach's view of the relationship bet- 
ween theory and practice is necessarily correct. 
So farg through sentences 17-219 theory has not been 
mentioned. There has been a gradual shift from 'knowledget 
(18), through 'information' (20), to tcodes of practice' 
(21). However, theory is imported to end this series of 
formulations. In sentence 22 Leach says that in the last 
resortz code of practice becomes a theory. This series of 
formulations appears relatively coherentl especially in the 
fast flow of ordinary interaction; but contrast the final 
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formulation with that in sentence 9. The shift here is 
from a theory of civil engineering being derived from pure 
physics, to civil engineers learning a code of Practice 
which in the last resort becomes a theory. We might spec- 
ulate that the extent of this reformulation is in some part 
a response to Koppts claim in 13 that 'studies don't findt 
Leach's initial formulation to be correct. Leach dilutes 
his formulation in the face of Kopp's claim to scientific 
legitimacy. Yet the diluted formulation still retains the 
notion that theory underlies practice and that it is self- 
evident that it could not be otherwise. Leach's apparent 
qualifications ofhis initial claim, introduced in response 
to Kopp's opposing thesis, are used simply to enable Leach 
to encompass Kopp's points as minor variations on his cent- 
ral assertion. 
In this extract I have illustrated how participants may 
draw upon structured sets of presuppositionsg or accounting 
systems, when discussing the application of scientific know- 
ledge. Kopp Is strategy is to question the common sense view 
of theory and application in the light of systematic evid- 
ence. She formulates an account consistent-with the cont- 
ingent version of utilityl which suggests that the inter- 
play between scientific theories and particular technological 
artifacts has been exaggerated. In contrastq Leach's 
strategy is not to question the evidenceg for Leach acknow- 
ledges that he is unfamiliar with either engineering pract- 
ice or with research on the topic, but to re-state what 
everybody knows must be the case. 
Leach thus draws upon the standard utility account 
which expresses the customary view of scientific applicat- 
ion: namely that modern technology is straighforwardly based 
upon scientific theorv. The strength of his allegiance to 
this account may be gauged by the way it is maintained with- 
out direct experience of the subject under discussion and 
in the faceof claims that the available evidence clearly 
contradicts his view. Although Leach does reformulate his 
position in the light of Koppts criticisms9 the presup- 
positions of the standard account are maintained. Moreoverg 
the strength of the standard utility account (henceforth 
SUA) is also evident in Kopp's statement that 'If you can 
show me (that I am wronq in rejecting the SUA) I will jump 
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for joy. But... (laughs)' (14). In this statement she 
seems to be expressing a desire to be abl-e to accept the 
standard utility account, which indicates that she recog- 
nises its persuasivenessg whilst showing to the audience 
that she is forced by the evidence to withhold aquies- 
cence. These two approaches to theory applicationg then, 
closely parallel the secondary literatureq where sociolog- 
ists initially adopted the common sense position, which was 
subsequently challenged on the basis of its inconsistency 
with the results of systematic study. In the rest of this 
paper I will concentrate on social psychologists' use of 
the standard utility account (SUA). 
Example (2): Media Violence and Broadcastinq Policy 
The example above was intended to illustrate the notion 
of application-discourses and to reinforce the claim that 
it is difficult to accept these sorts of accounts as accur- 
ate, literal descriptions of scientific activity. The two 
speakers gave contradictory versions of the role of theory 
in bridge-building. We saw that Leach's version, drew upon 
a general, taken-for-granted model of kno wl edge- app li cation 
and was not even presented by the speaker as being based 
on direct experience or systematic study. Thus Leach's 
description of the process of utilisation cannot be separ- 
ated from his assumptions about utilisation. Howevert the 
implications of this instance are restricted because the 
speakers were not talking about their own research or even 
about utilisations within the realm of social psychology. 
In this example, and the nextv participants are discussing 
research which they either conducted themselves or which 
is taken from fields where they are expert. In each example 
I will compare an extract from a formal paper, an extract 
from a scientist's initial overview of the paper in the 
conference, and extracts from the ensuing discussion. In 
these more complex situations we will see that participants 
make a variety of specific technical evaluations. Howeverg 
I will be concerned with the scientific details of these 
evaluations only insofar as they help to highlight some of 
the formal properties of'-this kind of discourse. 
The following set of extracts are all concerned with 
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ttelevision violence research' and its application. The 
research consists of experimental simulations of television 
and cinema viewing. In particular it concerns the way 
that the effect of film violence on people's behaviour 
changes according to how they are watching and who they 
are watching with. The first of these extracts is taken 
from the conclusion of the paper that Biggs has prepared 
for the workshop. Having described a number of experiments 
carried out by himself and his research assistantsl he add- 
resses the general issue of the application of his resarch. 
2. (1)We are not applied social psychologists; rather we 
consider ourselves as experimental social psychologists 
who choose to investigate empirically-and theoretically 
problems having implications for the society; with the 
hope that such knowledge will some day be applied'--by 
others than ourselves(l). 
(Footnote, 1. ) (2)Fortunately, -this happens sometimes 
in the area of mass-media and violence in Europe. 
(3)For instance, the BBC televisian recently circul- 
ated a new guidance policy booklet which clearly takes 
into account the results of most recent research. 
(4)The Swiss television also devoted one of its most 
favourite programs to the problem of filmed violence 
and to our approach to this topic. (Biggsl unedited 
manuscriptj p. 15) 
Biggs writes, in sentence 19 that he does not regard 
himself as directly engaged in applied social psychology, 
but as producing knowledge which can be applied by others. 
The knowledge is applicable because it concerns social prob- 
lems which have particular implications for society. The 
first sentence of this extract employs the SUA in that the 
author presents his empirical and theoretical work as having 
been undertaken with application in mind and his results 
as being applicable in principle to the solution of social 
problems. The link between theory and practice is weakened 
somewhat by the qualification that the ensuing knowledge 
will only 'some day' be appliedg suggesting that application 
has not yet taken place. However, in the footnote, two 
examples illustrating the application of such knowledge are 
given (sentences 3 and 4). These examples suggest how the 
research in the body of the paper might be applied and also 
that it is likely that it will be applied. They inform us 
that television companies have taken notice of such research 
in the past; in one case incorporating it into a policy 
booklet and in the other basing a programme around the auth- 
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ors' theoretical approach. These examples thus provide a 
warrant for the applicability of the reported research and 
justify its inclusion in a conference on the application 
rather than the theory of social psychology. 
The next extract is taken from the transcript of the 
workshop. It is from Bigg's initial exposition of his res- 
earch. Biggs has said that he will read out his conclusion. 
However, although sentences 2t 3 and 4 are identical to 
the manuscript reproduced aboveg sentence 1 is modified. 
3. (1)Most of the experimental social psychologists rely 
on the fact that their basic work has applicationst 
or at least implications, fibr the surrounding society. 
(2)Fortunately this happens sometimes in the area of 
mass-media and violence in Europe. (3)For instance, 
the BBC television recently circulated a new guidance 
policy booklet which Swiss television also devoted one 
of its most favourite programmes to the problem of film 
violence and to our approach to this topic. (Biggs, 
transcript, B7/8) 
In the transcript, Sentence 1 refers to experimental social 
psychologists generally and not just to Bigg's particular 
research. Furthermore, sentences 2-4, which appear in the 
footnote in the manuscript, are here directly used to war- 
rant the applicability claim. Apart from these minor d1f- 
ferences, which perhaps make the utility claim slightly 
stronger in the spoken version, both accounts clearly draw 
attention to the practical relevance of the reported res- 
earch. 
The first discussant takes up a number of issues raised 
by Bigg's paper. One of these concerns the influence of the 
research in practical contexts. 
4. (1) ... your work 
[is a good exampleD of really the way 
to look at a topic in a slightly more discriminating 
way thanv certainly in the aggression research, was 
typical in the 601s. (2)But I think this presents a 
great problem for researchers who actually want to con- 
vince officialdom. (3)Because it is bad enough trying 
to get people to understand what a main effect meanst 
but once you start trying to describe what an inter- 
action is, and perhaps even a second order interactionq 
then officials say 1wellq you-are obviously not very 
confident about it'. (4)If a programme on television 
doesn't necessarily lead people to be aggressivet but 
it goes through a peer group, or it only affects some 
children, or it may have a delayed response, I mean; 
you have obviously done poor research or there isn't 
really a phenomenon there, and you are just some woolly- 
minded liberal standing on a soap box and we hear one 
of those every other day. (5)And so they can discard it. (6)And my feeling is that as one becomes - and this 
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is a general point - that as one becomes more discrim- 
inating on the research on these cumplex sort of multi- 
faceted phenomenat it becomes more and more difficult 
to make uneqivocal statements9 the type of statements 
which decision makers in authority are likely to pay 
attention to and do something about. (Aldridge, 
transcript9 810/11) 
The speaker starts by complimenting the author for work 
which is more discriminating than that done in the 1960's 
(1). This compliment may be double-edged, however. For 
Biggs's research is only 'slightly' more discriminating 
than work done 10 years earlier. The possibility is left 
open of even better work done recently. The speaker then 
suggests a practical difficulty in applying Biggs's research 
2 The problem is that the sorts of results that Biggs 
has obtained, because they require some degree of statist- 
ical skill to understand them, will not be persuasive to 
officials who make policy decisions (3). In sentence 4 
the speaker parodies the image which these unspecified 
officials will have of the social research. He describes 
the ways in which the results will be interpreted as erron- 
eous: 'there isntt really a phenomenon there'; or a product 
of political. interests: 'just some woolly-mindhd liberal 
standing on a soap box'; and can thus be discarded (5). 
In the final sentence the speaker produces a general acc- 
ount of the dilemma facing social researchers; as their res- 
earch becomes more subtleg decision-makers will pay it less 
and less attention and it will cease to influence their 
action. Thus the discussant tends to undermine Biggsts 
application claimt suggesting that the relevant officials 
will ignore his research, along with other similar work. 
Biggs replies as soon as this discussant has finished 
speaking. 
5.1 am not so sure about your intuition, Or YOUrcon- 
viction, lets sayg that the officials would be less 
touchedg that this kind of research with interactions, 
no main effects, would have less impact. (2)Er, I 
am not convincedg but at least I have some evidence 
that they don't like, that peoplein the TV, for example, 
would like that once there is violence in TV it is bad. 
(3)They dontt likýe that and they are not naive enough 
to think that it tias no influence. (4)Sol in some 
sense they are verv glad that someone says thatl you 
know, it can have effectsv but not for everybodyg not 
in all circumstances. (5)Maybe they will say that 
so-they have nothing to do. (6)That could very well 
be, (7)But at least in one recent journal that posit- 
ion was, you knowl advancedl that Position was apprec- 
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iated, and on the Swiss TV also. (B)But maybe it is 
in order so that they have everv Justification not to 
do anything. (9)That can be. (10)But if you say viol- 
ence an TV is bad I think it, you block them also. 
(11)Wellq that would be my reaction. (12)1 am not 
sure that would have less impact. (Biggs, transcript, 
B15) 
In sentence 1 Biggs identifies the point he is replying 
tog and takes issue with it. He characterises the discus- 
sant's claims about influencing officials as 'intuitions' 
and 'convictions'; whereas he has 'evidence' (2) that 
these claims are unfounded. Biggs suggestsq contrary to 
the discussant, that the tTV people' dislike claims that 
violence is bad per se (2). and that they are also exper- 
ienced enough to know that violence has some effect on view- 
ers (3). These officials are thus tglad' of interaction 
effects which support neither extreme (4). In sentence 7 
Biggs repeats, in support of this claim, the two examples 
that appear in the paper and in the initial verbal expos- 
ition (sentences 3 and 4 in extracts 2 and 3). Howeverg in 
sentences 5 and 8 Biggs provides a furtherg and significantly 
different argument against the discussant's point. He sug- 
gests that the officials may use research which recognises 
the presence of complex interactions to legitimate their 
inactivity. Biggs is implying here that officials may well 
respond to social psychological research in accordance with 
their interests and that they may use its findings merely 
to justify policies which have their 'real originst else- 
where. This conception of the practical impact of social 
psychology seems far removed from Biggs's initial formulation 
of the SUA. 
We can see that the notion of 'impact' (12) is subtly 
attenuated as Biggs interacts with his critic. By the end 
of extract 5, limpactt may mean that results are put into 
some sort of practice; but equally it may mean quite the 
opposite, that the results 'lead to' inactivity. In this 
extract Biggs has fashioned an account of the (potential) 
impact of his work specifically to repudiate the discus- 
sant's suggestion that it will have little impact. Howevert 
in doing so, Biggs has introduced an interpretation which 
was not used in either his paper or his initial verbal exp- 
osition. This interpretation is suited to the specific 
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interactional task of undermining the discussant's central 
criticism, in that it enables the speaker to maintain some 
kind of utility claim even in a situation where his research 
may have no ostensible outcome. Thus this example illust- 
rates the flexibility of the notion of application in 
informal discourse. The SUA can be employed both in inst- 
ances where officials are depicted as using the research to 
guide policy and to educate the public about the problems 
of television violenceg but also where officials use the 
research as a rhetorical justification for doing nothing. 
The notion of application is so open-ended that the speaker 
is able to draw two quite contradictory accounts of action 
together as documents of the utility of his research. As 
we will see in later chapters of this thesis, such inter- 
pretative flexibility is typical of informal accounting and 
is one of the principal reasons why general-purpose inter- 
pretative devices like the SUA are so widely adopted. With 
a little ingenuity, they can be applied to virtually any 
particular case. 
Example (3): Theoretical Analysis and Enerqy Consumption 
The third example concerns a discussion of research by 
Aldridge and Gough on the conservation of energy in pri- 
vate households. Again no appreciation of the technical 
details of their work is essential for understanding the 
analysis. The research involves comparison of energy 
savings in households which have been given feedback on 
their consumption and households given information about 
effective strategies for energy conservation. In the fol- 
lowing extract from Aldridge and Gough's paper a strong 
case is made for the integration of pure and applied res- 
earch. 
6. (1)Following our previous argument [concerning short- 
comings in purely empirical approaches to energy con- 
servation], we would assert that the applied problem 
of energy conservation can only be effectively analysed 
and solved through theoretical analysis and related 
empirical research. (2)Of coursel empirical research 
can produce a solution to a particular situation but 
any change in that situation which affects consumers' 
reactions can only be countered by further exploratory 
research to find a new solution. (3)The advantage of 
a theoretical analysis is that it allows for prediction 
of practical. procedures to obtain optimal results in 
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both stable and changing situations. (4)Moreover it 
gives rational direction to further research and all- 
ows for the identification of anomalies requiring 
consideration. (5)Theory must be an integral aspect 
of the research process not an optional extra. (6)It 
is in this context that distinctions between pure and 
applied research become somewhat meaningless: good res- 
earch requires both. (Aldridge and Goughq unedited 
manuscript, p. 15-16) 
In the first sentence the authors strongly assert that 
the solution to the specific problem of energy conservation 
is dependent upon the integration of theoretical analysis 
and emprical research (1). In the next three sentences 
grounds are given for this claim. Firstly it is suggested 
that emprical research alone is poorly suited for dealing 
with changing situations. Each change requires a fresh 
study to find a new solution (2). Theoretical analysisq 
in contrast, can predict how practical procedures should be 
changed to deal with fresh situations (3). Secondly the 
authors claim that theoretical analysis has the virtue of 
directing future research and identifyin_g anomalous res- 
ults (4). Although in sentence 1 the authors refer to the 
sPecific, problem of energy conservationj their argument 
seems to be broadened through sentences 2-4 to deal with 
application in general. The central point is forefully rep- 
eated in general terms in sentences 5 and 6; theorv and 
application must be drawn closely together, Again we have 
an example ofan SUA which stresses the essential link bet- 
ween theoretically informed research and successful aPPlic- 
ationt and which presents the speaker! s actions as exemP- 
lifying that link. 
These points are restated in Aldridge's initial over- 
view of the paperp before any discussion has taken place. 
7. (1)1 really do consider that all empirical research 
should be theory related. (2)There are certainly 
occasions where a little crass empiricism doesn't do 
any harm at a119 but I think in terms of the solut- ions to practical problemsp and a development of an 
understanding of the psychological processes which may be involvedp some kind of theoretical underpinningg theoretical framework, is absolutely vital. (3)Bec- 
ause it seems to me without theoretical underpinnings 
a practical solution which might emerge from a piece of empirical research is essentially static and is essentially only short term. (4)A purely emprical solution provides no rational way of making decisions 
about further researc"Rj provides no rational way of dealing with anomalies. (Aldridgeg transcriptq A2) 
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The first two sentences reassert the importance of theory 
for the solution of practical problems. As with the writ- 
ten version, the claims are strongly put: tI really, do 
think that all empirical research should be theory related' 
(1, emphasis added). Aldridge accepts that there are occ- 
asions when la. little crass emp-Iricism' does not actually 
harm the research. But he seems to suggest that this is 
less true when practical solutions are being sought. In 
these latter cases theoretical support is 'absolutely vital' 
(29 emphasis added). The written and spoken versions are 
thus very similar; with the latter being perhaps slightly 
stronger. 
During theinitial discussantfs comments and ensuing 
general discuss-iont Aldridge and Gough's position is crit- 
icised a number of times. This leads Aldridge, at an 
early stage in the discussions to state more explicitly 
how their work gives rise to practical action. 
B. (1)The whole point of our research is not actually to 
persuade people to conserve energy, but to give people 
the wherewithall to use energy more efficiently if they 
so choose. () (2)We are not in the businessq it 
seems to me, of social influence by shaping the gen- 
eral public into certain ways of behaving. (3)It 
seems to me that it is so eminently rational for them 
to behave in the right fashion, given the ififormationj 
and given that the price of energy will go up, etcoteral 
etcetera, we don't need to worry about motivation. 
(Aldridgel transcript, A12) 
Aldridge compares his research to that on 'influence' (1-2). 
In contrast to that researchl he suggests, he is concerned 
with providing the information-to enable people to conserve 
efficiently (1). He mgues for his own approach by the 
further claim that price increases will be enough to per- 
suade people to conserve (3). All that is necessary to 
increase conservation is to give people information about 
WaB how to do it effectively. ThisAcriticised by Hearn, the 
initial discussant. He makes the point that the relation- 
ship between price risesand motivation to conserve may be 
weaker than Aldridge and Gough suggest. The following 
extracts are from Hearn's first three formulations of this 
criticism. 
9a. (1)Ilm just trying to think of how, eml generally via- ble is the model which you present which is, implicitlYP that people know that energy conservation is a good thingg but they don't have the facts at their disposal 
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to know how to go about saving energy. () (2)1 
don't think it is j-ust simply clear that nobody has 
taught them and now we musthave a theoretically based 
information campaign to tell them, and the, and things 
will somehow be better after that. (A7) 
9b. (1)Can I just on, just query you on that rationality 
thing? (2)1 mean, what would you say, in terms of 
saying this is clearly irrationalg to somebody who 
says 'well lookl the way things are going in ten 
years time I just won't be able to affordto run a 
car, so right at the moment I am just goin to burn 
up and down in my TR6 or 7 or 8 or 91? 
? 
A13) 
9c. (1)All I am saying is that the message that prices for 
energy are high and likely to become higher, might 
have the effect of making you want to save 6r it 
might have the effect of lets use it as I, 
)asg 
while 
we have got it. (Hearn, transcriptq A14 
Hearn gives a gloss on Aldridge and Gough's model (al) 
and suggests that one of its basic presuppositions - that 
increased information will lead to increased conservation - 
is possibily unwarranted (a2). Hearn does not accept 
Aldridge's reply to this pointt and reformulates it with a 
specific example. He suggests that there is no compellinq 
rationality to conserve. On the contrary it may be rational 
to use as much energy as possible while it is still possible 
to afford it. Aldridge's reply still does not satisfy Hearn 
and he gives a further reformulation, stating the point even 
more bluntly (cl). 
We will now examine three responses to this criticism: 
two from Aldridge and one from Gough. The first is from 
Aldridge. 
10. (1)One of the things that I think is relevant to thatg 
I excluded it from the paper becauset I think, we 
really can't think of a theoretical underpinning for 
it - it seemed to make this statement about theory and 
then produce a whole strin of interesting results 
which didn't fit in... (2ýBehaviours are located in 
group norms, and that one of the more effective ways 
of changing behaviour is t6 change those norms. (3) 
And so we are doing some research for example on the 
use of schocichildren. (4)It's not terribly well struct- 
ured but we see () schoolchildren as potentially 
people who are carrying home new ideasq innovatory 
ideas, to their parents to change them. (Aldridgeg 
transcripty A15) 
Aldridge here replies to Hearn's point by outlining some 
research which he and Gough had conducted on social influ- 
ence, more specifically on the influence of school children 
(2-4). This reply undermines the previous statement that 
they believe providing information to be sufficient on its 
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own; it suggests instoad that they have been looking at the 
effects of both information and persuasion (2)9 but that 
only data on the provision of information have been incl- 
uded in the present paper. What is most interesting from 
the present perspective is Aldridgets preamble to this 
statement. In this he accounts for the absence of the per- 
suasion research from the paper and from the spoken present- 
ation by noting that it is atheoretical, and thus could not 
be included in the paper as it would be inconsistent with 
the account of theory given there (1). Yet, in accounting 
for its exclusion, Aldridge comes close to recognising 
explicitly that there is a contradiction between this ver- 
sion of their work and that offered previously. This may 
be why sentence 1 remains iincomple ted. Aldridge certainly 
stops at the point where the contradiction seems about to be 
made fully explicit. To summarise, Aldridge has produced 
an account of his research in reply to Hearn's specific 
criticism. In so doing, as he himself notes, he has dep- 
arted from the rigorous utility account which is proposed 
in the paper and in the initial overview. Thus the SUA9 
with which Aldridge and Gough began the presentation of 
their work in the context of this conference on applicationg 
can be seen to be no more than one possible version of that 
work which the authors decide to present on this particular 
occasion. The contingency of this version becomes apparent 
only by means of close examination of participants' dis- 
course, in the course of which alternative accounts are 
generated. 
Aldridgets reply in passage 10 is not taken as suf- 
ficient by Hearn 9 whog after some discussion of related 
theoretical pointsq restates his criticism. This time 
Gough replies. 
11. (1)1 meang there is a, there could be a completely 
different aspect on this research which is, perhapsp 
the way the research has developed out of the pilot 
research which was doneg and the m in which the 
problem was defined, and so on. (2 (Hearn. Yes. ) 
(3)Em, because it in a way, it is a fall back position 
from the original positiong which was - although it 
was never probably formally stated - the original sort 
of ideal behind the research was promoting energy con- 
servation, and persuading people to conserve, and 
very much bound up with social influence. (4)The fall 
back from that Position to a Position of trying to 
put people in a Position where they can make better 
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decisions about energyq if they have to, was, in a 
wayt a fairly defensive one becauseq since the energy 
crisis over whether there will be a shortage of 
energy or anythingg or what it will be like in 20 
years time, we haven't actually got a stable base 
to work on. (5)Because energy conservationg change 
of governmentg change of policy amongst the oil dev- 
eloping, er, oil producing countries and it is all 
wiped out and energy conservation is out the window. 
(6)So that to have a stable base for doing researchq 
and so ong if you step back to not worrying about 
energy conservation and saying this is a good thing in 
itself, to educate people and inform them and if it 
comes we will know how to deal with it. (Gough, 
transcript, A20/21) 
The structure of this account can be understood as 
dealing with the task of showing, much as Aldridge did in 
extract 10, that they accept the general force of Hearn's 
argument (that persuasive factors might be important), 
but that it does not apply to these specific results. Gough 
suggests that their initial research position was tvery 
much bound up with social influence', and he forestalls any 
scrutiny of this claim by noting that this was an 'ideal 
behind the research' which was never formally stated (39 
emphasis added). He goes on to cite a pragmatic reason 
for changing to a completely different 'fall back posit- 
iont (3). This is thatq given the volatility of the polit- 
ical and international situation, they would not have a 
stable base on which to carry out their research (4). 
Thus Gough characterises this change of positions as enab- 
ling them to avoid having to deal with, the changing polit- 
ical sitLEtion (5-6). However, in the paper and in the init- 
ial overview of the researchl theoreti'cally based research 
is depicted as and justified as a way of solving the prob- 
lems that purely empirical research meets in dealing with 
dynamic situations. 
It seems, then, that in the courseof resisting Hearnts 
criticism, Gough departs radically from the written formul- 
ation; instead of reaffirming the version of their work in 
which theory, is used to guide both research and practical 
application through various changing social situationsq 
Gough now describes a methodological decision not to look 
at persuasive factors, which will be in fluxq but to conc- 
entrate instead on informational factors precisely because 
they will be static (6). Furthermoreq in describing their 
interest in persuasion as having been abandoned for prag- 
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matic reasons, Gough produces an account which is incon- 
sistent with Aldridge's in extract 10. In that account 
social influence was characterised as a continuing interest 
as yet in need of theoretical underpinning. Hereg thent 
we have an instance of the joint authors of a paper givingt 
in the course ofinteractiong strikingly divergent accounts 
of the research activity depicted in the paper. Once 
again, the contingency of any particular account of their 
research and its dependence on the interactions occurring 
at the conference, is made strikingly evident. 
At this point Aldridge gives a further reply to Hearnts 
criticism. 
12. (1)1 think also as a result of our research it is 
fairly clear that most people thought it was a good 
idea. (2)Most people admit that they do something 
but tend to do something that is rather ineffective 
without knowing. (3)(Hearn. Yes. ) (4)So in a way 
talking to people persuaded us that that was really 
the place to start. (Aldridge, transcript, A21) 
In this account Aldridge justifies the energy conservation 
research in purely pragmatic terms. He claims that 'most 
people thought it was a good ideat (1), and that talking 
to people persuaded them that it was a good place to start 
(4). In the light of the failure to satisfy Hearn as to 
the theoretical grounding of their researchq Aldridge 
draws upon a purely pragmatic consideration to legitimate 
their approach. He accounts for their research in terms 
of peoplets lay evaluations, without making reference to 
theory. Thust in the course of responding to Hearn's rep- 
eated. criticism, the standard account of the relationship 
between theory and practice appears to be clearly aband- 
oned and in its place a purely pragmatic justification is 
used. This in no way implies, of courseq that the SUA of 
this research will not be employed again on different 
occasions or later in the same conference. Despite their 
production of several radically different accounts of the 
relationship between theory and application in this researchl 
at no point in the discussion does Aldridge or Gough explic- 
itly withdraw the initial utility account. Nor do any of 
these alternative versions of their research appear in 
the published version of their paperg even though it was 
explicitly suggested that people rewrite drafts in the 
light of the conference discussion. 
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Discussion: Utility Accou. nts and Interpretative Contexts 
In the preceding analysis I have illustrated how soc- 
ial psychologists often use a particular interpretative 
device for depicting the relationship between theory and 
application. This I have termed the 'standard utiliity 
account'. It is a highly general and stereotypical acc- 
ounting system for depicting this realm of social action 
and belief. By means of this system, application is typ- 
ically described as 'derived from' or as 'enabled' or 
'correctly guided' or 'rationally directed' by theory. 
Alternativelys theories are said necessarily to have 
'implications' for society or to be a 'vital underpinning' 
25 
of the solutions to practical problems In short, the 
standard utility account treats the existence of a strong 
relationship between theory and practice as proper, typical 
and generally unproblematic. 
In each of the three examples examined abovet the SUA 
was given interpretative primacy by at least one of the 
parties involved. In example one, we saw a speaker treating 
the SUA as obvious in the case of civil engineering. Int- 
eractional problems arose from this use of the SUA because 
the speaker was unable to claim any direct familiarity with 
engineering practice or with the relevant research literat- 
ure. Nevertheless, the SUA was strongly reasserted in 
response to another speaker's more contingent descriptiong 
on the grounds that the practical success of engineering 
necessarily implies that engineering practice ultimately 
derives from a sound body of scientific theory. The advoc- 
ate of discontinuity between theory and practice was unable 
to elicit any withdrawal of the SUA, despite the apparently 
flimsy basis for her opponent's position. Indeed, her own 
alternative position was to some extent weakened by her 
acknowledgement of the interpretative potency of the SUA. 
It seems likely that the SUA is most interactionally 
effective, and least likely to be subject to detailed qual- 
ifications, in situations like that occurring in the first 
example, where speakers are talking in generalities about 
areas of action in relation tu which they have little 
first-hand experience. By contrastv in examples 2 and 3t 
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speakers were dealing with research areas with which they 
were very familiar. Consequentlyq their interpretative 
work was more detailed and concrete; and a whole range of 
interpretative modifications were brought about in the 
course of interaction. 
These interpretative modifications were analytically 
useful. For they made it possible to demonstrate the con- 
tingency of participants' specific attempts to portray and 
justify their own professional work by means of the SUA. 
Neverthelessq despite clear evidence that interactional 
difficulties followed from participants' use of this inter- 
pretative formulation, in none of the three cases did a 
speaker abandon an SUA. Rather, they engaged in 5upplem- 
entary interpretation which allowed them to retain the SUA 
as one legitimate characterisation of their work. For 
instance, the speaker in example two extended the meaning 
of 'application' to include cases where theoretical analy- 
sis produced no discernible practical outcome. Whilst the 
speakers in the third example generated a whole series of 
alternative and incompatible accounts9 yet retained the SUA 
in the final text of their paper. 
In examples two and three we observed social psychol- 
ogists presenting their work in terms of the SUA when engaged 
in fairly formal discourse. It is only in the course of 
unpredictable informal interaction that these actors come 
to qualify, modify and contradict their initialt formal 
SUAs. There seems, thereforeq to be some indication of 
broad contextual variation in the use of utility accounts, 
in a way which parallels scientists' use of empiricist and 
contingent repertoires 
26 
; that is, participants appear to 
use a relatively wide range of utility accounts in the course 
of informal interaction, but to select from this range a 
somewhat standardi5ed and restricted kind of utility acc- 
ount for more formal contexts. This finding corroborates 
the conclusions of the previous chapter. 
Clearly, the results of these analyses are highly tent- 
ative. They are based on an examination of only three 
examples from the transcript of one conference and one int- 
erview. Moreoverg the conference was convened specifically 
to address issues in applied research and the interview to 
discuss application. Consequentlyq there will have been 
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an exceptional stress on the applicability of social psych- 
ological research in these settings. Thus I am certainly 
not claiming that this sort of accounting will be pervasive 
in all areas of science on every occasion. Howeverg let 
us accept as provisional possibilities that scientists 
recurrently characterise their professional actions in terms 
of the SUA; that such accounts cannot be treated analytic- 
ally as literal descriptionsl but must be regarded as cont- 
ingent and context-dependent members' interpretations; 
that the SUA tends to be in certain respects primary in 
informal interaction and even more dominant in formal dis- 
course. If these provisional results were firmly established 
by further more extensive and systematic research, would 
they have any interesting analytical or empirical implicat- 
ions? I will examine some possibilities. 
In the first place, the question arises as to why the 
SUA should be primary and why it should be particularly prom- 
i nent in relatively formal texts. As a provisional interp- 
retationt I suggest that the notion of utility provides a 
powerful. source of legitimation for a great range of actions 
in industrial societiesq including that of knowledge- 
production. In our society, it is difficult to discredit 
any action which can be successfully depicted as facilit- 
ating control over the physical or social worlds. By char- 
acterising research in terms of the SUA scientists fashion 
a potent legitimation for the acquisition of funds and other 
scarce social resources. 
Given this interpretation, it would be expected that 
the supposedly strong relationship between theory and pract- 
ice would be particularly emphasised in interaction between 
researchers and non-speciali-sts. For it is the non- 
specialist who must be persuaded of the practical results 
of theoretical work, if funding and other forms of support 
are to be acquired. It would also be expected that this 
general purpose legitimating device would be absorbed, 
perhaps increasingly in the current climatel into the infor- 
mal discourse of the research community and employed in 
various appropriate circumstances. There is at present lit- 
tle systematic information available an scientists' infor--% 
mal interpretative procedures. It isp therefore impossible 
to document how frequently or when the SUA is used among 
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researchers. There ist howeverg a considerable body of 
evidence showing that it is regularly employed by scient- 
27 ists in their dealings with laymen 
In the case of social psychology it is possible to 
identify publications which are aimed to show that the 
discipline makes important and frequent contributions to 
28 the society at large Without engaging in any detailed 
analysis, these articles appear to be constructed through 
giving brief overviews of research conclusions from dif- 
ferent areas of social psychology and combining each conc- 
lusion with a SUA. In some respects these accounts are 
like examples 2 and 3 abovet where SUAS are applied to 
specific pieces of research. However, these accounts also 
share some of the features of example 1; they give brief 
summary descriptions of work intended for readers who have 
no first-hand knowledge of the area. This kind of form- 
ulation, as I noted, appears to be interactionally very 
effective. Thus in the form of a written text it may pre- 
sent the reader with a version difficult to deconstruct. 
Indeed, in many ways such accounts are organised to appear 
self-evident: as we know X we must be able (in society at 
large) to do something about/to X. 
Given the flexibility of the SUA, it seems well suited 
for legitimating research where other sorts of justific- 
ation are unsatisfactory. Gilbert and Mulkay 
29 have sug- 
gested that justifircations based on empiricist accounts 
may be sufficient in a variety of informal and formal con- 
texts in science, and particularly so when scientists are 
presenting their knowledge claims as being determined by 
the carefully controlled experimental explication of facts. 
Yet these accounts are likely to be opaque to lay people 
and inadequate on their own for funding agencies and pol- 
itical organisations. Here accounts of the practical ret- 
urns of science may be far more persuasive. It is not that 
the SUA replaces the straightforward empiricist account on 
these occasionss but it supplements the account and joins 
the arcane world of science to the everyday world of non- 
scientists. The SUA can thus be viewed as part of a Ivoc- 
abularyof justification, 30 or of an 'ideology of applicat- 
t3l ion It may protect the collective interests of scient- 
ists by portraying their sectional interests as universal 
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and by suggesting that the support of science in particu- 
lar will be to the general good. For instance, by sup- 
porting research on television violence, we can be seen to 
be helping to cut down crime on the streets. I have shown 
in the above analysis that this sort of practical charact- 
erisation of research activity can be more or less effect- 
ively maintained because of the generality and flexibility 
of the utility account. This argument suggests that it 
would be fruitful to examine the organisation of applic- 
ation accounts in more detail as well as the ways in which 
accounts are devised in accordance with variations in int- 
erpretative context. The preliminary conclusions suggest 
that SUAs should be more common in contexts where other 
legitimations of theoretical work are interactionally inap- 
propriate. 
Overall, then, it is possible to develop a tentative 
explanation of why SUAs are often treated by participants 
as primary in informal settings and why they are adopted 
in formall generally accessible, discourse about knowledge- 
production. In addition, these findings have implications 
for research into theory-application. It is evident, of 
course, that the kind of research being suggested here will 
not enable us to answer traditional questions on this topic. 
In particular the investigation will not help to reveal 
how far practical action does actually depend on theory. 
At the start of this chapter I mentioned the contradictory 
answers to this question presented in the secondary literat- 
ure on science. In this respect, the secondary literature 
simply reflects the variability of participants' own inter- 
pretative work. As 1 have showng there was considerable 
variability in the accounts of scientific action and res- 
earch given at the conference. This can be seen in each 
of the three examples discussed. This variability appears 
to pose a dilemma for the researcher who tries to use such 
accounts as data on the relationship between theory and 
practice. Given that different accounts of the 'same' act- 
ion are divergent and, in some casesq contradictory, the 
analyst who wishes to answer the, traditional question must 
decide which accounts are correct and which erroneous, in 
order to construct his or her own analysts' account of 
theory-application. As I have argued in chapter one, how- 
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everg there are no satisfactory procedures for building up 
analytical versions of action in this way 
32 
0 
The perspective on utility accounting adopted here sug- 
gests an explanation for the variability in the literature 
on scientific application. This variability may be unrel- 
ated to actual utilisation of scientific theorising, but 
may instead be an artifact of the contexts in which the 
discourse about theory-application used by the analyst was 
produced. ForExample, discourse taken from contexts where 
empiricist legitimations are insufficient and where SUA's 
predominate may lead the analyst to conclude that inter- 
change between theory and practice is pervasive. Alternat- 
ively, discourse taken from contexts where empiricist leg- 
itimations are sufficient, for instance, in informal inter- 
views where scientists are commenting on each other's work 
may lead to the reverse conclusion. Indeed, in the latter 
situations both empiricist descriptions and SUAs may be 
abandoned at certain moments in favour of contingent ver- 
sions of scientific activity. It may be, therefore, that 
the 'new model' of the science-technology relationship form- 
ulated by Barnes and others is a direct result of changing 
research practices which have placed increasing emphasis on 
informal sources of information. 
If we accept that participants' accounts cannot be 
used as inert data about their actions outside the context 
in which those accounts are produced, but instead must be 
treated as the means through which participants accomplish 
contingent meanings for their actions, we can start to dev- 
elop a more viable analytic approach. This point can be 
illustrated using example 3 above. Here Aldridge and Gough 
give a variety of different accounts of their research. 
This variability becomes intelligible if each account is 
itself taken to be a type of action rather than merely a 
representation of action. For instance, in extract 12p 
after sustained criticism from Hearn of theoretical aspects 
of their research (extract 9)q Aldridge formulates a purely 
pragmatic case for the utility of the research. Although 
inconsistent with earlier accounts (notably the stress on 
theory as all-important), it is highly suited to the task 
of juztifying the research as useful independently of the 
specific theoretical underpinning which is being challenged 
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by the discussant. In this type of analysis we have advan- 
ced beyond the preliminary formulations of the previous 
chapter in which the type of account used uas related only 
to broad shifts in social context. Here the participants 
themselves can be seen to be constructing and modifying 
accounts in line with the specific interpretative contexts 
33 
which they also help to reproduce Within broad social 
contexts - the formal literatures the conferences the int- 
erview, and so on - there can be many changes in the spec- 
ific interpretative context. That is to say, the meaning 
of the interpretative context is not determined by the nat- 
ure of the social context, but is a social accomplishment. 
Indeed, social contexts themselves can be seen to be con- 
stituted by the recurrent use of particular systems of 
accounting. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TESTABILITY, FLEXIBILITY 
In the previous two chapters I examined the organis- 
ation of accounting in the -context of the utility of sci- 
entific theories. The issues raised in this analysis 
will be developed in the next two chapters through an anal- 
ysis of Kuhnian notions about scientific development and 
structure. In both of these chapters I will be concerned 
with the flexibility inherent in seemingly precise and 
clearcut linguistic categories when they are drawn upon in 
different interpretative contexts, although it is not until 
chapter six that I will start to look in detail at the ways 
in which such flexibility is achieved. For the moment I 
will concentrate on the notiong developed by Kuhn, that 
certain broad values constrain theory choices and thereby 
allow scientific progress. Kuhn's general argument will 
be discussed and then compared with an analysis of value 
accounts produced at a scientific conference. As a resol- 
ution of some of the difficulties raised by this analysisq 
I will suggest that values should be viewed as a flexible 
repertoire of interpretative resources which scientists' 
selectively draw upon when warranting their own theory 
choices and undermining their opponents'. 
Values and Kuhn's Model of Proqress 
In 1973 Kuhn 1 responded in some detail to accusations 
that his views led to the inevitable conclusion that scien- 
tific progress was irrational2 , and ultimately a matter of 
mob psychology 
3. Kuhn's denial of these accusations rested 
on a discussion of the crucial role played by scientific 
values in the choice between competing theories. He sug- 
gested that scientists are socialised into the use of a 
number of broad scientific valuest such as accuracy# con- 
sistency or scope and thatp because they are largely ind- 
ependent of particular scientific theories or frameworks, 
they provide a rational basis for theory selection. Ult- 
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imately they ensure the rational progress of science, which 
to some had seemed so fragile following the publication of 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions4. 
There is considerable subtlety in Kuhn's notion of 
values. He is unequivocal about the importance of values; 
,5 'they provide the shared basis for theory choice Yet 
the actual process by which values effectively constrain 
scientific development is complicated. He does not suggest 
that scientific values determine theory choice. On the 
contrary, he notes that 'two men deeply committed to the 
same list of criteria for choice may nevertheless reach 
6 different conclusions' This situation arises because of 
unavoidable difficulties in relating broadly formulated 
criteria to multi-faceted practical situations For exampley 
Kuhn notes the difficulty in applying a criterion of accur- 
acy to the choice between oxygen theory and phlogiston the- 
ory. Although oxygen theory could account for the weight 
relations in chemical reactionsl phlogiston could account 
for the fact that metals are more similar to each other than 
to their ores. The criterion of accuracy is thus, on its 
owng insufficient. Either theory can be held to be the 
more accurate, depending on the way in which accuracy is 
interpreted in this context. 
The situation becomes even more complicated when we 
consider more than one value. Kuhn illustrates this with 
the tension between the values of simplicity and consist- 
ency in the choice between heliocentric and geocentric 
astronomical theory. He notes that Ptolemy's geocentric 
system was both internally consistent and consistent with 
much more of the broader physical theory of the time than 
Copernicus's heliocentric system. Consistency alone would 
thus unambiguously favour the geocentric system. Howeverp 
Copernicus's heliocentric system was simpler in the sense 
that certain broad features of planetary motion could be 
calculated with the aid of fewer mathematical assumptions. 
Each theory therefore satisfied one value but not the 
other. Thus values on their own could provide no unambig- 
uous criteria for the selection of one or other of these 
theories. To understand why a particular theory choice 
is made in the way it is, Kuhn argues, we must go beyond 
the list of shared valuesl*to examine the characteristics 
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of individual scientists and aspects of their social cont- 
ext. 
We should not, howeverg imagine that Kuhn is embracing 
some sort of relativism, some sort of strong sociological 
explanation of scientific activity. This is exactly the 
accusation he is trying to refute. While he attacks the 
idea of producing a well articulated objective algorithm 
of theory choice, he claims that values have considerable 
effectiveness in practical situations. He contrasts his 
claims about the functioning of scientific values with 
philsophers' discussions of the role of crucial experiments 
in arbitrating between scientific disputes. His position, 
he claims, is descriptive of scientific practiceg while 
philosophers' discussions are simply post hoc rational- 
isations. According to Kuhnq crucial experiments are not 
a factor in the actual choice between competing theories, 
they are performed or at least recognised as 'crucial' 
after the choice, to provide illustratimand legitimation. 
Values, on the other hand, are actually used by scientific 
participants in the choice between theories 
7. How$ theng 
can values be effective in practical situationsq where their 
application to specific theories is ambiguous and where 
they may conflict with each other? 
Kuhn suggests that this indeterminacy of values is 
actually functional for the development of science. With- 
out it the creative processes of dispute and theory testing 
would be lost. But how exactly do values ensure this 
creative orderliness? Kuhn suggests analogies from other 
spheres of social life to clarify the issue. He notes 
that proverbs9 such as "Many hands make light work" and 
"Too many cooks spoil the brothl', are frustratingly vagueq 
and also in apparent conflict with one another. Neverthe- 
less these maxims: 
alter the nature of the decisions to be made, high- light the essential issue which it presents, and 
point to those remaining aspects of the decision 
for which each individual must take responsibility 
himself. (8) 
In the same way, he suggestsq values and norms Pro- 
vide effective guidance in situations of choice and uncert- 
ainty. For examplel the values of freedom of speech and 
the preservation of life and Property may conflictq such 
- 144 - 
that freedom of speech may have to be curtailed in cert- 
ain situationsq when it leads to a riot, for instance. 
Yet we do not suggest the abandonment of such values. We 
are acutely conscious: 
that there are other societies with other values and 
that these value differences result in other ways of 
life, other decisions about what may and what ma 
not be done. (9ý 
Despite being superficially convincingg both of these 
examples of Kuhn's soft determinism are problematic. He 
draws upon our unexplicated common-sense knowledge of the 
functioning of proverbs and social values. Proverbs alter 
the nature of the decision and thus its outcome, claims 
Kuhn. But do they actually do this? Are they really more 
than post hoc legitimations of action? Againg with social 
values: is it actually the possession of certain values 
that leads to differences between one society and another? 
Sociologists have been far less ready to characterise the 
causal chain in this way. It is just as plausible to treat 
the different actions which occur in different cultures 
as products of the way in which participants use values 
and other cultural resources to give meaning to their act- 
ions. Thus merely to point to the prevalence of different 
actions in separate cultures in no way demonstrates that 
actions are the result of actors' conformity to cultural 
values, rather than their interpretative use of such val- 
ues, 
Kuhn's discussion of the operation of values in sci- 
ence itself does little to clarify their putative function. 
Kuhn says tantalisingly little on this issue. Referring 
to the problem of scientistst sharing the same values but 
making different choicesq he writes: 
differences in outcome ought not to suggest that the 
values scientists share are less than critically 
important either to their decisions or to the devel- 
opment of the enterprise in which they participate. 
Values like accuracy, consistencyl and scope may 
prove ambiguous in applicationg both individually 
and collectively; they mayt that is, be an insuf- ficient basis for a shared algorithm of choice. But they do specify a great deal: what each scientist 
must consider in reaching a decisiong what he may and 
may not consider relevantl and what he can legitimately be required to report as the basis for the choice he has made. (10) 
Kuhn suggests that values identify certain features of 
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scientific theories as importantq and relevant to the 
choice between theories. But this contention is either 
empirically empty or it is inconsistent with what he has 
argued before. In suggesting that values specify the 
factors which must be considered in reaching a decisiong 
Kuhn seems to be doing no more than saying that values 
specify themselves: a value of accuracy, say, merely 
specifies that accuracy is important. Howeverg this 
leaves totally unresolved how the value is to be interp- 
reted in, and thereby guide or constraint any spec , 
ific 
choice. If he wishes to regard values as constraining sci- 
entists' choices, as 'specifying what each spientist must 
consider', Kuhn must describe what these values specify 
for each scientist. Yet Kuhn provides no such specific 
analysis; and, indeedq he cannot do so whilst he cont- 
inues to emphasise the essential indeterminacy of scient- 
ific values. 
Perhaps it is not surprising that Kuhn does no more 
than provide this almost tautological description, for 
his is the difficult task of describing in general terms 
the effect of broad formulations on idiosyncratic pract- 
ical instances. Kuhn has produced a number of strong arg- 
uments as to why values do not determine theory choice. 
But his case for values nonethelessq in some unspecifiable 
wayt constraining choice appears much weaker. It rests 
largely on our common-sense assumption that generalised 
values are in fact important in directing our activity down 
particular avenues. This seems to be fundamentally an emp- 
irical issue. We need to know exactly how a value or set 
of values constrains choice in any particular scientific 
debate. The rest of this chapter will be concerned with 
the empirimal analysis of the functioning of scientific val- 
ues. 
, 
Values in Psycho o ists' Conference Discourse 
It is particularly difficult to make an empirical eval- 
uation of Kuhn's model of theory choice because of the 
tensions within his argument. On the one handt he stresses 
that values are largely consensual and longlasting attrib- 
utes of science, with a meaning which is independent of any 
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specific theory or perspective; and on the othert he notes 
that they change with time and according to theory select- 
ion 11 . These claims make his position vague and possibly 
inconsistent. If values change over time and with the 
choice of certain theories# how can they constrain those 
choices? Kuhn claims that they do not change enough to 
make a difference, but does not elaborate this point 
12 
. 
The actual process of constraint is never made explicit. 
The only examples he gives are simplified panoramas of 
historical episodes that occurred over many yea-rs. It is 
clear that this degree of ambiguity makes any evaluation 
of the model very difficult. As it stands it is not clear 
at all what sorts of findings would cast doubt on its 
It is crucial to any examination of the functioning 
of scientific values that we note that they are considered 
to be participants' concepts. Values are not intended to 
be simply descriptive of scientific activity on aggregate; 
they are seen as categories that scientists actually use in 
the decision making process. Thus, according to Kuhnq 
Copernicus responded to the value of accuracy when convert- 
ing heliocentric astronomy from a global conceptual scheme 
to mathematical machinery for the prediction of planetary 
13 
position Kuhn makes reference to scientists' interpret- 
ation of simplicity, etc,, not those of philosophers or 
historians. In the empricial situation it will not be suf- 
ficient to say that certain choices appear to conform to 
particular values from an analyst's perspective; we must 
look for evidence that the participants themselves are draw- 
ing upon values. 
In the analysis which followst the data are drawn 
from periods of semi-formal talk at a scientific conference. 
This is just the sort of situation of direct theoretical 
debate that we oyght to see participants identifying the 
values whichl supposedly, guide and legitimate their the- 
oretical commitments. For in this situation scientists 
are continually describing and justifying their acts of 
theory choice under the critical scrutiny of experts within 
their own fieldq who may respond by supporting, modifying 
or challenging the propriety of their choices. 
To recap on the details of the conference (described 
more fully on pages 75-76); it was attended by psychologists 
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who, for the most partp were from the United Kingdom, Just 
o%xrlDD attendedg drawn from various areas of the disciplinev 
to discuss 'fundamental theoretical issues'. Roughly half 
of the conference time was allocated to the formal present- 
ation of papers which had been previously circulated, and 
half to the discussion of papers and the issues which 
arose out of them. The general discussion periods were 
led by selected participants although in many cases topics 
were raised from the floor. The papers were exclusively 
orientated to theoretical or conceptual issues; no speaker 
used the conference to present original data. All the 
sessions were tape recorded and the entire discussion was 
transcribed verbatim. 
The analysis that follows will concentrate on the value 
of testability. Although it is not one of the examples 
that Kuhn explicitly characterises in the 1973 paper, there 
are good reasons for concentrating attention specifically 
on this value. Not only is it strongly emphasised by other 




, but also Crane 
16 
has suggested in a Kuhnian inspired analysis of particle 
physics that it is the value most fundamental to scientific 
activity. Popper, of course, takes it to be similarly fund- 
amental. Furthermore, in the conference transcript refer- 
ences to testability.. or to the related notions of falsif- 
iability and refutability, occurred very frequently. On 
average one page in five of the transcript contained such 
references, which were produced by a total of 34 of the 
participants. Even using such a gross measure of occurrence 
as this it is clear that testability entered the discus- 
sion more than any other Kuhnian value. With so many acc- 
ounts of testability it is obviously not possible to exam- 
ine them all in a-single chapter. Instead I will document 
some of the different forms in which testability accounts 
appear and the implications of this for Kuhn's model. No 
attempt will be made to separate the notions of testability 
and refutability. Throughout the transcript the particip- 
ants tended to use these concepts interchangably, or to use 
refutability simply as a stronger form of testability. And 
as I have emphasised above, and in chapter one, it is the 
participants use of categories that is important. 
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Participants' Versions of Testability 
In this section I wish to document the most common 
ways in which the conference participants characterise 
testability and the constraint it places on theory choice 
17 
and scientific development A number of participants 
emphasise the central importance of testability. The fol- 
lowing example is taken from the opening minutes of the 
very first discussion periodg and may well have helped to 
plant testability firmly in the conference agenda. The 
speaker produces a linked set of complaints about a paper 
which has just been read by a psychologist who I will call 
18 Carlisle One of the complaints concerns whether 
Carlisle's position is testable: 
1. if you are offering any explanationg you don't offer 
any means of testing your explanation - and of course 
that is the absolute, cardinal feature of scientific 
work, scientific explanation. And that's not just 
pointing to something that you say is important. It 
has the following critical value: that it allows us to 
make progress; we can discard theories which have 
proved useless (Nortong 3). 
This is a very strong account of the role of testab- 
ility. Norton implies that a theory which is not testable 
cannot be scientific. For testability is not merely imp- 
ortant but is a central and necessary feature of science. 
It is only by testing explanationsp and rejecting those that 
fail such tests, that scientific beliefs will progress. 
In a further dispute between these two scientists, 
later in the same day, Carlisle himself gives a strong 
account of the centrality of testability: 
2. anybody who, er, wants to propose any sort of theory 
in psychology, they have got to put that theory to the 
test. I clearly think that. Anybody would be utterly 
foolish to say here are some proposals but there are 
no consequences that follow from them (Carlislet 72) 
In this account the speaker suggests that the require- 
ment that a theory be testable is obviously importantl so 
much so that anybody would be utterly foolish to deny it. 
BY implicationg he includes himself within the category of 
'sensible scientists who recognise the importance of test- 
ability' andq in this wayg challenges Norton's assertion 
that his theory does not satisfy this criterion. He is 
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thus able to characterise as misplaced Norton's suggestion 
that his theory might not be testable. 
During the conferencet numerous references were made 
to philosophers of science and the emphasis that they place 
on testability. Popper was most often mentioned, but 
Lakatos and Kuhn were both referred to an several occasions. 
In the next extract Popper is drawn upon to legitimate a 
general stress on the importance of testability in the eval- 
uation of theories: 
3. as Popper saidg and I think quite rightly, the merit 
of something which is called a scientific theory, or 
a scientific hypothesis, is that it is clearly enough 
stated and clearly enough linked to empirical pred- 
ictions so that we can go around finding out whether 
it is true or false (Hurst, 113). 
In this quotation the property of being open to emp- 
irical test, through being clearly stated and making precise 
empirical predictions, is taken as a defining feature of 
scientific theories. It is strongly implied that if a 
theory is not testable it will not be scientific. 
Popper is also used in the following extract9 where 
the idea that scientists should attempt to refute their own 
theories is criticised. 
4.1 have never yet seen a scientist engaged in the ref- 
utation of his own theory. E)And I understood the 
Popperian idea not to ask for the action of refutat- 
ion in the working scientist, but to be concerned 
with the object that the scientist has created 
being so formulated that it has the character of ref- 
utability. But you see the psychology of scientific 
work doesn't care two hoots about refutation; and it 
shouldn't. You would never get any places if you 
really, with your own ideasp set out to search how 
can I possibly be wrong. But refutability in the 
formulation; thatts the major problem (Boweng 274). 
The speaker stresses that refutability is an important 
property of scientific theoriesl but that we misunderstand 
Popper if we maintain he is claiming scientists should 
refute their own theories. It is not that particular sci- 
entists should act in a certain fashion towards their the- 
oriesq but that they should take care to formulate them in 
the proper, testable way. The speaker does not elaborateg 
but seems to suggest that by formulating theories such that 
they are testable other scientists may undermine them 
through testing experiments, or they might even be inadver- 
tantly undermined through the continuous production of data. 
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These first four extracts put a strong emphasis on 
testability as an important or perhaps crucial feature of 
scientific theories. They show scientists themselves 
making use of the notion of testability in the evaluation 
of both scientific theories in general (3 and 4) and spec- 
ific theories (1 and 2). There is some disagreement over 
whether a particular theory should be seen as testable: 
Carlisle claims that his own theory is testable while 
Norton disagrees. Yet Kuhn suggests exactly that two sci- 
entists sharing the same value may interpret its use dif- 
ferently. Thus Carlisle and Norton's disagreement is in 
no way opposed to Kuhn's model. Howeverv these extracts 
seem to suggest an even stronger role for testability than 
might be implied from this model of theory choice. Kuhn 
claims that values work together to make theory choice pro- 
gressive. Yet these speakers seem to imply that this feat- 
ure alone should be criterial in theory selection; i. e. 
that whatever its other features no untestable theory should 
be selected. From these accounts, then, we might suppose 
that testability is not a Kuhnian value at all, but that 
it acts more like a straightforward selection criterion. 
Thus whatever their simplicityq scopeg etc. g all acceptable 
theories must be testable. 
Other extracts from the conference transcript present 
a very different picture of the significance and function 
of testability. The following accounts suggest that test- 
ability should not necessarily be a central aspect of sci- 
entific theories. Just as philosophersq particularly 
Popperl are drawn upon to justify an emphasis on testabil- 
itY9 so they are drawn an to undermine the importance of 
testability. For example, in the following passage the 
speaker characterises philosophers' as rejecting the notion 
that testability is essential for scientific progress: 
5* it seems to me that a considerable body of informed 
opinion in philosophy of science, nowq which would 
argue that there is a great deal, that there are a 
great many other ways in which scientific theories 
and so forth (understand [ing]) progress; other than by falsifying particular hypotheses (Rugg, 88). 
In contrast to Norton's earlier claim that testabil- 
itY is vital to ensure scientific progress9 the speaker 
suggests (without specifying any of them) that there are a 
great many other ways in which scientific understanding 
- 151 - 
progresses, The implication seems to be that progress 
through repeated exclusion of hypotheses which are found 
wanting is just one of a number Of means by which science 
can develop. 
A stronger conclusion is drawn in the next extract. 
6. [Although psychologists have absorbed a little bit 
of philosophy] they obviously havn't heard about 
sophisticated falsificationism. And this -I am 
not going to go into this now - but it can really 
be summed up by the statement which I think is gen- 
erally agreed by all philosophers now; _19-nd that is 
that it is not just that scientists, or certain sci- 
entists, don't go about refuting their theories, but 
the simple statement that no theory wast is, or ever 
will be actually refuted by the facts (Blackt 275). 
The speaker draws a contrast between those 'little 
bits of philsophyl that psychologists have absorbed and 
what is 'generally agreed' by 'modern' philosophers. It 
is implied that talk of scientists' refuting theories orig- 
inates in these out-dated and superficial philosophical 
ideas that psychologists have adopted. Howeverp what all 
Philosophers now agree is that theories are not refuted by 
the facts at all: a claim the speaker specifies as a sum- 
mary of tsophisticated falsificationiSm'. 
Participants at this conference thus use versions of 
philsophers' claims and arguments to support both an emph- 
asis on testability (extract 3 and 4) and a view that the- 
ories are not straightforwardly open to testing (extracts 
5 and 6). Furthermoreq despite these opposing claims, the 
speaker in extract 6 suggests that there is agreement 
amongst philosophers. We can perhaps view this claim of 
philosophical consensus as an interpretative resource for 
legitimating the Position an testability he espouses; if 
all philosophers are agreed, then what they agree on must 
be correct. 
In other parts of the transcriptq More explicitly soc- 
ial accounts of theory selection are offered. For exampleg 
the following passage draws on the social studies of science 
literature. 
7. If logic plays no part in the matter, if in fact we ha%xnft managed to refute anything yet; and yet there 
are a large number of theories -I put the Word in inverted commas - that have been proposed and with 
which we no longerhave any truck; if logic has played 
no part in that, then what has? It seems to me that what's happehed is some combination of in-dividual and 
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social mattersq umq as Ziman said: science is pub- 
lic knowledge# that science takes place in a social 
context and is, in the last analysis, a consensual 
matter 
jInness, 279-280). 
Here the speaker starts by suggesting that the prog- 
ress of science poses a problem: if theories have not been 
abandoned as a result of the 'logical' procedures of ref- 
utationg why is it that, nonethelesss many theories are no 
longer supported? The answerg he suggestsq is that it is 
not refutation at all but social processes and individual 
psychologies which lead scientists to abandon theories. 
The refutability of theories is thus seen as unimportant, 
it 'plays no part in the matter'. For the real processes 
of development are social 
A further social account of testability or refutab- 
ility proposes an almost complete dislocation between 
theory and data. Because of the way data are open to rein- 
terpretation, a theory can be sustained by continually 
recategorising any data which seem to undermine it. 
B. And I would want to make the argument that most 
theories are, as an abstract system for which there 
are no obvious exemplars. C3 Ue have sets of con- 
structions - theoretical constructionsp multiple con- 
structions - for. which we can point to no obvious 
exemplar* And we can negotiate the meaning of any 
particular observation in virtually any direction. 
So thatj for example, we talk about aggressiont and 
yet it's not clear when we ever have an instance of 
aggression. ED Virtually any activity, I suspect, 
that I engage in any day, could be looked at as an 
instance of aggression in some form. It is aggres- 
sion or it is not aggression. And it depends on the 
set of social agreements of what things are called. 
And those agreementsq it seems to me, are negotiable 
over time, and they can be disagreed upon and 
writhed round in any case. So that, in effect, any 
theory can be sustained so long as you have a capable 
negotiator of reality (Learyq 278-279). 
In this passage a radically social view of the testing 
Process is proposed. Instead of theories being undermined 
by recalcitrant observations it is suggested that the 
meaning of any observation is dependent an a set of social 
conventions and, furthermorep that those conventions can 
be reinterpreted in very different ways. In fact the pos- 
sibilities of reinterpretation are so great that a 'capable 
negotiator of realityt can continue to ininterpret obser- 
vations indefinitely so that they fall into line with any 
particular theory. The value of testability thus becomes 
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irrelevant from this perspectivet because what is seen as 
a test will depend dntirely on the negotiated conventions 
for interpreting observations. 
These last extracts (5-8) present a picture of test- 
ability and theory choice markedly different from that doc- 
umented in extractSI-4. Instead of testability being desc- 
ribed as a necessary requirement for progressive theory 
choice, its significance for scientific development is rad- 
ically downgraded. In extracts 5 and 6 the speakers draw 
upon recent philosophical thinking to suggest that refutab- 
ility is unimportant or even irrelevant; its role is cert- 
ainly not seen to be crucial in guiding scientific progress. 
Extract 5 seems to characterise testability in a way much 
closer to the Kuhnian value than the earlier extracts. Pro- 
gress may result from the testing and eliminating of theor- 
ies, but it may also result in many other ways. These are 
not specified by the speakerg so we cannot be sure that 
reference would be made to other values. However, taking 
testability as just one of a number of possible consider- 
ations seems quite close to Kuhn's position. Extract 6 
implies that refutability ought to be abandoned as a crit- 
erion altogether, although again the speaker does not exc- 
lude the possibility that it should be replaced by further 
criteria. 
In extracts 7 and 8 more social accounts of theory rej- 
ection are offered. These also suggest that the process 
of testing plays little or no part in scientific develop- 
ment. Theories are rejected because they do not coincide 
with the consensus of scientific opinion. Moreover, test- 
ability cannot constrain development because with skillful 
interpretation of data any theory can be sustained. In 
these accounts the basis of selection is seen to lie in the 
social organisation and action of scientists rather than in 
criteria such as testability. 
It seems9 theng that we can document the existence 
of different versions of the constraining role of testab- 
ility in the talk of different participants. One version 
approximates to the model that Kuhn suggests. Yet othersq 
as we have seen, treat testability as a rigid criterion orl 
alternativelyq suggest it plays little part in theory sel- 
ection. Most of the accounts discussed above deal with the 
- 154 - 
general significance of testability in theory choice and 
scientific progress (3-8). This raises the possibility 
that these psychologists are merely reiterating standard 
philosophical positions about science. For there hasp of 
course, been considerable philosophical dispute over the 
19 
question of the refutation of theories This leads to 
the question of whether a more straightforward9 consensual 
picture would emerge in the discussion of the testability 
of specific theories. That is, do the psychologists util- 
ise a broad quasi-philosophical discourse for arguing about 
these theories in general terms, but approach specific sci- 
entific positions with more clearcut expectations. 
Disputing the Testability of SPecific Theories 
In the 7 extracts that follow a number of psycholog- 
ists argue about the testability of specific theories. In 
the first passage Norton notes that Carlisle has written 
approvingly about a particular theoryp taken from the 
Russian psychologist Vygotsky, concerned with the devel- 
opment of consciousness. He asks Carlisle how he would 
decide whether this theory or a particular opposing the- 
ory is the correct one. 
9. Vygotsky also, if I could make a guess9 didn't sug- 
gest an experimental or other way by which one could 
distinguish between that view and any other view. 
I am still trying to get you to tell me - you admit that there is no point in proposing a theory if you 
cannot test it; no point g you said 9 in just standing 
up and making proposals unless consequences follow 
[see extract 2J. I want to know how you would act- 
ually rule one ofthese points of view out. They are diametrically opposed hypotheses. They can't both 
be right (Norton, 73). i5 
Howeverv it&Thomas, not Carlisle, who responds to Norton. 
10. Thomas. But there are such things as coherence the- 
ories of truth as well as correspondence theories. 
Norton. Then how would you apply it in this or any 
comparable instance? 
Thomas. Well, it seems to me that, I may be doing 
Vygotsky a gross injustice, but his view has the advan- tage for him of being coherent with Marxism. Uml now 
my view has the advantageg for meq of being coherent with a body of findings of experimental psycri-ol-ogy 
which enables me to provide what seems to me to be a coherent account of a range of phenomena. And I 
would hope to convince Carlisle in due course, or he might hope to convince me on the same ground, that one 
- 155 - 
view or the other was preferable because it enabled 
us, if we were prepared to agree in adopting that view, 
it permitted a coherent set of views9 covering a range 
of phenomenas wT; lch was largerg or preferable for some 
other reasong from the one which followed from the 
view at present adopted (73-74). 
In this extract Thomasq instead of proposing a spec- 
ific way of testing Vygotsky's theory as Norton asks, prop- 
oses an alternative view of the process of theory selection. 
Instead of a theory being selected because it survives a 
test, or being rejected for failing one, theories may be 
selected because they are coherent with various other views 
that are held. The theory which allows most coherence, 
and deals with the largest range of phenomenag should be 
accepted. Of course, to make coherent sense of a body of 
findings might itself be seen as a test and to lay the 
theory open to refutation, because an inconsistency may 
be discovered in some part of the findings. Howeverg this 
is not how Thomas is using the notion of coherence. In 
this context he takes coherence specifically to oppose the 
emphasis that Norton places on testing. He thus relegates 
the notion of testability to being just one of two possible 
criteria that can be used. 
In the next extract, which follows directly from the 
last, the idea of a coherence theory of truth is taken up 
and used to introduce a further disagreement with Norton's 
claims. 
11. Well, yes. I would like to support that. And I think 
I would like to accuse Norton of some inconsistency on 
this point. Because several times today he has quoted 
us the example of the theory of natural selection as# 
above all, the sort of theory that we ought to aspire 
to in psychology. Butt notoriously, all this Popper 
business doesntt hold with the theory of natural sel- 
ection. If somebody doubts it you can't drag them 
along and show them a critical experiment. You simply have to jawbone with them for hours. And if at the 
end of the day they don't agree with you you just have to conclude that they are some sort of fool Claughter]. 
That's pretty much the only way to do it. I suggest that's what Carlisle's trying to do with you [much laughter](74). 
The speaker suggests that Norton is being inconsistent, 
because the criterion he wants to apply to Carlisle's theory 
would not be satisfied by one of the theories he himself 
espouses, namely evolutionary theory* He introduces the 
passage by expressing support for what Thomas has said in 
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in extract 11. His pointq howeverp is rather different. 
Although Thomas includes social elements in his exposit- 
ion of the 'coherence theory' 9 the coherence is seen to be 
the property of a range of phenomena; that is, the scient- 
ist is introduced as an agentq but his role is taken to be 
mainly passive. In extract 119 on the other hand, a much 
stronger social account is given. There are no critical 
experiments that can demonstrate the truth of evolutionary 
theory. Scientists come to accept it through social proc- 
esses of persuasion. They argue with each other about the 
value of their theories and no mechanical decision procedure 
is available for deciding their truth and falsity. 
Norton replies to these claims about evolutionary 
theory with an apparently sarcastic characterisation of 
the idea of a coherence theory. 
12. Perhaps I could tell Quest why I think the theory of 
evolution is not the same kind ofthing as whether or 
not you agree with Marxism. The difference is this. 
It is perfectly correct that you cannot put the the- 
ory of natural selection directly to experimental 
test. It is a set, it provides you with a set of 
axioms which you must take as the starting point for 
theory construction. But if that's all the theory of 
evolution had been we would not have taken it seriously. 
What has happened, of course, is that within the time 
that Darwin proposed the theory of natural selection a 
very large number of specific theories, and hypotheses 
derived from those theories, have been developed and 
put to experimental test. There are in fact a very 
large number of experimental tests of theories con- 
structed with the axioms of natural selection in the 
background. And had any of those individual theories 
come up with hypotheses which had clearly proved to 
be falsified then-we would not accord the theory of 
evolution the respect that we do in fact accord it 
today (74-75). 
Norton here draws a powerful picture of evolutionary 
theory supported by a large number of successful experim- 
ental tests. He suggests that Quest is right (extract 11) 
that the theory cannot be put directly to the test. How- 
ever, he claims that because of its axiomatic structure it 
is indirectly testable: hypotheses are derived from theor- 
iesl which are in turn derived from the axioms of natural 
selection. If any of these hypotheses had been refuted, 
then less respect would accrue to the axioms of the theory. 
Norton thus characterises evolutionary theory using clas- 
sical logical empiricist categories and thereby maintains 
the notion that evolutionary theoryis accepted due to its 
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satisfying some mechanical decision procedure, rather than 
because of its coherence or persuasiveness, 
Thomas and Quest respond to this description of evol- 
utionary theory in significantly different ways. Thomas 
suggests that the picture is not so clear cut as Norton 
would have it. There are researchers who disagree with the 
theory and have data to support their disagreement. 
13. Can I say, surely the theory of evolution is also con- 
traversal. There are people who don't accept natural 
selection and advance counter evidence (75). 
This account is used to undermine the claimt implied 
in Norton's account (extract 12), that it is consensually 
agreed that evolutionary theory has survived the testing 
process. unscathed. 
Norton's reply is to claim that all biologists accept 
evolutionary theory. 
14. To my knowledge there are no biologists who do that 
[do not accept natural selectionj but there are 
others (75). 
In this extract Norton can be seen to draw an a sim- 
ilar device to that used in extract 6. A position is made 
more credible by characterising it as one espoused by all 
competent or expert members of a field. In this caseq 
thereforeq there may indeed be some scientists who do not 
accept natural selection, but those who are properly 
qualified to make assessments of the evidence (biologists) 
are all agreed on its correctness. Norton thus uses a 
social account of scientific belief to undermine the sug- 
gestion that evolutionary theory is controversial 
20 
Quest responds to Norton's description of natural 
selection (extract 12) by asking for an example of a hyp- 
othesis derived from evolutionary theory which has survived 
attempts to falsify it. In reply Norton mentions that there 
have been 'innumerable behavioural selection experiments' 
(75). However, Quest in the following passage, undermines 
the relationship between these sorts of experiments and 
evolutionary theory. 
15. But the counter argument to that, as you will know9 
is that the sort of mutations that have cropped up 
in the laboratory situationsg which allow the pos- 
sibility of selection experiments9 have virtually 
nothing to do with the kinds that have been postulated to be advantageous and have led to the progress of 
evolution that has actually occurred. Umq I mean they have to do with the change in colour of the flies 
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of drosophila and they have to do with various cyt- 
ogenic things. But none of the millions of gradual 
improvements in the optical structure of the eye which 
have to be postulated have ever been observed, still 
less selected for. Unless there should be any mis- 
understandingg of course, I believe the official doct- 
rine [much laughter]. But I can't for one moment 
admit that there is any experimental evidence that 
argues in favour of it ( Quest, 75-76). 
Quest describes the experimental evidence that Norton 
mentions as irrelevant to the theory; it is only to do with 
trivial mutations and certain delimited changes that are 
amenable to laboratory control. In contrastq Quest claims 
that important changes that the theory does predict, such 
as changes in the structure of the eye, have never been 
observed. Nevertheless, he does not argue that the theory 
should be rejected. Instead he describes his belief in 
the theory as 'entirely due' to its coherence with his 
other beliefs. He thus implies that the more complex 
model of testing that Norton produces (extract 12) is a 
fiction, because the sorts of specific hypotheses through 
which he claims evolutionary theory as a whole may be tested 
have no bearing. on the central tenets of the theory. He 
re-emphasises the more social account of the adoption of 
the theory. 
In the course of the interaction (extracts 9-15) the 
participants dispute the role which the criterion of test- 
ability plays in the adoption of specific theories. These 
accounts display a variability in characterising testability 
which is very similar to that documented in the previous 
section. Norton asserts the crucial importance of testab- 
ility. He views it as an essential property of any scient- 
ific theory and the process of testing is taken to provide 
an unambiguous criterion for theory selection. The reason 
why evolutionary theory is acceptedq then, is its survival 
of empirical tests. On the other handy Norton criticises 
Vygotsky's theory and Carlisle's theory for being untest- 
able; such theories should not be adopted by scientists. 
It seems therefore, that Norton takes a stronger view 
of the role of criteria than Kuhnq much like that taken in 
extracts 1-4. Kuhn argues that shared criteria for select- 
ion exert a powerful influence on scientific judgmentsq and 
indeed enable progressive theory choices to be made, How- 
- 159 - 
ever, he does not want to claimg as Norton seems tog that 
criteria determine theory choice. Instead he emphasises 
the problems scientists have in interpreting values and 
weighing their relative importance for any particular 
choice. This appears closer to the view of theory select- 
ion proferred by Thomas (extract 11). who suggests that 
although theories can be selected because they are test- 
ableg they may also be selected because they are coherent 
with a large body of findings. The notion of coherence is 
used here in very much the way that Kuhn uses scientific 
values, as one of a number of positive features that the- 
ories may possess. Vygotsky's theory and Carlisle's the- 
ory may be adopted because of their consistency with other 
bodies of data. Their (possible) lack of testability should 
not lead to their immediate rejection. 
Although Quest's account of the adoption of evolution- 
ary theory in extract 16 is similar to Thomasts in its 
stress on coherenceg in extract 11 he produces an account 
which places more emphasis on social processes. In this 
extract he makes no reference to criteria or values for 
theory selection. In fact he produces no formalised acc- 
ount of the selection process at all. Emphasis is instead 
placed rather vaguely on social processes of discussion 
and persuasion; although to what degree this process is 
rLear 
seen as rational is not madeA. Neverthelessp this view 
appears rather different from Kuhn's stress on the role 
of a few broad values. As with the previous sectiong there- 
fore, some of these accounts appear to be similar to Kuhn's, 
while others propose either a stronger or a weaker role 
for testability. Moreover, this variability represents 
more than merely inconsequential reiteration of philosoph- 
ers' perspectives on testability. For it shows that these 
psychologists are using different versions of testability 
to make detailed evaluations of specific theories, not just 
in their general discourse concerning theory choice. 
It is worth noting finally in this section that these 
extracts present a further problem for Kuhn's model of the- 
ory selection. For they show that judgments of testability 
may be based on additional technical evaluations of scient- 
ific fields and that these technical evaluations may be 
highly contentious. Thus Quest uses a distinction between 
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the limited findings of laboratory experiments and pred- 
ictions which are central to evolutionary theory in order 
to undermine the close positive relationship that Norton 
claims between the theory and experimental findings. The 
tests that Norton sees evolutionary theory as having sur- 
vived are only taken to be tests from a particular interp- 
retation of the theoryp its predictions and the meaning of 
21 the experimental findings Yet Kuhn argues that one of 
the things that supporters of rival theories can display 
to each other (not always easily) is exactly their conc- 
22 
rete technical results This seems to be a modification 
of his earlier view which placed considerable emphasis on 
the way observations and findings are understood in the 
23 
context of specific theoretical and conceptual frameworks 
And these present findings seem more in line with this 
earlier view. 
Testabilityg Variability 
In this section I wish to show that the criterion of 
testability is not only used in highly variable ways by 
different speakers, but that there is also considerable 
variability within particular speaker's accounts. I will 
illustrate this point by examining individual scientist's 
accounts of the testability of a number of specific theor- 
ies. In the following passage the speaker accounts for the 
role of testability in the selection of his own theory and 
those of other speakers at the conference. 
16.1 would like to return to this game of I am more ref- 
utable than you. I said refutable. not reputable, 
although you can be forgiven for -Misunderstanding that. 
[laughter] Umq I don't believe that refutability is 
the only criterion that we should be judging our mod- 
els by but, and it is particularly difficult to use it 
very systematically because we actually don't under- 
stand the nature of refutation at all well. Neverthe- 
lessq I think it is perfectly reasonable that people 
should have made such a big thing of it earlier on. 
C] Umg they all, everyone pretty well has paid lip 
service to refutation. It is interesting to notice 
the strat., the different strategies that peoplep erg 
have used. Umf since Norton spoke such a lot it is a 
pity he is not here. Itts, I would like to draw attert- 
ion to his, which is very clearly to say 'leave me 
aloneg I am doing very well in my own small cornerst 
you knowq 'go and die in your own'. [laughter] Leave 
me alone I. although he says that-everybody has a duty 
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to be an intellectual imperialist, he is not trying 
to produceg um, largerg more ambitious models which 
aret of courseg much easier to, to, er refutet erg 
than the less ambig., ambitious ones. 
LD 
Now the good 
guys are the ones who are leaving hostages to fort- 
uneg who reallyRre laying themselves open to being 
knocked down in all possible ways. The good guys 
are the people who are putting up the biggest pos- 
sible theory that they can imagine. Andt umg hoping 
that, um, it won't be knorked down too quickly. 
Among these people I would put Squireg umg Chester - 
I apologise if I have missed anybody else outg I 
cantt remember if all the thidgs that haiie happened 
in theg in this meeting. But I can, of courseg rem- 
ember what I saidg and I am one of the good guys 
Llaughter] (Young, 272-272)'. 
In this passage the speaker, Youngg fashions an acc- 
ount ofhis own and other scientists' theories in terms of 
whether they can be testedt presumably by means of exper- 
imental evidence. The passage starts by characterising 
the evaluation of testability as a game in which the goal 
is to establish that the player's own theory is refutable, 
and therefore reputable. He then claims that some earlier 
speakers used a variety of strategies to reduce the pos- 
sibility that their theories will be undermined through 
testing. He singles out Norton for particular comment. As 
Norton was not present Young could provide an account of 




Young criticises Norton for using double standards: 
on the one hand he advocates an intellectual imperialismg 
yet at the same time he researches a very limited area of 
psychologyj using small-scaleg unambitious theories. These 
sorts of theories are nott Young claimsp so open to refut- 
ation as more ambitious models. Although Young stresses 
that Norton is using testability in a strategic fashion, 
and that testability is not well understoodg he does not 
maintain that it is irrelevant as a constraint an psycholo- 
gists' acts of theory choice. He states that it is quite 
reasonable that people should have emphasised it earlier in 
the conference. This enables him to use the notion of test- 
ability himselfg later in the passageg to establish that 
his own and some similar positions are 'reputable'; that 
they are the 'good guys' and, by implication, that their 
professional actions follow from proper conformity to the 
rules governing scientific theory choice. 
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This extract can thus be seen to draw upon two rather 
different versions of theory choices similar to the dif- 
ferent versions of theory choice I documented earlier in 
different speakers' accounts. The firsts which Young uses 
to characterise his opponent's theory, I will call the 
contingent versions using the term contingent as in the 
previous chapter. The criterion of testability using this 
version is said to be used 'strategically'; it is depicted 
as being inconsistently invoked in support of Norton's 
theory at the expense of others'. In contrasts Young gives 
a much more empiricistj asocial account of the adoption of 
his own theory. In this case the criterion is not pres- 
ented as open to strategic interpretationsq but as an effect- 
ive constraint on the speaker's actions. The action of 
Irefutation'Aremoved from the speaker's sphere of social 
control; all he can do is 'hope' that his theory will not 
be undermined by the evidence. Young presents himself, 
unlike Nortong as unable to influence whether or not his 
theory will be found wanting. As a result of Young's int- 
erpretative work the criterion of testability appears to 
ensure that his theory is a 'hostage to fortune' and that 
it will be rejected or retained by virtue of the data 
25 
alone 
These sorts of interpretative asymmetries are a recur- 
rent feature of psychologists' accounting for the choice of 
their own and others' theories. Let us examine some other 
examples to further illustrate this claim. We can see 
this type of asymmetry in Norton's accounts quoted earlier 
in the paper. For instanceg in extract 11 he gives an 
account of evolutionary theoryg which he has been espousing 
as an exemplary model for psychology, as having survived 
thprough attempts to test it, none ofwhich have showed it 
to be wrong or in need of revision. Furthermore, evolut- 
ionary theory is depicted as testable through the clearcut 
consistency of experimental data with specific, formalised 
hypotheses. Reference is thus made to a determinate eval- 
uation procedure which constrains individual scientists to 
endoise particular beliefs about the natural world. In 
contrast, he criticises Carlisle's theory for being untest- 
able in both extracts 1 and 8. Carlislel Norton claims# 
provides no clearcut procedure for testing his theory and 
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therefore it ought not to be adopted. The pattern here is 
thus the same as that revealed through analysis of extract 
16; Norton's own theory is described as having the virtue 
of testabilityl while an opponent's is seen as untestable. 
We saw in extract 2 Carlisle give a general account 
which emphasised the importance of testing theories. Indeedo 
he stresses that any scientist who ignored the requirement 
that a theory be testable would be 'utterly foolish' and he 
implies that he is certainly not one of these scientists. 
In the following passage, which is directed at Nortong 
Carlisle gives an account which undermines the testability 
of Norton's position. 
17.1 mean[] that Imechanismt is also a metaphysical syst- 
em within psychology, such that there are no facts , 
so 
to speak which can prove the mechanist approach wrongg 
just as there are no facts which can prove the Kelly 
approach wrong - as you want to say (Carlisle, 144). 
Carlisle suggests that the approach which Norton has 
been espousing is not open to refutation by the facts. It 
is not a directly empirical approach but a metaphysical 
system. Its selection could not, thereforel be adjudicated 
by direct reference to empricial events. 
So far, then, we have documented three scientists' use 
of asymmetrical accounting. Each variably characterises the 
role of testability; it is a central determinant in the 
choice of the speaker's own theory, while being unimport- 
ant or irrelevant in the choices of certain other scient- 
ists. The speaker's own theory or approach may be under- 
mined by the facts, while no such clearcut process may hap- 
pen with other's theories and approaches. Moreover, it 
is clear that these accounts cannot all be right; i. e. 
they cannot all be accepted as straightforward descriptions 
of the testability of different theories. For there are 
significant disagreements between them. We can see that 
Carlislets theory is viewed as testable by Carlisle but 
not by Norton; while Nortonts theory is viewed as testable 
by Norton, but not by Young. Furthermoreq although Carlisle 
stresses that it is the broad approach which Norton takes 
which is not testablel Young argues that Norton's theory 
is too small scale to be fully testable. Each of these 
scientists9 then, has variably characterised the role of 
testability to present radically conflicting representations 
- 164 - 
of the nature of theories within their scientific field. 
In the accounts which we have examined so far in this 
section 9 an asymmetrical pattern of accounting is regularly 
used to depict each speaker's own espoused theory as more 
testable than some other theory. In the next passage# 
however, the speaker gives an account which stresses that 
his own theory is actually less testable, less open to ref- 
utation, than various other theories. Neverthelessp the 
account is organised in such a way that it provides legit- 
imation for the speaker's theory. 
18. Could I just say a quick word about falsification, 
because I think it is really a rather important topic. 
And I think part of the troubles that arise in trying 
to get a handle on it, as a practical working scient- 
ist, is that itis quite different, it has quite dif- 
ferent character depending upon the type of theory 
that you are operating with. If you are operating with 
a theory which has a well established deductive struct- 
ure then the, er, the refutatory process is relatively 
speaking logical; i. e. you use modus tollens to show 
that a false consequence tells you that some element 
in the deductive structure is, is false. C3Now that's 
OK, and that's I think the structure of what we have 
been calling mini-theories, i. e. theories which are 
sufficiently small-scale to be articulatable in that 
deductive form. They are really rather rare in the 
natural sciences. And I dare say they are just as 
rare in the psychological sciences. But I think the 
case thatts much more interesting is the sort of 
theorising at the level of which I was talking of this 
morning: molecular theory of gasses; evolutionary 
theory; [Squire's own theory]; those kindof theories 
which contain the double analogy structure. C] And it 
may be that a really powerful theory contains within 
itself enoughl as it wereq potential material, as 
indeed the molecular theory of gases didg to go on 
with, through a great deal of traditional refutatory 
procedures and still survive as the theory in the 
field. And Darwinian theory has also been through the 
same kind of game. Now the theory I was trying to 
outline this morning has just that character; i. e. it is a theory for providing a conceptual system, but it 
does have - although Youngt of course Csee extract 163 
sees it as having pseudopodia which put out a fair way into the, into the refutable world - at least I would 
also claim for it that it has a certain measure of 
elasticity and that it is not qoinq to be too darn eas-Y to refute, (Squire 9 273-275 . 
In this passage the speaker makes a distinction between 
two broad form of theory which are testable in very differ- 
ent ways. One of these has a deductive structure, and thus 
its refutation is based on fairly simple logical procedures; 
a refuted prediction indicates that there is an error some- 
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where in the deductive structure. The speaker equates 
these kinds of theory with the 'small-scale' theories 
that have been discussed by Young (extract 16) - that is, 
he equates them with theories such as that espoused by 
Norton. The other form of theory is depicted as having 
a. very different structure which is based on analogies 
rather than formal logical deductions. It is thus not 
open to refutation in the same way. Indeed, Squire emph- 
asises that theories of this kind have a measure of elast- 
icity which allows them to resist traditional procedures 
of refutation and to remain the central theory in a part- 
icular field. 
Squire fashions a wideranging and historically based 
account of the nature of theories in science to display 
lack of testability as a positive feature of certain theor- 
ies. He does this by characterising the class of theories 
which are not straightforwardly refutable as including clas- 
sic theories from the natural sciences, such as the molec- 
ular theory of gasses and evolutionary theory. The charge 
that all theories ought to be refutable is thereby under- 
mined. For it is made equivalent to the very implausible 
charge that certain classic and profound theories are not 
properly scientific. And the charge is further undermined 
by the suggestion that those theories which do have a ded- 
uctive, refutable structure are rather rare. Moreover, by 
characterising his own theory as being based on a structure 
of analogies rather than deductions, Squire equates it 
with those theories which are usually seen as the very 
pinacle of scientific achievement and, at the same time, 
indicates that its lack of refutability is an asset rather 
than a fault. 
Overall 9 then, this account is like Youngts (extract 
16) in that it embodies two very different images of the 
way the criterion of testability functions in theory sel- 
ection. On the one hand there is refutations that isp a 
clearcut, logical process which effectively constrains any 
theory choice. While an the othert there is a much more 
flexible process of theory testing in which empirical find- 
ings are not crucial for selecting or abandoning theories. 
However, Squire uses these two versions in a way which is 
unique in the transcript and almost the exact opposite of 
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the way Young uses them. Thus Squire characterises Norton's 
theory as open to clear testingg while his own theory takes 
a form which actually resists empirical refutation. Young 
claims the reverse. He characterises Norton's theory as 
not open to empirical testing and refutation, and Squire's 
theory as much more exposed to refutation. In extract 18, 
Squire comes close to drawing attention to this conflict 
between his and Young's accounts9 when he explicitly form- 
ulates Young's view that his theory is clearly refutable. 
Yet he draws away from endorsing Young's stronger version 
of testability (which is already somewhat attenuated in 
Squirets broad gloss on Young's point - extract 18) because 
it would contradict Squire's own warrant for his theory. 
Despite the fact that Squire in this passage goes to 
considerable lengths to show that lack of openness to emp- 
irical testing is a positive attribute of his own theoryl 
only a few minutes later he criticises another theory for 
exhibiting exactly this feature; 
19. the survival by a thousand qualifications ah, isp er 
is what goes on. And certainly cognitive dissonance 
theory is a beautiful example of that. The more the 
theory got refuted the more distinctions that were 
made. Now of course that is a technique which you can 
use. But it has, as it were, nothing to do with the 
logic of the case. And one would then query the mot- 
ives of the people engaged in the anaudible] (Squire, 
277). 
In this passage Squire accounts for the lack of falsif- 
iability of a certain theory in the same way that Young 
accounts for the lack of falsifiability of Norton's the- 
ory. Thus retaining Support of 'cognitive dissonance the- 
ory' in the face of contradictory evidence is character- 
ised as a technique used by scientists whose motives are 
open to question. When his own theory flexibly avoidsref- 
ution that is a good thing; it is only doing what great 
theories have done in the past. But when a particular 
theory which Squire opposes is treated in this way, 
Squire suggests that this is not something rational but 
to be explained by reference to the psychological makeup of 
certain scientists. 
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Discussion: Testability as a Flexible Symbolic Resource 
I will now look more closely at the implications of 
this analysis for Kuhn's model and the social study of 
scientific theory choice. In the first section we saw that 
although certain participants gave an account of the con- 
straining role of testability very similar to Kuhntsv 
allowing it as just one of a number of important attributes 
of theories, others gave rather different accounts of test- 
ability. On the one hand, some of the scientists implied 
that testability acts like a determinate criterion for 
theory selection and that no untestable theory should be 
adoptedt regardless of any other virtues that it might have. 
On the other, some participants' accounts stressed the 
central role of social phenomenag such as scientists' con- 
sensual belief systems and their. interpretative skillst in 
theory selectiong and suggested that the criterion of test- 
ability would therefore be unimportantor irrelevant. 
This variability in accounting was repeated in the 
second section of analysis, where scientists disputed the 
role of testability in the selection of specific theories. 
Again, certain participants' accounts seemed to depict test- 
ability as a Kuhnian value. In these instances testability 
is characterised as one possible condition for selection, 
but not a necessary condition. For examplel Vygotsky's 
theory may be selected because of its coherence with a body 
26 
of data rather than because it is necessarily testable 
For other participantsq howevert testability is considered 
to be a necessary condition for selection. Thus evolut- 
ionary theory is said to be adopted specifically because 
it is testable and has been able to withstand rigorous 
empirical testing; and it would not have been adopted if 
this had not been the case. While Vygotsky's theory is 
seen to be untestable, and therefore it ought hot to be 
adopted. Further participantsq in contrastt emphasised the 
centralityof unformalisable argument and social processes 
in theory selection. They suggestq for instancet that eVDI- 
utionary theory is not-widely supported because of its 
ability to withstand empirical tests but because scient- 
ists have been persuaded of its correctness. Here no exp- 
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licit criteria are offered for the choice; but continued 
discussion and dispute are seen to be crucial in the pro- 
cess. I have thus documented variability between different 
scientists in both their evaluations of the general imp- 
ortance of testability and its significance for choosing 
particular theories. 
What are we to make of this variability? As I have 
noted at the start of this chapterg Kuhn accepts that there 
will be a degree of variability between individual scient- 
ists in their emphasis on different values and their meaning. 
He also suggests thbt the significance placed on particular 
values will change when new theories are adopted; perhaps 
a new theory with broad scope will be chosen and then more 
emphasis will be subsequently placed on the value of scope. 
This, of course, opens up the possibility of circularity: 
scientists adopt a new theory, values change to correspond 
to features of that theory, and then the adoption of the 
theory is subsequently explained by reference to the very 
constellation of values it produced. Howeverl Kuhn claims 
that any circularity will not be vicious, because the tmag- 
nitudel of value change is regularly smaller than that of 
27 theory choice Yet this claims seems to presuppose 
exactly what Kuhn makes problematic, namely an understanding 
of the specific, processes by which values constrain theory 
choice. For it is only if we have this sort of under- 
standing that we can judge the magnitude of value change 
to be insufficient to account for theory choice. Kuhn 
nowhere produces such a specific account of the practical 
effectiveness of scientific values. 
It is difficultl therefore, to see how we can judge 
the implications for Kuhn's model of the variability between 
scientistst accounts of testability I have documented 
above. Variability is to be predicted by Kuhn's model; 
yet if variability is too great values will cease to be 
useful in explaining theory choice. Orl put another way, 
Kuhn wants to use the functioning of values to explain sci- 
entific progress (i. e. values through their constraint an 
choice ensure progress) and at the same time maintain that 
they do not determine theory choice. Howeverg this raises 
the question: at exactly what 16vel does variability bec- 
ome so great-that theory choice ceases to be progressive? 
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Of course, one of the central difficulties in elucid- 
ating this question is that it involves clarifying what 
counts as scientific progress. In his discussion of sci- 
entific values Kuhn treats progrOss as relatively unprob- 
lematic. Indeed, his paper is organised to show how the 
'facts of progress' may be explained by reference to- sci- 
entific values; while the assumption that progress is a 
fact goes unexamined 
28 
. It seems9 therefore, that Kuhn's 
model does not provide the resources for its own evaluation. 
It is not specific enough to enable us to determine the 
degree of variability in the interpretation of values at 
which they will cease to act as a constraint. 
In these circumstances, perhaps the best that can be 
hoped for is a more negative critique. Because Kuhn's 
model does not specify the degree of variability between 
scientists which will ensure progressive theory choice, 
and because such a specification depends on the further 
specification of such imponderables as what counts as sci- 
entific progress in a scientific field 
29 
91 cannot clearly 
demonstrate that the variability documented is too great to 
allow progress. It is only possible to make the weaker 
claim; that there is no apparent way in which such extreme 
variability in values (from testability as a necessary 
condition to a total irrelevance) can effectively and prod- 
uctively guide scientific development. Of course, a mech- 
anism which is driven by such highly variable values might 
be formulatedg or the model might be rescued by claiming 
that there is a true consensus over values, but it is not 
apparent at scientific conferences. Nevertheless, no res- 
ources for a mechanism of this sort are apparent in Kuhn's 
model as it standsp nor does it indicate where a truer con- 
sensus might be found. 
In the third section of analysis I documented the var- 
iability within individual scientists' accounts of the role 
of testability in theory choice. I described two broad 
Perspectives on testability which are used in these acc- 
ounts. On the one hand, testability is characterised as 
an effective constraint on choice which is not significantly 
influenced by social processes. It serves purely to select 
those theories which may be related to bodies of data in a 
clean cut fashion. This can be called the empiricist ver- 
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sion of testability. On the other hand9 testability is 
described as ineffective in constraining scientific act- 
ivity. For it is open to different interpretations which 
may be strategically made by scientists to give a spurious 
aura of legitimation to their theories. This I have cal- 
led the contingent version of testability. Furthermoreg 
I noted that there is a regular pattern in the use of these 
different versions. Apart from one interesting exception 
(which I will discuss shortly) the empiricist version is 
only used by participants to characterise their own theor- 
ies. In contrast, the contingent version is generally used 
in the description of theories which the speaker does not 
support or are supported by scientists the speaker disag- 
rees with. 
Before we can go on to properly examine the implic- 
ations this sort of variability has for Kuhn's modelg we 
must look in more detail at the relationship he advances 
between values and acts of theory choice. The major 
source of variability in criteria that Kuhn identifies 
is between different scientists. He suggests three orig- 
30 ins of this variability Firstly, it may result from 
each participant! s unique experience as a scientist; 
being particularly successful with a certain sort of the- 
oryg say. Secondly, extra-scientific belief systems may 
encourage scientists to accept certain sorts of theory; for 
instance, Victorian notions of population selection influ- 
encing the adoption of Darwin's theory. Thirdly, scierit- 
ists' individual personalities may lead themtomake cert- 
ain sorts of choices; for exampleg encouraging a scientist 
to choose a more narrow, conservative theory. 
Kuhn's identification of the main sources of variab- 
ility in this way allows a further explication of the rel- 
ationship he proposes between values and scientists' acts 
of choice. Kuhn implies that scientists internalise a par- 
ticular version or constellation of scientific values 
through their scientific and broader social experience 
which is, in turn, mediated via their specific personalit- 
ies. In Kuhn's termsp these features of each scientist'-s 
socialisation-lead to the emergence of individual interp- 
retatiqnsof the criteria for theory choice which are gen- 
erally available. Each scientist will thus take a value 
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such as testability to have a particular importance for 
choosing theories and will understand the meaning of test- 
ability slightly differently from other scientists. Con- 
sequentlyg an historian or sociologist of science who und- 
erstands both these shared criteria and the idiosyncratic 
ways in which individual scientists are socialised into 
them can properly expl&in why tparticular men made partic- 
131 ular choices at a particular time 
There are, howeverv some important difficulties with 
this. The central problem is thht, when Kuhn deals with 
the relationship between scientists' individual interpret- 
ations of criteria and their acts of choice, he treats this 
relationship as determinate; i. e. he assumes that the part- 
icular constellation of values held by a particular scient- 
ist will determine choice. Although he emphasises that 
the criteria do not provide a shared algorithm of theory 
choice, he seems to accept that each individualts acts of 
theory choice can be, in principle, unequivocally derived 
from that individualts particular interpretations. His 
argument, theng is not that shared criteria do not deter- 
mine general scientific choices; that there is a general- 
ised indeterminacy between criteria and choice. Rather it 
is because individual criteria are different for each sci- 
entist that what is shared is insufficient to fully predict 
the theory which will eventually be adopted. 
Howeverg in treating individual scientist's criteria 
in this way, as enduring, psychologically encoded values 
which actually determine their actionst he ignores imp- 
ortant arguments and evidence that demonstrate the great 
flexibility of criteria when interpreted in practical con- 
32 texts Moreovert although flexibility is a pervasive 
feature of all natural language use 
33 it is particularly 
evident in the case of broadt generalised criteria such as 
testability, scope, etc.. Because Kuhn ignores the possib- 
ility of variability within an individual scientist's int- 
erpretations of criteria 'at one point in time t34 he fails 
to consider the possibility that the same scientist, using 
the same value, will interpret it differently on different 
occasions. It seemst thereforeq that Kuhn's model cannot 
account for the sorts of variability I'have documented 
within the talk of some individual scientists. This raises 
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the issue of what can account for this variabilityg and 
leads on to a further difficulty with the model. 
In treating values as psychologically encoded temp- 
lates for generating action which we socially conditioned 
into each individual scientistq Kuhn directs attention away 
from an examination of what is achieved by sciefitistd talk 
of theory choice. This might not matter if Kuhn were con- 
cerned only with philosophical rationalisations of theory 
choices. Howeverg as I, have notedg Kuhn makes it clear 
that he is interested in the actual categories used in 
choosing theories; i. e. he wants to produce an historian's 
account of the way science actually progressesq not an a 
posteriori justification of that progress. Thus he is faced 
with the social analyst'-s task of identifying the values 
held by particular scientists and elucidating their actual 
use. He cannot, of course, infer these values by looking 
at the properties of theories which have been adopted. 
For such a procedure would inevitably lead in a vicious 
circle. In fact Kuhn avoids facing up to this problem by 
not making the analytic basis of his model explicit. 
Nevertheless, if he is going to avoid circularity, at 
some point his model must be based on evidence of the kinds 
of criteria offered and arguments proposed by scientists 
themselves when deciding between opposing theories; in 
shortp on their discourse concerning theory choice. 
Following the approach developed throughout this the- 
sis, the variability within individuals' accounts can be 
taken as an analytic point of departure. If the contents 
of accounts on a given topic are highly variable, it seems 
reasonable to explore the idea that accounts are not lit- 
eral descriptions of participants' given actions nor exp- 
ressions of their given beliefs, but rather flexible 
interpretations devised in accordance with the require- 
ments of social situations which are themselves constantly 
35 
changing That is, we can start to specify the proc- 
edures whereby scientists actively use accounts of values 
in the construction of their own and their colleagues actions. 
Another example of Mulkay and Gilbert's work on biochem- 
ists can clarify this point and serves to elucidate the 
Particular pattern of accounting analysed above 
36 
0 
These authors examined the way in which a certain 
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group of biochemists gave accounts of the success and fail- 
ureq or correct and incorrect beliefs9 of other scientists 
in the research network. They found a regular pattern of 
interpretation in the participants' talk. Each scientist 
would take his own scientific view (correct belief) as un- 
problematic. This belief was warranted in the great maj- 
ority of cases by means of reference to the constraining 
role of experimental evidence and the correct application 
of a limited number of procedural rules. This, however, 
leads to a problem for participants in devising accounts 
of erroneous belief; if beliefs typically arise unproblem- 
atically from experimental evidence why are some scient- 
ists mistaken? This difficulty is resolved by the biochem- 
ists through the adoption of an alternative repertoire 
for characterising action and belief. In this case, sup- 
posedly distorting socialg psychological or political 
factors are introduced into the accounts to maXe sense of 
errors. Thus an erroneous belief is not characterised as 
arising directly from the experimental evidence but as a 
product of incompetenceg political biasv self interest, 
or one of a multitude of other socio-political factors. 
It is impossible for the analyst to accept literally any 
collection of such accounts from a specific field, because 
the accounts of different scientists are often incompatible, 
because each scientist says different things in different 
passages of talk, and because one direct implication is 
that virtually every member of the field is scientifically 
incompetent. Nevertheless, although the specific content 
of these accounts varies from one occasion to the next, they 
display a common underlying interpretative structure. It 
is, therefore, possible to use the accounts, not to explain 
how scientists develop views which are taken to be incor- 
rectp but as revealing a recurrent interpretative technique 
which scientists employ to construct versions of social 
actiong in this case versions of scientific error 
37. 
I have already noted that the accounts of values I 
discussed cannot be readasliteral description of their 
role in various acts of theory choice. There are further 
parallels with Mulkay and Gilbert's study. The asymmetry 
in psychologists' accounts of valGes is very'similar to 
that which occurs in biochemists' accounts of correct and 
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incorrect belief. Thus social factors and interests are 
entirely absent from the empiricist version of testability 
which psychologists use to characterise their own the- 
ories. In contrast they use a contingent version of test- 
ability when accounting for the selection of certain other 
scientists' (incorrect) theories. Here testability is 
characterised as open to strategic manipulation and is not 
seen as an impersonal constraint on action. This asymmet-* 
rical accounting has much the same consequences as error 
accounting. Psychologists' draw flexibly on the notion of 
testability to display their opponents' view (incorrect 
belief) as problematicq i. e. not directly and necessarily 
constrained by the criteria but influenced by contingent 
38 
social factors And they also draw upon the notion of 
testability to characterise their own views (correct bel- 
ief) as impersonal and determined by the criteria. Thus, 
by way of these accounting techniques, they legitimate their 
own position and undermine alternativeg competing positions. 
In the third analytic section I documented a passage 
which appears to be an exception to this regular pattern 
of accounting for theory choice. For in this extract (num- 
ber 18) there is an inversion of the asymmetrical structure 
found elsewhere in the psychologists discourse. In this 
case the contingent version of testability is used to sup- 
port the speaker's own theory, while the empiricist version 
is used to downgrade the value of an opponent's theory. 
However, this inversion is introduced in the context of a 
wideranging historical account which undermines the stand- 
ard view of testability and divides theories into two dist- 
inct classes. By associating the contingent version of 
testability with certain classic and successful theories 
from the natural sciences the speaker recharacterises it 
as a positive feature of theories, while implying that the 
empiricist version is perhaps only a feature of a less imp- 
ortant class of theories. 
Although in one particular discursive context the 
speaker apparently produces an internally coherent warrant 
for his idiosyncratic perspective on theory choice, cont- 
ingent accounts of theory choice tend to lead to interp- 
retative problems. Difficulties arise, for examplet if 
other scienti-ists are said to support an incorrect theory 
IN 
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in the face of contradictory evidence. It is not easy for 
a given speaker both to criticise their continued support 
of their theory and to espouse a contingent version of 
testability in relation to his or her own theory. In facto 
as we see in extract 19, the speaker who proposed the 
inversion of the regular pattern of justification adopts 
the more standard empiricist justification when faced with 
this kind of situation. In this new context he suggests 
that the motives of the scientists who continue to support 
the theory may be disreputable. He is enabled to adopt 
this more traditional view by using his division of the- 
ories into two classes. For one class of theories (which 
includes his own) does not have to be straightforwardly 
testable. While this example further demonstrates the 
flexibility of the notion of testability it also illust- 
rates the difficulty in trying to sustain across different 
contexts a contingentg social account of testability as 
a formal justification of theory choice. Although he uses 
the contingent version of testability for legitimation in 
extract 18, this speaker, like the othersdiscussed, goes 
on to characterise it as a negative feature of his oppon- 
ent's theory (extract 19). 
These psychologists may therefore be seen as flexibly 
drawing an the notion of testability in the construction 
of an unproblematic version of the way their own and other's 
theories are chosen. Testability from this perspective 
may be viewed as a symbolic resource which participants 
use in the performance of specific interactional tasks. 
Participants characterise it as a constraint, or as prov- 
iding no constraint, only in the context of further, sit- 
uationally specific interactional work. It is the very 
generality of the notion of testability which enables par- 
ticipants to flexibly interpret it in these different ways. 
It must be emphasised here that it would be quite wrong to 
think of these scientists as confused about testability. 
For they use the notion in a regular and clearcut fashiont 
carefully fitting particular versions of the criterion to 
specific interpretative contexts. 
In conclusion, then, I have not offered a straight- 
forward refutation of Kuhn's model. For I have argued 
that the model is both too vague and inconsistent to allow 
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clearcut appraisal, and that there is no way of getting 
directly at the kinds of evidence which might be relevant, 
namely definitive versions of the role of values in spec- 
ific theory choices. Howevert I have illustrated some of 
the ways in which scientists themselves use values in the 
construction of versions of their acts of choice, and how 
the same value may be used by the same scientist to perform 
quite different interpretative tasks. It is possible, of 
course, that testability is an unusual value or that psych- 
ologists are not typical of the scientific community. How- 
ever, there seems to be no obvious reason why notions such 
as 'scope' and 'simplicity' should be any more clearcut 
than testability; and Mulkay and Gilbert have documented 
the variable usage of these other Kuhnian values in the 
discourse of biochemists 
39 
0 
It seems likely - although he does not make it clear - 
that Kuhnts model is ultimately based on just the sorts of 
participants' interpretative work that has been explicated 
here. As I suggested in chapter one, it is difficult to 
see how models of this kind can be developed in any other 
way. Insofar as it is to be assessed in relation to 
the available empirical evidence, it must be compared with 
the kinds of accounts of theory choice examined above. 
Furthermore, it is probable that Kuhn, because of his inter- 
est in scientific progress9 concentrates on accounts of 
values in the choice of 'correct' theories; indeed, just 
the sort of retrospective accounts that participants and 
histarians use to show why significant theories were chosen. 
Moreover, as I have argued, it is in exactly these sorts 
of accounts that values are depicted as constraining theory 
choice. It seems likelyl therefore, that it is by treating 
at least some of these sorts of accounts as literal desc- 
riptionsl and by ignoring the specific interpretative con- 
te. ýts_for which they were fashionedl that Kuhn is led tot 
or -expects to gain empirical support fort the model of val- 
ues constraining choices 
40 
* In the endt Kuhn's attempt to 
show that progress is ensured through the action of values 
may be merely a reification of scientists' self-legitimating 
talk. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SCIENTISTS' SOCIAL CATEGORISATIONS 
I wish now to extend the discussion concerning the 
flexible application of criteria for theory choice to an 
examination of flexibility in the use of social categor- 
isations. The general form of analysis will be similar to 
that of the previous chapter. I will show that there is 
considerable variability in the meaning and application of 
supposedly straightforward descriptive categories. This 
will reinforce the findings of earlier chapters and prov- 
ide further evidence of the necessity for a systematic 
analysis of scientists' discourse However, in this chap- 
ter I intend to look in more detail at the interpretative 
practices through which the flexibility in category use is 
achieved. In what ways is the meaning of categories alt- 
ered? And what devices enable such change? These quest- 
ions will be addressed through a study of psychologists' 
use of the categories 'humanist' and 'mechanist' at the 
Theoretical Perspectives Conference 12 . Firstlyq howeverg 
I will discuss some attempts to deal with social categor- 
isations of scientists analytically, starting with Kuhn's 
classic notion of the scientific paradigm. 
All Toqether Now 
The notion that scientists can be divided into categ- 
ories of various kinds underlies virtually all social stud- 
ies of science. Sometimes the notion is tacitq but often 
it is explicitly formulated. As Woolgar notes, the identif- 
ication and definition of scientific collectivities is the 
'basic preliminary task in many studies of science t3 The 
very idea of examining Iscienrel implies at least the exist- 
ence of some sort of community of participants. often 
analysts take scientific categorisations to be so obvious 
and unproblematic that they devote little attention to 
showing how they were arrived at. One categorisationj how- 
ever, has generated a considerable amount of discussion 
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and a body of empirical studies. This is, of courseq T. S. 
Kuhn's concept of the 'paradigm'. It is unusual because 
it is taken to show more than merely participation in some 
broad scientific collectivity such as 'physicists' or 
'Social psychologists'. Membership of a paradigm group is 
taken to indicate a high degree of cognitive consensus. 
Moreover, this consensus will cover a diverse array of 
items: 'values for theory selection'; 'metaphysical models'; 
4 'symbolic generalisations' and 'exemplars' According to 
Kuhn, these are 'the objects of group commitment... and as 
15 such they form a whole and function together 
It is not my goal in this chapter to produce a det- 
ailed textual exegesis of exactly what degree of consensus 
is implied in Kuhn's notion. Indeedt the highly varied lit- 
erature on paradigms and scientific development indicates 
that this sort of definitive reading might well be impos- 
6 
sible Rather I wish to draw attention to the way that 
the notion of a paradigm has been used to organise items 
as different as 'values' and 'exemplars' so that they can 
be treated as a unit. In other words, I wish to emphasise 
the way it has provided a rationale for makingg as it weret 
a neat set of s7lices through a multi-layered cake. For 
simplicity, and to avoid the large baggage of connotationg 
which have become attached to the term-paradigm, I will 
use this cake metaphor through the rest of this chapter. 
In the analysis which follows I will show that a very sim- 
ilar construction appears in member's discourse at certain 
juncturesl although it. is by no means the only form of par- 
ticipants'categorisation. Before moving on to the analysist 
though, it is worth looking at some of the ways in which 
researchers have traditionally attempted to identify and 
explicate paradigms. 
Various analytic techniques have been used with the 
goal of identifying the consensual matrix of items which 
supposedly make up paradigms and their boundaries. Quant- 
itative woýrk has concentrated on indices of cOmmunication 
and the explication of social networks 
7e Citations and co- 
citations along with other records have been analysed to 
reveal any regular structuring into discrete networks. 
Insofar as they aim to f, ýeAj* paradigms or 'invisible col- 
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leges'89 these sorts of study depend on the equation 
of communication systems of some sort or other with shared 
systems of concepts and techniques. Yet there is no nec- 
essity for the existence of such a one to one relationship 
between communication (citation)v belief and practice 
Thus to show that a group communicate is not sufficient to 
show that they share activities and beliefs. It mightq 
of course, be argued that if communication is taking place 
then at least the parties are 'speaking the same (scient- 
ific) language'; that is, they share a set of categories in 
which to formulate agreement and disagreement. Howeverg 
even this is assuming too much. Neither citation nor part- 
icipantst specification of communication shows that Com- 
munication is actually 
, 
taking place, that there is shared 
reciprocal understanding. Going back to the criticisms of 
quantitative approaches in chapter one, we can see that 
there is an unacknowledged inference being made when cit- 
ations are used as measures of communication; for citat- 
ions only indicate the possibility of communication, they 
are not a sufficient condition for demonstrating its exist- 
ence. 
Other research hasnot tried to stick to purely quant- 
itative indicators, but has tried to directly elicit the 
belief systems of scientists. These are got at through 
interview and questionndre techniques. For instance, 
workers in a particular area have been asked to rank rec- 
ent research contributions and the importance of certain 
future research questionslo . Their ranking can be used to 
calculate a measure of similarity - the mo . 
1ý similar the 
ratings the greater the degree of consensusAis taken to 
exist within 'the group. As a less structured alternatives 
replies to open-ended questions posed in interviews have 
been inspected to see whether scientists say 'the same 
thing' about their particular subfield, andq by inferences 
how far they believe the same thing and do the same thing 
There are a number of difficulties with these latter 
kinds of approach. To start with, they are subject to all 
the usual problems which beset these sorts of research in- 
struments. These have been documented repeatedly and at 
great length in sociology and social psychology over the 12 past 15 years . Furthermoreq as Kuhn himself notesp sci- 
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entists may not have perfect or even very good insight into 
their own circumstances. 
Though many scientists talk easily and well about the 
particular individual hypotheses that underlie a con- 
crete piece of current research, they are little bet- 
ter than laymen at characterising the established 
bases of their field, its legitimate problems and 
methods. (13) 
This sort of criticism presupposes scientists' talk 
to be a fairly straightforward and homogeneous medium for 
communication, characterised here and there by certain 
unfortunate failures of insight. However, from the stand- 
point on scientists' discourse which has been developed in 
thisthesisand elsewhere much more serious doubts must be 
expressed about this way of analysing consensus. Just 
because scientists appear to say the 'same thing' in an 
interview, sayq does not mean that they will continue to 
do so in other contexts or that such accounts constitute a 
literal description of their scientific subfield. In fact 
accounts of the consensual nature of a field may vary rad- 
icallyl even within the discourse of a single scientist 
14 
And even the issue of what should count as 'saying the 
15 
same thing' is, of courseq highly problematic 
An alternative to the analysis of citation and commun- 
ication networksq and to the elicitation of beliefs using 
interviews and questionnEiresg is to become a participant 
in the area of science being studied. For instance, in 
Collins and Pinch's work on research with children who 
claimed to be able to bend metal spoons by paranormal meansp 
their analytic practice is to develop a working 'partic- 
ipantslt competence 
16 by way of a varied range of proced- 
ures: doing work in the field; reading written materials; 
interviewing members; visiting conferences and doing much 
17 informal talking The suggestion is that by using this 
strategy the analyst is enabled to draw upon his or her 
member's competence to explicate the frames of meaning or 
paradigms shared by different scientific participants . 
Hoyevek, this approach appears to be vulnerable to 
the very same set of problems as arise with more tradit- 
ional interview and questionnEire studies. Even if the soc- 
ial researcher is able to develop a working members' com- 
petence, there is no reason why he or she should not be 
subject to exactly the same difficulties in 'accurately' 
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formulating the boundaries of social categories and the con- 
tent of consensus as beset scientific members themselves. 
Part of the problem may lie in the idea that there is a 
single, definitive categorisation which will be revealed 
if all sources of bias and distortion are removed. The 
researcher may indeed learn to successfully make certain 
sorts of social categorisations appropriately and in such 
a way that they are accepted by members. Yet this does not 
solve the analytic problem of trying to formulate a tech- 
nical version of consensual belief. For this will still 
involve resolving inconsistencies and ambiguities in the 
acceptable practice of categorisation. Furthermore, this 
approath assumes that there exists a unitary competence 
which will enable the researcher to assign scientists to 
membership of particular paradigm groups and explicate 
what sort of beliefs will count as rational in a given 
group. Alternative models of competence, which place more 
emphasis on the way it is occasioned in particular contexts9 
might not be so easy to reconcile with such a definitive 
account of paradigm membership 
18. 
It seems9 theng that there are shortcomings and dif- 
ficulties with each of the three main approaches for deter- 
mining the existence of paradigms in particular scientific 
areas. Having explicated some of the methodological dif- 
ficulties, let me mention some of the research which has 




The early 1970's saw a flurry of activity on the issue 
of whether psychology is divided into paradigms or not. 
The presence of this analytic literature makes a study of 
psychologists' own categorisations particularly apposite. 
Most of this work hhs concentrated on the question of 
whether fbehaviourism' t lintrospectionism' and possibly 
psycholinguistically based 'cognitive psychology' are par- 
adigmatic or not. Palermo and Weimer 
19 have argued that 
these terms refer to fully paradigmatic traditions of 
research. In contrast Mackenzie 20 and Warren 21 have arg- 
ued against this claim on a number of grounds. Briskman 
22 
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has suggested yet another possibility by arguing that 
although behaviourism does not meet the criteria for full 
paradigmhood it should nevertheless be considered to be a 
Lakatosian research programme. 
Commenting on this disputatious literature, Weimer 
23 
has suggested that the debate is apparently irresolvable 
in the terms it is couched because of the complex inter- 
relationship between theories of scientific development and 
the historical reconstructions they underpin. To decide 
whether psychology has paradigms and periods of revolution 
reference must be made to the 'historical record'. Yet 
this is not a neutral description of events but is an act- 
ive construction which itself cannot be divorced from the- 
ories of scientific development. Weimer suggests that most 
of the major historians of psychology, and in particular 
E. G. Boring 23 9 worked with a simple empiricist historiography 
which stressed the orderly accumulation of scientific know- 
ledge. No wonderl therefore, that the presence of parad- 
igms in psychology has often been questioned; for they have 
24 been twritten out' of the historical record More int- 
erestingly for the present discussiong Weimer also claims 
to be able to detect the sound of committed theoretical 
axes grinding behind a number of these disputes about par- 
adigms. Certain historical reconstructions of events, he 
suggests, may actually hawe the function of increasing the 
legitimacy of certain positions in psychology. 
This issue of how analyses in terms of paradigms can 
be used for purposes over and above Imeret description is 
26 discussed by Peterson in a comprehensive review of the 
literature on paradigms in psychology. His general approach 
is to contrast various claims made in the analytic literat- 
ure and by psychologists themselves with 'what Kuhn int- 
ended'; which is outlined in a confident definitive reading 
of Kuhn's various works. Despite this strangely innocent 
(even pre-Kuhnian) approach to Kuhn's work, Peterson high- 
lights the way that these studies can use apparently des- 
criptive or historical analyses as a vehicle for making 
highly selective evaluative claims. Thus he suggests 
that certain assertions about the existence of paradigms 
have been used to 'facilitate consensus and reduce deb- 
127 ate Describing a theory as paradigmatic in this way 
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is to further imply that it is legitimate. On the other 
hand, if a debate can be characterised as a disagreement 
between two paradigms the need for rational discussion is 
reducedq as is the necessity to explain why traditional 
ways of thinking are difficult to overcome. 
Seeing a debate as a paradigm clash whose results are 
seen as depending an persuasion and conversiong may 
become self-serving and inhibit fruitful exchange 
Those offering new paradigms have seen debate ov; r 
their proposals as signs of a clash, which servesp 
of coursev to affirm their approach as paradigmatic. 
(28) 
In effect, thereforeq Peterson is suggesting that what was 
originally a descriptive approach is vulnerable to being 
used in a normative fashion. Where it originally merely 
described situations in which rational debate had become 
problematicq it now is taken to legitimate the abandoning 
of certain kinds of disputes. Peterson's suggestiong thent 
is that the idea of paradigms and revolutions can be usedt 
at least on certain occasionst for evaluative purposes by 
scientists. In the analysis which follows this notion will 
be examined in specific instances. 
The Practice of Social Cateqorisation 
It is interesting to note that virtually the only 
discussion of scientific conferences in the analytic lit- 
erature concerns consensus and categorisation. Ziman 
provides a strong rationale for taking scientific con- 
ferences as a fruitful site for the study of categaris- 
ation. In fact, he implies that the scientistts main 
purpose for attending conferences is to situate themselves 
with respect to important consensual groupings: 
the primary motive [for attending conferences3 is to 
be noticed as a serious contributor to the consensusp 
to be seen by the leadersq to act the part of member- 
ship in the [Invisibleý College. 
A scientific conferences as the venue of the face- 
to-face social interaction that qoverns an Invisible 
Colleqeq is thus a fascinating phenomenons full of 
hidden meaning and symbolic ritual ... The actual paP- 
ers themselves may not be of great importances but 
the informal discussionsl the talk over lunch or at 
the bars questions from the floor and remarks of the 
chairman of the sessions are the means by which the 
current consensus is dramatized to the participants. 
(30) 
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The analysis which follows will suggest serious dif- 
ficulties for Ziman' characterisation of the role of soc- 
ial categorisation at conferences. Nevertheless, it is 
true that categorisation and consensus are a recurrent 
issue in the transcript. Some sort of social categorisat- 
ion or consensus claim is madet implicitly or explicitlyq 
in the vast majority of utterances by conference particip- 
ants. Even a speaker's characterisation of their own bel- 
iefs and allegiances can be seen to. presuppose assumptions 
about consistency and category membership. 
As in the previous chaptersq the analytic approach 
adopted here will be different from that common in most of 
the literature an consensus and paradigms. In particular 
I will not be attempting to formulate a more accurate method 
for describing the paradigmatic landscape of scientific 
specialties. With respect to psychology, at least, it 
seems unlikely that any further such attempts would resolve 
the debate about the presence of paradigms. Instead the 
way participants divide up their fields into social categ- 
ories in the course of varied interactions will be the 
central topic for analysis; that is, I will attempt to 
elucidate members' practices of social categorisation rather 
than trying to produce a definitive set of analysts' soc- 
ial categorisations. 
The analysis will concentrate specifically on the use 
of the categories 'humanistt and 'mechanist'. These were 
chosen as the central topic in part because they are char- 
acterisedg on a number of occasionst in a way similar to 
Kuhnian paradigms. That isq they are depicted as made up 
of a diverse array of items - methodst forms of explanationt 
etc. - rather than merely being labels referring to general 
institutional specifications (psychology) or research spec- 
ialties (artificial intelligence, say). These categoriest 
thereforet are not simply reflections of institutional 
definitions and conventional problem areas, but puport to 
be picking out genuine groups with different practices and 
beliefs. The second reason for this choice is that the cat- 
egDries 'humanist' and 'mechanist' occurred very frequently 
in the transcriptq particularly at some of the periods of 
most heated debate. They appear on 17% of the transcribed 
pages of discussion and are found in the talk of 28 of the 
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of the participants. Moreover, as nearly one in three par- 
ticipants did not contribute to the discussion at all, this 
means that over half of those who did contribute used these 
categories at some point. Of courseg not all these accounts 
can be discussed in this chapter. My approach will be to 
concentrate on cases where more than one account of the 
same topic is available. For it is only in these cases 
that the variability or consistency of the categories can 
be properly assessed. Even sol there is space to discuss 
only a part ofAdiversity in the use of these terms. Fin- 
ally, it should be strongly emphasised that these are part- 
icipants' not analysts' concepts - except in the extracts 
themselves they should be read in inverted commas through- 
out. 
Psycholoqists' Formal Cakes 
In this first section I will concentrate on the most 
detailed formal accounts of the categories 'humanist' and 
'mechanist'. Two very elaborate descriptions of a dist- 
inction between opposing 'camps' of psychologists were 
produced in the formal conference papers and appear also 
in the published proceedings. These are virtually ident- 
ical, and to save repetition I will discuss only one of 
them - the other is reproduced in Appendix B. The passage 
that follows appears at the beginning of the paper which 
puports to situate contemporary theoretical issues in a 
broader historical context. At the conference this was 
the second paper to be presented; however the order was 
changed for the published version in which this passage 
starts the very first page. 
1. MIt may be said that at present the psychological 
world is divided into two camps; on. the one side are 
the champions of mechanism, an the other side the 
champions of the person. (2)The first camp makes its 
headquarters in biological psychology; animal behav- 
iour provides the key to man's more complex functionsp 
and objective experiment is the preferred method. (3)The second camp is more loosely organised and more 
varied in its opinions; its adherents are more likely 
to be found in clinicalg differential and social psy- 
chology; they employ self-report and conceptual anal- 
ysis,, and prefer purposive to mechanistic explanation. (4)Any such division is certainly a great over- 
simplification. (5)There are many shades of opinion in each camp; some theorists combine aspects of both; 
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yet others are hard to place in these terms at all. 
(6)But it provides a useful first approximation to 
the different kinds of [metatheoretical frameworks] 
that we are likely to encounter in psychology today, 
and reminds us that this division is part of a much 
wider debate in philosophy and the social sciences 
generallyp which [has been termed3 the rivalry bet- 
ween 'plastic' and 'autonomous' man. (Fish, pub- 
lished paper) 
The extract begins by proposing a broad division that 
splits the 'psychological world$ into 'two camps' (1). By 
characterising each camp as comprised of supporters of a 
certain kind - 'champions' - the writer emphasises that this 
is a social division which represents a categarisation of 
scientists, rather than a clear conceptual or theoretical 
distinction. This sort of social categorisation into 'camps' 
with particular 'adherents' who are torganised' and have 
topinions' is continued into sentences 2 and 3. In addit- 
ion, some features which distinguish the membership of the 
two camps are identified. Thus the camps are viewed as 
variously distributed across the different subgroupings in 
psychology: 'champions of mechanism' are more likely to be 
found in 'biological psychology' (2); tchampions of the 
person' are more often to be found in 'clinicall differ- 
ential and social psychology' (3), The camps are also dis- 
tinguished in terms of methods (tobjective experimentt 
versus 'self report/cohceptual analysist), subject matter 
('animal behaviour' is essential or not) and forms of exp- 
lanation ('mechanistic' verus 'purposive'). 
In sentences 4 and 5 some qualifications are placed on 
the picture so far produced. The writer suggests that the 
notion of two camps is an over-simplification of the sit- 
uation because it ignores different 'shades of opinion in 
each camp' and some theorists who 'combine aspects of both 
campst or cannot be categorised by this sort of division. 
However, in sentence 6, two warrants are provided for using 
it. Firstlyt the writer emphasises its heuristic value 
in approximately characterising the different theoretical 
frameworks in psychology. Secondly the categorisation is 
depicted as emphasising the continuity of the division in 
psyc'hology with a more general 'debate in philosophy' and 
other social sciences. There is a subtle but significant 
shift in terminology in sentence 6. It seems that the soc- 
ial categorisationt a division between campst becomes a 
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part of a more abstract debate between two positions con- 
cerning the nature of human action. The divide between 
individual psycholoqists is thus recharacterised as part 
of a debate between philosophical ideas. In Kuhnian terms9 
the account proposes that different metaphysical assumpt- 
ions underly each category of psychologists. 
An extended abstract of this paper was precirculated 
to all participants before the conference. 'In it the first 
three sentences are identical to those in the published ver- 
sion. Howeverg the sentences 495 and the first part of 6 
are ommitted. 
2. It may be said that at present the psychological world 
is divided into two camps; on the one side are the 
champions of Mechanism# on the other the champions of 
the Person. (2)The first camp makes its headquarters 
in biological psychology; animal behaviour provides 
the key to man's more complex functionsg and object- 
ive experiment is the preferred method. (3)The sec- 
ond camp is more loose 
, 
ly organised and more varied 
in its opinions; its adherents are more likely to be 
found in clinical, differential and social psychology; 
they employ self-report and conceptual analysis and 
prefer purposive to mechanistic explanations. 
MThe 
contrast is part of a much wider debate in philosophy 
and the social sciences generallyv which [has been 
termed] the rivalry between 'plastict and lautonous' 
man. (Fish, extended abstract) 
The effect of these deletions is to remove the qualif- 
ication on th-e accuracy of the writer's social categorisat- 
ion. Furthermoreq the relation of the social division to 
a wider ph1losophical debate is here merely stated, rather 
than being depicted as an inference from the use of this 
catpgorisation. This version thus seems slightly stronger 
(less hedged by qualifications) although much of the mater- 
31 ial is shared 
To summarise, then, the basic feature of these accounts 
is that they divide psychology according to the way its 
members participate in one of two camps. These camps are 
further distinguished according to their emphasis on part- 
icular research areasq methods used, general subject mat- 
ter studiedg and form of explanation adopted. Without in 
any way wishing to suggest that an analyst would be likely 
to identify these camps as paradigmsg or would be right to 
do so, the formal similarity is readily apparent. Member- 
ship of one of the camps is not taken merely to be nominal 
but is seen to allow deductions to be made about a whole 
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range of the member's activities and beliefs. This account 
is a classic cake account. It groups together diverse feat- 
ures of scientific practice and belief into coordinated 
entities. It seemsq thereforep that at least on certain 
occasions psychologists' draw upon categories which have a 
very similar structure to 'paradigm groups' when they are 
making sense of their own discipline. However, as we exam- 
ine further participantst accounts it will become clear 
that these are not the only ways that psychologists' use 
these categories. 
Crucial Evaluative Distinctions 
I 
In this section I will discuss two extracts from the 
transcribed discussion which also formulate the difference 
between 'humanist' and Imechanistt psychologists, In these 
cases the cake structure is abandoned in favour of a single 
distinction, which is used to mark a crucial difference 
between the putative camps and to show one is inferior top 
or superior tog the other. As the discussion proceeds I 
will also document some of the detailed interpretative pro- 
cedures through which these 'crucial evaluative distinct- 
ions' are achieved. 
The following extract is a response to the paper by 
Fish described above (extracts 1 and 2). The speaker 
adopts the distinction between two camps of psychologists. 
Howeverg he disagrees with what he takes as the premise of 
Fish's paper. 
3. (1)1 find the premise extraordinary: that there has 
been no advance in the laboratory and experimental 
investigation of psychology from what you call the 
mechanist camp since William James wrote his text- 
book. (2)1 think of Pavlov having produced a gener- 
alisation at something, it must have been about 19039 
about the conditioned reflex. (3)And that has not 
been thrown aside in favour of other things. (4)It 
has been precisely refined over the years... [states 
generalisation] (5)Anotherg I could give you hund- 
reds of examples from the study of learning. (6)And 
you will probably object to me that I will qualify 
each of them by saying that they apply to specified 
experimental conditions. (7)But if you make that 
objection then you have misunderstood the nature of 
physical science to which our science is attempting 
to approximate. (B)The generalisation5of physics 
and chemistry also relate to specified experimental 
conditions. (9)No physicist makes a statement that 
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applies at the level of generalisation, empirical 
generalisationg across the universe... [indicates two 
further generalisations from psychology2 (10)1 have 
no need to say more, I am sure. (11)So the premise 
seems to me to be quite wrong. (12)On the other side 
of the fenceg looking at what you call the humanist 
camp, I would like to knowq converselyt where there 
has been any progress? (13)1 will there go back to 
the point I made in reply to, er, Or Carlisle's pre- 
entation, that I don't think that camp has any way of 
testing between rival generalisationsand making prog- 
ress. (14)So does the humanist camp have anything 
more specific to offer today than it had in 1890? 
(Norton, transcriptq 12-13) 
The speakerv Nortong starts by identifying as 'extra- 
ordinaryt what he describes as the tpremiset of the pre- 
ceding paper (extracts 1 and 2). This premise concerns 
progress in the tmechanistic camp'. Howeverg he distances 
himself from the term 'mechanistic'; it is identified not 
as his own term but that of Fish, the paper4s presenter. 
Thus Norton talks of progress 'in what you EFish] call the 
mechanistic campt (1, emphasis added), indicating that he 
might not wish to use this term. However, Norton apparently 
takes the reference of this term as unproblematic. That isp 
he seems to accept that there is a group of people, a camp, 
but 'mechanistic' is not the appropriate term for it. This 
enables him to warrant his suggestion that Fish's claims 
about progress are lextraordinaryt by mentioning specific 
researchers and their work (2). For it would, of coursel 
be difficult to question the reference of the term and 
at the same time apply it to particular members of a camp. 
Norton contrasts Fish's 'premise' that there has been 
no progre-ss in the 'mechanistic camp' with the example of 
Pavlovts Igeneralisation' about conditioned reflexesq which 
he describes as having been 'refined over the years', rather 
than abandoned (2,3 and 4). And he goes on to suggest that 
he could provide 'hundreds of other examplest from res- 
earch on learning (5). This use of contrasting pictures 
depicting on the one hand tno advance' and on the other 
'hundreds of examples' of generalisations which, like 
Pavlovts, have stood the test of timeg meshes with Nortonts 
characterisation of the first picture as extraordinary. It 
is displayed not as merely an ordinary disagreement; Fish's 
claim conflicts with so many counter examples that it is 
almost anachronistic. One counter example might be over- 
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overlooked but it would be an extraordinary achievement to 
32 
overlook hundreds 
Immediately after this the speaker formulates what he 
claims will be a 'probable objection' that Fish will make 
to his points (6). This is that his examples are only gen- 
eralisations within 'specified experimental conditions' (6). 
Howeverg Norton claims that Fish's supposed future objection 
is based on a 'misunderstanding of the nature of physical 
science' (7). For generalisations in physical science also 
have this property of relating only to tspecified experim- 
ental conditions' (8). Norton thus characterises any crit- 
icisms of the generality of his examples as equally crit- 
icisms of work in physics and chemistry. Physicists, he 
claimsl consensually avoid generalising 'across the univ- 
erset (9). Thus in the course of sentences 6,7 and 8 he 
draws a parallel between the generalisations in an area of 
psychology which he wishes to cite as examples of progress 
and generalisations in the natural sciences. This parallel 
is used to reinforce the bizarreness of Fish's suggestion 
that there has been no advance in this area of psychology. 
For it now becomes equivalent to the suggestion that physics 
and chemistry have not advanced. 
Norto-n here uses a technique which can be called pre- 
formulation. That ist he formulates what he claims will 
be a future objection and then undermines it. Such a tech- 
nique may not only defuse future criticism but also implies 
that critics hold false (and predictable) views. Moreoverg 
by formulating his opponents putative views within his own 
discourse they can be characterised in a way which prepares 
them for rejection. Another way of thinking of this acc- 
ounting technique is as a formulation of a contrast bet- 
ween a real and apparent state of affairs. One view of 
science is depicted as plausiblej but4only a misguided 
apparent version; the other is treated as the real state of 
affairs, which may be concealed behind false appearances. 
Of course, much of scientific debate has this kind of under- 
lying structure. Yet the difference here is that the con- 
trast is formulated by a single speaker. Some of the 
accounting possibilities offered by this technique will be 
discussed in chapter seven. 
After providing descriptions of two further general- 
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isations Norton indicates that these, along with earlier 
ones, will be sufficient to warrant his case. He is sure 
that he will have to give no more examples (10). This 
comment seems to present his instances of progressive gen- 
eralisations in 'mechanistic' psychology as so self evid- 
ently persuasive that anyone asking for additional examples 
must be abnormal in some way9 or even irrational. And 
here the initial criticism is forcefully reiterated: 
that Fish's premise (of no advance in 'mechanistic' -psy- 
chology) is 'quite wrong' (11). 
At this point Norton changes the focus of his talk to 
the 'humanist camp'. Again he distances himself from the 
term by talking about 'what you [Fish] call the humanist 
camp' (12). But again the reference of the term is taken 
to be unproblematic; the existence of such a group of res- 
earchers is not queried. The speaker identifies what he 
claims is a central feature of the 'humanist camp'. This 
is it has no 'way of testing between rival generalisations 
and making progresst (13). He asks if the humanists 'have 
anything more specific to offer in the way of generalisat- 
ions I than in 1890 (the date of William Jamests text). 
Yet this apparently straightforward question seems to have 
a rhetorical emphasisq sharpening the contrast between the 
many generalisations of 'mechanistic psychology' which he 
has referred to and the lack of any such generalisations 
in 'humanistic psychology'; 'humanists' have produced vague 
talk while tmechanists' have produced empirically supported 
laws. 
In the course of his reply to Fisho therefore, Norton 
adopts the general image of the two camps of psychologists, 
whilst at the same time indicating suspicion of Fishts 
terminology for referring to the camps. He formulates the 
difference in a way quite different to Fish. Instead of 
proposing a series of distinctions and building up a cake 
account from them he concentrates on the single issue of 
progress and suggests that the crucial difference between 
the camps is the lack of progress in the 'humanist camp'. 
He thus uses the notion of a division to make a critical 
evaluative claim: only the 'mechanist camp' of psychologists 
exhibits the progress characteristic of the natural sciences. 
The next extract has a very similar basic structure. 
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This timep howeverg the viability and coherence of a 'hum- 
anist' approach is emphasised. 
4. (1)The fact is that mechanism ana humanism, as we 
were discussing earlierl Ll are incompatible, (2)It 
seems to me that any humanism requires as a minimum 
condition that the subject should have freedom in 
some sense and that he should have consciousness which 
is effective in some sense, not merely epiphenomenal. 
(3)And that these two points are utterly unacceptable 
to any mechanistp who has to account for these phenom- 
ena in some other way. (4)Nowg harking back once 
again to a discussant in a previous paper who talked 
about the nature of philosophy, it seems to me that 
philosophy has always Worked by identifying problems 
which were capable of answer and hiving them off into 
separate disciplines. (5)And it seems to me that we 
have now reached the stage where philosophy has done 
enough to show that the problems of an effective con- 
sciousness, the problems of free will, can be recon- 
ciled with a naturalistic view of the phenomenon of 
man, quite compatible with science, as long as we und- 
erstand what science is really about and don't go in 
as we traditionally have in psychology assuming that 
science is what the 19th Century philosophers of sci- 
ence said it was. (6)They were simply wrong. (7)And 
modern philosophers of science present a view of sci- 
ence which makes it perfectly possible to have a cent- 
ral model which will permit all the phenomena in which 
humanists are interested in and all the phenomena in 
which natural scientists are interested to coexist. 
(Thomas, transcriptq 23) 
The speaker starts by emphasising the incompatibility 
of 'humanism' and 'mechanism' rather than emphasising a 
division between 'humanists' and Imechanists 
,1 
(1). It might 
seem that this introduces a separate kind of discussiong 
which emphasises conceptual differences rather than dif- 
ferences between identified groups of scientists. Yet the 
speakerp Thomasq quickly blends this with talk of social 
33 
categories (tany mechanist' - 31 'humanists' -7) Having 
emphasised the incompatibility of 'humanism' and 'mechanism' 
Thomas goes on to state a tminimum condition' for tany hum- 
anism', which is that people ('the subjectl) should have 
'freedomt and an teffective consciousness' (2). Further- 
more, this is depicted not only as a necessary condition 
for 'humanism' but as tutterly unacceptable' to 'any mech- 
anist' (3). The 'mechanist' must account in some other 
way for phenomena which the 'humanist' explains as a prod- 
uct of free will (3). This issue is thus made crucial for 
distinguishing the two groups of psychologists. 
At this point Thomas relates the discussion back to a 
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Previous issue concerning the nature of philosophy and 
suggests that philosophers work by identifying answerable 
questions and 'hiving them off' into other disciplines (4). 
The reason for this apparent dig; ession into the workings 
of philosophy becomes clear in the next sentence, There 
the problem of tfree will' is described as just such a 
problem which can be 'hived off' into science itself. For 
philosophers have shown that free will does not conflict 
with a 'naturalistic' approach to the 'phenomenon of man' 
(5). However, this point is qualified. He claims that 
this compatibility will only be visible if 'we understand 
what science is really about' (5). The problem isq he exp- 
lainsg that psychologists have traditionally adopted a view 
of science derived from 19th Century philosophers. It is 
this which has prevented psychologists from seeing the 
compatibility of notions of 'effective consciousness' and 
'science'. These 19th Century philosophers 'were simply 
wrong' (6). Modern philosophersq in contrastp show science 
to be able to study phenomena of interest to 'humanists' 
34 
and 'naturalist scientists' (7) 
Thomas characterises the contrast between 'mechanism' 
and 'humanism' very differently from Norton. Instead of 
addressing the issue of progress in the two camps, he emph- 
asises a sharp distinction in their approach to such phen- 
omena as 'effective consciousness'. fHumanism' is depicted 
as able to deal with these from a 'naturalistic'$ 'scient- 
ific' viewpoint; 1mechani5m19 in contrast, must find some 
other way of dealing with them. To take this approach 
would be 'utterly unacceptable'. This-extract, then, like 
the last, can be seen to make an evaluative claim based 
around a single crucial distinction. In this case the 
claim is that 'humanists' can deal with central phenomena 
such as 'free willf from a scientific perspective. 'Mech- 
anists19 however, are unable to deal with these phenomena 
in this way. While Norton emphasised the progress of 'mech- 
anism' with respect to 'humanismtt Thomas emphasises the 
greater ability of 'humanist psychologyl to deal with cer- 
tain kinds of difficult subject matter. Despite their 
substantive contradictions both of these extracts share 
the same underlying structure. Each draws upon a crucial 
evaluative distinction for displaying the ad. equacy of one 
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group of psychologistst work with respect to the other's. 
A further similarity between these extracts is that 
each draws on a general model of science to warrant spec- 
ific claims and preformulates an incorrect model. Norton 
depicts the generalisations produced by scientists in the 
'mechanist camp' as being of the same kind as those of phy- 
sicists or chemists. Thomas depicts the essential feat- 
ures of thumanism' to be fully amenable to scientific anal- 
ysis. Each speaker preformulates a plausible alternative 
to their own tcorrect' view and implies that those scient- 
ists who hold such misguided beliefs may be led to equally 
misguided criticisms. In each paper, thereforeq criticisms 
are dismissed in advance. In extract 3 the Imistakent view 
of science is contrasted with the 'correct' view in which 
the Igeneralisations of physics and chemistry... relate 
to specific experimental conditions' (3.8), This view 
is baldly statedl without warrants or hedges. In extract 
4 Thomas contrasts the 'traditional' psychologists' view 
of science with the 'real' view. Howeverg in this case the 
speaker more fully explicates the contrast, The tradit- 
ional psychologists, view is depicted as arising from an 
identification of science with what tl9th Century philos- 
, ophers of science said' about it (4.5). However, Thomas's 
own beliefs are based on the improved ideas of modern phil- 
osophers. Unlike Norton, Thomas implies that science is not 
directly understood but available through the analyses of 
philosophers. In each case the general technique is to 
show that one camp is More scientific than the other. That 
is, that the distinction Imechanistt/thumanist' will cOl- 
lapse into the more basic distinction Iscientifict/tnon- 
scientific' (or vice versa). 
In constructing these accounts other social categories 
are taken as unproblematic. For instance tphysicists' (3.8) 
ano tl9th Century philosophers of sciencet (4.5). These 
categories are treated as straightforwardly consensual; 
no hint is given that problems might ariseAsaYing who is 
a physicist or not, or even which philosophers properly 
belong in the 19th Century. Thus Norton confidently asserts 
that 'no physicistt would make generalisations beyond spec- 
35 
ific experimental conditions Thomas does take the cat- 
ogory of philosophers to be divided; however it is split 
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only into those of the 19th Century and those of the 20th. 
The point of the division is that it enables Thomas to 
account for psychologists' (preformulated) misunderstand- 
ings of science. As philosophers have progressed from the 
'simply wrongt to the modern consensually correct view psy- 
chologists have yet to catch up. 
To summarise this section: both speakers do interpret- 
ative work on the nature of the categories 'humanist' and 
'mechanist'. Each highlights a certain sort of distinction 
and emphasises the properly scientific nature of one of the 
categories with respect to the other. Furthermore, the 
speakers warrant their claims by way of specific interp- 
retations of the genuine nature of science which are con- 
trasted with a popular but mistaken alternative. Never- 
theless, although the two speakers evaluate Imechanismt and 
'humanism' very differently, there is no explicit 
, 
disagree- 
ment in their specific claims about what divides the two 
camps. Norton does not address the issue of how 'mechan- 
ism' deals with purposive behaviour; Thomas does not com- 
ment an the respective production of empirical generalis- 
ations from the camps. However, as we examine further 
accounts in the subsequent analysis it is possible to doc- 
ument highly discrepant versions of each of these issues. 
We will see that not only the formal cake accounts but 
also these accounts invoking a crucial evaluative distict- 
ion are reinterpreted and undermined. 
Accounts of Testability-and PrOgress 
In this section I will concentrate on the issue of 
theory testing and progress raised in extract 3. In that 
extract Norton suggested that a crucial difference between 
the ? mechanist' and thumanistt camps is that only psych- 
ologists working within a 'mechanist' framework can prop- 
erly test theories and thereby produce progressive science. 
In the three extracts which followt we will see this claim 
repeated in even stronger terms9 rejected and then reaf- 
firmed. As well as providing evidence of the flexible 
meaning of these categoriesq these extracts provide fur- 
ther examples of the accounting techniques through which 
these variable categorisations are achieved. 
- 196 - 
The following passage shows Norton reiterating the 
importance of testability in response to an earlier account 
by a participant called Reese which outlined four central 
areas of difference between Imechanists' and 'humanists'. 
Indeedq this was a classic cake account similar in many 
ways to that seen in extracts I and 2. Norton responds to 
it by denying what he takes to be Reese's suggestiong that 
tmechanist' psychologists cannot deal with 'experience' but 
only with lbehaviourt. 
5. Norton. (1)You [Reese"3 suggested that the mechanist 
studies behaviour and that the humanist studies exper- 
ience. (2)There is no need for that to be so. (3)Let 
me tell you of a beautiful little experiment which 
studies experience, brought it under experimental con- 
trol, and proved that the reports of experience were 
veridical. 
Reese. (4)But I was not arguing that it need be so; 
I was trying to point to the facts of the case and 
the facts are that/[Norton cuts Reese off] 
Norton. (5)1 take your point, but I was trying to 
use what you had said as a way of answering the quest- 
ion, by saying that anything is capable of scientific 
investigation if you think 9bout it hard enough. 
(6)Now thatq to me therefore[ý the key issue is not 
what the subject matter is. (7)You can apply scient- 
ific method to anything. (B)Nor is it what the the- 
ory is that is under test. (9)The hypothesis can come 
from anywhere. (10)The trouble with Freud is not 
that his theory postulates very curious entities like 
ids and egos, but that they cannot be tested. (11) 
If somebody could propose a way of testing Freudl 
Freud would become a scientific theory. (12)If some- 
body could propose, including Peter [Carlisel him- 
self, a way of testing Peter's views about social 
behaviourg that would become a useful theory (13 And 
until that point is reached it is not usýeful: (14ýI 
don't think it is useful to the humanists any more 
than it is to the so called mechanists. (transcriptl 
83-84). 
Norton starts his account by formulating one of the 
points which the earlier speakerg Reese, described as dist- 
inguishing 'humanism' from 'mechanism'. This is that Imech- 
anists' study behaviour and humanists study experience (1). 
He suggests that this need not be the case (2) and goes on 
to refer to a 'beautiful little experiment' which took a 
certain sort of experience, studied it 'under experimental 
control', and showed that the subject was reporting it 
truthfully (3). This is proffered as an example of 'mech- 
anistic' research on experience. Thus it seems that Norton 
is here*identifying the 'mechanistic, approach with an exp- 
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erimental approach. 
Reeseq who originally suggested the division in terms 
of subject matterg responds to Norton by claiming that 
although there is no necessity for this distinction the 
facts of the matter are that Imechanists' deal with beh- 
aviour and 'humanists' with experience (4). Norton app- 
ears to agree with Reese; yet he does not seem to modify 
his account in any way. In his reply he gives a further 
formulation of his point that Imechanists' can study exp- 
erience. However, here the claim is that lanything is cap- 
able of scientific investigation' (5). In sentences 3 and 
5. therefore, Norton uses firstly the term 'experimental' 
and then the term 'scientific' as interchangable with the 
term 'mechanistic'. 
Norton carries an to suggest that because of the fact 
that 'anything' is amenable to 'mechanistic' investigation 
what subject matter is investigated is not the key issue 
(7). What is crucial, Norton argues, is whether the the- 
ories can be tested (11-14); for instanceg it is the lack 
of testability of Freud's theory which stops it from being 
scientific (11-12). Again hereq Norton takes 'mechanistic' 
to be equivalent to 'scientific'. And finally Norton ref- 
ers to Carlisle's ideas as 'views' and suggests that only 
when a way of testing them can be proposed will they bec- 
ome 'a useful theoryt (13-14). 
Following Halliday, I will use the term Irelexical- 
isation' to refer to this situation in which there is a 
systematic replacement of terms 
36. For Halliday and ling- 
uists working within the same tradition the substitution 
of lexical items in this way is a functional process; it 
enables the speaker to avoid certain sorts of troubles 
which potentially arise when 'managing reality' and to 
coherently achieve certain accounts. An example from Trew's 
37 
work on newspapers can illustrate this 
Trew carried out a detailed examination of the way 
certain happenings were reported in newspapers 
38. In part- 
icular he examined the way the terms used to describe 
events and processes were modified as stories were reiter- 
ated on subsequent days in the same newspapers. Trew 
suggests that the stories are not merely being condensed or 
more briefly summarised but are actually transformed 
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in this process. For instancev in a story concerning a 
number of people killed by police during a riot in Rhodesiag 
Trew notes a systematic sequence of modifications from day 
to day. In the first report it is claimed that Ill 
Africans were shot dead... when police opened fire on a 
rioting crowd'. This expresses in an only weakly causal 
form the link between the actions of the police and the 
deaths, as is clear when it is compared with the potential: 
'police shoot dead 11 Africans in riots'. Howeverg in the 
following daVs report both the agents and the manner of 
death are deleted altogether leaving: Ill Africans were 
killed in riots'. Crucially the term tshot dead' is rep- 
laced by Ikilledt. Trew argues that processes ofthis kind 
(this is only a small part of his analysis) allow partic- 
ipants to construct explanations which would be untenable 
when applied to the initial, untransformed version. The 
relexicalisation of 'killed' with Idiedt, or its reverse 
changing tkilled' with ImurderedI9 allows the construction 
of highly variable and conflicting accounts of the original 
events. 
Coming back to the present analysisq two sorts of 
relexicalisation can be identified in extract 5. On the 
one hand, certain terms such as 'experimental' and Isci- 
entificf are substituted for the term fmechanist'. On the 
other, 'humanist' is made equivalent to 'non-scientific' 
and 'non-useful'. Overall Norton contrasts 'useful, test- 
ableg experimentalv scientificl mechanistic, theories' 
with 'useless, untestable, non-experiment. all unscientificq 
humanistic, views'. The division between 'humanists' and 
fmechanists' comes to mean the distinction between fscientif ic 
and 'non-scientificf. This process transforms a boundary 
between two camps of scientists into an opposition between 
two discoursesl one scientific and the other not. Essent- 
ially this is the same process as we saw occurring in ext- 
racts 3 and 4; the opposition Imechanistf/lhumanist' is 
collapsed through a sequential replacement of terms into 
the (tacitly evaluative) opposition Iscientificf/Inon- 
scientifict. 
The following speaker responds immediately to Norton's 
claims. Carlise responds to Norton by stressing that test- 
ability does not necessarily arise from taking his kind of 
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experimental approach but depends on the way theories are 
formulated. 
6. Carlisle. (1)I would like to say something quicklyg 
because it does seem to me that this question of test- 
ability is not simply a question of scientific exper- 
iment itself, but a question of the type of way in 
which a theory is formulated. (2)And, er, when I am 
concerned withl erg whether a mother has a particular 
intention in relation to a baby, say, that can act- 
ually be tested out, with evidence, in terms of what, 
as a consequence of having that particular intentiong 
I would suggest a mother goes an to do. (3)And if she 
in fact does it I take that as confirming evidence. 
[3 (4)So what I am, er, baulking at is the great 
apparatus of experimental design and control and that 
sort of thing. (5)But as soon as you mention the 
example of the eidetic imager -a single subject and 
a crucial test -I would think that I could match 
that with some of the things with which I am interested. 
Norton. (6)Most of psychaphysics was done with the 
single subject. 
Carlisle. (7)Um, sureg right. B)Well, I am more 
than happy to accept thato 
ýtranscript, 
85-86) 
In this response, Carlisle argues that testability is 
not merely dependent on the kind of experimental approach 
adopted but also on the type of theory one has, The res- 
earcher can test whether a mother has a certain intention 
by checking what the mother does (2). If the mother acts 
in line with a hypothesised intention then that is tcon- 
firming evidence' for that hypothesis (3)o Carlisle thus 
argues that it is not testability per se thaL he is baulk- 
ing at (for this can be provided if the theory is correctly 
formulated) but the tgreat apparatus of experimental design 
and controlt which he sees Norton. as advocating for all 
psychologists (4). Howeverg Carlisle contrasts this with 
the particular research that Norton mentioned on mental 
imagery, The latter researchg Carlisle claimsg is very sim- 
ilar to things in which he is interested (5). 
At this point, instead of producing any critical com- 
ments, Norton notes that tmost of psychophysics' was done 
in this way (6). He thus seems to support Carlisle's 
endorsement of the value of this kind of study 
39 
. Carlisle 
in turn expresses agreement with Norton ('sure, right' - 7) 
and emphasises that he is thappy to acceptt this kind of 
work (8). Nevertheless, through this account Carlisle 
undermines the contrast in Norton's attempted relexical- 
isation, He does not adopt the offered terminology 
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of lunscientificg non-experimentalg untestablep humanistic 
views' for depicting his own work. Instead he argues that 
it produces 'theories' which are amenable to 'crucial tests' 
although they do not correspond to the 'great apparatus of 
experimental design and control and that sort of thing'. 
He thus counteracts Norton's relexicalised version, split- 
ting up the particular pattern of distinctions and assoc- 
itions which has been generated, and substituting his own 
replacement. In this the opposition is not Isciencet/Inon- 
science', or even 'testable'/tuntestablet; rather it is 
concentrated on Norton's methodological approach. Carlisle 
formulates this as an unwieldy and unresponsive structure 
for which his own approach substitutes precise tests with 
single subjects. 
Returning now to the general issue of variability bet- 
ween social categorisations, it seems that Norton and 
Carlisle are able to agree, at least on this occasion, on 
a certain subset of possible research methods which are 
acceptable and which allow theories to be properly tested. 
In extract 3 the crucial importance of testability for dis- 
tinguishing 'mechanistic' work from 'humanistic' was emph- 
asised by Norton. Yet it now seems that 'humanistic' res- 
earch can be testable. Furthermore, it is clear that 
40 Carlisle takes his own work 6s testable The crucial 
evaluative distinction between the camps thus appears to 
be an occasioned matter. It is supported by Norton in 
extracts 3 and 5 and undermined by Carlisle and Norton in 
extract 6. It should not, however, be thought that this 
variation merely results from a change of opinion or a 
lack of understanding which has been rectified. There 
is no evidence that the disagreement has been sorted ou-t 
and the participants now understand the testable nature of 
'humanism'. Indeed, it is not long before the crucial 
evaluative distinction between the camps is reaffirmed. 
At a later point in the conference a discussant ret- 
urns to the issue of the testability of 'humanism'. He 
brings the point up in the course of a description of his 
own position. 
7. Keefe. (1)1 think that a behaviouristic view -I ETon't'particularly like the term; lets say a scient- ific view, or a bioscient., a biological view of man/ [Squire cuts Keefe offD 
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Squire, (2)Not Iscientificlg please! (3)That's the 
one thing it isn't, so lets not use moral terms like/ EKeefe cuts Squire off] 
Keefe. (4)But you haven It heard it yet. 1 [laughter] 
(5)Well, OK. (6)This is the view9 then, that man's 
behaviour is governed by natural laws, that natural 
laws can be understood, and it is the task of science 
to describe or represent these natural laws. (7) 
This means that a scientific view of man must make 
propositions the truth value of which can be asses- 
sed. (B)OK. [I (9)Now, the objectionst the discrep- 
ancy I thinkg the conflict between the. so called bio- 
logical or behaviouristic or scientific - if you will 
pardon me - view of man and the alternativeg whatever 
you want to call it - there are so many, other terms 
that are applied to the alternative - from the scient. 9 from the biological or behaviouristic point of viewp 
we, I do not understand how one tests the truth value 
of assertions that are generated by9 for exampleg 
Peter Carlisle's theory. (10)And that, and several 
things have been said here about Jim Norton's contrib- 
ution to this symposium. (11)I think that he was com- 
pletely consistent in asking that question over and 
over again. (transcript, 288-289) 
Keefe starts his description of his work by indicating 
a difficulty with what to call it. He suggests possible 
alternatives to lbehaviouristictg such as IscientificIt 
'biological' and Ibioscientifict (1). However, Squire 
interruptshimto complain that the term Iscientifict would 
be inappropriate (2), because Keefe's work is not that 
(Ithatts one thing it isn't' - 3). Keefe in turn inter- 
rupts Squire and reproaches him for making this judgement 
before his work has been properly described (4). This is 
another attempt at relexicalisationp again with the goal of 
substituting Iscientifict for 'mechanistic'. In this case 
the process is questioned by another participant who sug- 
gests that it is misleadingg and indeed immoral. 
Keefe goes on to outline his view as being that 'man's 
behaviour is governed by natural laws' and that the task 
of sciencce is 'to describe' these laws (6). He draws a 
further implication from thisq which is that scientific 
work must produce testable propositions (7). This he rel- 
ates back to earlier discussions of the testability of ? hum- 
anism' and 'mechanism' (10-11). He repeats the earlier 
attempt at relexicalisation, formulating a series of differ- 
ent descriptions of his work: tbiologicallp lbehaviouristiclg 
'scientific', ironically apologising for tscientific' as he 
does so (9). This can be viewed as an instance of 'over- 
- 202 - 
lexicalisation'. Trew suggests that repetitions of terms 
with slightly different meanings in this way can have an 
almost tautological effect and work to foreclose any dis- 
cussion and disagreement 
41 
* 
Keefe does not name the alternative to his approach, 
merely commenting that there are 'so many terms' for it (9). 
Yet it is clear the use of Carlisle's ttheory' as an exam- 
ple and from the reference to Norton's criticisms that the, 
earlier dispute between 'mechanism' and thumanismt is being 
referred to. The crucial feature of the extract, howevert 
is that Keefe characterises his account as a. reassertion 
of Nortonts position, which is that no way has been put for- 
ward for testing Carlisle's theory in particular and 'hum- 
anist' theories in general. For Keefe, clearly, the 
question of whether theories produced by the thumanist' 
camp could be tested was never answered and the distinction 
still stands. 
To summarise this sequence of extracts, then; Norton 
initially distinguished between the 'humanist' camp and the 
Imechanistt camp by suggesting that 'humanistst could prop- 
ose no way of testing their theories and thus generate prog- 
ressive science (extract 3). Later Norton reasserts this 
distinctiong and indeed implies that testability is the 
only feature that necessarily separates the camps(extract 
5). In contrast Carlisle argues, using a specific research 
example produced by Norton as an illustration, that 'hum- 
anists' can and do formulate testable theories and go on to 
test them. At this point Norton seems to accept Carlisle's 
claims. Thusq on this occasion at least, the two particip- 
ants take testability to be a feature of both tmechanist' 
and thumanistt work (extract 6). It should notq howeverp 
be thought that the differences have been resolved once- 
and for all. For later in the conference Keefe reiterates 
Nortonts point and treats it as unanswered (extract 7). 
The distinction of 1humanistst from tmechanistst according 
to their production of testable theories seems therefore to 
be an occasioned matter. In extracts 3,5 and 7 Norton 
and Keefe treat testability as a crucial difference bet- 
ween camps. On the other handq in extract 6 Carlisle and 
Norton accept that the 'humanist' camp is able to produce 
testable theories. 
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Accounts of Purpose and Agency 
In the previous section I discussed the variability in 
the way theories from the 'humanist' and 'mechanist' camps 
are seen as testable or not. In this section I will ret- 
urn to the other crucial evaluative distinction concerning 
agency. In extract 4 the single crucial feature dividing 
the camps was taken to be the ability to deal with agency 
and human purposes. It was suggested that only 'humanists' 
have managed to adopt a proper scientific approach to pur- 
posive behaviour. For Imechanists' cannot deal with pur- 
poses as such; they can only be dealt with as an epiphen- 
omenon or as a result of some more fundamental causal pro- 
cess. In this section I will show that this distinction 
too is open to variable reinterpretation. 
In the accounts discussed above there are a number of 
instances in which Carlisle is characterised as a member 
of the thumanist' camp; indeedg on occasion he seems to be 
depictedo typical or paradigm member of this camp with 
his work taken as synonymous with 'humanism' (5.12-14, 
7.9-11). However, in the following extract Thomas critic- 
ises Carlislets work specifically because of its (putative) 
emphasis on automatic rather than purposive behaviour. 
B. (1)... it seemed to me that, um, Peter Carlisle's anal- 
ysis of the humanistic tradition had got things up- 
side down. U (2)it seemed to me that while in theory 
much of our everyday interaction is at an unthinking 
level, at a level of acceptance - or we wouldn't be 
able to say precisely why we behave as we do or how 
we learned to interpret other peoplets social signals 
in the way that we do, quite automatically - that he 
underestimated the extent to which conflict existed in 
this social situation, and the extent to which once 
conflict becomes apparentE) you have then to fall back 
on the problem or not as the case may be. (3)And it 
seemed to me more appropriate to regard the mode that 
Peter [Carlisle] regards as important as being the 
residue of numerous acts of active problem solving on 
the part of individuals in contemporary society. (Thomasl transcript, 68) 
Thomas suggests that Carlisle's analysis of the 'hum- 
anistic tradition' has got things the wrong way up (1). 
For whereas Carlisle is presented as emphasising that aut- 
omatic activity is primary, the speaker maintains that this 
primacy is illusory. Thusq although 'in theory much of our 
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everyday interaction' is 'automatic' and funthinkingft in 
situationswhere 'conflict becomes apparent' people have to 
think about these problems and try to solve them (2). 
Thomas here fleshes out why he thinks Carlisle has 'inver- 
ted' the 'humanist tradition?. He suggests that the 
'model' of activity which Carlisle treats as central is 
really only the residue of 'numerous acts of active prob- 
lem solving' (3). 
In this extract, then, Thomas, who argues in favour 
of thumanism' in extract 4, asserts that Carlisle is in a 
specific respect not properly within th e 'humanist tradit- 
ion'; even though he argues in favour of 'humanism' (ext- 
ract 6) and is depicted as a 'humanist' by Norton (extract 
5) and Keefe (extract 7). Thomas's criticism concentrates 
on the issue which he has claimed is the essential criter- 
ion for research to be 'humanistic'; i. e. it must scient- 
ifically examine purposive behaviour. He suggests that 
Carlisle is treating purposive behaviour, or the products 
of purposive behaviour, as automatic and thereby 'inverting 
the humanist tradition'. Here is an exampleg thereforeq 
of a psychologist who has been identified by certain other 
speakers as a 1humanist19 and identifies himself in this 
way, having his work criticised for not satisfying the 
essential requirement of humanism; for Norton and Keefe 
Carlise is a typical and indeed paradigm 'humanist'; for 
Thomas, Carlisle does not meet the essential criterion of 
'humanism'. 
The next two extracts are from Coleman's contributions 
to the discussion. In the secondq Coleman gives an account 
of the way his research deals with purposive behaviour. 
The first is a reply to Fish's historical paper (extracts 
1 and 2) and shows Coleman identifying himself with the 
'mechanist campt. It is worth examining this passage in 
some detailp along with the reply from Fish, because it 
provides further illustration of some of the detailed acc- 
ounting techniques used in the formulation of social categ- 
orisations. 
Coleman. (1)I am rather worried by the prevalence of iour war-like metaphors. [3(2)you use these terms like 
twarring factionIq tchampionslp tcontinuous conflict' 
and talk about 'winning an outright victory' and so 
on. (3)And this really isntt my picture of most psy- 
chology; they don't seem to me to exist in warring 
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camps at all. (4)Speaking for myself, I am one of the 
vast majority of unaggressive psychologists who see 
nothiný much wrong with other people's points of view. 
['1 (5 Now, for the purposes of the conference at least 
I am going to be playing the role of a radical behav- 
iourist. (6)And one finds that when one is in this 
role, either voluntarily, or because others push one 
into itg they seem to have a conception of the role 
which I don t; it doesn't correspond with minet not 
at all. (7; But they push me into this role of being 
a kind of psychological black, and it seems to me 
almost the victim of prejudice. [] (8)But I suggest 
then, to revert to my original topic, it is not so 
much that there is a war but there are a large number 
of people throwing things at what you call the mechan- 
ist camp as it exists at the present day. (9)And I 
Would suggestq really, that Most of the ammunitiong. 
the missiles - if I can indulge in the warlike meta- 
phor - are really going in one direction. 
Fish. (10)Well I you did have to come back in the endp 
though admittedly [inaudible]. (11)I don't take that 
too seriously but it is a convenient way of making it 
rather vivid and perhaps by talking in those terms one 
tries really to persuade people not to take it too 
seriously. (12)Because it is not, actuallyq a shooting 
war. (13)1 don't really agree when you say that the 
missiles are only flying from one side, (14)That is a 
piece of propaganda for war which is not at all, wellp 
there are plenty coming in the other way I must say* 
(transcript, 9-10). 
At the begining of this extract Coleman expresses dis- 
agreembnt with Fish's characterisation of psychology as 
being split into 'warring camps', and he details the list 
of terms which he sees as sustaining the metaphor and thus 
as pernicious (1-3). Like Squire in extract 7, Coleman 
contests an attempt at relexicalisation. He claims that 
the tvast majority' of psychologists see 'nothing much wrong' 
with those positions taken up by other psychologists (4). 
Fish's'camps'metaphor is replaced by a picture of (mainly) 
harmonious tolerance; Coleman includes himself with this 
tolerant majority. He goes an to note that the role he will 
be adopting tfor the purposes of the conference' is that 
of a 'radical behaviourist' (5)o However, he complains 
that often he is 'pushed into' thib roleg and even when he 
adopts it 'voluntarily' other people have a very different 
conception of the role to his own (6). Coleman's adoption 
of the category radical behaviourist is thus hedged with 
distancers in much the same way as Norton's use of the 
term 'mechanist' (extract 3 and 5) and Keefe's use of that 
term (extract 7). Furthermoreq this different conception 
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of the role of radical behaviourist approaches prejudice; 
he is treatedq he complains, as a 'psychological black' (7). 
He thus characterises himself as a victim of unfair or mis- 
guided criticism which people apply because they have a 
distorted understanding of the meaning of 'radical behavior- 
ism'. 
Coleman then broadens his discussion from 'behaviour- 
ism' in particular to 'mechanism' in general. The attack 
is depicted as not merely on 'radical behaviourism' but on 
the 'mechanist camp' as a whole. He replaces Fish's met- 
aphor of war with one of persecution: 'there are a large 
number of people throwing things at what you would call 
the mechanist camp' (8) and 'the missiles are really going 
in one direction'. (9). In this passage, therefore, 
Coleman adopts two radically contrasting criticisms of 
Fish's categorisation and analysis. He suggests, firstly, 
that psychologists are not organised into -, warring camps 
and so metaphors which depict conflict between such camps 
are inappropriate. Secondlyq he claims that -the 'mechan- 
ist camp', which includes 'radical behaviourists', are 
victims of tprejudicet and have been attacked by 'missiles'. 
He thus attempts to undermine the descriptive form adopted 
by Fish and draw upon that descriptive form to deny certain 
of Fish's claims. Moreoverv there is a further inconsist- 
ency with his attempt to suggest that the label 'radical 
behaviouristt is not his-own and does not fit. For this 
is exactly the category he adopts when he tries to display 
Fishts intellectual prejudice. 
In his reply, Fish initially appears to comment on 
the tension between these two sorts of criticism (10). 
Yet he too draws on the same competing ways of criticising 
Coleman. Fish suggests that the use of the warring met- 
aphor should -encourage people not to take the disputes too 
seriously-, Fish seems to imply here that there is something 
obviously wrong or exaggerated about his military metaphor 
(11). And he also characterises Coleman's claims that 
Imechanists' are victims of prejudice as 'propaganda for 
war' (14). Againg there is a move, in a very short time, 
between treating a certain form of words as rhetorical 
and taking them as literal, 
I will return to this issue of mixing criticism and 
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use of categories in the discussion. For the momentq the 
main point to note is that in this context Coleman treats 
his particular research area as a part of the 'mechanist 
camp,. 
Later on in the conference he continues the theme of 
other people misunderstanding his research area while at 
the same time he addresses the problem of purpose and 
agency, 
10. Coleman. (1)I think that still the sort of position 
I. take is grievously misunderstood, and has to be put 
in front of people over and over again. (2)But also 
in the end I have discovered I have some sort of model 
So I want to come out and positively Einaudible]. 
(3)The things that I would want to say about what I 
would call operant psychology -I think behaviourism 
is a bit out of date - but operant psychology and 
the attitudes of operant psychologists are something 
like this. (4)That first of all most behaviour is 
operant behaviour. [](5)And most of the area I am 
interested in is operant. (6)Nowq the first charact- 
eristic of this behaviour is that it is emitted; it is 
not jerked out of the organism; it is emitted. (7)And 
so it is voluntary behaviour. 
Thomas. (B)Not necessarily. 
Coleman. (9)Well , it is something like voluntary 
behaviour. Llaughter] (10)It is not, we are cert- 
ainly not talking about muscle twitches or reflexes 
in the psychologists' heads (11)And the second 
point about it is this. (li)That the behaviour is 
defined in terms of its consequences. (13)In other 
words it is acts we are talking about. (14)Not muscle 
twitches. (15)Now the notion of muscle twitches came 
in not from any behaviourist at all, but from the 
critic McDougal: McDougal used this phrase, directed 
against Watson. (16)Watson used the term reflexq yes# 
and perhaps he shouldn't. (17)But you have to remem- 
ber that the term reflex has been used in very ma UY 
senses since it first came into psychology (18)It 
is a very wide, a very wide term indeed. 
j19)So 
Watson perhaps shouldn't have used thatq and perhaps 
he shouldn't have talked about stimulus and response. 
(20)But he did make it clear that when he said res- 
ponse he meant a bit of behaviour; he said a bit of 
behaviourg something you can give a name tOl. (21)And 
then he gives examples like picking up a pencil from 
the desk9 getting married, and so on. [much laughter- 
(22)Yes, that's one of his examples. [3(23)They are 
[inaudible] defined or anything; in other words they 
are acts: the same sort of thing that all psychology 
is about and must be about . 
(24)A rat-pressing a bar 
in a Skinner box is performing an actt which is def- 
ined by its consequences. (25)There is no doubt about it at all, about that. (26)The rat does something and 
we haven't prescribed exactly what is is at all. (27)And we don't care exactly what the behaviour is; 
the rat isq in a sense, is left free to do that. 
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(28)So we are all talking about the same thing, it 
seems to me. (transcriptt 281-282) 
Coleman starts this passage by returning to the theme 
of extract 99 that his position is 'grievously misunder- 
stood' (1). In what follows he tries to address some of 
these misunderstandings. This is prefaced by Coleman sug- 
gesting that the term lbehaviourism' is a bit out of 
date' (3). Instead he wishes to be known as an operant 
psychologist (3). The point of emphasising this termin- 
ological change becomes clear as Coleman directs his acc- 
ount to showing that his specific approach to psychology 
can deal with voluntary behaviour, and indeed is based an 
the analysis of Voluntary behaviour. 
Coleman claims that 'most behaviour is operant beh- 
aviour' (4) and most of his own interest is in this sort 
of behaviour (5). He characterises this sort of behaviour 
as lemitted1v which is contrasted with the idea of behav- 
iour being 'jerked out of the organism' (6). Coleman then 
claims that this behaviour is 'voluntary' (7). Therefore, 
in sentences 4 to 7 he has equated 'operant behaviour' with 
'emitted behaviour' and in turn with 'voluntary behaviour'. 
It seems that the change from lbehaviourism' to 'operant 
psychology' is meant to provide an indication of an inc- 
reased emphasis on purposes at the expense of causes. 
At this point Thomas (who as we saw in extract 4 sug- 
gests that the crucial difference between 'humanists' and 
Imechanists' in psychology is that Imechanists' cannot deal 
with purposes) intervenes and suggests that emitted behav- 
iour is 'not necessarily' voluntary (8). Coleman's retort 
is to suggest that 'it is something like voluntary behav- 
iour' (9) and he emphasises the contrast between the sort 
of behaviour he is talking about and 'muscle twitches' or 
'reflexes'. He then returns to his theme and asserts that 
as the behaviour under study is 'defined interms of its con- 
sequences' (12) the operant psychologist is studying 'acts' 
(13) not tmuscle twitches' (14). 
Through the initial part of this extract Coleman has 
contrasted first 'operant behaviour', then temitted behav- 
iour', 'voluntary behaviour', 'something like voluntary 
behaviour' and finally 'acts' with the terms 'muscle twit- 
ches' and 'reflexes'. Coleman now gives a further gloss 
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on the two opposing notions: 'muscle twitches' and 'ref- 
lexes'. It seems that these terms have been applied to 
lbehaviourism' in the pastv but incorrectly or innaccurately. 
It is clearl thereforeg that he is engaged in reconstruct- 
ing the categories used for depicting the subject matter 
of 'operant psychology'. He is attempting to eliminate the 
use of certain previously applied terms and to demonstrate 
the relevance of certain new terms. 
In this sequence Coleman fashions a complex account to 
show that Thomas's picture of 'mechanistic' psychologists 
being unable to and unwilling to deal with voluntary beh- 
aviour is merely a rhetorical version. For he suggests 
that the real subject matter of (his area of) 'mechanist' 
psychology is voluntary behaviour and action. To achieve 
this account Coleman engages in a comprehensive attempt at 
relexicalisation. He replaces terms sequentially through- 
out the accountv thus softening the contrast between the 
initial terms and their final replacements. The progres- 
sive sequence here is: lbehaviourism', toperant psychologylg 
'emitted behaviourtg 'voluntary behaviour' and finally 'acts'. 
The end product of this process appears to contradict the 
suggestion that Imechnaists' do not deal with voluntary 
behaviour. 
Coleman goes on to construct an historical account to 
show that while certain key terms which seem to conflict 
with the emphasis on agency have indeed been used, they 
should not be treated as literally applicable to Coleman's 
work. The notion of tmuscle twitches', he claims, was int- 
roduced by McDougal, who is not a lbehaviouristi at allp 
but a 'critic' (15). Coleman describes the notion of 
'muscle twitches' as having been 'directed at Watson' (the 
tfounderl of behaviourism) by McDougal (15). Although 
'muscle twitches' appears to be a descriptive phraset 
Coleman's form of words treats it as abusive; syntactic- 
ally, descriptions are tabout' while abuse or insult is 
'directed at' as the present extract would have it. More- 
over, displaying McDougal as a critic rather than a member 
allows Coleman to treat his terms as abusive in this way 
rather than merely descriptive; for it shows McDougal to 
have a specific interest in producing a non-neutral term- 
inology 42 . 
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Although the term 'muscle twitches' can be dealt with 
in this way the term 'reflexes' is a rather different prob- 
lem because it was introduced by Watson (16). The diffic- 
ulty here for Coleman is that he is involved in depicting 
modern Ibehaviourism' as dealing with 'purposive behaviour' 
rather than 'reflexes'; yet the latter is exactly the term 
used by the founder of Ibehaviourism'. Coleman resolves 
this interpretative problem by emphasising the vagueness of 
the term as it has been traditionally used in psychology. 
Although he himself has drawn upon it earlier (10)q Coleman 
stresses 'it has been used in very many' ways in psychology 
(17) and that it is a 'very wide term indeed' (16). Bec- 
ause of these many possible senses, Coleman impliesq Watson's 
use of the term 'reflex' must not be taken too literally. 
Despite some of its uses, the term can cover purposive beh- 
aviour. 
Coleman indicates that it was also unfortunate that 
Watson used the terms 'stimulus' and 'response' (19). How- 
ever, he suggests that what Watson really meant by the 
term 'response' was 'a bit of behaviour' (20). And such 
things can be named (20); for instanceg 'picking up a 
pencil' and 'getting married' (21). This means that they 
are 'acts' (22). Coleman thus draws an equation between 
Watson's term Iresponselg the term 'behaviour', 'behaviour 
which can be namedt and finally the notion of tacts'. The 
force of this seems to be that although Watson used the term 
tresponselt which according to Coleman he tshouldn't have19 
what he was really talking about was 'acts'. And lactsIg 
as Coleman goes on to state, are 'the sort of thing that 
all psychology is about and must be about' (23). It is 
thus Watson's lanquaqe, which is at fault, not the nature 
of behaviourism. As in the earlier sections of the ext- 
ract, Coleman4s/is constructed using a progressive series 
of relbxicalisations which smoothly shift it between causal 
and voluntaristic conceptions. 
Coleman finally returns more explicitly to modern 
psychology and notes that when the rat in a 'Skinner Box' 
presses a bar (to get food, say) it performs an act (24). 
'There is no doubt about itl (25) says Coleman, the rat 
'does something' (26) which it is 'free to do' (27). And 
Coleman ends this sequence by concluding that in psychology 
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'we are all talking about the same thing' (27). In the 
endq thereforeq the implication is that differences bet- 
ween psychologists have been exaggerated by other speak- 
ers and that all psychologists conceptualise their sub- 
ject matter in fundamentally the same way. 
In this account Coleman has stressed that his work 
takes purposive action as its central topic. Indeedq 
Coleman denies any interest in non-purposive topics. How- 
ever, in extract 9, he has also indicated that his approach 
is broadly aligned with the 'mechanist campt, although he 
would not necessarily refer to it by that term. Yet, in 
extract 4, Thomas strongly argues that the essential feat- 
ure of 'humanism' is its study of purposive behaviour and 
that this is tutterly unacceptable' to 'any mechanistt. 
As before, then, with accounts of the testability of the 
camps, we see there is a significant degree of variability 
43 in the claims of different scientists 
Discussion: Categorisation, Evaluation and Reference 
Let me return now to the metaphor of the sliced, multi- 
layered cake which I introduced at the start of this chap- 
ter. While Kuhn's thesis of scientific paradigms is the 
classic cake account, it is clear that such accounts are 
not exclusive to the writings of meta-scientists. For 
instance extract 1 is one of two cake accounts which appear 
in the formal conference proceedings and are presented in 
papers at the conference. From a close examination of 
these accounts it is possible to formulate the basic feat- 
ures possessed by such social categorisations. 
1 They reree- lo- I/ JIV 'Af Orpeýqole_ 
who share a partic- 
ular set of beliefs and assumptions and engage in 
a similar set of scientific practices. 
2) The beliefs and practices of the members form a 
coordinated whole. 
3) This whole is constructed by combining a particular 
subject matter, methodological approach, form of 
explanation and set of basic theoretical assumpt- 
ions. 
When we come to examine in detail the passages of con- 
ference discussion in which 'cake categories' are used a 
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rather different picture emerges. I will illustrate this 
by summarising in turn the analytic findings concerning 
the four distinctions between the 'mechanist campt and the 
'humanist camp' introduced in the initial cake account 
(extract 1 and 2). 
1) Subject Matter. In extract 1 the speaker prop- 
oses that one of the differences between the 'mechanist 
camp? and the 'humanists' is that the Imechanists' emphas- 
ise the study of animal behaviour. Yet in extract 5 another 
speaker suggests that this is not necessarily so. This 
speaker maintains that what subject matter is studied is 
not important for distinguishing the two forms of psychol- 
ogy. 
2) Methods of Study. In extract I the speaker makes 
a distinction between objective experiments, which are used 
by members of the 'mechanist camp', and conceptual analysis 
and self report, which are used by the 'humanists'. In 
extract 3a stronger account is given which suggests that 
only the Imechanistst have methods which enable them to 
produce progressive science. This distinction is elaborated 
in extract 5 where tmechanist psychology' is equated with 
the use of experimental methods, and it is also stressed 
that it is these particular methods which lead to scientific 
progress. While neither of these formulations are identical 
with that in extract 1, the equation of experimental meth- 
ods with 'mechanistic psychology' in extract 5 comes close 
to it (the difference is only that the initial cake account 
does not tie progress to this distinction). 
Extract 6 also draws upon a distinction between dif- 
ferent methodst in this case distinguishing large scale 
experimental approaches from intensive studies with single 
subjects. Here, however, it is claimed that a process of 
theory testingg and thereby scientific progre 
, 
ss, is possible 
for the 'humanist campt. Furthermore, it is not experim- 
ental methods per se which are criticisedl rather large 
scale, conventionally designed studies. Extracts 5 and 6, 
then, contradict each other: while extract 5 treats prog- 
ress as given only by the methods of the tmechanistic camptl 
extract-6 stresses that progress is produced by the alter- 
native methods used by 'humanists'. Moreoverg extract 6t 
in accepting the importance of some kinds of experimental 
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methods, undermines the experimental/non-experimental dist- 
inction erected in extract I. 
3) Metaphysical Assumptions and Explanatory Form. In 
the formal cake accounts (extracts I and 2) the two camps 
are distinguished by the different sorts of explanations 
which they use: mechanistic in the tmechanistic camp' and 
purposive in the 'humanist camp's and by the underlying 
metaphysical assumptions of tplasticityl and 'autonomy' that 
go with them. In extract 4 this is treated as the essential 
feature which distinguishes the camps. For only 'humanists' 
adopt a scientific approach to human purposes. Yetq in ext- 
ract 10, a scientist who adopts the label 'mechanist' sug- 
gests that his area of psychology is concerned specifically 
with purposive behaviour and that its explanatory form ref- 
lects this rather than trying to replace purposes with a 
more causally based form of explanation. This speaker 
finally suggests that the subject matter of all psychology 
is purposive behaviour or actst thereby erasing the basic 
distinction proposed in extract 4. 
To sum up: each of the distinctions between camps con- 
structed firstly in the formal cake accounts and subsequ- 
ently in accounts stressing crucial evaluative distinctions, 
are undermined or revised at some point in the conference 
discussion. The distinctions in terms of subject matter 
and metaphysical assumptions are -straightforwardly cont- 
radicted. The distinction in terms of methods is broadly 
compatible with two further distinctions of this kind in 
the discussion. Yet these further distinctions contradict 
one another. Thus it seems that neither the formal cake 
accounts nor the specific accounts in the discussion can be 
taken as unproblematic literal descriptions of what it 
means to be a member of the tmechanist' or 'humanist' camps. 
Although the categories of 'mechanism' and 'humanism' are 
frequently used by psychologists at this conference as they 
construct their accounts of their professional social worlds 
the meaning of the categories appears to vary significantly 
from one occasion to another. 
A similar problem is apparent in the way membership is 
ascribed to the camps. For instance, Carlisle is treated 
as a 'humanist' in extracts 5 and 7. And he himself at no 
point"in the transcript queries this categorisation. Yet 
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Thomas suggests that his work does not satisfy the essential 
criterion of 'humanism' , namely, that it should deal with 
purposive behaviour (extract 8). Indeed, Thomas claims 
that Carlisle has inverted the 'humanist tradition' by 
claiming that automatic behaviour is prior to purposive 
behaviour. Furthermoreg to take a second exampleg Coleman 
aligns himself with the 'mechanist camp' (extract 9) and 
at the same time argues that his particular approach to 
research concentrates almost exclusively on voluntary beh- 
aviour (extract 10). Yet Thomas has claimed previously 
that it would be utterly unacceptable for any 'mechanist' 
to account for behaviour in this way. In each case the des- 
ignation of membership conflicts with certain versions of 
the meaning of these categories. It seemsq thereforeq that 
neither accounts of the meaning of these categories nor 
particular participants' ascriptions of membership can be 
taken as straightforward descriptions of the state of act- 
ion and belief in the discipline as a whole or even the 
specific conference. 
One response to these findings might be that the var- 
iability in meaning and reference of these categories is 
not surprising and that analysts would certainly not adopt 
such c-+-gories when providing technically adequate divis- 
ions ofAfield. Howeverl the method of comparing and exam- 
ining in detail social categorisations produced on differ- 
ent occasions makes any variability present highly visible. 
When categorisations are used as a basis for erecting cert- 
ain analytic claims variability is likely to be much less 
apparent. Using the work of Wynne 
44 
and Harwood 
45 let me 
briefly show that there can be important similarities bet- 
ween analytic categories and the kinds of cake accourit 
discussed at the start of this chapter. 
If we remember the discussion of Uynne's work in chapter 
19 it is clear that a fundamental part of his analysis of 
the social determination of ether theory is the unambiguous 
identification of two categories of scientist: the Cambridge 
Physicists and the Scientific Naturalists. These sides are 
said not only to have different views about the physical 
world but also to differ in their broad philosophy of sci- 
encev methods of study and general beliefs about society. 
In most respectst thereforej Wynne's categories are like 
f If 
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standard cake accounts. The major difference from the 
psychologists' accounts is the inclusion of views about 
society into the coordinated set of beliefs and practices. 
Yet, as I demonstrated, a number of the specific accounts 
cited by Wynne conflict markedly with this discrete div- 
ision. Some of the accounts stressed only theoretical 
differences between the groupsl while others showed that 
certain key participants had beliefs compatible with both 
categories (see pages 34-36 above). Indeed the division 
seems to be sustained largely through the use of a number 
of 'homogenising devices'. the most important of which 
is the repeated equation of institutional affiliation with 
shared belief. In this casep then, there appears to be a 
considerable degree of formal similarity between the part- 
icipants' categories 'humanist' and 'mechanist' and Wynne's 
technical division into 'Cambridge Physicists' and 'Scient- 
46 ific Naturalists' Each specifies the existence of a 
coherent group of scientists possessing coordinated sets of 
beliefs and practices; but when discourse is examined 
closely it becomes apparent that these categories may be 
modified or even abandoned on specific occasions. 
Harwood's work on the debate over the innateness of 
IQ differences is interesting here bL-cause the two sides 
in this debate are characterised in a way almost identical 
(in content as well as form) to the 'humanists' and Imech- 
anists' in the formal cake accounts. On the one hand are 
supporters of a hereditary position which is Icharacterist- 
ically rationalist, quantitative. abstract9 atomistict and 
static' while on the other are critics and environmental- 
ists whose position is lintuitiveg qualitativeg concrete, 
47 holistic and dynamic' Harwood even refers to the hered- 
itarian position as 'mechanist', although he reserves the 
term 'organismic' for the alternative. His central anal- 
ytic goal is to account for the (social) origin of these 
4B two styles of thought As in the case Of Wynne, Harwood'S 
analysis depends on the unambiguous identification of two 
sides. There is not sufficient information available in 
his article to properly show the inadequacy of these cat- 
ogories, or their origins, but it seems very likely that 
they are subject to the same flexible accounting as has 
been documented in the present study. It also seems likely 
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that his technical categories originate in the discourse 
of participants. It is noticable that theterms 'envir- 
onmentalists' and 'hereditarians' are introduced as part- 
icipants' categories, but as the analysis proceeds they 
become increasingly incorporated as taken-for-granted 
analytic resources. 
These two examples suggestq therefore, that analysts 
have adopted as adequate for 'technical purposes categories 
very similar to the ones discussed here. Indeed, these - 
seem to be exactly the kinds of categories that are drawn 
on by researchers whose work isbased on the qualitative 
reconstruction of historical debates (Wynne, Harwood) or 
participant observation (Collins and Pinch 
49 ). Perhaps 
this similarity is not surprising as cake accounts are 
very like Kuhnian paradigms, and Kuhnts work has had a 
powerful influence on contemporary social studies of sci- 
ence. Nevertheless, the present study suggests such cat- 
egories should be used with considerably more caution than 
in the work of these authors. 
One feature shared by these analytic approaches is 
that their categorisations are viewed as essentially des- 
criptive rather than evaluative. Put another way9 the 
identification Of collectivities is treated as entirely 
separate from judgments about the relative merits of dif- 
ferent Positions. The latter activity is unacceptable to 
those who accept the Strong Programmets tenets of impart- 
iality and symmetry, or who espouse relativist principles; 
whilst the former activity is a crucial and often largely 
unproblematic preliminary to conducting analyses. Howevert 
there is no Possibility of producing a clear cut division 
of this sort in the present analysis. In many instances 
the distinction thumanistl/vmechanistt is intimately assoc- 
iated with the construction of accounts which assign dif- 
ferent scientific values to these categories of psycholog 
ist. i 
It is important to be clear about what is being sug- 
gested here. The aim is not to replace one interpretation 
of these categories - that they are literal description - 
with its converse - that they are simply rhetorical glosses. 
Perhaps the best way of putting it is to say that scient- 
ists construct the social categories in their field in 
Pl 
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accordance with their other scientific elaira5 and occas- 
ioned to fit the requirements of specific interpretative 
contexts. To see them in terms of a polarisation between 
strategic and literal discourse would be to adopt an 
unwarranted participants' classification. 
This emphasis on the enmeshing of description and 
evaluation is clearly illustrated by the contrast between 
the formal cake accounts -in the published proceedings 
(extract 1) and accounts 3 and 4 from the transcript. 
While formal cake accounts formulate a number of ways in 
which 'mechanism' is distinct from thumanismtg accounts 
generated during the conference tended to concentrate 
attention on single issues: the methods of theory testing 
used and the progress they provide; the ability to deal 
with purposive behaviour. Each speaker claims one of these 
issues to be crucial for the division into camps. Although 
different in content, these issues are each used in the 
same way: to highlight what one camp is taken to lack with 
respect to the other. They are descriptions used in the 
process of evaluation and constructed accordingly. Thus 
Norton (extract 3) depicts the 'humanist camp? as lacking 
any way of clearly testing theories and therefore as 
unable to produce a progressive science; while Thomas 
(extract 4) depicts the 'mechanist campt as lacking any 
way of dealing with purposive behaviour scientifically. By 
focussing an particular 'crucial' issuest rather than an 
array of different issues which distinguish the groupst 
a stronger evaluative form can be achieved. To claim that 
IX is crucial and this camp lacks Xf is more damaging than 
claiming 1X9Y and Z are all importantp and this camp lacks 
Xt. In the latter case the force of the account can be 
undermined by emphhsising tY and Z' which the camp does 
not lack; while in the former case this reVOICe, is ow& 
Mae q6awt6. 
In each of extracts 3 and 4 the evaluative force is 
increased by displaying one of the camps as scientific in 
a way the other is not. Thus the 'mechanist campt is dep- 
icted as able to produce long lasting empirical generalisat- 
ions like those of the natural sciences; whilst the thuman- 
ist camp' is unable to do this (extract 3). In contrast, 
extract 4 shows the 'humanist campt as able to take a 
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'naturalistic'. Iscientifict view of human purposes which 
the tmechanists' are unable to do. It appears that if 
the speakers able to make the distinction 'mechanist'/ 
'humanist' collapse into the distinction scieritific/non- 
scientific (or non-scientific/scientific) this will pro- 
vide a powerful legitimation of one camp with respect to 
the other. The category 'science' is used as a basic leg- 
itimating term. Once these speakers have shown their camp 
to be scientific no further interpretative work is seen to 
be required. 
So fart theng I have shown that although in the 
formal papers accounts appear which divide psychologists 
into two coherent campsg and that this camp metaphor is 
at times reiterated in the discussion, the meaning and 
membership of these camps is variably accounted for. I 
have also shown that in the discussion these accounts 
are particularly involved with displaying the relative 
success or coherence of one camp with respect to another. 
Furthermorep I identified two accounting techniques for 
legitimating the work of one or other camp. These were 
to stress a single evaluative distinction as the crucial 
difference between them and to identify one camp as prop- 
erly scientific with respect to the other. In the anal- 
ytic sections of this chapter I discussed two further acc- 
ounting techniques. One of these involved the 'preform- 
ulationt of competing positions to undermine them in 
advance of their use. This will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next chapter. The other involved the process 
of Irelexicalisationtg where certain kinds of contrasts 
and distinctions are modified and transformed by the 
progressive substitution of terms. This process was 
apparent in a number of the extracts9 although on some 
occasions attempted relexicalisations were contested (see 
extract 79 sentences 2-3, extract 109 sentence 8). 
Before moving on to address the issue of social cat- 
egories in more general termst one final accounting tech- 
nique should be noted. In each of the passages which 
stressed the inadequacy of the thumanistl with respect to 
the tmechanist camp' (extract 3,5,7 and 9) the term 
tmechanist is displayed as problematic in some way. This 
is typically done either by prefacing the term with a 
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Idistancer's such as 'the so called mechanist camp' or 
'what you would call the mechanist camp', or by relexic- 
alising: replacing 'mechanist' with 'scientific' 9 'exp- 
erimental' or 'biological'. Across the entire corpus of 
categorisation accounts there is no construction which 
positively values the 'mechanist camp' without treating 
the term as problematic in one way or another. In ext- 
racts arguing for the superiority of the thumanist campt, 
however, the use of such techniques is very rare. What 
could explain this asymmetry? 
One plausible explanation is suggested if we return 
to extract 4, the account which identifies the crucial 
distinction between camps a5 the inability of 'mechanism' 
to deal with purposes. For here the term 'mechanistic' 
appears to be treated as synonymous with non-purposive. 
On the other hand, in extract three there is no suggestion 
that the term 'humanist' means non-testable, it is simply 
a label for scientists whose work is (it is claimed) non- 
testable. It thus appears that the terms themselves more 
effectively mark the positive value of the 'humanist camp' 
than the reverse. Adopting these terms, theng may be to 
begin to adopt the evaluation they mark; and as a consequ- 
ence, in certain cases they must be made problematic by the 
50 
use of distancers or by relexicalisation 
Returning now to the general issue of social categor- 
isation and consenst4 we can see that there is a crucial 
by product of the form of talk which has been discussed. 
The participants continually formulate and reformulate the 
meaning of the categoriesq and what they should be calledt 
in the context of producing specific evaluations. This 
process continually presupposes the successful reference 
of the categories even while their meaning is disputed; 
that is, it is presupposed that this talk is about certain 
specific groups of scientists and that the terms thumanist' 
and ImechanistIq even if not always appropriate, are names 
for unproblematic groupings of psychologists. One reason 
for this appears to be that it is necessary to assume the 
categories when fashioning an evaluation. If the member- 
ship of the categories cannot be distinguished there is no 
basis for making an evaluative distinction. The very struct- 
ure of this talk9 therefore, leads to the social categor- 
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ies being reified. 
Evaluative categorisations could be undermined simply 
by questioning the existence of the categories being dis- 
cussed. But for any particular scientist's work this would 
not offer any response to the content of the criticism; 
it would only suggest its form was inappropriate. In may 
thus be more straightforward for participants to (tacitly) 
accept the idea that there exist two homogeneous groups 
of psychologists so that the specific evaluative criticism 
can be addressed. This sort of difficulty may explain the 
form of accounting seen in extract 9. There the 'camps' 
metaphor is characterised as an inappropriate way of des- 
cribing psychology. Yet very shortly afterwards, when 
trying to show that a specific criticism of his own posit- 
ion is not justified, the speaker treats the 'camps' met- 
aphor as indicating a genuine difference between groups of 
psychologists. Thus even where a speaker explicitly under- 
mines the basis for making the division into camps, it is 
reintroduced to respond to the content of criticism. 
While these social categories tend to be reified in 
this way, as literal descriptions of psychological sub- 
groupings9 their actual reference is left extremely vague. 
Very few contemporary pa3rticipants are identified as mem- 
bers of one camp or another. Furthermore, there is often 
ambiguity over whether the accounts are meant to be des- 
scriptions of the actual states of (contingently existing) 
affairs or illustrations of the necessity for, say, certain 
camps to use certain methods. For instance, in ext- 
ract 5, while one speaker emphasises that the categories 
describe 'how things are' the other claims that his con- 
cern is with what tmust be the case'. On the one handl 
it is implied that the constellations of beliefs and pract- 
ices-adopted in the camps of psychologists are just one 
of many possible constellations; on the other, it is 
implied that these constellations have properties such 
that certain methods, say, will necessarily combine with 
certain metaphysical assumptions. A third area of vague- 
ness is over whether the camps consist of groups of mem- 
bers or systems of beliefs and concepts. This difference 
is marked by the difference between tXisms and tXistt. 
In many cases speakers moved fluently between these two 
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constructions as if there were no important differences 
51 between them 
As a product of this vagueness there is only a very 
low likelihood of severe interpretative difficulties 
arising over the reference of these category terms. The 
vagueness introduces a flexibility which facilitates the 
repair of any apparent conflict over reference. It seems 
likely, thereforeq that these categories will continue to 
be available as viable resources used in the construction 
of evaluations despite the sorts of problems over their 
meaning and membership outlined at the start of this dis- 
cussion. 
Finallyp let me briefly return to the issue of formal 
cake accounts. I have already argued that they cannot be 
treated as literal description of consensual scientific 
categories. But this raises two further questions. How 
are they constructed? And what is their function? Neither 
of these questions can be answered definitively through 
the present analysis. However, it is possible to make 
some suggestions for furtherg more detailed study. 
It seems likely that formal cakes are produced by com- 
bining together various evaluative distinctions made in 
different kinds of participants' discourse. The presup- 
positions which are made in each particular dispute - that 
there exist certain coherent, orderly subgroups in psych- 
ology - are taken as literal and used as grounds for treat- 
ing them as markers of a boundary between two broad social 
categories. At the same time, many of the evaluative over- 
tones are stripped away so that the final cake account 
treats, or apparently treats, each cake grouping symmetric- 
ally. Formal cakes are thus constructed through a process 
of reifying categories that are used by participants' them- 
selves as practical evaluative resources in certain varied 
forms of discourse. 
Why should such cakes be produced? Both cakes pres- 
ented in formal papers appeared to depict 'mechanism' and 
? humanism' 9/m. netricallyt as both equally valued. Neverthe- 
less, the categories were involved in evaluative accounts. 
For in each paper both cakes were contrasted with a third 
alternative. In one the products of 'mechanism' and fhum- 
anismý on their own were depicted as inferior to the product 
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of their interaction. Only by an exchange of ideas and 
methods, the paper suggestsq will psychology realise its 
progressive potential. In the other paper differences 
between the camps were depicted as relatively unimportant 
because they have little influence on the practical util- 
isation of psychology. Arguing about the nature of camps 
is here a scholastic irrelevance. In both cases the two 
camps are toqether evaluatively contrasted with a third 
option. So there is some tentative indication that formal 
cake accounts may have specific stipulative functionsq 
although not necessarily the same ones as the informal 
evaluative distinctions. 
It seems, overall, that the claims of Peterson and 
Weimer to be able to detect partisan commitments underlying 
the discussion of paradigms in psychology should be ext- 
ended to other kinds of social categorisation as well. In 
formal cake accounts there is some evidence of stipulative 
use, while many informal classifications accompanied 
strongly evaluative cl7aims. Because of the intimate rel- 
ationship between evaluation, beliefs and social categor- 
isation it is likely that it will prove difficult if not 
impossible to produce a truly neutral social categorisat- 
ion which attempts to classify scientists according to 
their beliefs and actions. For in every case that content 
is given to particular consensual groupings certain ach- 
ievements and limits are implied: theory A can explain Y 
but not X; a class of observations, Op cannot be dealt 
with by framework B; method P is satisfactory for all prob- 
lems Q to R. Studies which have looked closely at the var- 
iety of different beliefs expressed by scientists show 
how unlikely it is that there will be consensual agreement 
an these issues. It seems probable that analysts in the 
Kuhnian traditiont who strive after the delineation of 
paradigms and categories of this kindl are inevitably, if 
often implicitlyl going to become embroiled in the pract- 
ical problems which face scientists when ordering their soc- 
ial worlds in ways that are best for them. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
READING READINGS 
In this chapter I will continue the emphasis of the 
last on explicating the detailed interpretative procedures 
used by psychologists in the construction of their dis- 
course, However, I will move away from the concern with 
notions such as criteria for theory choice and social cat- 
egorisation which are central to traditional social res- 
earch on science. Instead the analysis will concentrate 
on the topic of reading. It will address the question of 
how participants make sense of and account for spoken and 
written discourse. This issue has had little interest for 
researchers concerned to give causal accounts of the nature 
of scientific belief or for sociologists whose aim is to 
show the lack of impact the 'natural world' has on theory 
selection. It is only when we start to consider a system- 
atic analysis of scientific discourse that the central imp- 
ortance of this question becomes clear. For work from 
this perspective has documented the complex and heterogen- 
eous nature of scientific texts 
1 
and shown that divergent 
systems of concepts may be used to account for scientific 
2 
action and belief Given these findings, which show that 
texts and spoken discourse are far from being a transparent 
and straightforward medium of communicationg the question 
arises of what practical procedures scientists use to deal 
with texts and to respond to spoken discourseq tasks which 
form a large part of their professional lives. 
Readinq Transcript 
As a prelude to an analysis of participants' 'readings' 
it is important to clarify what will be meant by this term. 
The notion of reading will be used in the restricted sense 
of recent literary theorists. The analysis will not be 
concerned with revealing some elusive inner experience of 
the text had by a reader. Insofar as participants are 
explicating, interpreting and commenting upon written texts 
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they are publically displaying techniques of sense making 
in the production of versions of textst meaning. It is 
these versions which I shall call 'readings' . There is 
probably no hard divide between readings of this kind and 
the more general interpretative practices which are discus- 
sed in the other chapters of this thesis. In each case 
what is available for analysis are sequences of texts. It 
is convention only that we call one text in the sequence 
which appears to refer back to another a reading of that 
other text. We might treat a discussant's formulations 
concerning a paper presented earlier as embodying a reading 
of that paper. Yet it can be argued that all texts have 
to refer back to others as the very condition of their 
making sense; it is just that most of the time these all- 
pervasive citations go unacknowledged or are so tobvious' 
that they are not explicitly alluded to. This point will 
be elaborated in the discussion section of this chapter. 
The specific materials for analysis were chosen with 
this restricted notion of reading in mind. In these data 
recurrent and explicit reference is made to particular and 
identifiable anterior texts. It is for this reason alone 
that I will refer to them as 'readings'. Two main sets of 
data are drawn on. The first consists of 34 pages of trans- 
cribed discussion between a group of 11 Personal Construct 
Psychologists at a residential workshop at a South Coast 
seaside resort (see pages 78). This discussion concerned 
some transcribed material which had been circulated to all 
the participants before the workshop. The precirculated 
transcripts were accompanied by a letter (figure 1) sug- 
gesting that participants might like to read them in prep- 
aration for a discussion. At the workshop session at which 
the materials were discussed they were introduced as fol- 
lows: 
My fantasy of what will happen this morning is a bit 
like what my workmates and I do at Yorkq which is to 
sit round a table with chunks of speech. And people 
say 'well, I thought what was going on on page three 
was rather stranget interesting or so and solq 1I 
thought such and such was happening'; or 'I was cur- ious about what this was' ... I meang I don't particularly want to start off by 
going throughq or saying things which I think are 
going ong mainly because I have been through these 
things extremely briefly; probably no more more than 
you have, apart from having typed them out some years 
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I enclose an item for our PCr workshop. It consists of two extracts 
(pp. 6,2,15-6,1 (1) , XI and 8,2,13-8,2,21) from the trans- 
cripts of our previous meeting. It has been suggested that we might 
use them as material for a discussion at some point. So do read 
them through beforehand if You can. 
I know that I have taken a bit of a risk in distributing attributable 
dialogue in this way. But it seemed to take some of the life out to 
remove people Is names.. I trusted in the good spirit of the meeting 
that nobody would be too grieved. 
Itis interesting though to reflect on the difierence between saying 
something momentarily to someone, and having it recorded for scrutiny 
at leisure. 
Best wishes, I 
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ago. But afterwards I might try and explain a bit 
more the perspective I might take, if people would be 
interested in that. (Jonathang transcript, 1-2) 
This introduction was deliberately as nondirective as 
is compatible with it being an introduction at all. Its 
aim was merely to initiate discussion concerning the trans- 
cripts# not to influence its direction. 
Clearly this data is not tnaturalistictg in the sense 
that the participants are engaged in an activity structured 
by the researcher which is not part of their everyday con- 
ference activities. However, through using this artific- 
ially constrained situation it was hoped to elucidate the 
'competence' * of the participants; i. e. - it ioas hoped to 
reveal the sort of readings that participants could make. 
Although further work would of course be needed to show 
when these sorts of readings would be used in practical con- 
texts. 
The transcription material which provided the topic 
for this discussion was taken from another workshop of 
Personal Construct Psychologists, which had taken place 
some 16 months earlier (see pages 77-78). Indeed a num- 
ber of the participants were common to both workshops: 
Dennis, Ian, Jonathang Janthiag Mikeq Neil and Richard. 
Some participantsl howeverg were at the second workshop 
but not at the first: Annel Frankq Chrisq Shirley; and vice 
verse: Alans Carol, Sueg Grant, James. The two extracts 
from this earlier workshop were selected because they con- 
tained what appeared to be fairly self contained disputes 
about specific issues. The analytic interest of this 
exerciseq however, in no way depends on these selection 
criteria being accurate. In the event virtually the ent- 
ire discussion was devoted to one 14 page transcript out 
of the two. Accordingly the discussion of the other trans- 
cript will be ignored here. 
Because of its embedded nature - the transcripts rec- 
ord participants discussing themselves as they appear in 
a transcript - the following exposition becomes convoluted 
in places. To some extent this is unavoidableg but to 
avoid undue confusion I will refer to the precirculated 
transcript as 'the transcript' and the recorded discussion 
of that transcript as 'the discussion'. In addition, par- 
ticipants speaking in the transcript will be given the 
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superscript 1. So. for examplet 'Richard interprets 
Richard 1 as saying XI will mean that in the discussion 
Richard interprets his previously transcribed utterances 
to be saying X. Before going on to the analysis proper 
I will briefly examine the way reading has been dealt 
with in modern literary theory. 
Readinq Resources 
A central theme in the style of discourse analysis 
which has emerged on the Continenty particularly in the 
work of Roland Barthesq is that literary texts should not 
be seen as direct representations or mere causal products 
of some extra-linguistic entity. I intend to suggest that 
this argument has some relevance to the present analysis, 
so I will run the risk of over simplifying some highly 
complex sets of ideas and try to outline it. 
Traditionallyq Barthes argues, both analysts (liter- 
ary critics and sociologists of literature) and lay people 
have wanted to explain the existence and form of discourse 
(texts) by reference to one of three 'sites' or entities 
existing 'beyond' the text: the authorg the world and ide- 
ology. These sitesq or resourcesq are used to produce def- 
initive interpretations of the text and close off possible 
competing interpretations. 
In the first caseq although literary critics have per- 
sistently tried to use the intentions or proposals of 
authors as a way of producing definitive readings of texts, 
the attempt is doomed to failure. This is not merely due 
to the pervasive and incorrigible problem of deciding what 
the authorýs 'real' intentions are. It is due to the pos- 
sibility, inherent in all texts, of reading them in dif- 
ferent ways. To claim that only those ways lauthorised' by 
writer's intentions are acceptable isq Barthes argues, a 
moral or ideological claim; for non authorised readings are 
perpetually available with any text. This is not to say 
that versions of authorts intentions or Psychological makeup 
are not interesting; rather that such versions can have no 
spec_ial legitimating function. They do not 'close off' the 
Possibility of alternative readings. As Barthes puts it: 
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It is not that the Author may not tcome back' in the 
Text, in his textj but he then does so as a 'guest'. 
If he is a novelistt he is inscribed in the novel 
like one of his charactersq figured in the carpet; 
no longer privileged... He becomes, as it were, a 
paper-author: his life is no longer the origin of 
his fictions but a fiction contributing to his work... 
(3) 
This isl of course, fully compatible with Barthes's gen- 
eral enterprise of producing a semiology of reading pract- 
ices to replace the flawed interpretative 'science' of 
criticism which is concerned with the goal of producing 
4 definitive readings of texts 
The argument about the role of ideology is very sim- 
ilar. Barthes rejects the position, which is represented 
in his own early work as well as in other places 
5, that 
readings are determined by ideology. For although ideol- 
ogy may be implicated in the formation of texts it cannot 
determine the way they are read. Take, for instance, 
Barthests classic example of the Paris Match cover he 
sees while visiting the barbers. This shows a young negro 
in French army uniform saluting the French flag. Barthes 
describes what the cover signifies: 
that France is a great Empire, that all her sons, 
without any colour discrimination faithfully serve 
under her flag, and that there is no better answer 
to the detractors of an alleged colonialism than the 
zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called 
oppressors., (6) 
Yet Barthests own reading is a deconstruction of the text; 
it displays the operation of ideological processes and is 
certainly not a passive victim of these processes, In res- 
ponse to problems such as these in his later work Barthes 
argues that ideological processes influence the way texts 
work to construct the worldq but do not prevent alternat- 
ive readings such as his own. Another way of putting this 
is to say that readers are not passive victims of the 
world views expressed in texts but make a much more active 
contribution to the reading process. 
Barthes's argument about the relation between texts 
and 'the world' and the way tthe worldt is used to warrant 
particular readings, is central to his total semiological 
perspective. It is essential to notep however, that he 
is not attempting to solve one of the basic problems of 
Western philosophy; his is not an epistemological argument 
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for anti-realism. Ratherg he is concerned with processes 
of sense making in complex texts and theattemptby liter- 
ary critics to read texts as literal descriptions of a 
(sometimes imaginary) world. The most sustained critique 
of this view is found in his book S/Z where he takes an 
apparently classic realist text by Balzac and attempts to 
elucidate how it makes sense to the reader by splitting 
the story into 561 fragments (Ilexias') and showing how 
7 
each functions in the complete text In particular, 
Barthes undermines the view that the text's sense is der- 
ived through process of description and denotation. In- 
steadq he arguesq the text aquires its meaning through the 
reader bringing to it 5 cultural codes or accounting syst- 
ems which embody an organised corpus of background know- 
ledge concerning narrativeg theme, characterl cultural soc- 
iology and symbolism. The text cannot therefore be seen 
to have a single definitive meaning independently of the 
specific readings made by particulax- readers. 
A simple example may make what Barthes is suggesting 
clearer. The sentence 'Midnight had just sounded from the 
clock of the Elysee-Bourbon' appears right at the begining 
of Balzac's text. Barthes suggests that its significance 
derives not from what it denotes but from what it connotes. 
For readers with the appropriate background knowledge will 
know that the Elysee-Bourbon is in a wealthy neighbourhood 
of Paris (Faubourg Saint-Honore) and furthermore that this 
wealth is held by the nouveaux riches who acquired it through 
speculation and similar means. Thus the literal, denotat- 
ive meaning of this sentence is rather unimportant and could 
be replaced by many different sentences. What is important 
is that this sentence (or any possible replacement) conveys 
through its connotations, the information about wealth 
which is structurally central for making sense of the text. 
So when Barthes writes: 
denotation is not the first meaningg but pretends to 
be so; under this illusion, it is ultimately no more 
than the last of the connotations (the one that seems 
both to e"gtablish and to close the reading) (8) 
he is stressing that the sense of the text is constituted 
through the interpretative systems the reader brings to it 
ands moreover, claiming that this sense is mistakenly seen 
to arise from the text's literal description of the world 
9. 
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Overallq then Barthes attacks the idea that the sense 
of a text is an unproblematic consequence of either the 
intentions of the author# the ideological processes-that 
may have influenced the text's constructiong or of the 
world that the text is taken to represent. In each case 
he changes perspective and treats these ideas as worthy 
of explanation in their own right. In more usual sociol- 
ogical terms, he takes certain resources commonly drawn on 
by literary critics and readers for making readings and 
treats them as interpretative procedures to be analysedg 
10 
as topics for study Thus, although he sees authors' 
intentions, and ideology, as not being grourde for defin- 
itive textual exegesest he nonetheless sees the study of such 
attempts as illuminating; and instead of treating 'realism' 
as a product of acute and literal description he treats it 
as a linguistic effect. The traditional question of how 
accurately a text describes is therefore replaced by a more 
coherent analytic question which asks how the the organis- 




Resources and Repertoires 
If we return now to this chapter's theme of scient- 
ists' approaches to their own discourse, we can see the 
relevance of Barthes's argument. It suggests the pertin- 
ence of the following questions: do scientists draw on 
certain resources to achieve and sanction readings? And 
ii they do what might these resources be? In other words, 
what are the similarities between the reading practices of 
scientists and the reading practices which Bathes ident- 
ifies as typical of traditional literary critics. To make 
these questions even more specific I will concentrate on 
the way readings are produced by using the 'empiricist' 
and 'contingent' repertoires. 
In chapters 3,4 and 51 have examined the way these 
accounting systems or Iregisterst 
12 
are used for character- 
ising actions and beliefs. In chapter 31 showed the way 
in which a social psychologist is able to characterise his 
applied work either in terms of a standard empiricist model 
of theory application or in a way which stresses more con- 
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tingent processes. In chapter 5 the ways scientists' 
characterised the role of criteria in theory choice were 
examined. It was found that they were more likely to treat 
criteria as determinate and clear-cut when describing their 
own theory choices; but when describing those of their 
competitors they would more often treat criteria as soc- 
ially contingent and open to strategic manipulation. Fur- 
thermore, the use of these systems of accounting for action 
and belief has been extensively documented in the work of 
13 Gilbert and Mulkay These repertoires have been desc- 
ribed in detail in chapter 3 (pages 92-93). Briefly, the 
empiricist repertoire corresponds roubhly to traditional 
conceptions of scientific rationality. Data are seen as 
arriVed at by way of standardised impersonal routines and 
are taken to provide a clear-cut criterion for selecting 
theories. The contingent repertoire recognises the import- 
ance of a variety of 'social' influences and takes facts 
to be dependent on fallible interpretative procedures. 
What has not so far been examined is the way these 
accounting systems are utilised by scientists for dealing 
directly with discourse. Such utilisation is implied in 
some of the studies that have examined the use of these 
systems; for scientists do not have unrestricted and per- 
sistent access to each otherts lives and workplaces, and 
even if they did their understanding would be textually 
mediated. Thus scientific texts will inevitably play a sig- 
nificant role. Yet for the most part scientists' accounts 
of actions and beliefs take the form of (more or less) 
direct descriptions of these things. They seldom make 
reference to any textual mediation in arriving at such 
descriptions. Textual sources which may have played a 
part in the construction of these accounts are rarely dis- 
played in the account itself. By analysing transcripts in 
which participants are discussing in detail certain discur- 
sive materials it is hoped that some light may be thrown 
on the interpretative procedures used to construct readings. 
In the examples that follow the sorts of stylistic 
differences between repertoires documented by Gilbert and 
Mulkay are unlikely to become apparent. For instance they 
show a specifically impersonal form of reportage of empir- 
icist actions to be common in scientific research papers 
14. 
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The differences I will be examining are predominantly 
lexical, and centre on the alternative ways that the trans- 
cript can be seen as revealing the actions and beliefs of 
the conference participants. Psychologists at the work- 
shop may read a particular section of transcript as rev- 
ealing actions which are, for instance, concerned with 
the disinterested development of theory. It is in this 
sense that I will speak of 'empiricist readings'. Alter- 
natively a section of transcript may be seen to embody 
actions which are orientated towards more personal, 'int- 
erested' goals rather than neutral scientific ones. Thus 
it is not the form of the reading itself which is cont- 
ingent or empiricistg but the content of its interpret- 
8tiDn of the transcript. The text is read either as 
empiricist or as contingent. 
Now it is clear that not all accounts describing the 
text in personal or social terms can be called contingent, 
as in certain situations personal or social processes may 
be quite separate from any issues of scientific relevance. 
For instanceg if thereisa pause in the discussion for an 
argument about seating positions this might be totally sep- 
arate from scientific questions of any kind and should not 
therefore be classed as contingent. Yet perhaps such an 
argument was a struggle for psychological supremacy which 
would influence the outcome of the next hour's theoretical 
debate. How would the analyst decide? As a resolution of 
this difficulty I have chosen to examine accounts in which 
participants characterise the same section of transcript 
in contrasting ways, and in particular where some give an 
empiricist reading and otheisa contingent reading. 1n 
this chapterg therefore, I will use the term contingent 
in the restricted sense of those accounts which recharact- 
erise empiricist versions of actions and beliefs using 
terminology from the contingent repertoire. 
Participants' Readinqs 
To start with I will examine a relatively straighfor- 
ward empiricist reading of part of the Precirculated trans- 
cript. In it the speaker is responding to two earlier 
speakers who have identified certain themes in the trans- 
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cript. One of these themes concerns the nature of the pro- 
cesses actually occurring in the group, andthe other con- 
cerns the ideal group which would be implied by Construct 
Theory (a 'Kellian group'). The speaker, Mikeg takes 
the previous speaker to be seeing these things as equiv- 
alentp and disagrees with this equation. 
I Mike. (1)Um. I think that these two things are dif- 
f erent and they are playing out against each other. 
(2)1 mean we are using the group to think about the 
nature of a Kelly groupq and then we are Elaughs3 
using the nature of a Kelly group to think about how 
the group is operating. (3)1 mean they are, I thought 
it was working -I mean, reading it - it works quite 
nicely. (4)We are both using the direct shared exp- 
erience of everybody who has been there and yet trying 
to produce a more generalised view of whatp what 
Kelly thinking would do to group dynamics. 
(Discussion, 8-9) 
In sentence 1 Mike formulates the two themes - the pro- 
cesses occurring in the group and the nature of a Kellian 
group - as separate and suggests that there is a tension 
between them. This tension, however, is positive: 'it 
works quite nicely' (3). Each is being used to throw 
light on the other: the participants' 'shared experience' 
of the group is being used as a resource for explicating 
the nature of a Kellian group and their theoretical under- 
standing of what a Kellian group would be like is used to 
elucidate their specific group interaction (2 and 4). In 
this extract, therefore, the speaker treats the transcript 
as revealing what is going on - the acts and actions - in 
the previous workshop. Three particular classes of activ- 
ities are identified: A) 'Using' - the actual group, a hyp- 
othetical notion of a group; 8) 'Thinking' - about the nat- 
ure of a Kellian group, about the activities of the partic- 
ular group; C) 'Producing' -a more generalised idea of the 
application of construct theory to group dynamics. In 
addition the transcript is described in more general terms 
as showing the activities in A and 8 successfully 'playing 
out against each other' (1). Overall, then, this speaker 
distinguishes between the theme concerning social processes 
occurring in the group and the theme concerning the content 
of the group's discussions and he sees a successful and 
reflexive interaction to be taking place between them. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that at the 
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point where the speaker appears to be making a direct 
evaluation of the group's success he corrects himself and 
emphasises that his understanding is derived from reading 
the transcript (3). In a preliminary way this speaker 
formulates a 'gap' between the transcript and the actual 
actions of participants. He thereby starts to raise the 
possibility that the actual , 
actions might be other than 
they appear from the transcript, and in so doing indicates 
the fallibility of his interpretation. In later extracts 
we will see this point raised in a more explicit fashion. 
In the next passage the interpretation of the trans- 
cript is more complex*. Again the speaker characterises 
the actions which the transcript reveals happening 
at the previous workshop. This time, however, two dif- 
ferent versions of these actions are formulated. The 
transcript is described as explicitly saying one thing 
which hides a more significant implicit message. 
2 Dennis. (1)Yesq I meang reading it again I got a 
sense that some of the tension in it is to do withg 
er, Claughs] to do with the way in a sense you can 
cheat slightly and we do. (2)That is you can, you 
can be actually making a remark about the behaviour 
ofother people in the groupq in the sense of not 
wanting itj or regretting its being thereq but you 
can frame that into saying that an ideal Kellian 
group would be like this. (3)And the unsaid part is: 
'but not like what you've been'. (4)And a couple of 
times youg and I think I, and I don't know if anyone 
else as well, referred to other groups we had been 
in. (5)Er, and that was quite interestingg. because 
it sort of again it [Mike laughs] was said 'isn't it 
interestin :I have been in a group that works like 
this'. (6ýBut you could see behind that the possibil. 
ity of saying: land whyhavenltyou buggers! ' 
Mike. (7)[1aughs) Exactlyp yes. 
Dennis. (B)I mean in my group I specifically said 
that we were very good at rapidly throwing in exper- 
iments, little formalisations, which everybody picked 
up and role'd through; unlike say Mike Davies who opts 
out. (9)[Mike laughs] (Discussiong 9-10) 
The first speaker in this passage$ Dennisp starts by 
alluding to the 'tension' mentioned by the previous speaker 
(extract 1). However, in this case tension is given a 
rather different meaning. The previous speaker treats ten- 
sion as a creative product of the theoretical analysis and 
the group process being used to illuminate each other. In 
contrast, Dennis treats tension as a consequence of the 
fact that participants can and do 'cheat slightly' (1). 
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This cheating consists of using points which appear to be 
to do with the nature of Kellian groups to make points 
which are actually critical comments on the behaviour of 
other group members (2). These implicit points are char- 
acterised as a sort of hidden speechg or subtext. Thus a 
comment that 'an ideal Kellian group would be such and such' 
is depicted as conveying the implicit message: tbut not 
like what you've jusýt been' (3). In all Dennis gives three 
different examples to illustrate this dichotomy between 
what is actually said and what is apparently said (sent- 
ences 2 and 3,5 and 6. and 8). In each case, the osten- 
sive meaning is given along with a translation which prov- 
ides the real meaning. 
This technique is similar to that of fpreformulation' 
discussed in the previous chapter (page 191). In this case 
what is preformulated is an incorrect reading of the text. 
Demýformulates two versions of the transcript being discus- 
sed. One is what it appears to say and the other is what 
it really says. The real message of the speech is seen as 
implicit. Yet it is clearly thought to be understood by 
at least some of the other participants - Dennis is not 
describing a solipsistic joke on his part. For conven- 
ience I will refer to this discursive technique as the R/A 
(reality/appearance) device. 
Towards the end of the extract Mikeg the speaker in 
extract 1, expresses support for Dennis's claims (7). Yet9 
although this support might be taken to imply that his 
points and Dents are the same, as I have noted the two 
accounts are differently organised. Mike suggests that the 
participants constructively use an understanding of the 
actual group processes and the notion of an ideal Kellian 
group to illuminate each other and promote theory develop- 
ment. That is, he interprets the text as a document of 
empiricist actions. Dennisq in contrast, implies that what 
appear-to be instances where the theoretical discussion of 
ideal groups is used to throw light on the actual group's 
interaction, and vice versel are in fact veiled contribut- 
ions to the actual group's interaction. Put another way, 
he claims that what appear to be dispassionate comments on 
the interaction are actually partisan and critical contrib- 
utions to the interaction itself. It is not merely claimed 
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that one theme is used as a way of making points relev- 
ant to the other; Dennis's point is that one theme is 
being used to make a contribution to the Processes which 
are the topic of the other theme. He interprets the text 
as revealing contingent actions: certain participants in 




points of personal dispute in the form of disinterested 
theoretical comment. In this way Denrýbformulates two po , S_ 
sible readings: an empiricist reading of wbat the text 
appears to say and a contingent reading which reveals what 
it really says. 
As I have noted the main aim of this chapter is to 
elucidate the organi5atiod of certain kinds of readings. 
The details of the relationship between the readings and 
the transcript which is read are of only secondary concern. 
Nevertheless, it is important to show (however unlikely it 
might be) that participants are not simply reproducing the 
transcript in some mechanical fashion; i. e. that 'reading' 
as a constructive and active phenomenon is a viable topic 
for analysis. I will thus examine the section of transcript 
on which Dennis's reading is based. In extract 2 he does 
not explicate all the exact parts of the transcript to which 
he is referring. Neverthelessp it is clear that the fol- 
lowing passage is one of them. 
3 Dennis'. (1)I have worked regularly in a group that 
meets fortnightlyp and one thing[] I have noticed is 
that we are developing and getting very adept at - and 
it is to do with, I thinkl essentially with the not- 
ion of Reople's experiments - is quite quickly as it 
were one or other will think-of a form for a quick exp- 
erimentg you know. (2)And it can be thrown in, and 
there almost now seems to be an agreement that you 
never resist a for T you know, even if that doesn't 
particularly [Mike Ump umv um. 3 attract you; that 
is not an issue. 
Mike'. (3)1 think that is interestingg because 1 
think the group made a decision not to go along with that form. (4)1 mean, I consciously h2d decided I 
was not going to name my forml [Dennis . Yes. ) yest- 
erday evening [laughsj. 
1 
(Transcript, 223-224) 
In sentences 1 and 2 Dennis characterises some of the 
features of a group he regularly attends. This appears to 
be the reference of sentence 4, extract 2. He particularly 
emphasises that group members willingly took part in any 
interpersonal experiments suggested by other members, even 
if they were not particularly interested in them (2). In 
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his reply, Mike' suggests that their present group decided 
not to act along those lines 
1 
(3). Andq referring back to 
an 'experiment' which Dennis had suggestedg but which had 
not been completed, Mike' notes that he had decided that 
he was not going to take part (4). 
It seems clear, thereforeq that Mike' treats Dennis's' 
description of the way 'experiments' are accepted in his 
group as related to a particular instance in which the pre- 
sent group decided not to take part in an experiment. Yet 
there is nothing in Mike's' reply which forces us to read 
it as a response to implicit criticism rather than merely 
a further explication of the differences between the pres- 
ent group and the one Dennis 
1 takes part in; that isp there 
is no obvious feature of the transcript which suggests that 
Mike's 1 point is any more than a contribution to the theme 
of what group processes axe actually occurring. Mike' 
draws on an apparently neutral descriptive terminology 
without recourse to terms which explicitly display crit- 
icism, apology or anger. Thus we cannot use Mike's reply 
to sanction Dennis's interpretation of his own utterance 
(extract 2). 
It is of course possible that Dennis uses the fact 
that a dispute is not displayed in Mike's 
1 
reply as a ground 
for reading the personal/critical force of his point as 
implicit rahter than explicit. In this case Dennists imp- 
utation of implicit force to his utterance could be seen 
as an accounting deviceg which deals with the troubling 
fact that Mike's 
1 
response does not appear to treat 
Dennists 1 point in a way appropriate to the gloss which 
Dennis wishes to give it. Yet, as Dennis himself makes 
plain, his own speech (extract 3) also appears neutral and 
disinterested. 
h 
Dennis is therefore reading as contingent 
a speech which/accepts appears to be empiricist and, more- 
overp which a subsequent speaker appears to take as empir- 
icist. Furthermore, although Mike appears to express agree- 
ment with Dennis about his reading (extract 29 sentence 7) 
his own reading (extract 1) appears to be totally empiric- 
ist: it makes no reference to conflicts of interest or int- 
erpersonal dispute. The interaction is depicted by Mike 
as concerned with elucidating the nature of a Kellian group 
and the way their own group is operating. 
- 238 - 
It is clear, therefore, that neither Mikels nor 
Dennis's readings can be considered as straightforuard, 
literal descriptions of a reality unproblematically rev- 
ealed by the transcript. The transcript appears suscept- 
ible to the production of alternative versions of the act- 
ions and beliefs which it embodies in just the same way as 
other aspects of scientists' social reality. 
Let us now examine another reading which uses the R/A 
device. Again both contingdnt and empiricist versions of 
the actions revealed by the text are formulated. In this 
caseq however, the R/A device is used to display en empir- 
icist reality behind a contingent appearance; i. e. the 
inverse of the previous example. Ian suggests that one of 
his points appears to be a self-interested contribution to 
the psychological processes going on in the group. Yet, he 
claimsp it is really concerned with questions of a theoret- 
ical nature. 
4 Jonathan. (J)So you think that -I meang to try and 
and keep it to this - do you think that's what is 
going on on the bottom of [page] four B? 
Ian 
,. 
(2)1 think there's a triple sort of complication 
there. (3)1 mean I look at myself saying that there 
and think, well I just, I chose a very silly example. 
(4)You know, what I was trying to do was to say some- 
thing about theory and about what construct theory has 
to say about groups. (5)And then chose as an example 
something from the here and now, which is of course 
bound to end up in a s? iral of infinite complication. T-67-And I think Richard is quite right to say keep it 
away from that. (7)1 meang one should, one should 
choose examples, I mean if you choose an example from 
the here and now it obviously becomes a complicating 
factor, doesn't it. 
Jonathan. (B)So you read Richard' there as saying Ike9p-it away from the there and now'? 
Ian. (9)Well I was certainly not wanting to got into the here and now. (10)I was wanting to got some ideas 
about how construct theory in groupst you knowl at at 
at a theoretical level. (11)I chose an example from the here and now becauseq you knowq you think loh well, it's nice and clear and everyone can see it'. (12) [laughs] But, of course, everybody can't see itj bec- 
ause it is part of the very engine that is going on 
at that very moment ... (13) ... it's clear isn't itj it's nice, you see what four, my first bit on four B is basically talking 
at the level of theory. 1(14)OK. (15)And in line four I take me aTd James as an example. (16)OK. (17)Thcn Richard takes that as being not interestingg but thatq I wasn't particularly interested in it; 
only as an example. (18)1 wasn't interested in it as 
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a piece of interpersonal business to be sorted out. 
(19)So I think you were right to do that. (20)And 
then I think I go along-with what Richardl is saying 
in practiceg because on five AI am actually contin- 
uing to talk theory. (21)And not interested in get- 
ting into the examples either. (22)1 think that that 
statement there of mine is what I was trying to say 
in a nutshell: thatq you knowq that goes back to an 
earlier distinction and that is the distinction bet- 
ween 'up there' and 'right here'. (23)And what I am 
trying to say about groups is that it is a very conc- 
rete business. (24)That the constructs are expressed 
absolutely concretelyq in people. (25)And that to try 
and make out that it is some kind of floating thing up 
in the ceiling is, ýs um, something I wanted to dis- 
agree with at the time. (26)Does that clarify it? 
(Discussion, 12-14) 
In his use of the R/A device Ian's point is the in- 
verse of Dennis's (extract 2). It suggests that one of his 
statements which-has been read as, and appears to be, con- 
tingent is really empiricist. Ian brings out this contrast 
most strongly in lines 13 to 21. He identifies his speech 
in the transcript Omy first bit on four BI) and says that 
it is 'basically' concerned with theory (13). Furthermorel 
he characterises his point about the dispute between him- 
self and another participant, James', as an 'example' of 
his theoretical point; he is not interested in it for 
its own sake (15). Ian then turns his attention to the 
response to his points from Richard 
1* He chaýacterises 
Richard 1 as reading them as 'not interesting' (17) because 
they are a 'piece of interpersonal business' (18) which has 
to be sorted out. Yet he claims that he too is not inter- 
ested in them for this reason (17-18); he is only inter- 
ested in them 'as an example' which illustrates his the- 
oretical point. And he goes on to give a gloss which dep- 
icts a particular piece of speech as summarising the whole 
'in a nutshell' (22-26). 
Overallq then, Mike contrasts what he sees as 
1 
Richard's misreading with his own proper understanding of 
the transcript. It is interesting to note, howeverl that 
he goes to some lengths to make Richard's 
I 
misreading 
accountable. He points out a number of reasons why 
Richard I should (mis)read his points as an attempt to 
contribute to the 'interpersonal business' rather than as 
a contribution to the theoretical discussion. For inst- 
ance says that he was 'silly' to choose an example from the 
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here and now to illustrate a theoretical pointo because 
it was 'bound to end up in a spiral of infinite complic- 
ation' (4-5). And he says that Richard' is 'quite right' 
in saying that they should not get involved in that (ra); 
a claim he reiterates in sentence 19. Although he does 
not totally endorse Richard's' reading - which he sees as 
encouraging him not to use examples from the processes in 
the present group - he depicts it as both understandable 
and having a positive effect. Ian identifies Richard's 
1 
misreading as one which could be made by any reader not in 
possession of specialised knowledge or prepared for the 
degree of reflexivity which Ian 
1 has introduced. 
Richard is present during this discussion of the 
transcript and the possibility of contesting Ian's inter- 
pretation is therefore open to him. It is thus possible 
that Ian means this emphasis on the accountability of 
Richard's 1 reading to dissuade him from contesting his int- 
erpretation of the reading. For if Richard does contest 
it this will involve questioning the very positive attrib- 
utions that Ian makes. (And indeed, Richard does not 
question the interpretation prof erred - although it is not 
possible to say how far this was due to the form of Ian's 
account). 
As beforeq I will examine the section of transcript 
which is being discussed. In this case it is possible to 
clearly pick out the passage being referred to. 
1 5 Richard (1)I think I saw Cthis group] in the terms 
in which I have seen other groupsq and would want to 
see other groups in the future which i's A-smply as 
being a set of constructs. (2; OK. (3)And these con- 
structs are not in any simple wa the constructs that 
are held by each individual. (4ýThey are a set of 
constructs that are, as it wereq pushed up into the 
air -I mean I think of it ver physically by people 
talking to one another... 
MI 
mean the this is MY 
perspectiveg admittedly - it's success as a Kellian 
group in the way in which I would want to see it is that people do take away that set of constructs and identify itq for the sake of economy, or sort of cog- 
nitive processing and all the rest of it, as the set 
of constructs that were thrown up by the construings 
of particular people in a particular place in a part- icular time. 
(6)Yeah, that's the sort of thing; I mean the typical sort of thing that you get in human behaviourg 
or whatever you want to call it, is that in different 
contexts people will do different things. (7)Nowp it 
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mi; ht be that me and you, James argue about some- 
thing - OK - and you are defending so and so and I am 
attacking it. (B)It might be that next week somebody 
is attacking your position and I will comy in and I 
will really defend your position. [James . Um. D (9) You knowt because I have taken away the entire set of 
alternatives that has been generated by this group 
and I then use it. (10)And I have become bigger as a 
result of being with this group. 
1 Richard (11)I am not interested - sorry, just to 
come back in an e3ocentric way - that does not fit 
what I said. (12 1 am not terribly interested in what 
happens to your or what is happening to you and that's 
why I am just going back to where we 1 started 
in this 
bit of the discussion; you and James is really not 
terribly interesting. 
Ian'. (13)Yesl well, I was just trying to illustrate 
what you are saying. 
1 Richard (14)Well it doesn't illustrate what I am 
trying to say from the point of view of a Kellian 
group* [Ian . Um. 
3 (15)Because the set of const- 
ructs that constitutes a Kellian group for me... 
is at a totally different level from what is happening 
between the two of you. (16)That's why I think it 
is very unprofitable to start talking about a Kellian 
group in terms of what's happening between two people# 
because one very quickly gets locked into that way of 
seeing the group. 
Ian'. (17)1 don't see how you can separate them; you 
are talking about group constructs, or whatever you 
call themg as being up there in the air, you literally 
went like that fgestures] and I don't think they are 
up there; I think they are between us; I think they 
are very concrete; they are acts. 
Richard'. (18)Yes, but they are not between you and 
James'L. 
11. (19)That was just an example. 
T-T-ranscript, 227-228) 
At the start of this extract Richard 
1 
gives an account 
of the way he would characterise the construct workshop 
from the perspective of personal construct theory (1-4). 
Ian 1 responds positively to this and suggests that it is 
a 'typical$ feature of 'human behaviour' (6), He then goes 
on to present his interaction with James 
19 
another partic- 
ipant, as an example of what Richard 
1 is saying (7-10). 
Furthermore, by using such constructions as 'it might be' 
(7 and 8, emphasis added) Ian 
1 
seems to depict this example 
as hypothetical. 
Richardl responds to Ian' by claiming that this exam- 
ple does not fit what he himself said (11). As we SOW 
above, when discussing the transcript Ian reads Richard 
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as saying he is 'not interested' in the example because it 
was from the 'here and now'. This interpretation of 
Richard's 1 reading takes it to be primarily concerned 
with contingent matters of dispute peculiar to the group. 
However, although emphasising sentences 11 and 12t it 
ignores sentence 14, where Richard 
1 denies that Ian's 1 
example illustrates the theoretical point he is developingg 
and sentence 16 where Richard 
1 
seems to single out the 
form of the exampleg rather than its specific content, as 
the thing with which he disagrees. However, at the time 
Ian' seems to resppnd both in the way he does in the dis- 
cussion (taking Richardl to be m*sreading his point) and 
by taking Richardl to disagreae6Aýiut correctly read) his 
point. 
In Ian's 1 first response to Richard' (13) he stresses 
that his point was just meant as an illustration of what 
Richardl has been saying. It thus seems to be taking 
Richard' to interpret his point in contingent termsq as a 
contribution to group processesl and attempts to show this 
reading to be incorrect. Howeverg Ian's' second response 
to Richard' (17) is very different. It argues for theor- 
etical reasons against Richard's 
1 theoretical claim that 
it is unprofitable to try to understand a Kellian group 
in terms of processes occurring in dyads. In doing 509 
Ian' can be seen to be treating Richard 
1 
as accepting that 
Ian's 1 point is actually a contribution to theoretical 
discussion. For Richardl is no longer soon to be mistaken 
over what kind of point Ian 
1 is making; rather it is a the- 
oretical point which Ian 
1 
sees as dividing them. Further- 
moreq these two responses to Richard's' points seem to 
conflict with one another in two distinct ways. Firstlyl 
as we have noted, they presuppose different interpret- 
ations of Richard's 
1 
readings. Secondlyq while one speech 
claims only to be an illustration of what Richard 
1 is 
saying the other expresses disaqreement with what he is 
saying. So what first appears as support and elaboration 
is later changed to criticism and dissent. As with the 
last example, theng there is no straightforward analysts' 
reading of the transcript which will allow an evaluation 
of the correctness of different Participants' readings. 
Let me summarise the analysis up to now. So far in 
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this section I have documented three rather different ways 
of reading or characterising this transcribed discussion. 
The first depicts the transcript in purely empiricist terms. 
This is seen in extract 1 where the speaker characterises 
the discussion as a constructive interchange concerning two 
basic themes: the present group's interaction; the nature 
of a hypothetical Kellian group. Although the social psy- 
chological processes occurring in the group might appear 
to be a more contingent than empiricist matter, the speaker 
characterises them as a topic for discussion; and as such 
they are not depicted as influencing the discussion in any 
way. Rather they are depicted as if they were an avail- 
able and rich source of data which is open to disinterested 
analysis. This empiricist reading thus takes the group 
processes as a topic for discussion but does not indicate 
that they should have any relevant influences on the course 
of the discussion. The topic of the group processes at 
work is seen as distinct from the effects or functions of 
such processes. The work of the discussion is treated as 
entirely concerned with evaluating the coherence of 
Kellian theory and checking its adequacy for dealing with 
a particular form of social interaction. 
The second way of reading the transcript (extract 2) 
also draws on this notion that the discussion concerns two 
separate themes. However, this time the transcript is read 
as a document of a contingent reality. The speaker ident- 
ifies what appear to be comments an the question of what 
a Kellian group should be like but which are really cont- 
ributions to the group processes whose discussion constit- 
utes the other theme; i. e. instead of being neutral and 
disinterested comments on the theoretical point, they are 
seen as a consequence of and a contribution to the contin- 
gent interaction occurring in the group. 
This reading strategy is more complicated than the 
first. It makes use of the R/A device. That isl it does 
not merely identify the text as constituting a certain kind 
of discourse; it also explicitly formulates an alternative 
reading which is mistaken. It treats the text as if its 
real nature is concealed: the participants who produce it 
are 'cheating' by making points in such a way that their 
actual meaning is hidden. In extract 2 the speaker thus 
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formulates the 
, 
appearance of the text9 which is neutral 
and innocentg but contrasts this with the real nature of 
the text, thereby subverting the appearance of innocence 
and displaying the interpersonal business whichq he sug- 
gests, is in fact being conducted. 
This strategy is related to the accounting technique 
of 'preformulationlg used for dealing with conflicting 
views9 which I outlined in chapter six. I noted that 
instead of speakers merely formulating their own individual 
position they may also formulate the conflicting position 
of their (real or potential) competitors. The conflicting 
position can then be dealt with in two ways. one way is to 
give straightforwamdcriticisms on contingent grounds: the 
experiment is flawed; there is a contradiction in the the- 
ory. Another is to give an explanation of why that speaker 
holds such views. That is they can be rationally critic- 
ised or causally explainedg respectively. In formulating 
their own version of opponents' views they can be 'pro- 
paredt for rejection by emphasising certain features and 
ignoring others. In the case of extract 2 the apparent 
version is explained as an artful disguise to allow part- 
isan interpersonal business to appear as if it is a thoor- 
etical pointg which is (implicitly) more acceptable in 
this context. 
The third way of reading the transcript (extract 4) 
has a similar structure to the second. Again it uses the 
R/A device. An apparentg although mistaken, reading is 
formulated; and thisis contrasted with the reading of the 
transcript which properly reveals the nature of the part- 
icipantst interaction. In this casep however, the apparent 
reading takes the discourse to be orientated towards con- 
tingent goals while the discourse is seen to actually be emo- 
iricist. The apparent reading which is formulated in this 
extract is that of a specific participant at the workshopq 
rather than the unspecified reader of extract 2. Neverthe- 
less, it is explained as an accountable misreading which 
might have been made by any participant; it is not identif- 
ied merely with the particular interests of Richardll the 
specified (mis)reader. 
From this analytic section, then, it is possible to 
document three provisional conclusions. Firstly that, in 
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some cases at least, scientists may interpret discourse 
in terms of the kind of empiricist and contingent inter- 
pretative repertoires that I have discussed in other places 
in this esis. They may thus account for talk in similar 
6 AW- /-Z/91119 
ways j they account for action and belief. Secondly, it 
is possible to read this discourse in a number of rather 
different ways. In the extracts above there are examples 
of both the same scientists and different scientists giving 
alternative and contradictory readings of the same piece 
of talk. Howeverg as yet I have made no detailed attempt 
to explicate the function of these different readings9 
although I will make some suggestions in this direction 
later in the chapter. Thirdly, I have outlined the struct- 
ure of a certain sort of deconstructive reading made by 
participants by use of the R/A device. In this reading 
they formulate as apparently literal a certain section of 
talk and then undermine this appearance of unproblematic 
reference with some further account oi explanation. It is 
then contrasted with a reading which puports to state the 
literal meaning of the talk. In the cases I have examinedq 
this sort of accounting is used to depict apparently cont- 
ingent talk as empiricist and vice verse. Clearly if such 
a reading strategy is commonly available to scientists then 
it allows considerable interpretative flexibility in the 
way participants' construct versions of their social worlds. 
Let me now return to specific cases and examine this ques- 
tion in more detail. 
In the following extract from the discussion we will 
see two further uses of the R/A device in the context of 
textual readings. The participants are discussing the 
meaning of a certain part of the transcriptg and in par- 
ticular of a statement by Caroý (who is not present for the 
discussion). 
6 Niel. (1)Why did Carol' say 'but I don't like being 
rl- rejected like that'? 
Ian. (2)1 dontt know. (3)It's a very important bitl 'I- I isn t it. (4)1 can't remember. 
Dennis. (5)Again I think that there is a/ [Mike cuts 
Dennis off 
Mike. (6)It effectively shuts Carol' up for about a 
page and a half. ElaughsD 
Shirley. (7)Well, Carollsl remarkably quiet through 
the whole thing when you look, really. (B)She comes 
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in occasionally, here and there, doesn't she. 
Frank. (9)Isn't it this reference about leadershipq 
that that refers to there? (11)I would infer that, 
not knowiny ýhat went on, just from the text, that in 
fact Carol is reacting to Ian'sl previous statement 
that he EMikel. Right. 3 simply wants to describe, 
wants to describe what ,s going on as a bid for leader- 
ship of the group. (12)And she responds by saying 
foh, that hurt'. 11 don't like being rejected like 
that'. (13)And otherpeople join in by saying 'we 
don't like it, either'. (14)And, er, you say 'I 
don't like role theory'. (15)Thatts what it looks 
like. (16)It may not be that. 
Mike, (17)But II think in effect Carol' loses at 
that point. (1811 mean, a bit anyway, whatljýver the 
decision wasq it took the di-rection of the next page 
and a half rather than the direction which she wanted 
it to go. 
Ian. (20)Can you say all that again Frank. (21)1 
wasn't at the right place. 
Frank 
,. 
(22)Um, I think that there was 
reaction against the way of describing 
esses which you offered in the previou 
which you tend to describe it as a bid 
ship. (23)And it looks like reaction 
(24)And it is not just Carolf, it is a 
a general 
group proc- 




Ian. (25)And where's the bid for leadership? Three A? 
Frank, (27)Ers four A. 
Shirley. (28)Just at the last few lines of Iani. 
Mike. (29)Towards your, towards the end of your... 
Ian. (30)1 got it, yes. 
Mike. (31)You see, but I think also that whilst 
everybody is sayingInolthere, the actual understanding 
is a recognition that probably that was going on: 
let's not acknowledge it, let's acknowledge it but not 
sa it. (32)So there is a sort of 'let's case it Ever that bump'. (33)1 mean the fact that it is so 
universal is, wasn't a rejection of itl it was an 
acknowledgement of it with Claughs3 'lot's not play 
that, play that through again'. 
Jonathan. (34)1,1 mean, what's the 'like that' 
referring to, then, in Carol'sl speech? (35)What is 
the specific 'this' for rejection? 
Richard. (36)1 had assumed it was being talked about 
in role terms, rather than the person. (37)1 mean, 
having one's discussion reduced to role play. 
Mike. (36)But I think that also hides the fact that 
there was an agenda negotiation going on there. (39) 
And that she's lost the agenda negotiation, as well as 
having it lost in terms of having it discussed in role 
terms. (40)1 mean it is/ Crieil interruptsD 
N eil. (41)1 mean, she does bring up the aganda. 
Mike. (42)She brings it up later, ENell. Yes. ] Yes. 
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(43)But my feeling was that there was a negotiation 
about which direction the thing was going to go, 
(44)And I can't put my finger on it, but Caroll is 
trying to make it go in one direction [Neil. AhhJ 
and that whilst this thing about role is put in those 
terms she in fact loses the agenda argument, or dis- 
cussion. (Discussion, 28-30) 
At the very start of the extract Neil asks why Carol 
1 
made the statement 'I don't like being rejected like that' 
(1). Ian responds to this question by noting that it is 
'very important' (3), but he is unable to answer it (2)*, 
There is an interesting difference between the two grounds 
that Ian offers for his inability. At first he simply 
professes lack of knowledge (2). Yet, almost immediately 
after this, he claims that the problem is in his retrieving 
the knowledgeg that he 'can't remember' (4). The dif- 
ference between Ian's two claims is illustrated by the 
acceptability of sentences such as tI know, but I can't 
remember'. Not remembering implies knowledgeg not lack of 
knowledge. Ian's two formulationsg then, can be seen as 
implying two different models of retrieving what 'really 
went ont or what the participants' actions actually were, 
One suggests that they can be recovered from the text9 
while the other suggests that such information may be 
exhumed through a feat of memory. This sort of distinct- 
ion operates in several places in extract 5, In this case 
the formulation in terms of remembering seems to suggest 
that Neil's query could be answered simply through memories 
of the earlier conference and without relying on the trans- 
cript, although Ian is not able to provide an answer at 
this point. 
Mike follows Ian's point by drawing attention to the 
consequences of the interaction (6). He notes that 
Carol I makes no more contributions in the next page and a 
half of transcript and explains this as zL result of the 
interaction tshutting Carol 1 up'; i. e. he depicts her sil- 
ence as a relevant and noticeable feature of the transcript 
rather than a 'normal' pause between conversational turns. 
Mike's speech appears to be intended to endorse Ian's 
point about the importance of the interaction being dis- 
cussed. It shows the speech to be important by making 
explicit its effect of 'shutting Caroll up'. In making 
this interpretation Mike makes no explicit claim to any 
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special knowledge that might have come from his attend- 
ence at the previous conference. Indeedq his categoris- 
ation of the time in which Carol 
1 is quiet in terms of 
'pages' suggests that he is drawing closely on the org- 
anisation of the transcript. 
In sentences 1 to 6, theng three participants who 
were at the original conference (Neil, Ian and Mike) stress 
the importance of a particular section of interaction. Yet 
at this point they do-'not interpret it or provýde any spec- 
ific account for it. As we sawt Ian raises the possibility 
of remembering what went on, but none of these participants 
appear to use special knowledge of this kind. 
Two turns now follow from people who were not partic- 
ipants at the earlier conference: Shirley and Frank. 
Shirleyts point is a response to Mike, and she seems to 
imply that what he identifies as the interactionally Uec- 
ial absence of Carolts 
1 
contributions is in fact normal 
for the whole transcript (7). Howeverg this is not 
clearly a contradiction of Mike's point - indeed# it can 
be read as endorsing it. For she depicts the frequency 
of Carol'J silences as 'remarkable' throughout the extracto 
This does not contradict the noteworthiness of the phen- 
omenon that Mike identifies (Carol' being 'shut up') but 
rather suggests that the phenomenon may be commonplace in 
the transcript. While Shirley does not propose any. spec- 
ific interpretation of the interactiong being content to 
elaborate an the issue of Carol's 
I 
silencep Frank attempts 
a detailed gloss on the piece of. transcript being discussed. 
There are a number of interesting features of Frank's 
gloss. In the first placeg as I have notedg Frank did not 
participate in the original conference. Yet here he is the 
first to give an account of some interaction which went 
on there. That he does this shows that participation in 
the original conference is not a necessary condition for 
interpreting the transcript. Dr. put another way, that 
these participants do not seem to think it is necessary to 
witness 'what went on' (including the non-verbal communic- 
ation, seating arrangements and so on) or experience it 
(the theat' of the dispute, the taffinitiest between part- 
iciPants) in order to contribute; Nevertheless, Frank's 
point does formulate a distinction between what appears 
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from the text to be going on and what is really going on, 
In other wordsq we can see Frank applying the R/A device 
to this distinction. In this case instead of the R and 
A categories being 'contingent' and 'empiricist' they are 
'the text' and what-is 'really' going on. Thus-in sent- 
ence 11 Frank notes that his interpretation is inferred 
'Just from the textt and that he does not 'know what went 
on'. Likewiseq in sentences 15 and 16 he contrasts his 
interpretation of the interaction with what the interaction 
actually is. In formulating his reading as an appearance 
which may or may not correspond to the reality of events 
Frank should not be seen as undermining his own point; 
rather he proposes an interpretation while allowing the 
possibility that special knowledge (the existence of which 
is hinted at by Ian)may undermine it. Frank depicts 
his point as correct but not infallibly so. 
The structure of Frankts interpretation is complicated. 
Apa rt from it5being framed by an R/A device it involves a 
hierachy of readings. Thus Frank reads Carol' as reading 
Ian 1 as reading 'what's going on' as being an interaction 
of such and such a type. One way to look at this would be 
as a 'four layered readingt (figure 2). Yet the 'bottom' 
three layers of talk are all formulated in Frank's own dis- 
course and each of them is accessible (at least partially) 
independently of the higher layers. Thus a more accurate 
scheme for understanding his interpretation would be figure 
3. Frank sees Ian's' reading (B, figure 3) as constituting 
a Id. escriptiont (11); and he sees Carol' as taking Ian' 
to be interpreting the interaction in this way (Aq figure 
3), and as 'reacting' against it (11). Thus Carol 
1 is 
depicted as treacting' to Ian's 
1 
claim to be correctly 
describing what is happening. Furthermores Frank suggestsq 
other people join in to agree with Carol 
I. And when Ian 
(20) asks Frank to say all that again Frank strengthens his 
account from saying that (unspecified) tother people' con- 
test Ian's' claim to saying there is a tgeneral reaction' 
against it by a collective of people which includes Carol 
1 
(22-24). 
Throughout Frank's two speeches (9-16,22-24) he gives 
no-. clear indication of whether the statements 'reacting to' 
and 'general reaction against' should be read as 'disagreeing 
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with' - with the implication that Carol 
1 
and others think 
it is not the case that such and such - or as 'disliking' 
with the implication that Carol 
1 
and others think that it 
is the case that such and such. Frank! s account makes no 
fully articulated and explicit commitment with respect to 
the exact interpretation that Carol' and others make of 
Ian's' descriptionsp although he is more definitive with 
respect to their evaluation of Ian's 
I d6scription. 
It is now clear how Frank's point answers Neil's 
original question: 'why did Carol say 'but I don't like 
being rejected like that" (1). For Frank the rejection 
is constituted by Ian 
1 describing Carol's' behaviour in 
contingent terms as being a 'bid for leadership of the 
group' (11). Carol's 
1 
reaction is thus a 'natural' resp- 
onse to the pejorative overtones of Iants' account. 
Frank could perhaps be read as interpreting the inter- 
action in terms of a 'norm' that contingent accounts are 
inappropriate in this particular context and making the 
'reaction' intelligible in terms of the perceived contrad- 
iction of this norm. However, the 'reaction' cang I thinkt 
be better understood in terms of more specific contextual 
featuresto be taking Iants' point as an taccusation' that 
Carol's 11 behaviour displays her hidden motivation to become 
group leader. It is probably because of the danger of int- 
eractional problems such as these arising that accounts of 
this kind are rarely found in more formal contexts. More- 
overg the restriction of such accounts to informal sit- 
uations could explain why participants recurrently claim 
that what is 'really interestingt (for sociologists, and 
psychologists studying science) at conferences is talk 
over dinner, in the bar and so-on. It may well be that 
hereq in situations where the information flow can be care- 
fully managed (or appears so) that much informal accounting 
of this kind takes place. It is here that participants 
construct what they see 
, 
as the sociological and psycholog- 
ical versions of events. Because of the privacy of these 
contexts such accounts are less likely to provoke the kind 
of 'reaction' described by Frank. 
, Before continuing the analysis of extract 61 will 
briefly recap on what has been suggested so far. "I have 
noted that the participants make use of a distinction bet-. 
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ween knowledge of what went on derived directly from the 
text and forms of special knowledge such as memories of 
what went on. As yetq however# we have seen no clear ind- 
ication of such special knowledge used in practice. In 
additiong we have seen this difference formulated within 
the framework of an R/A deviceq where the reality of 'what 
went on' is contrasted with the (possibly) distinct appear- 
ance presented by the text. We have also seen the way 
readings can be formulated in hierachical structures of 
considerable complexity in the course of providing exp- 
lanatory accounts. 
Returning now to extract 7. we can see Mike's turns 
of talk (6; 17-19; 31-33 and particularly 38-40; 42-44) 
using the R/A device in the manner of Ian in extract 4. 
In this case Mike reformulates part of Frank's account of 
the interaction as the appearance to which he himself pro- 
vides a contrasting reality. The R/A device is used to 
reframe a previous turn of talk and undermine its claim to 
veridicality rather than to reformulate an account given 
by the present speaker, as we have seen in extracts 2 and 
4. As before the structure of Mike's discourse is comp- 
licated. 
In sentences 17 to 19 Mike interprets the transcribed 
interaction under discussion in contingent terms9 as Carol 
'losing'. What he sees her as losing, as is shown in line 
38, is the negotiation over the agenda. He describes the 
consequence of this loss as Carol' being unable to influ- 
ence the direction of the discussion in the next page and 
a half of text (19). However, in sentence 31 Mike appears 
to extend the concept of loss even further, to cover Carol 
1 
losing the bid for leadership. It is here that Mike makes 
use of the R/A device. 
In sentence 31 Mike reformulates the point made by 
Frank - in which he suggests that there is a general react- 
ion in the group against Ian's' description of what is 
going on as a bid for leadership. As I noted abovet Frank's 
discourse does not appear to be explicitly committed on 
the question of whether 
1 
people are disagreeing with the 
factual status of Ian's description. However, Mike int- 
erprets Frank's gloss*as definitely taking people to dis- 
Agree with the factual status of Ian's' account; he claims 
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that 'everybody is saying' that Carol 
1 is not attempting 
to gain leadership of the-group (as Ian 
1) 
suggests). Yet 
Mike frames this version of Frank's gloss, using the R/A 
device, as the appearance which he contrasts with what is 
actually happening. He contrasts what 'everybody' is 
saying (Carol 
1 is not making a bid for leadership) with 
their ? actual understanding' (Carol 
I is making a bid for 
leadership). 
Mike's use of the R/A'device is in, some ways similar 
to Frank's. He contrasts what is said with what is , 
really 
going on, just as Frank contrasts what can be derived from 
the text (the transcript of what is said) to what is act- 
ually happening in the interaction. Yet, while Frank prop- 
oses a disjunction between the text and the actual events 
which is potential only, Mike proposes that the two things 
are in fact different in this case. Mike goes on to elab- 
orate on this interpretation by providing an explicit 'trans- 
lation' of the hidden speech or subtext, just as we saw in 
extract 2 above. This translation takes the form of quot- 
ation. It is speech as if from the participantst perspect- 
ive, rather than the speaker's, although it is, of coursep 
15 
not actually said Mike describes the participants as 
wishing to acknowledge Carol's 
1 bid for leadership but not 
explicitly say that it is happening (31). Indeedt Mike 
uses the very unanimity of the participants' not saying 
that it is happening as grounds for his claim, that the par- 
ticipants are really acknowledging that it is happening (33). 
Additional implicit speech is. 'reported' which explains 
why there should be this conflict between what is said and 
what is being done. Mike suggests that there will be inter- 
actional difficulties raised by making this contingent ver- 
sion of events explicit. So, to avoid these problems9 there 
is only implicit acknowledgement of the contingent reality 
(32-33). What everybody is rejectingg according to Miket 
is not the realityg which is contingentg but the problems 
and distractions that acknowledging its existence would 
create. 
In effectj thent Mike's use of the R/A device cont- 
rasts a contingent version-of events which is really going 
on (Carol bidding for leadership of the group and - the 
same thing? - for control over the topics to be discussed; 
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but being prevented from achieving this goal) with an alt- 
ernative versiont apparent in the participants' talkq 
which contradicts this. Moreovert the very unanimity of 
the spoken version is used as grounds for warranting the 
correctness of the unspoken version. It might seem that 
here is a prime instance where the special knowledge held 
by participants at the original conference is used succes- 
fully to give an interpretation which 'goes beyondt-the 
restricted verbal record of events provided by the trans- 
cript. Yet there are certain indications which belie this 
suggestion that Mike is simply revealing the correct ver- 
sion which Frankq with his lack of first hand experiencet 
is unable to do. 
These indications are apparent in Mikets response to 
a point made by Richard (who also participated in the 
earlier conference). In sentence 36 Richard proposes a 
rather different explanation from Mike's for Carolts 
1 
statement about rejection (1). In this explanation Ore- 
jectiont comes not from an implicit accusation that Carol 
1 
is attempting to gain leadership over the group, but from 
the theoretical categories used to characterise the int- 
eraction. Characterising it in specifically role terms 
is described by Richard as undermining the personal asp- 
ects of the interaction. What is interesting in the pres- 
ent context is the way Miket instead of disagreeing with 
Richardq attempts to introduce features of Richard's acc- 
ount into his own* Accordingly in sentence 38, directly 
following Richard's contributiong Mike depicts the issue 
of the role characterisation as 'hiding' the agenda neg- 
otiation and the fact that Carol' lost it. Yet Mike then 
notes that being discussed in role terms also constitutes 
losing the agenda argument (39). He tries to assimilate 
Richard's explanation to his own whilst retaining the 
central features of each. And at this point he starts to 
downgrade the facticity of his own account. The interp- 
retation of an agenda negotiation 9 which has previously 
been confidently asserted is now hedged as a 'feeling' 
(43). Moreovert although he reiterates the claim that 
the role characterisation in some way leads to the loss of 
the argument (44)9 he this time claims that he cannot give 
an exact interpretation of this: 11 can't put my finger on 
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it' (44). Mike therefore moves from the internally con- 
sistent and confident 'factual' account of sentences 31-33, 
which reformulate Frank's claim using the R/A device, to 
the vaguer. hedged - arouhd intuitive I account of sentences 
42-44. 
Overallq then, through the course of this extract a 
number of differing accounts of what is 'going on' in a 
section of transcript are offered. The two accounts which 
I have concentrated on (Frank's and Mike's) both use an R/A 
device. In each case the talk itself is formulated as the 
appearance. For Frank this appearance corresponds to what 
is really going on (although he raises the possibility that 
it might not). For Mike the two do not correspond. Further- 
more, Mike explicitly formulates the interpretation given 
in the previous turn (Frank's) as the appearanceg rather 
than formulating this appearance entirely in his own dis- 
course. This difference mayq however, be only a matter of 
degree. For even where participants formulate appearances 
in their own discourse this may be intended to undermine 
other locally produced versions. 
With the previous two examples I went on to examine 
the section of transcript which is the topic of discussion. 
In this case the complexity is such that there is no space 
for such an examination here. I will simply reproduce the 
appropriate section of transcript so that the reader is 
free to examine questions of the relationship between dis- 
cussion and transcript and the 'basis' for the different 
readings produced by Frankq Mike an ,d 
Richard. 
7 Dennis. The group has a kind of understanding that 
you li-re going to have to kill the experiment if you 
opt out because evenif you opt out somehow you have 
done something that is part of the experiment# you 
know, that is you have said something about yourself* 
You knowl it is kind of like the question of freedoms 
and constrictions. 
[pause] 
I Ian. When You say the group has an understanding I am 
not sure that, he was saying that the reason- he didn. 1t 
want to do it was for purely personal reasonsp he didn't want to tighten; in other words a personal con- 
struct theory analysis of why you didn't do it. I 
would say that we have to say more than that. We 
have to look at the whole role structure of the group# the way it is begining to develop and the fact that 
that was a piece of process that went on which was 
bidding for leadership of the group and saying 'I am 
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going to structure the next half hour'. 
1 Carol . But I don't like beiýg rejected like that. 
And I have a personal/ [Dennid' cuts Carol off3 
1 Dennis We don't like... 
Mike'. [laughs]And I don't like role theory. [some 
laugF; ter] 
Ian 1. Yess well I don't want to use the word role but 
that was the one/ [Ian' is cut off. 3 
J several people talk at onceg laughtbr] 
Transcriptt 226) 
Discussion: Readingg Resources and Reality 
ýet me now examine some of the broader issues that 
arise out of these findings. In the course of the analysis 
I have discussed a number of ways in which participants 
characterise text. In particular I have examined the use 
of what I have termed the R/A device and the way particip- 
ants draw on the contingent and empiricist repertoires 
when describing discourse. 
participants have the option of treating any partic- 
ular section of discourse either as a kind of transparent 
medium which provides direct access to the actions of part- 
icipants or as a medium which can conceal these actions. 
In the former case a speaker willsimply list or describe 
the acts which may be tseen' in the transcript. Extract 
number 1 is of this type. The speaker uses a number of 
act and action categories to describe what the transcript 
reveals is tgoing on' in the earlier workshop. The trans- 
cript is taken to document the shared group of acts of 
'using' (a hypothetical notion of a group)p 'thinking' 
(about this notion)t 'producing' (a more generalised the- 
ory of the application of Kellian ideas to group dynamics) 
and so on. Furthermoreq at a higher level of generality 
these actionsq taken together, are depicted as 'working' 
successfully. Such an account is not merely a reformulat- 
ion of what is said, it also starts to cbscribe what the 
saying is for, or what is done by what is said. Thus the 
utterances discussed in extract I are taken by the speaker 
to be doing certain sorts of theory development, In addit- 
ion 9 the speaker indicates that his interpretation is based 
on a readingof the text (as opposed to memory, for example) 
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and that it conflicts with an earlier interpretation. 
Nevertheless the relation between these actions and the 
text from which they are inferred is treated as unproblem- 
atic. 
An alternative way in which participants treat the 
discourse is to see it as concealing those actions which do 
occur. In this case the text will appear to embody certain 
actions; yet these axe. not the actual actions of particip- 
ants. It is this form of accounting that I have described 
by the term R/A device. Such accounts appear in extracts 
29 4 and 6. In these cases two versions of the actions 
embodied in the text are proposed. One of these is dep- 
icted as obvious to the reader or as the version which would 
be arrived at by taking the text at face value. The other 
version is depicted as concealed by this obvious version, 
as implicit, yet not apparent, in the text. Extract 2 
shows how this works. The speaker characterises a section 
of transcript as appearing to embody a statement about the 
ideal form of group predicted on theoretical grounds. 
Howeverl the speaker goes on to say that the 'text actually 
embodies criticism of the behaviour of other members of the 
group. This device thus suggests superior knowledge or 
skills on the part of its user. For it implies that the 
user is able to penetrate the appearance to reveal what 
actions are ýctually occurring. 
Clearly such a device presupposes two readers: the 
speaker and some notional or implied reader. In the dif- 
ferent instances of use of the R/A device above various 
notional readers are suggested. For instancel in extracts 
2 and 4 the notional reader who recovers only apparent 
actions is equated with a generalised reader who is with- 
out special knowledge and reads the text innocently, We 
might compare this to Dorothy Smith's initial reading of 16 the account of K's illness In this reading the a: count be, 
is taken toAactually what it appears (to a naive reader, to 
Doroth Smith at first) to say. In extracts 4 and 7 on the 
other handq although the idea of a generalised notional 
reader is not abandoned a specific reader of the text is 
also introduced. Thus in extract 4 Ianýcharacterises 
Richard's 1 readings as only recovering what the text 
appears-to say (only those actions which the text appears 
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to embody) not what it actually says (the actions it act- 
ually embodies). Yet Ian describes Richard'sl misreading 
as only to be expected because of the organisation of the 
discourse and the limits to people's reading skills. He 
thus implies that Richard's 
1 
reading is equivalent to that 
of a generalised reader; it is not therefore a reading 
promoted by any specific interests that RicKardl might 
have. Similarly, in extract 69 Frank's specific reading 
is undermined although it is acknowledged to be c. ongruent 
with how the text would appear to any reader without special 
knowledge 17 . 
What is the role of the R/A device in scientific dis- 
course7 Clearly it is used in the construction and rej- 
ection of versions of events. Howeverg it is specifically 
suited to certain tasks, for instance those in which the 
speaker is dealing with a version of events which is taken 
as obvious or natural. In such cases simply disagreeing 
with the versiong or simply producing a competing versiong 
might well be ineffective. For it would not deal with the 
question of the alternative's obviousness. At best such 
an approach would succeed in producing a viable competitor. 
Howeverg the R/A device works by undermining one version 
in tandem with the production of an alternative. Moreover, 
it addresses the issue of the obviousness of the competing 
account. Instead of trying to contradict this obviousnessf 
it is accepted. Howevert the R/A deviceg in its formulation 
of a reality which lies 'behind' appearances, distinguishes 
obviousness from correctness. Indeed, it specifically form- 
ulates obviousness as equivalent to incorrectness 
le 
0 
A second interactionally important feature of the R/A 
device is that users may formulate their own versions of 
the position which is to be rejected. This allows them to 
'prepare' the position for rejection by emphasising those 
features which will be used as grounds for rejection or 
which might support certain appe&rances but not actual 
events and ignoring or downplaying others. For instancet 
in extract 6 Mike uses the R/A device to display an earlier 
speaker's version as only an appearance. Mike formulates 
the basis for the version he is criticising as lying in 
what the participants are saying. But he implies that if 
readers 'look beyond' what is said a different, real ver- 
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sion will bL-come clear. It is only by formulating the 
rejected version in this way that Mike can sustain the 
credibility of the rejection. If9 for exampleg the ear- 
lier version was characterised as derived from, sayg the 
'whole context' Mike's replacement versions would become 
merely one possible competitor not the the now tobvious' 
successor. 
A third important feature of the R/A- device is the 
flexibility in accounting which it facilitates. In the 
examples analysed above there are typically important dif- 
ferences between the two versions formulated, For inst- 
ancev one will be contingent and the other empiricist (as 
I will discuss in a moment) or, as in extract 6, a 
unanimous verbal rejection is taken as hiding a unanimous 
acceptance. The actual degree of flexibility will, of 
course, be a practical issue which will depend on each 
specific context of use. Howeverl it does seem that the 
R/A device is suitable for dealing with highly disjunctive 
versions. 
Such accounting will notp bf courseq necessarily be 
successful; other participants will not always be convinced 
of the reality implied- by the R/A device. Indeed, in 
the examples discussed, instances where participants' prod- 
uce competing versions subsequent to the use of the device 
can be found. For exampleg Richard does so after Mike's 
use of the device in extract 6. Further work would be 
necessary to show in exactly what contexts the device 
could be used most effectively. Howeverg its use does 
seem to be one practical, if not omnipotentg solution to 
certain interactional problems. 
In addition, the device provides one way in which the 
problem of competing versions can be resolved in practice. 
For instead of discussion and dispu-te amassing increasingly 
large numbers of competing versions of events9 versions are 
continually rejected as being of appearances only. The 
notion of a real version which may or may not lie behind 
appearances is continually reinforced by the use of the R/A 
device. It thus maintains the idea of a definitive truth 
while explaining away the existence of a multitude of incon- 
19 
sistent versions-of it 
I will now return to the issue with which I introduced 
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this chapterp namely the issue of resources being used to 
construct definitive versions of actions embodied in texts. 
As we saw# Barthes has suggested that readers and critics 
draw on particular kinds of resources when producing 
readings of literary texts. These resources might be 
typically the 'intentions of the author', the 'ideology 
behind the text' or the 'nature of the world' which the 
text is seen as a representation of. While in no way 
wishing to exclude the possibility that these resources 
have important functions in the interpretation of scient- 
ific discourse (clearly the latter two have been much util- 
ised by sociologists and philosophersq respectively)9 in 
the analysis above I have concentrated on the use of two 
specific resources: the contingent and empiricist reper- 
toires. 
In what way can these repertoires be seen as resouces 
in the sense outlined by Barthes? As I have notedt when 
dealing with the pre-circulated transcript the particip- 
ants generally take it to be a document of specific acts 
and actions. Giving a reading of the transcript therefore 
involves providing an interpretation of what acts and 
actions are performed by or through what is said. Fre- 
quently such interpretations involve specifications of 
acts using the contingerit and empiricist repertoires. For 
examplet talk might be interpreted in empiricist terms 
as a development of theory (extract 1) or in contingent 
terms as an interpersonal criticism couched in 'the lang- 
uage of theoretical commentary (extract 2). Thus in the 
same way that Barthes sees the use of a resource such as 
the notion of ideology as enabling and legitimating a 
specific reading of a text, the participants draw upon 
the interpretative repertoires to give definitive readings 
of the transcript and close off alternative readings. 
Perhaps a more precise analogy would be with the more 
specific cultural codes which Barthes discusses in S/Z. 
Each of these codes consists of an organised corpus of 
background knowledge aboutp for instancel character and 
personality. It is through the use of these codes that 
the reader makes sense of the text. Indeed, the text can- 
not be properly considered to have a meaning outside of 
these constructive acts of sense making. The empiricist 
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and contingent repertoires could similarly be considered 
to be codes or semiotic systems for making sense of trans- 
cribed discussion and other forms of scientific discourse. 
It is these codes which allow the reader to construct 
actions (such as 'using a specific notionf - extract 1) 
and complete acts (such as 'producing a better theory' - 
extract 1) from discourse. Although'at times participants 
appear to treat this move as natural and unproblematicq 
the frequent production of competing readings as I-have 
20 documented above exposes its interpretative nature 
The possibility of competing readings and the problem- 
atic nature of the relation between discourse and actions 
becomes particularly clear where the R/A device is used 
with empiricist and contingent as the contrasted categ- 
ories. In these cases participants characterise what is 
really going on in, say, contingent terms, and contrast 
what appears to be going on in empiricist terms. The 
two repertoires are thus treated as incompatible alter- 
natives for making sense of the transcribed discourse. 
One repertoire is treated as providing one single reading 
of the reality which underlies the text and the other as 
only providing a mistaken version which captures how the 
text appears but not what it really says. The particip- 
ants treat the transcript as embodying a single set of 
actions, which it is the task of reading to reveal. 
Exactly what actions are embodied is a practical problem 
about which there may be some disagreement. Neverthelessp 
itiz assumed that given time or special knowledge it 
will be possible to produce such a single correct version. 
This tendency to treat actions as having one partic- 
ular meaning - as being bids for leadership but not theory 
developmentp or intellectual discussion but not personal 
criticism - could be part of the reason why in a number of 
cases a distinction is made between the transcript and 
the actions of the participants (see extracts 1,2t 6). 
For a distinction of this kind can deal with the potential 
conflict between the notion that there is a single correct 
reading of the text and the fact that there is argument 
over the transcripýs various interpretations and that par- 
ticipants may find it enigmatic. If the relations between 
text and action were natural and transparent this would 
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imply that there ought to be little disagreement over 
what the participants are doing on *any particular occasion 
being discussed. Moreoverg the transcript would be a 
straightforward record of the participants' actions which 
would not therefore need interpretative work to recover 
them. Without such a clear distinction between the. dis- 
course and participants' actions these disagreements and 
ambiguities would suggest that the same discourse could 
be performing a variety of different actions and perhaps 
not clearly any one single action. This would therefore 
undermine the assumption that only a single, unitary set 
of actions is being performed at any one time. However, 
by stressing the fallibility of the transcript this assum- 
ption "n be maintained in the face of the practical dif- 
ficulties encountered while reading. t 
I want now to move from these specific conclusions 
and outline how the above study might throw light on a gen- 
eral analytic problem which has been raised by Steven 
21 Yearley This concerns the status of analysts' readings 
of scientific and other texts. Briefly stated, the prob- 
lem concerns the potential of texts to affect readers: 
for instanceg if a text embodies certain texternalising 
devicestg as Woolgar claims of accounts of discovery 
22 
9 
should these be seen as routinely effective in influencing 
the reader's perception of discovery? Yearley suggests 
that the problem of much work on the organisation and funct- 
ion of texts is that it is not sufficiently empiricalg in 
the sense that it does not pay enough attention to the way 
that texts are generally read. Instead analysts have 
tended to concentrate on the construction of texts and have 
presupposed that this will affect the reader. 
Now it is, I think, true that the question of how 
texts have been read by scientists has been a somewhat 
neglected topic and Yearley is right that studies addressing 
the problem of the effectiveoe-GSof texts ought to be carried 
out. Howeverp I wish to suggest a slightly different 
approach to the studies of Smithq Woolgar and Barthes to 
the one given by Yearley. He suggests that Smith's and 
Uoolgar's studies of discourse are empirical in.. the sense 
that they draw upon their own responses as readers as a 
basis for analysis, Howevert although their own responses 
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are implied they are not crucial for their analysis as long 
as we are careful to treat them as deconstructive studies 
of texts and not of readers' experience, These studies 
are not concerned with the phenomenology of reading, in 
the sense of whether the authors were persuaded of the 
reality of Kýs illness or the 'out-there-ness' of discov- 
ery, but with the organisation of discourse concerning these 
things. It is true that Smith claims that she was initially 
persuaded, and that someof the -interest and significance 
of her study is derived from this, but the actual analysis 
is concerned with peculiarities in the discursive organis- 
ation in an account of mental illness. Smith's procedure 
is to reveal the descriptive contingency of the text by 
showing that it cannot be taken as a coherentp unitary 
account of action, but should be seen as a more fragmentaryg 
heterogeneous account which 9 although lauthorisingt one 
version by the use of a number of textual devicesp is 
nevertheless open to alterna6ive readings. Likewiset 
Woolgar is concerned to display the way certain sorts of 
sequential constructions using a quasi-passive voice imply 
that new discoveries force themselves into the scientist's 
world; that they are come across, as it wereq like drift- 
wood on a beach. He does not talk of his experience 
, 
but 
gives a detailed analysis of certain textual constructions. 
Yearley is right that Woolgar and Smith do trade 
on -certain implicit phenomenological assumptions. Yet 
these 
can be excised without the studies losing their interest. 
It is important to distinguish rigorous, analysis of text- 
ual organisation and speculation about the effectiveness 
of texts. In each of these studies it is legitimate to 
ask: do readers of the illness account take K to be ment- 
ally ill? did hearers of Hewish's Nobel Lecture register 
the 'out-there-ness' of Pulsars? Nevertheless Woolgar's 
and Smith's work does not become uninteresting because it 
does not answer these questions. They are not more fundam- 
ental than analyses of the organisation of the original 
texts, nor are they a prerequisite for such analysis. 
The reason it is not possible to treat one of these 
questions as the more basic is that it is no t possible to 
generate an absolute distinction between texts and readings. 
There is a considerable body of writing which suggests 
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that all texts9 not just those which explicitly pose as 
readings9 are inescapably para5itiC81 on previous texts. 
For instance, much of the force of S/T lies in its attack 
on the realist notion of writing which treats texts as 
'copies of the world' whose language gains its meaning 
through the process of denotation. Barthes'project is 
to show that such a view was untenable and that texts 
could only be made fully intelligible through referring 
to other signifying systems and in particular the 5 cult- 
ural codes. As Coward and Ellis put it, summarising this 
claim. 
Each text is suspended in the network of all others, 
from which it derives its intelligibility. Realism 
is 'a copy of a copy', supported by connotationo a 
'perspective of citations'. It is silent quotationg 
without inverted commas, with no precise source. (23) 
It is for this reason that many continental discourse 
analysts, including Barthesq Derridat and Kri5teva - who 
coined the notion - stress that tintertextualityl is a 
basic condition of writing and readingg and that it is 
quite misleading to think of texts as autonomous 
24, From 
this perspective readings share the feature of being rel- 
ated to previous texts; they merely make the relation more 
explicit. 
There is a second problem with the suggestion that a 
study of readings is necessary to be able to identify those 
features of the text which are effective in influencing 
readers. For this suggestion implies that readings are 
somehow transparent and straightforward In a way other 
texts are not. That is, it seems to take readingsaslit- 
eral reports of experiences rather than contextualised dis- 
cursive products like any other. It is clearl however, 
from the above analysis that discourse which poses as a 
reading of a text is subject to the same variability as 
other forms of discourse. This variability comes as no 
surprise, of course, as even such 'professional' readers 
as literary critics ceaselessly produce varied interpret- 
25 
ations of texts The basic problem is the same as with 
accountVother scientific activity: if different, but 
equally plausibleg versions are available how is the anal- 
yst to choose which one is the correct one? Or. in terms 
of reading5l which reading is the one which displays the 
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reader's genuine experience of the text? For examplep in 
extract 6 above at least three different readings of a 
section of transcript are proposed. Howq thent could we 
use these to legitimate the incisiveness of a particular 
analystJs reading? 
This problem can be made manageable, I suggest, by 
dropping the unhelpful distinction between texts and read- 
ings. I have talked of readings throughout this chapter 
for reasons of convention. Howeverg this, to Anglo-Saxon 
ears anywayq gives the misleading impression that what is 
being analysed is some subjective experience which accomp- 
anies scanning the text. In fact9 what I have been cal- 
ling readings are accounts of the meaning of a text made 
within a very specific social context. As such they are 
as open to anblysis, or not9 as any other accounts. Cer- 
tain incidental features, such as brevity perhaps, may 
make readings appear to be easier to handle in practice. 
Yet these should not delude us into thinking that readings 
have any special transparency nor that they are somehow 
representations of inner experience. There is no a priori 
reason for thinking that the forms of sense making deployed 
in the discourse identified as 'readings' in this chapter 
will be very different from the kinds of discursive pract- 
ices discussed in earlier chapters. At least at firstj 
thereforeq analysts should approach each form of discourse 
in the same way, attempting to expose their arganisation 
and the varied means through which each constructs the 
social and natural world. 
The next stage in the study of readingt then, - and 
here I am concurring with Yearley's conclusions26 _ should 
be to examine the organisation of readings in more detail. 
In the analysis above I have been concerned only with the 
structure of a particular kind of reading which uses the 
R/A device, and with showing some of the different ways in 
which it functions. What is needed is an examination which 
starts to show in what contexts these readings are used 
and what is achieved by their use. For example, it would 
be important to know in exactly what contexts participants 
may draw upon the R/A device and in what situations its 
use is effective. From this perspective reading becomes 
similar to other topics analysed in this thesis and else- 
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where. The analytic goal is to document the variability 
and then start to make it intelligible according to the 
contingencies of particular interpretative situations. 
This approach would not make the problem of the effectivýýMG 
of texts disappear. But in lieu of a more adequate con- 
ceptualisation it transforms the question of reading into 
a manageable one which can be encompassed using the anal- 
ytic procedures outlined in this thesis. The analysis 
of this chapter provides one example of this approach in 
practice; Yearley's studies of the reading of geological 
texts provides another27. 
In addition to these general suggestions, it is imp- 
ortant that further studies transcend some of the limit- 
ations inherent in the present analysis. It is important 
to supplement the above findings, which are from an unusual 
and artifically constrained situationg with analyses of 
readings occurring in more natural contexts. Furthermorep 
I have only examined a very small number of readings which 
use the R/A device; although I have documented the use of 
a similar accounting technique in chapter seven. It may 
be also that Personal Construct Psychologists are an unus- 
ual group of scientists in that they give considerable 
emphasis in their writings to personal and reflexive con- 
cerns. Howeverg this feature also makes them a partic- 
ularly interesting group for studyp because they have to 
face, in an unusually explicit formg problems of integ- 
rating what would traditionally be thought of as cognitive 
and social concerns. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SPEAKING AND WRITING SCIENCE 
In this final chapter I want to move away from the 
discussion of specific analytic and theoretical issues 
which has occupied the l. ast five chapters and return to 
more general questions concerning current and future dev- 
elopments in the study of scientific discourse. This 
will initially involve an examination of the way the not- 
ions of 'interpretative repertoire' and 'social contextt 
are developed in this thesis and the way the findings of 
this research mesh with other work using these notions. 
Following that I will discuss the detailed interpretative 
procedures which have been documented here and comment 
on how their study could be fruitfully developed in the 
future. Finally I will address some of the critical 
points which have been directed at the programme of dis- 
course analysis by sociologists of science and describe 
some of their shortcomings. 
Repertoires and Contexts 
The analytical chapters of this thesis provide further 
documentation of features of scientific discourse which 
have been explored by other researchers in other scientific 
specialties. In particular they give further evidence of 
the generality and pervasiveness of the contingent and emp- 
iricist repertoires in the accounting for scientific act- 
ivity and belief. As should now be familiar, the empiric- 
ist repertoire treats scientific knowledge as dependent on 
the experimental disclosure of facts through the use of 
standardised techniques coupled with the application of 
impersonal rules and criteria. Except where personal and 
social factors interfereytheoretical interpretation is 
taken to be derived unproblematically from the facts. In 
contrastj the contingent repertoire allows that a variety 
of personal and social factors influence both the prod- 
uction of scientific facts and their theoretical interp- 
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retation. Intuitive and craft skills are seen as essent- 
ial to research, whilst rules and procedures are not taken 
to be binding in themselves. 
The use of these contrasting accounting systems is 
described in chapter 59 in which the analysis showed that 
the role of criteria or values in theory choice could be 
characterised in radically different ways. On the one hand, 
they were depicted as impersonal constraints which deter- 
mined acts of theory choice and thereby belief in specific 
theories. In this view criteria are outside the sphere 
of scientists' social control and can be unproblematically 
applied to different scientific theories. Converselyq they 
were depicted as dependent on further interpretative work 
for their application and thus open to strategic and self- 
serving manipulation. In each case selections from the 
empiricist and contingent repertoires are used to give a 
strongly contrasting account of the operation of criteria. 
The analysis in chapter 7 showed a similar bifurcation 
of accounting possibilities. In this case the participants 
were characterising actions 'performed at a conference ses- 
sion by way of a verbatim transcript of the session. While 
in some instances the transcript was taken as a document 
of rational discussion and clarification of theoretical 
issues, along with evaluations of the explanatory adequacy 
of theories; in others the same sections of transcript 
were taken to reveal social conflicts and psychological 
processes specific to the participants. The interest of 
this second example is that it shows how empiricist and 
contingent repertoires can be used at the level of detailed 
description of discourse. Clearly such processes are pre- 
Supposed at some level by all the studies which have des- 
cribed the operation of these repertoires. For scientists' 
understandings of each others actions and beliefs are inev- 
itably discursively mediated. Yet because scientists con- 
struct their accounts as if they were direct and privileged 
descriptions of the actions and beliefs of other scientistst 
making little reference to specific texts and talk, these 
studies do not explicate the procedures used specifically 
for characterising discourse. 
In chapters 3 and 41 dealt with the topic of the 
application of science. Although up to now studies of 
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the contingent and empiricist repertoires have concent- 
rated mainly on accounts of theoretical belief and its 
relation to research practicesq there are strong similar- 
ities between the pattern of accounting in these areas 
and with respect to the practical utilisation of knowledge. 
Here one perspective depicts successful practice as straight- 
forwardly based on correct theories# and assumes a gener- 
ally strong relationship between knowledge and utility. 
Practical application is here taken to validate scientific 
knowledge. From the other perspective, the relation bet- 
ween science and utility is treated as circumspect and 
often erratic; non-scientific expertise is seen as nec- 
essary to make theories useful and the process of applic- 
ation is taken to be open to a variety of social contin- 
gencies. The two versions of the connection between know- 
ledge and utility appear very similar to the contrasting 
ways in which the relationship between data and theory is 
characterised. While at its extreme the contingent account 
of scientific knowledge treats it as totally unconstrained 
by experimental findings, the strongest contingent versions 
of application treat science and utilisation as two totally 
unrelated and unconnected activities. It seemsp thereforeg 
that the empiricist and Contingent repertoires might be 
usefully extended so that they cover the situation of know- 
ledge utilisation as well as the purely scientific realm. 
The participants appear to use the same resources for each. 
Another similarity between the different forms of 
utility accounting and the contingent and empiricist rep- 
ertoires is the way that they are organised across dif- 
ferent forms of scientific discourse. The formal research 
literature examined draws almost exclusively on the stand- 
ard empiricist account of application. In the two analyses 
of informal disco6rse described in chapters 3 and 4 the 
style of accounting is differentj both from the formal lit- 
erature and from each other. In the interview with the 
social skills trainer discussed in chapter 3 the standard 
utility account is used, most commonly in general glosses 
on the nature of application. Howeverg at other places in 
the interview it is readily abandoned in favour of more 
contingent accounts which stress the problematic nature 
of the science-utility relationship. In the conference 
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transcript discussed in chapter 4 the standard account is 
maintained as primary throughout the interchanges analysed. 
In this case, howeverg the participants engaged in supplem- 
entary interpretations of their scientific actions in resp- 
onse to questions from others at the conference. Although 
these reinterpretations were made coherent with the stand- 
ard accountq they differed in important respects from the 
versions given at earlier stages in the proceedings and in 
the published papers. 
In generalt this is in line with the observations of 
Gilbert and Mulkay that empiricist accounts predominate in 
the formal literature while they are mixed with contingent 
accounts in less formal situations 
1. One question which 
arises9 however, is why should the interviewee in chapter 
3 readily abandon the standard account while the particip- 
ants in chapter 4 attempt5to maintain its primacy. A sat- 
isfactory answer to this must wait further research. -Never- 
theless, two possibilities suggest themselves. One is that 
the social skills trainer, as someone primarily concerned 
with practice and not, at the time of interviewingg cond- 
ucting any theoretical research had no strong reason for 
depicting his research as completely dependent on theory. 
The contingerit version of utility displayed the paramount 
contributions of the practitioner in interpreting and. 
modifying theory and responding to practical circumstances. 
The conference participants9 in contrastj were primarily 
engaged in researchg seeing application as a job for others. 
Thus to display their research's importance and show the 
need for the theoretical niceties of each study, the 
standard accourit is drawn upon. This emphasises the essen- 
tial role of the specific research findings while down- 
grading the contributions of the user. It also glosses 
over the question of exactly how the research is utilised. 
A second possibility is that the adversorialg semi-public 
situation of the conference led to a heavier stress on 
maintaining the general applied characterisation of the 
formal presentations and papersl even if this was at the 
expense of inconsistencies of other kinds. 
In chapter 5j alsog the pattern Of Contingent and 
empiricist accounting for the operation of criteria in 
theory choice parallels Mulkay and Gilbert's findings. 
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In this case only conference discourse was examined with 
the formal papers excluded from study. The pattern of 
contingent and empiricist accounting is here very similar 
to that identified in accounting for error2 . The psych- 
ologists used the empiricist repertoire to characterise 
their own theory choices as clearcut and constrained by 
criteria while treating those of their opponents as soc- 
ially contingent. This lst person/3rd person asymmetry 
corresponds to the correct/incorrect asymmetry found in 
error accounting. For the psychologists treat their own 
theoretical views as correct and those of competitors as 
incorrect. They use empiricist accounts of criteria for 
dealing with 'correct' belief and contingent accounts for 
dealing with 'false' belief. 
Taken togetherg then, the studies reported in this 
thesis provide further evidence for the existence of the 
two broad accounting repertoires and for their differential 
occurrence across varying contexts of discourse. It should 
be remembered that the number of instances which have been 
examined here is small and this should lead us to general- 
ise only with caution. However, the fact that the same 
repertoi-resp organised in the same fashiong can be docum- 
ented in a different specialty, using discourse drawn 
from different social contextsq concerned with different 
topics, suggests that these discursive phenomena may be 
recurrent in science. 
At this point it is worth making a few comments about 
the notion of social context. One interpretation. of the 
findings I have just discussed would say that the nature 
of scientific accounts is dependent on the nature of the 
social context, with the implication that the context det- 
ermines the kind of discourse that is admissable. This 
sort of interpretation of the goal of analysis of scient- 
ific discourse has recently been made by Gieryn3, More- 
over, he suggests that because the context and discourse 
are distinctl and the notion of context is used as an 
analytic resource, analysts must draw upon extra-discursive 
information concerning scientists' actions and beliefs to 
construct their analysis4 0 
Gieryn's point would be a good one if context and 
discourse were actually distinct in this way. However, 
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rather than conceptualising contexts as some sort of extra- 
discursive frame they are better seen as a way of charact- 
erising the systematic organisation of accounting. This 
means that context and discourse are not distinct entities; 
rather to refer to different contexts is to refer to system- 
atic differences between forms of accounting. As Gilbert 
and Mulkay put it: 
It is not that different forms of discourse literally 
occur in or are determined by different social con- 
texts. Ratherg different social contexts are con- 
stituted throuqh participants' selective employment 
if linguistic registers. (5) 
Thus scientists draw differentially on the interpret- 
ative repertoires when they are giving accounts approp- 
riate to specific contexts of discourse, and when they do 
so they help to reproduce the systematic features of those 
contexts. This kind of perspective on language usgage is 
elaborated helpfully by Halliday, particularly in his the- 
ory of 'register', although on occasion he formulates a 
6 
more causal version of context dependence .* 
While on this topic itis worth examining another. pot- 
ential criticism of this approach. As I have noted earlierp 
Gilbert and Mulkay have characterised the contingent and 
empiricist repertoires as two separate linguistic registers 
which differ in stylistic and grammatical terms as well 
7 
as lexical Coulthard has suggestedg in relation to 
earlier work using the notion of register 
89 that regist- 
ers may simply be a circular way of noting change between 
topics. Thus, for exampleg he suggests that 'the language 
used in dressmaking patterns is the register of dress- 
making and the register of dressmaking is that used in 
dressmaking patterns' giving an entirely vicious circle 
Howeverg evenif this criticism is applicable to some of 
Halliday's own formulations it cannot be sustained against 
the categorisation of scientific discourse into reper- 
toires. To start withq there is no simple identification 
of 'science' with a particular registerg classifying the 
language of scientists as the register of scientists 
10. 
Indeed, the identification of contingent and empiricist 
repertoires cuts right across such a simple-minded equat- 
ion and is based on a detailed descriptive study of the 
way discourse is used in science. Secondly9 there are 
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instances where the difference between registers becomes 
a practical problem for participants rather than a solely 
analytic construction. Such situations occasion specific 
forms of accounting. For example Gilbert and Mulkay show 
that at certain junctures in interviews with scientists 
the empiricist and contingent repertoire may be employed 
together. At such times participants display evidence 
of interpretative difficulties and typically use a device 
which reconciles potential contradictions by stressing the 
long term paramountcy of empirical findings: the ttruth 
will out devicet Phenomena of this kind would not be 
expected if registers were merely a circular, unheuristic 
redescription as Coulthard suggests. 
Interpretative Procedures 
Although one strand of this thesis has been concerned 
with documenting the way participants draw upon interpret- 
ative repertoires for characterising their own and others' 
actions and beliefsq another strand has been concerned to 
examine their more detailed interpretative practices. So 
far research on scientific discourse has tended to conc- 
entrate on describing the variable accounts which scient- 
ists produce rather than looking at the means through which 
that variability is achieved; although studies of this kind 
have begun to appear 
12 
01 
Heritage 13 has suggested that flexibility is a char- 
acteristic feature of all natural language uset but it 
appears particularly evident when actions and beliefs are 
characterised in terms of general accounting repertoires 
or broad interpretative schemes such as the standard util- 
ity acccount. If we take chapter 49 for instance, the 
variability there cannot be understood solely by refer- 
ence to the general context of 'conference discourse' 0 
It is, however, possible to make sense of this variability 
by making reference to the specific interpretative contexts 
in which the different accounts are produced. Thus although 
the general form of the standard utility account is main- 
tained throughout the conference discussions analysedq 
perhaps because of its general legitimatory potential or 
because it meshes with the applied theme of the confer- 
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enceg the specific characterisations of the account are 
modified. For instance, if research is characterised as 
applicable because of its theoretical development, and 
then theoretical aspects of the research are undermined 
in discussions its applied potential can be reasserted 
through characterising its empirical findings as utilis- 
able. The initial formulation of the standard utility 
account becomes untenable through questioning and is 
replaced by a new version which is modified to accomodate 
to the points of the questioner. In this instance the 
specific interpretative context is an achievement of the 
conference participants (although, of course, they are 
drawing upon conventional resources to carry it off). 
This process must be characterised with care. The 
aim is no more to suggest that the specific interpretative 
context acts as a causal constraint than it was for the 
general social context. Nevertheless, it is clearly an 
important consideration for the speaker. In the partic- 
ular example I have been discussing (see pages 128-134) 
the speaker tried on a number of occasions to dispute the 
adequacy of a critic's version of his work.. It is only 
when this produced no removal or modification of the crit- 
icisms that the speaker gave his alternative characteris- 
ation of his work's applicability. In generals as the dis- 
cussion proceeds moment by moment 9 participants are both 
producingg reproducing and responding to the interpretative 
context. No one is in 'intentional controls of the con- 
text; yet neither does it have a determinate influence an 
their discursive products. 
In this example it seems likely that the variation in 
accounts could be sustained without becoming a topic of 
note for the participants themselves because of the temp- 
oral separation of versions combined with their lack of 
opportunity to expose discourse to systematic analytic 
scrutiny. However, it is possible to identify procedures 
of accounting which deal more actively with the possibility 
of inconsistency between versions and facilitate the flex- 
ibility needed to successfully mesh discourse with changing 
interpretative contexts. One of these accounting proced- 
ures is progressive relexicalisation. This involves a 
sequential substitution of terms such that one description 
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or version is replaced by another through a series of int., - 
ermediate changes. The role of progressive substitutions 
appears to be to lessen the perceived contrast between alt- 
ernative versions. 
Only preliminary comments have been provided on rel- 
exicalisation in this thesis; however it appears that in 
the fast flow of conversation such procedures may be quite 
effective. For it is taxing the skills of participants to 
the limit to be able to explicitly formulate such gradual 
shifts in meaning as a topic for comment. It is interesting 
to note that the examples which Trew gives in his study 
of newspapers are from characterisations of events made 
14 in subsequent editions This change between texts Orob- 
ably reflects the special possibilities for rereading and 
the 'simultaneous presence' of written texts. Readers 
are unlikely to compare subsequent editionsg whereas such 
changes within a particular article might become a topic 
for comment. A fruitful future line of study may be to 
examine sequences of scientific texts in which a particular 
experiment or theory is described to see if equivalent. 
processes of relexicalisation take place. For instances 
the accounts given in an original experimental report 
could be compared with accounts given in general reviews 
and then textbook representations of the experiment. All 
this is notj of course, to suggest that there are not . 
modifications and conflicting versions within single texts. 
Indeed Yearley has clearly documented this phenomenons 
noting for example the contrast between versions in stret- 
ches of discussion and their formulations in summaries 
and introductions Howeverg relexicalisation in spoken 
discourse and between written texts is probably more - 
straightforward to accomplish and more rarely treated as 
a topic salient to the concerns of participants. 
A second interpretative procedure which promotes, 
flexibility in accounting is what I have termed the . 
Reality/Appearance device. In this case a shift between 
versions is accounted for by treating one as an appear- 
ance and the other as the reality. As I have noted in 
chapter 7, one version can be replaced by another some- 
times highly divergent version by means of this device. 
For instances a contingent account can be replaced by an 
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empiricist account or vice versa. Instead of smoothing 
over the transition between versionsp as is the case with 
relexicalisation, the R/A device explicitly formulates 
a sharp contrast between them. However, by formulating 
reality and appearance as alternative viewpoints 
16 the 
device provides an account for the contrast between ver- 
sions using the visual metaphor of 'distorted' appearances 
'hiding' the 'real situation'. 
This kind of accounting structure can be used with a 
prospective as well as a retrospective orientation. That 
isq it can be used to formulate future versions and under- 
mine them in advance. I have called this accounting pro- 
cedure 'preformulation' (see chapter 6). One of its cru- 
cial features is that it allows the speaker to formulate 
the criticised version in a way most suitable for its dis- 
posal and to create a sympathetic contrast with the ver- 
sion which is to replace it. What this procedure seems to 
achieveisan interpretative context in which it is very 
difficult to appropriately fit the preformulated version. 
For the production of such a version would be likely to 
involve not only replying to specific points of criticism 
but also accounting for the differences between the pre- 
formulated version of the speaker and the version produced 
in the reply. Preformulation generates a hostile environ- 
ment, as it were, to place certain subsequent versions. 
Clearly the work which has been done up to now hardly 
scratches the surface of the possibilities for studying 
the detail of scientists! accounting procedures. In part- 
icular, much of it has been concerned with the way sci- 
entists account for their social world, for instance in 
chapter 6 how they construct and modify versions of the 
categories of scientists within their discipline. Howevert 
it will be interesting in the future to examine in much 
more detail the accounts produced of particular research 
findings and of the detailed relation of these findings to 
theoretical interpretation. That is, it will be interest- 
ing to examine how particular formulations of data and 
theory are made out in terms of the empiricist repertoire. 
Furthermore, it seems likely that such an approach would 
benefit from a comparative study of realistic or 'factual' 
discourse whether it occurs in research reportsp newspapersp 
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novels or everyday conversations 
17 It may well be that 
modern work on trealism' in literary theory, because it 
has not been held back by concerns with the referential 
status of languageq can throw new light on scientists' 
procedures for making sense of the 'factual' world 
is 
0 
POsitivismt Vassdlage and ScotUsh Bluebells t 
In the final pages of this thesis I will respond-to 
some of the various criticisms that have been made of the 
programme of discourse analysis by researchers concerned 
with social processes in science. With the details of , 
the programme outlined and some specific examples of anal- 
ysis to draw on it is possible to properly address the 
central points of criticism. These are: that discourse 
analysis claims an unproblematic and uninterpreted data 
base and thereby poses as a form of positivism; that dis- 
course analystst classifications of and approach to accounts 
necessarily presupposes that they go beyond discourse and 
use participants' knowledge of various kinds; and that dis- 
course analysis on its own is not a sufficient approach to 
the social study of science. 
The question of the status of discursive data has , 
been raised by a number of commentators, Shapin 
19 
sug- 0 
gests that the claim that the discourse analysts tis no - 
longer required to go beyond the data 120 is highly sus-. 
pect. And Barnes, in a criticism of ethnomethodological 
approaches for features they share with discourse analysisq 
suggests that they should properly be thought of as an 
textreme form of positivism, 
21. Collins mirrors these 
points by suggesting that arguments for the necessity of 
analyses of discourse are dependent on the (mistaken) 
presupposition that discourse is a realm of 'pure data' 
22 
These characterisationsp however, do not do justice 
to the arguments which underpin the emphasis on discourse 
analysis as a fundamental approach. For the argument is 
not that discourse is somehow a realm of pure data - any 
such claim would indeed be very hard to sustain. Clearly 
when participants' discourse is being characterised in 
terms of different registers, as involving processes such 
as relexicalisationg or as using interpretative schemes 
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like the standard utility accountl it ýs being interpreted 
and ordered by the analyst. The sense4which the analyst 
is not going beyond the data is the limited one of not using 
discourse as iimply a medium for reaching the actions and 
beliefs of scientists. That isq the analyst is not using 
an account of I theory XI. say, or of the nexus of socio- 
economic factors that led to its rejection, as evidence , 
that the theory is as described and the socio-economic fact- 
ors are such. Of course, traditional social analysts will 
not treat every account in this way and would readily 
accept that a certain degree of selectivity must go on 
when generating 'an overall reconstruction of what went 
an' in any particular scientific episode23 Nevertheless, 
they do presuppose that Ihe construction of accounts of 
what went an is a manageable analytic problemt that by 
using processessuch as triangulation from a number of data 
sources and eliminating unreliable responses such accounts 
24 
can be achieved 
The argument against such a procedure is not an in 
principle one based an the fact that studies of this kind 
make inferences beyond the discourse. If discourse anal- 
ysts were simply formulating an a priori critique, more 
traditional researchers could justifiably berate them for 
a form of groundless methodological purism akin to posit- 
ivism. But this is not the crucial argument. Their crit- 
ical stance with respect to attempts to construct defin- 
itive social accounts is based on an appreciation of the 
variability which is a pervasive feature of participants' 
discourse. The argument is that the proliferation of dif- 
fering versions of scientific eventsp actions and beliefs 
in scientists' utterances and writing is such that dealing 




All this is not to deny that analysts are able to 
produce unitary characterisations of events in science. 
Like the scientists under study they have a variety of 
resources at their disposal for dealing with variability. 
However, as I argued in chapter 11 when they do so it 
tends to be by ironising large tracts of participants' dis- 
course while reifying others; or by selecting discourse 
from restricted social contexts in which only a subset of 
- 279 - 
scientists' possible interpretative formulations appear. 
The duggestion that analysts should concentrate, at least 
initially, on the organisation and production of scient- 
ists' discourse thus need not be seen as a critique of 'pos- 
itive theorising' 26 per se but rather a suggestion that 
while such theorising is grounded in inconsistent and 
unexplicated procedures for dealing with scientific dis- 
course it is unsatisfactory 
27 
. This approach does not pre- 
clude the possibility of positive theorising; it merely 
wishes to place it on' a firmer foundation. 
Apart from depending on inconsistent and unexplicated 
procedures for constructing definitive versions, when trad- 
itional work treats certain accounts as literal and certain 
as ironical it begins to suffer from a second probleM. For 
it moves away from the impartial stance often held as 
28 
essential for studying science By selectively drawing 
upon discourse of certain kinds generated within particular 
social contexts (only from formal papers, say, or only 
from informal interviews) sociologists risk their conclus- 
ions becoming dependent on the interpretative procedures 
29 
of scientists themselves 
To take an example from the present thesisg in chap- 
ter 51 described Kuhn's account of the role of values in 
the selection of scientific theories. Values are treated 
as an important constraint on choicep although not a det- 
ermin ant. In chapter IgI described Wynne's account of , 
the selection of the ether theory. As is clear from the 
way scientists' formal papers are characterisedl this - 
treats overt values as being largely irrelevant to the sel- 
ection process. Howeverg in chapter 59 1 showed that 
psychologists at a scientific conference characterise val- 
ues in both of these ways, selecting one when they desc- 
ribed the selectionof t4eir own (correct) theories and the 
other when they described the choice of their competitors' 
(false) theories. In Wynne's text accounts of both of 
these kinds are described - however, the lst person - 
accounts which treat values as central to choice are not 
taken to be literal statements of the way ether theorists 
chose their theory; while the 3rd personal accounts which 
describe the 6ther theory as not intelligible in terms of 
purely technical standards are incorporated as analytically 
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unproblematic. The data base for Kuhn's study is not made 
explicit, but from the particular instances he cites - 
Copernicus and heliocentricism, Priestly and oxygen - it 
seems that it is based on historians' reconstructions of 
the selection of 'progressive' theories which formulate a 
set of rational grounds for choice. In each case there is 
a homology between the technical perspective an theory 
choice and the type of discourse which is taken to be accept- 
able evidence; the difference between Kuhn and Wynne bec- 
omes intelligible in terms of the alternative contexts from 
which data are selected and ultimately the different inter- 
30 pretative practices which define the nature of the context 
Mackenzie3l has responded to a similar argument prop- 
osed by Woolgar 
32_by 
suggesting that just because some of 
the explanatory categories used by analysts and particip- 
ants are the same this does not mean that analysis will be 
flawed in any way or that the analysts' use cannot be kept 
separate from participants' use. He asks rhetorically: ý 
Ought the social historian delay any analysis bf 
nineteenth-century society in terms of class until 
the uses of the term 'class' by members of that soc- 
iety are fully understood? (33) 
Yet the shared use of particular terms is not the key 
issue; it is whether the explanatory work done by the term 
in the analysts' technical account can be distinguished - 
from the work done by the participants. In Mackenzielpý 
examplep if the historian's version is built up using - 
participants' accounts of class, or by using materials 
which were themselves constructed using the participants' 
conceptp then an understanding of the meaning of the term 
would indded be a precondition. Otherwise the status of 
the historical version will be undecidable. Moreover, the 
concept may be fitted to particular kinds of interpretative 
work in its original context - just as the categorisations 
thumanistt and 'mechanist' were shown to be in chapter 6. 
Adopting the concepts as unproblematic may thus incorpor- 
ate participants' interpretative work: the situation which 
Mulkay refers to as'vassalage. 
. 
In the light of this it is perhaps significant that 
those commentators from relativist, interest and normative 
approaches who have chosen to discuss the programme of dis- 
course analysis have treated its claims as methodological 
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stipulations abstracted from the analytic findings con- 
cerning variability. For by doing this their arguments 
appear most powerful. Howeverg it must be emphasised 
that the force of the methodological suggestions cannot 
be appreciated in isolation from a consideration of actual 
instances. In Yearley's terms, the response to naturalistic 
approaches in the sociology of science is basically anal- 
ytic and practical rather than derived from a critique of 
35 their conceptual coherence Nevertheless, given that 
the programme of discourse analysis is not attempting to 
infer actions and beliefs from discourse and thereby con- 
struct definitive versions 
36 
of events9 the question rem- 
ains of how discourse is interpreted. 
In one sense the response to this question is relat- 
ively straightforward. It is interpreted in the ways dis- 
played in the various studies of scientific discourse. 
This suggestion is not as empty it appears. For one of 
the features of these studies is, 'they attempt to make the 
process of interpretation as explicit as possible. Typic- 
ally this has involved presenting as much of the data as 
is manageable to the readerg and where selection does 
take place to make it as representative as possible of the 
variation in the materials studied. This is combined with 
a fine-grain approach which links interpretation to spec- 
ific parts or features of the discourse. These procedures 
contrast markedly with the textual practice common in other 
approaches37. as I have shown in chapter 1. They allow , 
other analysts the opportunity of assessing the veracity of 
particular interpretations and contesting them if they wish. 
Collins notes that the kinds of extracts from participants' 
discourse used in these studies are open to alternative int- 
38 
erpretations However, this possibility is nowhere den- 
39 ied What Collins, or any other criticl needs to do is 
demonstrate how an alternative interpretation can be sus- 
tained in practice and therefore how the kinds of variab- 
ility and interpretative procedures identified by discourse 
analysts do not undermine the status of the & own studies. 
That is, simply to claim that discourse analysis is an 
interpretative exercise is insufficient; if they are to 
rebut criticisms they must undermine the specific interp- 
retations which have been produced. 
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Given this point, what sorts of interpretations are 
produced by discourse analysts? One of Collins's claims 
is that a considerable amount of background knowledge is 
presupposed both of the nature of the English language and 
of details of the research specialty being studied 
40 
* 
Without this background knowledge and specific practical 
competencet it is arguedg it would be impossible to sep- 
arate renditions of the Bluebells of Scotland on a comb- 
and-paper from serious scientific contributions. That - 
is, the high quality accounts could not be sifted from the 
low quality. Whilst accepting that a certain amount of 
background knowledge of English is presupposed - after 
all the writing of the papers themselves would be dif- 
ficult without it - as well as some expectations about 
what is likely to be fruitful dataq there seems to be no 
reason to canonise this as analytically special. In 
other words, there is no reason why the researcher should 
not attempt to expose ideas as to what accounts are of 
high qualityl or who are scientists and who notg to anal- 
ytic scrutiny. Thus if contributors to conferences did 
indeed play the Bluebells of Scotland on cbmb-and-paper, 
and if respondents then asked questions - about the meth- 
odology, perhapsp or theoretical presuppositi6ns - then 
analysts would have to start treating it as an item of 
scientific interest. For instancep in chapter 5a number 
of extracts are presented in which participants' dispute 
over who is acting scientifically and who is not. There 
is no reason why the analysts should try to settle this 
question; indeed there are very good reasons for not attem- 
pting to do sog as it would hardly be compatible with an 
impartial stance. Neverthelesso the way participants are 
made out as scientists or not is an interesting topic for 
study. Moreover, as Gilbert and Mulkay note, distinguishing 
what data might be relevant to the study of science is 
quite different from producing an adequate analytic account 
of that data. Indeedq this critique itself trades an the 




A further question to do with the interpretation of 
discourse is of whether it is being treated as a form of 
action in itself, as a series of speech acts. This issue 
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is of particular complexityl and can only be touched upon 
here. Howeverg I think there are certain considerations 
which suggest that this, at least in its traditional form# 
is not an adequate way of viewing discourse analysis. 
This is not merely because defining speech acts involves 
a specification of a speaker's intention, which will be 
subject to the same methodological and practical diffic- 
ulties as are involved in giving definitive versions oft 
actions and beliefs lying 'beyond the text'. But such a 
specification would start to cut across the participants' 
procedures of reconceptualising and transforming the 
meaning and significance of events through time. 
Jaques Derrida makes this point rather well in a crit- 
ique of Austin-and Searlets speech act philosophy 
42. He 
emphasises the literabilityl of language in practicet that 
it continues to be meaningful in the absence of a specific 
speaker or determinate knowledge of the intentions 'lying 
behind it'. And he suggests that Searlets emphasis on 
conventions which ensure that discourse is interpreted 
successfullyq and on felicity conditions which must be sat- 
isfied in the performance of speech acts, presupposes that 
communication is generally successful. Searle's position 
becomes a moral theory, claims Derrida, which treats certain 
kinds of discourse -iýsincere andwauthentic speech acts - 
as parasitest which are dependent for their meaning on the 
sincere forms. Much of Derrida's critique is directed 
towards demonstrating that Iseriousq literall speech acts 
are as much dependent upon humorous or parasitical forms 
as vice versa. 
It is not easy to present a concise summary of 
Derrida's argument; for much of it depends on its style 
which continually parodies and disturbs the conventions 
he sees as underpinning Searle's writing. Howevext its 
general force is clear. Trying to assign a definitive 
action description to a specific section of discourse 
would be to freeze a continual process and formalise what 
is essentially practical; and to think of discourse as 
deriving its significance from an intention held by the 
individual speaker or writer is to uphold an idealised 
and unworkable conception of language. If Derrida is 
right - and here is obviously not the place for a thorough 
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evaluation - the idea of discourse analysis idehtifying 
speech acts (or their written equivalent43) is misplaced 
and would be to try and constrain practical language use 
into an unwarranted formalism. These issues are clearly 
very complex - but as the programme of discourse analysis 
develops it seems likely that they will come increasingly 
to the fore. 
Finally to the point that discourse analysis is not 
a sufficient approach to the study of science. This is 
made, in one way or anotherl by all the critics discussed 
above 
44. 
" Yet, as I hope is now clear, one of the signif- 
icant contributions of discourse analysis has been to 
reveal basic problems which underpin traditional approaches. 
Indeed, it has started to show how the conclusions of much 
of this work could be an unintended consequence of paying 
too little attention to the social generation of scientific 
discourse. To say that discourse analysis is not enough 
is to miss the point that traditional problems may well 
be insolu,, ble without it. Of course it may also show that 
some problems have to be totally reconceptualised and 
others are not coherent problems at all, but are perhaps 
confusions based on an over-literal approach to scient- 
45 istst interpretative formulations But that is in the 
nature of scientific progress: 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE: SOCIAL SKILLS TRAINING 
A) Introduction and entry into the field. 
How did the respondent (R) get into the area of social 
skills training (SST)? Was it through readingg friends, 
etc.? 
2. Who else in the country does this sort of thing? Names 
and institutions? 
3. How long has this field been going in clinical psych- 
ology? 
4. Does the R work with a team of clinicians or alone? 
8) The specific-practice of SST. 
1. How many patients does R normally treat in this way? 
2. How often does R see these patients? 
3. Get R to describe a normal session. How long does it 
take? Exactly what skills are taught? 
4. How far is this procedure modified to fit each indiv- 
idual patient? Or is it modified around particular 
problem issues? 
5. How much is construction, intuition and trial and error 
in each particular session? 
6. How are patients selected for SST? Are these ideal? 
7. How has R's practice been modified from its original 
form? Has this resulted in much improvement? 
8. How is the impact of SST on any particular patient eval- 
uated? 
The use of theories in SST 
1. What are the important theories used in SST? E. g. 
Argyle and Dean? 
2. Does R consider these to be good or bad theories? Are 
they theories at all? 
3. Does R consider himself to be applying these theories# 
even if only in some diffuse fashion? How exactly? 
4. What exactly is the relation between these theories and 
R's practice? 
- 285 - 
5. Have changes in theory - e. g. of NVC - affected R's 
practice. in any way? How exactly? 
6. Are there different approaches to SST? What dist- 
inguishes these approaches? Is it anything to do 
with different theoriEes? 
7. Might these different approaches relate to the 'back- 
ground assumptions' of the researcher, e. g. might, sayl 
a behavioural psychotherapy approach lead to certain 
interpretations of the function of SST? 
a. Are theories involved in the evaluation of the effic- 
acy of SST? 
Literature and communication. 
1. Who are the key figures in SST in this country? Abroad? 
2. Does R make distinctions between clinicians and theor- 
ists? 
3. Which of 1 are theorists? Could SST have got off the 
ground without their contribution? 
4. Does R contribute to the literature on SST? Does this 
contribution lead towards the more applied or more 
theoretical end of the spectrum? Try to get some ref- 
erences. 
5. What is the basic introductory literature to SST? 
6. What sorts of things does R read to keep abreast with 
new developments? 
7. Doep R have informal communication with others in the 
area to discuss new techniques etc.? What form does 
this communication take and with whom? 
General perspective on application 
1. How useful has SST been? 
2, Is SST considered to be an important part of what clin- 
ical psychologists do? 
3. Have the results and experienrce of SST had any input 
back into theories of NVC and skills? How exactly? 
4. Should the results of clinical practice have an import- 
ant role to play in'evaluating theory? 
5. Does R see there being ethical or political prob- 
lems with the application of social psychological 
theories in SST? 
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APPENDIX B 
THE SECOND FORMAL CAKE ACCOUNT 
-- -I f ollow Janet Hurst (1978) . and almost every other 
contributor to this volume, in classifying psychologists 
into two opposing campsq the humanists and the mechanists 
[I The differences between these two are very great at a 
theoreticalg even ideological level. Humanists tend towards 
'idealism': that is, they believe that the essence of know- 
ledge lies within the ideas which we have about the nature 
of the world. Mechanist5 tend towards 'realism': that is, 
they believe that the essence of knowledge is in the nature 
of the real world and that we possess knowledge only when 
our ideas match that reality. Humanists prefer Imentalist' 
and tholist' explanations. Mechanists prefer 'materialist' 
and treductionist' explanations. Humanists believe in1free 
will', mechanists deny its existence. Humanists place 
great relianct on 'introspective evidencelg while mechan- 
ists often adopt a dogmatic lbehaviourist' line. Human- 
ists are pre-occupied with human values and purposes. 
Mechanists spend their time investigating human limitat- 
ions and resources. 
I would not expect any single psychologist to meet all 
these defining characteristics of either mechanist or hum- 
anist psychology. Nevertheless these caricatured positions 
do correspond to the main ideological and theoretical div- 
isions among psychologists today, and these divisions are 
often very unsympathetic to each other. Humanists claimg 
with some justification, that mechanists provide only an 
impoverished account of human nature. This may be because 
they deliberately cut themselves off from the rich desc- 
riptions of human nature which are to be found in the wider 
humanist tradition in our culturel which is of course not 
all psychological. Mechanists claim, again with some just- 
ification, that humanists are careless in their attitudes 
to evidence. This may be a consequence of taking an ideal- 
ist view of the nature of knowledge. 
In what follows9 let me try to demonstrate that hum- 
anists and mechanists differ much less in Practice than they 
do in theory... 
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